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ABSTRACT 
 
Jamin Asay: Truthmaking, Truth, and Realism: New Work for a Theory of Truthmakers 
(Under the direction of Keith Simmons) 
 
Truthmaker theory begins with the idea that truth depends upon reality. When a truth-
bearer is true, that is because something or other in the world makes it true.  My dissertation 
offers a theory of truthmakers that shows how we should flesh out this thought while 
avoiding the contentious metaphysical commitments that are built into other truthmaker 
theories.  Because of these commitments, many philosophers have come to view truthmaker 
theory as being essentially tied to correspondence theories of truth, and to metaphysical 
realism.  I argue that, quite to the contrary, truthmaker theory is distinct from correspondence 
theory, and that the former actually undermines the motivation for the latter. In fact, 
truthmaker theory can be used to argue for a particular kind of deflationism about truth. I also 
argue that debates about realism and anti-realism are best viewed through the lens of 
truthmaker theory, which is not—contrary to what many have thought—an essentially realist 
approach to metaphysics. Anti-realists of various stripes can also make use of truthmakers.  
The anti-realism of such views depends upon either the nature of the truthmakers they use, or 
the nature of the truthmaking relation itself. 
 iv
 
For my first-year cohort: 
 
Adam Cureton, Felipe De Brigard, Katie Elliott, Emily Given, and Emily Kelahan 
 v
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
It’s customary to end one’s acknowledgments with the one to whom one owes the 
most thanks, to “save the best for last” (while acknowledging that he or she is “last but not 
least”). I don’t care about custom. My first and most important thanks for support on this 
project go to my partner Emily Matchar, who has been a source of constant encouragement 
and companionship from start to finish, across several years and several continents. The 
nature of our relationship has evolved while I’ve been writing this dissertation, but her 
support has been unwavering. If my prose were anywhere near as pleasurable to read as hers, 
these four hundred pages would be far more bearable. 
Next I extend my warmest thanks to my advisor and dissertation director Keith 
Simmons, who has selflessly spent countless hours reading, commenting on, and talking with 
me about my work. Keith has forged through draft after draft of these pages (and there are a 
lot of them), and they would be far worse had they not received his critical scrutiny. I thank 
him for taking me on as a student, and letting me submerse him in the literature on 
truthmaking. 
As members of my dissertation committee, and moreover just as supportive and 
enthusiastic colleagues, Dorit Bar-On and Bill Lycan have been invaluable commentators on 
my work. I have learned much from them over the years. I’m also grateful to Thomas 
Hofweber and John Roberts, who have both signed on late in the game to serve as readers for 
the dissertation, but who have been supportive of the project from the beginning. 
 vi
My thanks also go to the numerous individuals who have taken the time to read and 
meet with me about my work. This distinguished list includes Bob Adams, David Armstrong, 
Simon Blackburn, Rachael Briggs, Mark Jago, Matt Kotzen, Marc Lange, Ram Neta, Laurie 
Paul, Michael Pendlebury, Huw Price, Geoff Sayre-McCord, Jonathan Schaffer, and surely 
others I have neglected to mention. 
My work has also benefitted from the many audiences who have heard various pieces 
of it. This includes various audiences from the University of North Carolina, the 2009 
Australasian Association of Philosophy Annual Conference, the work-in-progress series at 
the University of Sydney (both for faculty and postgraduates), the Rethinking Mind and 
Cosmos conference (with gracious commentary from Alison Fernandes), the 2010 joint 
meeting of the North and South Carolina Philosophical Associations, the 2010 Midsouth 
conference (where I was supplied with helpful comments by Matthew Carlson), the 2010 
Annual Meeting of the Ohio Philosophical Association (with helpful commentary by 
Dimitria Gatzia), and the 2010 Rocky Mountain Ethics Conference. 
Institutional support has been provided by the Department of Philosophy at the 
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, my home department. I am incredibly grateful to 
all the faculty for their support during my tenure as a graduate student, and to all my fellow 
students for many years of friendship and philosophical companionship. The only way not to 
leave someone out would be to list everybody who has been through the department in the 
last six years. But let me still thank in particular Seth Bordner, Jason Bowers, Patrick 
Connolly, Dana Falkenberg, Elizabeth Foreman, Drew Johnson, Dave Landy, Cathay Liu, 
Clair Morrissey, Dave Ripley, Nate Sharadin, Elanor Taylor, and Piers Norris Turner. I have 
learned much from all of you, and deeply appreciate your friendship over the years. A special 
 vii
thanks also go to the departmental staff who have kept everything running behind the scenes 
over the years. To Sarah Blythe, Jennie Dickson, Kelly Finn, Diane Lupton, Claire Miller, 
Gucki Obler, Carlo Robustelli, Adam Schaefer, Theresa Stone, and Lance Westerlund: 
thanks for all you do and have done. 
I am also immensely grateful to the Department of Philosophy at the University of 
Sydney, and the Centre for Time, which supported me for one semester in 2009. I drafted this 
entire dissertation while in Sydney, in large thanks to the stimulating intellectual 
environment that is Sydney’s philosophical community. In particular, I thank Huw Price for 
extending his invitation to me, and I in turn extend my thanks to Sam Baron, Rachael Briggs, 
Pete Evans, Alison Fernandes, Patrick Greenough, Matthew Hammerton, Mark Jago, Ian 
Lawson, Nick Malpas, and Raamy Majeed for graciously welcoming me into Sydney’s 
philosophy community. 
Finally, a special thanks go to the surviving members of my first-year cohort: Adam 
Cureton, Felipe De Brigard, Katie Elliott, Emily Given, and Emily Kelahan. I cannot 
overestimate the effect that my fellow students have had on my philosophical development. I 
dedicate this dissertation to you, which only seems appropriate since no one has had to hear 
me drone on over the years about truth and realism more than all of you. 
 viii
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
Introduction................................................................................................................................1 
 
1. Truthmaking and Truthmakers ......................................................................................5 
  
 1.1. Background and theoretical desiderata ..............................................................5 
 
 1.2. The truthmaking relation....................................................................................8 
 
  1.2.1. Preliminaries ..........................................................................................8 
 
  1.2.2. Standard accounts of the relation.........................................................13 
 
  1.2.3. Truthmaking and the analytic/synthetic distinction.............................21 
 
  1.2.4. Troubles for truthmaking .....................................................................26 
 
  1.2.5. Settling for the synthetic ......................................................................28 
 
  1.2.6. Paradox avoided...................................................................................38 
 
 1.3. The scope of truthmaking ................................................................................43 
 
  1.3.1. The doctrinal approach to truthmaking................................................43 
 
  1.3.2. The methodological approach to truthmaking .....................................48 
 
 1.4. Conclusion .......................................................................................................59 
 
 1.5. Appendix: truthmakers and truth-conditions ...................................................62 
 
2. Truthmaking and Truth ................................................................................................72 
 
 2.1. Seeing truth in truthmaking .............................................................................74 
 
 2.2. How not to separate truth and truthmaking......................................................81 
 
 2.3. Truthmaker theory is not a theory of truth.......................................................93 
 
 2.4. Truthmaking against correspondence ............................................................103 
 ix
3. Truthmaking and Deflationary Truth.........................................................................121 
 
 3.1. Deflationary theories of truth.........................................................................121 
 
 3.2. The compatibility of truthmaking and deflationism ......................................131 
 
  3.2.1. The case against compatibility...........................................................131 
 
  3.2.2. Truthmaking and linguistic deflationism...........................................136 
 
  3.2.3. Truthmaking and conceptual deflationism.........................................138 
 
  3.2.4. Truthmaking and metaphysical deflationism.....................................146 
 
 3.3. Truthmaking against substantive truth...........................................................156 
 
  3.3.1. No need for truth................................................................................158 
 
  3.3.2. Taking truth to absurdity ...................................................................173 
 
  3.3.3. Unnatural truth ...................................................................................176 
 
  3.3.4. Closing remarks .................................................................................179   
 
 3.4. Conclusion .....................................................................................................182 
 
4. Truthmaking and Realism..........................................................................................188 
 
 4.1. Truth and realism: a defense of neutrality .....................................................188 
 
 4.2. Truthmaking and commitments ontological and metaphysical .....................199 
 
  4.2.1. Quine on ontological commitment.....................................................200 
 
  4.2.2. Metaphysical commitments and discriminating propositions............207 
 
  4.2.3. Azzouni and non-discriminating truthmaker gaps.............................212 
   
 4.3. A truthmaker account of realism....................................................................220 
  
  4.3.1. Truthmaking and realism: Armstrong..................................................222 
   
  4.3.2. Truthmaking and realism: Cameron ....................................................226 
 
  4.3.3. Projectivist truthmaking.......................................................................231 
 
 x
  4.3.4. Truthmaking and realism: a new account ............................................236 
 
 4.4. Conclusion .....................................................................................................245  
 
 4.5. Appendix: realism about truth .......................................................................248 
 
5. Truthmaking, Metaethics, and Creeping Minimalism ...............................................258 
 
 5.1. A new approach to metaethics .......................................................................259 
 
 5.2. Truthmakers for moral truths .........................................................................262 
   
  5.2.1. Moral realism.....................................................................................262 
 
  5.2.2. Classical non-cognitivism..................................................................267 
 
  5.2.3. Error theory........................................................................................271 
 
  5.2.4. Moral relativism.................................................................................274 
 
  5.2.5. Constructivism ...................................................................................278 
 
  5.2.6. Superassertibility................................................................................286 
 
  5.2.7 Quasi-realism .....................................................................................293 
 
 5.3. Creeping minimalism.....................................................................................310 
 
  5.3.1. The problem.......................................................................................310 
 
  5.3.2. The solution .......................................................................................317  
 
 5.4. Progress in metaethics....................................................................................321 
 
 5.5 Conclusion .....................................................................................................333 
 
6. Three Paradigms of Scientific Realism......................................................................337 
  
 6.1. The truth-mongering paradigm......................................................................338 
 
 6.2. The epistemological paradigm.......................................................................350 
 
 6.3. The metaphysical paradigm ...........................................................................359 
 
 6.4. Truthmaking and structural realism...............................................................368 
 
 xi
 6.5. Conclusion .....................................................................................................374 
 
Conclusion .............................................................................................................................377 
 
References..............................................................................................................................381
 
Introduction 
Realism, whatever else it may be, is a metaphysically substantive doctrine. I shall 
stand by that statement, though I admit that, as things stand now, it is fairly empty. That a 
doctrine is metaphysically substantive does not entail that it is controversial, inflated, or 
anathema to nominalists, empiricists, or whoever else might vow a preference for “desert 
landscapes”. We all believe that something exists, so we all must admit some substance into 
our metaphysical worldview. So to say that realism is a metaphysically substantive doctrine 
is not yet to say just how substantive it is. My main motivation for beginning with that claim, 
though, is to stress that I consider the debates that occur throughout philosophy between 
realists and their opponents to be fundamentally metaphysical (though they may have other 
dimensions). Realism debates are about reality, and reality is the domain of metaphysics. To 
be realist about something is to let in some metaphysics; the realist’s opponent lets in less, if 
he lets any in at all. Locating divides between realists and their opponents outside of 
metaphysics is, in my view, a mistake. I repeat: realism debates are about reality, and reality 
is the domain of metaphysics. There may be other important distinctions between competing 
philosophical views; those distinctions can and ought to be preserved. But the logical space 
occupied by realism and its competitors is already one of the most ill-defined and cluttered 
regions in all of philosophy. There is no need to muddy the murky waters of realism further 
by formulating it in ways that fall outside the domain of metaphysics. 
In the pages that follow, I shall advocate a distinctly metaphysical conception of 
realism, one that is purged of any overindulgence in epistemology, semantics, or pragmatics. 
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Do various forms of realism and its competitors have implications for epistemology, 
semantics, and pragmatics? Absolutely. But our task is to avoid trying to understand what 
realism is in terms of distinctly epistemological, semantic, and pragmatic considerations. As 
a result, we shall have a clearer sense of what is at stake in the debates over realism that 
occur across the philosophical landscape. 
Not far behind any discussion of realism lies the topic of truth, and my project is no 
exception. The topics of truth and realism have long been intertwined. While the two topics 
cannot adequately be explored in isolation, I do think that the two need to be kept separate as 
far as possible. Many have thought that realism debates just are debates about truth. Quite to 
the contrary, I think such an equation is deeply mistaken. Realism debates are best pursued 
not in terms of truth, but in terms of truthmakers. 
Hence, this project is an exploration into the theory of truthmaking, and what the 
theory of truthmaking can do for philosophy. Specifically, I discuss whether the theory of 
truthmaking is a theory of truth (it’s not), and what truthmaking has to do with realism 
debates (everything). To begin, I introduce the general theory of truthmaking, and present a 
novel account of what it is to engage in truthmaker theory. I then apply that theory of 
truthmaking to the theory of truth, and show why truthmaking need not and cannot offer an 
account of what it is in which the nature of truth consists. Nevertheless, careful attention to 
the insights behind truthmaker theory will reveal why many traditional substantive accounts 
of truth are misguided, and where the truth behind deflationary theories of truth lies. While 
not offering a specific account of truth, truthmaker theory does silence the debate between 
deflationists and correspondence theorists, and shows that the real debate over truth should 
be waged between deflationists and primitivists. 
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Next I take up the topic of realism, and argue for its theoretical autonomy from the 
debate over the nature of truth. Realism debates are debates about what makes things true, 
not about what truth is. I thus offer a new understanding of what is at stake in realism debates, 
and how they should be conducted. To offer a concrete application, I apply the methodology 
to metaethics, and show how thinking about truthmakers can clear up some standing puzzles 
in the arena. Specifically, I tackle the problem of creeping minimalism, and show how the 
truthmaker approach to realism can help reveal what is really at stake in the debate over 
moral realism. 
In the final chapter, I turn to scientific realism. As in the realism debate in metaethics, 
the realism debate in the philosophy of science is sometimes thought to turn on the nature of 
truth. I think this move is mistaken, and in turn show how understanding the debate in terms 
of truthmaking better captures what is most important to the debate. In addition to showing 
how my “metaphysical paradigm” for understanding the question of scientific realism best 
captures the essence of traditional realist and anti-realist views, I apply it to the burgeoning 
topic of structural realism, which is now reaching its heyday in the philosophy of science. 
Before commencing with the heart of the text, let me make a few notational points: 
(1) In accord with my methodological preference for neutrality wherever possible, 
I resist taking a stand on the question whether propositions, sentences, 
statements, or what have you are the (primary) bearers of truth. (Personally, I 
prefer pluralism about truth-bearers, and would rather dismiss the question of 
which kind is primary. But that issue will not be taken up here.) In many cases 
I wish simply to refer neutrally to truths. To do so, I will sometimes use a full 
sentence in italics. For example, in discussing the truth that snow is white, I 
may refer to it as in the following: Tarski’s favorite truth was that snow is 
white. This notation is intended to be neutral between whether that truth is a 
proposition, sentence, statement, or what have you. 
 
(2) Following common usage, I use ‘<p>’ as shorthand for ‘the proposition that p’. 
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(3) At times during the project it will be important to distinguish between, at a 
minimum, concepts and properties. Concepts are denoted by words in all 
small capitals. For example, the concept of truth will sometimes be denoted by 
‘TRUTH’. Universals are sometimes denoted by italicized words. If there were 
a truth universal, it would be referred to by ‘truth’. Context will make clear 
when italicized words indicate universals, and when they do not. Properties 
(in the “abundant” sense of Lewis 1983 as classes of objects) are referred to 
by underlined words, as in ‘mass’ and ‘charge’. Notation for tropes and other 
interesting metaphysical creatures will appear on an ad hoc basis. 
 
(4) Most citations should be self-explanatory. In the case of historical quotations 
with traditional line numbering, I include the contemporary page reference of 
the edition I am using followed by the standard reference. 
 
(5) Finally, unless otherwise noted by me, all emphases in quotations are found in 
the original.
 
1. Truthmaking and Truthmakers 
What is truthmaker theory, and what use is it to metaphysics? A rich industry on 
truthmaking has emerged in metaphysics in recent years; my aim is to propose a novel 
approach to truthmaking that can be brought to bear on questions that arise in various areas 
of philosophy. In this chapter, I introduce the theory of truthmaking,1 and present my 
approach to the topic that will inform the rest of the project. I begin by giving an account of 
what I take truthmaker theory to be, and what the desiderata are that a successful theory of 
truthmaking must meet. I give three such desiderata, and then go on to examine the various 
ways that they have been satisfied in the literature. I offer my own take of just what it is to be 
a truthmaker (a thing that necessitates and grounds synthetic truths), and a novel, more 
pragmatic answer to the question of how wide truthmaking considerations ought to be 
applied. To conclude, I consider whether truthmaker theory should be thought of as being 
“explanatory” (and what that might even mean). There is also an appendix that contrasts 
truthmaker theory with truth-conditional theories of meaning. 
 
1.1. Background and theoretical desiderata 
Just what the basic driving idea is behind truthmaker theory is a matter of some 
controversy. It is customary, if not a little clichéd, to begin discussions of truthmaking by 
citing Aristotle, so let us follow suit. In the Categories, Aristotle discusses various notions of 
                                                 
1In what follows, I use phrases such as ‘truthmaker theory’, ‘theory of truthmakers’, and ‘theory of 
truthmaking’ more or less interchangeably when talking broadly about the territory of truthmakers. Context will 
make clear when I am engaged in more specific inquiries such as what truthmakers there are or what the 
truthmaking relation is. 
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priority. On one conception of priority, “when, among things that reciprocate in implication 
of being, one is in some way the cause of the being of the other, it might reasonably be said 
to be naturally prior” (1995: 11; 14b12-14).2 Aristotle goes on to say that if a man is, then a 
statement that says that the man is is true; conversely, if a statement that a man is is true, then 
a man is. It might be tempting to think that the significance of Aristotle’s remarks here lies in 
the fact that he has offered some of the first instances of T-sentences ever to appear in print. 
Aristotle seems, in effect, to be endorsing one of the many truth schemas, here involving 
statements: 
(T1) The statement that p is true if and only if p. 
 
While I think that Aristotle would certainly grant the truth of the instances of T1, the 
biconditionals themselves are not the main point at which he is driving. He is calling our 
attention to a coincidence (a “reciprocation in implication of being”) between there being a 
certain worldly matter (a man’s existing) and the truth of a statement to that effect. 
Here we have two distinct matters—being and truth—that nonetheless fit together 
seamlessly. We can now raise the “Euthyphro question”, drawing on what is one of Plato’s 
deepest philosophical insights. In the dialogue named for him, Euthyphro suggests to 
Socrates that the pious is what is dear to all the gods, and Socrates is happy to grant the 
coextension between the two notions (1997: 9; 9e1-10a2). Plato’s brilliant move is to have 
Socrates ask which of the two notions is more fundamental: is something pious because all 
the gods love it, or do all the gods love something pious because it is pious? Returning to 
Aristotle’s case, we can ask: Does the man exist because the statement is true, or is the 
statement true because that man exists? Aristotle thinks the latter option is correct: 
                                                 
2See also Aristotle’s Metaphysics (1966: 158; 1051b:6-7). 
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The true statement, however, is in no way the cause of the object’s being. Rather the 
object is apparently in a way the cause of the statement’s being true; for it is because 
the object is or is not that the statement is said to be true or false. (1995: 11-12; 
14b18-22) 
 
Aristotle is telling us here that being is metaphysically prior to truth. On the one hand we 
have the existence of the man; on the other we have the truth of the statement that the man 
exists. The former is prior to the latter. It is more fundamental. The man grounds the truth of 
the statement. The statement is true in virtue of the man. And finally: the man makes true the 
statement.3 
A basic idea—perhaps the basic idea—behind truthmaker theory, then, is that what is 
true depends upon what is.4 Truths are true in virtue of the way of the world. The notions of 
priority, fundamentality, grounding, being in virtue of, and making true are at the core of the 
truthmaker literature. Whether such notions allow of further elucidation or analysis is a 
matter we shall take up in what follows. Perhaps they can be understood in more fundamental 
terms, or perhaps they simply are primitive metaphysical notions (as Rodriguez-Pereyra 2005 
suggests). Regardless, truthmakers are the sort of things that are metaphysically prior to their 
respective truths. Something is a truthmaker for some truth just in case that thing grounds the 
truth—the truth is true in virtue of its truthmaker. Unfortunately, here we seem to reach the 
end of the consensus on truthmakers. Different theorists offer different ways of 
understanding the notion of truthmaking; as a result, metaphysicians disagree in particular 
cases as to whether something is a truthmaker for some given truth. Furthermore, there is 
little consensus on how widely truthmaking considerations apply. Do all truths have 
                                                 
3For more on the history of truthmakers, see Mulligan, Simons, and Smith 1984, Fox 1987, and Mulligan 2009. 
4Cf. Leibniz: “it is obvious that all true predication has some foundation in the nature of things” (1998: 59). 
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truthmakers, or just the members of some restricted class of truths? There is simply no 
consensus on the answers to such questions, or even how to go about answering them. 
Any complete theory of truthmaking must contain at least the three following 
elements. First, there must be an account of what the truthmaking relation is. As part of that 
account, it must be stated what sorts of thing can stand in the relation. We need to know, in 
other words, what truths are, what truthmakers are, and what the relation is that stands 
between them. Second, there must be an account of which truths fall under the scope of the 
relation. Perhaps all truths have truthmakers, or perhaps only a proper subset of them do. 
Finally, there must be an account of just what truthmakers there are. We can sum up by 
saying that any fully adequate theory of truthmaking must (at least) offer answers to the 
following three questions: 
(1) What is the truthmaking relation? 
 
(2) Which truths fall under the scope of the relation? 
 
(3) What truthmakers are there? 
 
On none of the three scores is there anything close to unanimity in the literature. We shall 
take up each one in turn. 
 
1.2. The truthmaking relation 
 
1.2.1. Preliminaries 
Consider the first desideratum: we must say just what the truthmaking relation is. 
There is rampant disagreement over the nature of the truthmaking relation, but we can say 
one uncontroversial thing about it: it is a relation that obtains between truths and truthmakers. 
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If x makes true y, then y is a truth, and x is a truthmaker.5 By ‘truth’ I mean nothing more 
than a true truth-bearer. I prefer plurality about truth-bearers: thoughts, sentences, statements, 
beliefs, and propositions (if they exist) can all be true or false. My examples throughout will 
employ various kinds of truth-bearers. I prefer neutrality as to whether one of those kinds of 
truth-bearers is primary. To the extent that nothing turns on the issue, I shall take it for 
granted that there are a variety of kinds of truth-bearers. Some philosophers—notably D. M. 
Armstrong (2004) and Trenton Merricks (2007)—have argued that truthmaker theory 
requires the existence of propositions.6 Consider the truth that there are electrons. Some 
actual electron E is a truthmaker for that truth, even though there are possible worlds where E 
exists, where it is true that there are electrons, and yet there are no intentional agents and 
hence no beliefs, statements, or interpreted sentences.7 In such worlds, it is argued, some 
thing must bear the truth that electrons exist, and so that must be a proposition. I have some 
reservations about that line of argument. That something is true of a world does not entail 
that some thing is true in that world. Our interpreted sentence ‘There are electrons’ truly 
describes other possible worlds, even those of which it is not a member. So it is not 
obviously clear that truthmaker theorists must embrace the existence of propositions. My aim 
is to develop a truthmaker theory that is available even to those who are suspicious of the 
existence of propositions. 
                                                 
5Note that I shall take ‘being made true’ and ‘having a truthmaker’ as coming to the same thing. D. H. Mellor 
(2009) advocates a view where all truths are made true, but only some have truthmakers. I find his way of 
speaking infelicitous, as it requires there being making without a maker. But note that our disagreement here is 
merely terminological. See also Melia 2005 for a defense of truthmaking without truthmakers. 
6See also David 2005 for discussion. 
7I now hereby make the common but necessary caveat: though I shall employ repeatedly the language of 
possible worlds, my intention is to use it merely as a useful façon de parler, with no commitment to David 
Lewis’s modal realism (1986) presupposed. 
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As for the other member of the relation, we can begin with what truthmakers are not. 
Truthmakers are not to be conceptually identified with or restricted to any particular kind of 
entity; specifically, they should not be conceptually identified with or restricted to states of 
affairs or facts, in the sense employed initially by Bertrand Russell (1985) and Ludwig 
Wittgenstein (1921), and later by the likes of Armstrong (1997) and D. H. Mellor (1998). On 
their view, facts and states of affairs are worldly entities; they are not identified with truths. 
(Nor do they stand in a strict one-one correspondence with them.) Armstrong’s states of 
affairs are not Alvin Plantinga’s (1974) or Roderick Chisholm’s (1981), whose states of 
affairs are Platonic or ersatz entities that exist in all possible worlds, obtaining in some but 
not in others.8 Armstrong’s states of affairs are the core entity in his ontology; they are 
contingent existences. It is sometimes suggested that truthmakers just are facts or states of 
affairs, that what it is to be a truthmaker is to be a fact or a state of affairs (Sider 2001: 36, 
Heathcote 2003: 361; see also Williamson 1999 and McGrath 2003). True, Armstrong thinks 
that his states of affairs are truthmakers. However, (a proper subset of) Armstrong’s 
truthmakers are states of affairs because states of affairs are what populate Armstrong’s 
ontology. Indeed, truthmaking has been of great appeal to those who adopt factive ontologies 
(ontologies of facts, not of things). And as a matter of contingent, sociological fact, fans of 
factive ontologies have been fans of truthmaking.9 But factive ontologies are not necessary 
                                                 
8Where I use ‘Platonic or ersatz’, most writers would use ‘abstract’. I follow Armstrong in thinking that this use 
of ‘abstract’ to mean “non spatiotemporal” is a perversion of the original meaning of the term that has played a 
central role in metaphysics for centuries. (He calls it the “Harvard sense” of ‘abstract’.) Abstract entities are 
those that are abstractions from other entities, regardless of whether or not they are located in space-time. 
9Which is not to say that the sociological fact here is mere coincidence. It is perfectly explicable why friends of 
states of affairs have been advocates of truthmaking (just look at the influence of Russell’s logical atomism). 
My point is only that there is no conceptual necessity between truthmaking and anti-nominalist ontology. 
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for truthmaking.10 David Lewis, for instance, offers a sophisticated theory of truthmaking 
that makes no use of facts or states of affairs (2003). Others offer tropes as candidate 
truthmakers (e.g., Mulligan, Simons, and Smith 1984, Martin 1996, and Cameron 2008a11). 
Truthmakers can be drawn from any kind of ontology whatsoever; the notion is not limited 
simply to certain kinds of entities.12 Anything can be a truthmaker, and everything is a 
truthmaker. Take some existing object x. x, plausibly, is a truthmaker for ‘x exists’.13 But x is 
just any old object, so the argument generalizes. Every object is a truthmaker for the truth 
that it exists, and perhaps more besides.14 The world is the totality of truthmakers. 
Hence, I suggest that we embrace a hearty pluralism about the kinds of things that can 
enter into the truthmaking relation, on both sides. Anything that can bear truth can be made 
true, and anything at all can (and does) make true. We have now said what the relata are in 
the truthmaking relation. But what exactly is the nature of the relation that they stand in? 
Most are agreed that the relation is many-many: a truth may have several truthmakers (‘There 
are humans’ is made true by each and every human), and a single thing may be a truthmaker 
for multiple truths (Obama is a truthmaker for both ‘There are humans’ and ‘Obama 
                                                 
10But see Merricks 2007, which argues that truthmaker theory requires states of affairs. The argument depends 
upon truthmaker maximalism (the thesis that every truth has a truthmaker) being a sine qua non of truthmaker 
theory, which is something I adamantly reject. 
11In his 2010, Ross Cameron retracts his sympathy for tropes as truthmakers. 
12Hence we should reject Joseph Melia’s suggestion that nominalists are conceptually forbidden from 
employing a truthmaking relation. Since he thinks nominalists have nothing in their ontology to stand in the 
truthmaking relation to truths, Melia thinks nominalists should take ‘makes true’ as a one-place connective, and 
flesh out truthmaker theory with ungrammatical sentences like ‘a is red makes true the sentence ‘there is a 
colour a and b both share’’ (2005: 79). My alternative suggestion is that the notion of a truthmaker should not 
be limited conceptually to only certain kinds of entities. Anything can be a truthmaker, and everything is a 
truthmaker. 
13But see Schaffer 2010. 
14Peter Simons (2005: 254) presents this thesis as a consequence of truthmaker necessitarianism (see TM2 
below), but I think it is independently defensible, regardless of how one conceives of the truthmaking relation. 
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exists’).15 Armstrong argues that the relation is internal, in the sense that it obtains in every 
possible world in which the relata both exist (2004: 9). For example, in every world in which 
Obama and ‘Obama exists’ both exist, they will stand in the truthmaking relation. It would be 
impossible for there to be Obama, and yet not have him be a truthmaker for ‘Obama exists’. 
Accordingly, the truthmaking relation is not anything above and beyond the relata.16 
Many also assume that the truthmaking relation is asymmetric and irreflexive 
(Hornsby 2005, Rodriguez-Pereyra 2005, Schaffer 2008b, and Fine 2010; see also David 
2009). If x makes true y, then it is not the case that y makes true x. And in no case does x 
make itself true. However, those assumptions are false. Recall that everything is a truthmaker, 
including truth-bearers themselves, whichever ones exist. While it is true that the relation 
holds reflexively only very rarely (namely, in some of those cases where truth-bearers stand 
on both sides of the relation), it would be ad hoc to insist on the irreflexivity of the relation in 
the face of plausible cases. And, of course, if there are reflexive cases of truthmaking, then 
there are symmetrical cases of truthmaking. Consider, then, the proposition that there are 
propositions, the sentence token ‘There are sentence tokens’, and the belief that there are 
beliefs. Typically, an object is the truthmaker for the truth of a claim to its own existence, 
and to any existential involving one of its essential features. Socrates makes true ‘Socrates 
exists’, and Obama makes true ‘Obama exists’. Both provide grounds for ‘A human exists’. 
When a truth-bearer is about itself, its own existence, and nothing more, we have an exactly 
parallel case. The sentence token ‘There are sentence tokens’ makes itself true in exactly the 
                                                 
15The exception here is Jonathan Schaffer (2010), who is a monist about truthmakers: there’s only one 
truthmaker (the world), so his truthmaking relation is one-many. 
16Hence, there is no need to posit any sort of truthmaking universal, for relational universals are posited only to 
serve as ontological grounds for relations that do not already supervene upon the relata. For more on 
truthmaking as an internal relation, see sections 1.2.5 and 2.1 below. See David 2005 for worries about 
Armstrong’s claiming the “ontological free lunch” for his truthmaking relation. 
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same way that Socrates makes true ‘There are humans’. So I see no non-ad hoc way of 
denying that there are reflexive cases of truthmaking. It is quite easy to come up with 
examples.17 
 
1.2.2. Standard accounts of the relation 
Having seen some of the properties traditionally attributed to the truthmaking relation, 
we can now turn to some of the going accounts in the literature of the nature of the relation.18 
Here the literature offers a variety of answers. One answer is that the truthmaking relation 
simply is primitive (e.g., Rodriguez-Pereyra 2005). Hence: 
(TM1) For all x and y, x is a truthmaker for y if and only if y is true in virtue of the 
existence of x. 
 
TM1 is the sort of principle that everyone in the literature accepts. What is controversial 
about the primitivist view is taking its ‘in virtue of’ not to admit of any further analysis. 
Rodriguez-Pereyra accepts that TM1 is as basic as it gets, and then offers paradigm examples 
                                                 
17As far as I know, Marian David is the only other writer who has noticed such cases (2009: 153). E. J. Lowe 
holds that logically necessary truths are self-truthmakers (2007: 250). In correspondence, Schaffer has replied to 
me saying that the way to understand such cases is that the truth of these truth-bearers depends upon their 
existence. But here we have separate things, and so no case of reflexive truthmaking. My worry is that Schaffer 
sees three distinct things where I see only one. We have the proposition <There are propositions>, its truth (the 
state of affairs of its being true), and its existence (the state of affairs of its existing). Schaffer holds that the 
second thing is dependent upon the third thing. Because I do not recognize truth and existence as universals (in 
any sense such that they could be constituents of states of affairs), I only see the proposition itself. So the only 
thing that could stand in the truthmaking relation is the proposition. The proposition makes itself true. For 
similar reasons, I am not troubled by Schaffer’s objection that those who believe in necessitation are plagued by 
trivial truthmakers like the state of affairs of <There are penguins>’s being true being a truthmaker for <There 
are penguins> rather than just penguins (2008a: 312). There are no such states of affairs, since truth is not a 
universal (as I argue at length in section 3.3). 
18Let me flag yet another assumption on my part. We’re now about to discuss what the truthmaking relation is, 
and I take it that there is only one under discussion. (For now, at least. I complicate matters myself in chapter 5.) 
But muddying the waters here is Matthew McGrath, who distinguishes two kinds of truthmaking, one 
performed by propositions, and one by worldly entities (2003). (Apparently propositions are not worldly 
entities?) As far as I can tell, only McGrath acknowledges his former notion of truthmaking: “If a proposition is 
true, then something about the world makes it true” (2003: 683). Here, we have propositions making themselves 
true. McGrath thinks his notion here is the intuitive notion of truthmaking (its existential counterpart, that 
something in the world makes statements true, is not), though I doubt anyone else would agree. We shall 
encounter McGrath’s view again in section 2.2. 
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by way of elucidation: That Socrates exists is made true by Socrates. Conjunctions are made 
true by whatever makes their conjuncts true. A disjunction is made true by whatever makes 
one of its disjuncts true. 
It is important to remember that in taking something as primitive, one is not 
consigning it to the realm of mystery.19 Nor is one not owning up to one’s theoretical 
responsibilities. Following Lewis, we may distinguish between offering an account of 
something and offering an analysis of it. Lewis writes: 
Not every account is an analysis! A system that takes certain Moorean facts as 
primitive, as unanalysed, cannot be accused of failing to make a place for them. It 
neither shirks the compulsory question nor answers it by denial. It does give an 
account. (1983: 352) 
 
 Lewis is here speaking of accounting for facts, but we can extend his idea to concepts, 
notions, or what have you. Every theory has its primitives. Having a store of such primitives 
is not in and of itself open to the charge of philosophical cheating; rather, the set of 
primitives a theory posits is just one more consideration to be weighed when it comes to 
decisions of theory choice. (Presumably, the fewer primitives the better, ceteris paribus.)20 
We might disagree as to what are the kinds of things that we should allow as primitives; but 
taking something as primitive in and of itself is not objectionable.21 
                                                 
19Paul Horwich (1990: 10) takes this line with respect to primitivism about truth. For criticism see Merricks 
2007: 185-187. 
20See also Goodman 1954: 37. 
21Let me also flag the distinction between two senses of being primitive: theoretical and metaphysical. Some 
notion might be primitive relative to a theory. Consider all those philosophers who employ the notion of a fact, 
but have nothing to say about what facts are. Relative to their theories, facts are (theoretically) primitive. Such 
theorists help themselves to the notion, do not offer an analysis, but remain neutral on the question whether such 
an analysis could be given by those who care about such matters. A metaphysical primitive, by contrast, would 
be something that is taken to be metaphysical bedrock, and that cannot be further analyzed. Such things have 
also gone under the name ‘brute’. The primitivism about truthmaking that I denote by ‘TM1’ is of the 
metaphysical sort. 
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Not only is taking something as primitive philosophically legitimate, it is to be 
expected. Here we may turn to Donald Davidson: 
however feeble or faulty our attempts to relate these various basic concepts to each 
other, these attempts fare better, and teach us more, than our efforts to produce 
correct and revealing definitions of basic concepts in terms of clearer or even more 
fundamental concepts. 
 
This is, after all, what we should expect. For the most part, the concepts philosophers 
single out for attention, like truth, knowledge, belief, action, cause, the good and the 
right, are the most elementary concepts we have, concepts without which (I am 
inclined to say) we would have no concepts at all. Why then should we expect to be 
able to reduce these concepts definitionally to other concepts that are simpler, clearer, 
and more basic? We should accept the fact that what makes these concepts so 
important must also foreclose on the possibility of finding a foundation for them 
which reaches deeper into bedrock. (1996: 264) 
 
Davidson’s point is that we should expect some of our most basic philosophical concepts not 
to admit of any further analysis. They are so important because they are primitive: they are 
the foundation into which other derivative notions are to be analyzed. Now, whether the 
truthmaking relation is one such primitive is of course quite contentious. Its plausibility will 
depend on the success or failure of other analytical attempts, to which we may now turn. 
We owe much of truthmaking’s current appeal to Armstrong. Armstrong understands 
truthmakers as things that necessitate truths: 
(TM2) For all x and y, x is a truthmaker for y if and only if it is metaphysically 
necessary that if x exists, then y is true.22 
 
Necessitation here is not propositional entailment. Entailment holds between truth-bearers. 
Armstrong’s truthmaking relation obtains between a worldly entity on the one hand, and a 
                                                 
22Armstrong no longer takes the right hand side of TM2 to state a necessary and sufficient condition for 
truthmaking, just a necessary one. He, like many others, is worried about trivial truthmakers for necessary truths. 
It is implicit in his earlier writings and argumentation that it is necessary and sufficient (1997: 115, 2000: 150). 
But in later writings he distances himself from thinking that it states a sufficient condition (2004). Since 
Armstrong doesn’t say what else truthmaking would require, it may be plausible to attribute to him the 
primitivism of TM1. 
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truth-bearer on the other. The necessitation relation is thus “cross-categorial”.23 As an 
example, take some basic contingent predicative truth, that a is F. Armstrong rightly 
observes that the existence of the particular a and the universal F is not sufficient to 
guarantee that it is true that a is F. There are worlds where a is not F, but something else is. 
Supposing universals to be immanent, they exist in all and only worlds where they are 
instantiated (see Armstrong 1989b). Here we have a world with both a and F, but yet it is 
false that a is F. So Armstrong employs states of affairs, such as a’s being F. For Armstrong, 
a state of affairs is a complex entity composed non-mereologically of particulars and 
universals (see his 1997, and Vallicella 2000 for discussion). In every world where the state 
of affairs of a’s being F exists, it is true that a is F. Hence the state of affairs is a truthmaker 
for the truth that a is F. Here we have a classic example of how truthmaking considerations 
play a role in metaphysical theorizing. Armstrong argues for the existence of states of affairs 
in part by arguing that we need them in our ontology to serve as truthmakers for contingent 
predicative truths (among many others). 
Lewis (2001b, 2003) agrees with Armstrong that truthmakers necessitate their truths. 
However, Lewis brings a vastly different metaphysics to the table than does Armstrong, a 
metaphysics that gives him a very different understanding of what it is for something to exist 
in other possible worlds. Strictly speaking, Lewis thinks that individuals do not exist in 
multiple possible worlds. Because of his modal realism, Lewis thinks that individuals can 
exist in only one possible world (1986). When we speak of something existing in other 
possible worlds, we are actually speaking of its counterparts. So for x to be a truthmaker for 
y, in every world in which x or one of its counterparts exist, y must be true. Lewis (2003) 
                                                 
23Usually. Consider again cases like the proposition that there are propositions. Here we have a proposition 
standing on both sides of the truthmaking relation. Cf. Rodriguez-Pereyra 2006b: 189. 
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does not think that there is one single counterpart relation. Rather, there are different 
counterpart relations serving different purposes. Suppose I drive a green Geo Metro named 
‘Rudiger’. Rudiger exists only in our world, but has counterparts in other possible worlds. 
We can also speak of Rudiger qua green. Rudiger qua green just is Rudiger, but understood 
from a slightly different modal perspective. Namely, when we think of Rudiger qua green, 
we are thinking of Rudiger with greenness essential to it. They are the same object; it’s just 
that, in Lewis’s words, they differ “in essence” (2003: 30). Consequently, Rudiger qua green 
has a different set of counterparts than does Rudiger. Rudiger has some blue counterparts; 
Rudiger qua green has no blue counterparts. Lewis uses the notion of an object qua property 
in order to offer nominalist friendly truthmakers for predicative truths. In every world in 
which a counterpart of Rudiger qua green exists, it is true that Rudiger is green, for Rudiger 
qua green has only green counterparts. As a result, Lewis can find truthmakers for 
predicative truths without turning to Armstrong’s ontology of states of affairs. 
The dialectic between Armstrong and Lewis shows that while they may agree on 
what the truthmaking relation is, and thus on what it is to be a truthmaker, they may still 
disagree about what truthmakers there are. It is not just Lewis that sides with Armstrong in 
thinking that truthmaking is necessitation. Merricks refers to truthmaking necessitation—at 
least as a necessary condition on truthmaking—as “truthmaker orthodoxy” (2007: 5; 
Cameron 2008d, Schaffer 2008b: 10, and Goff 2010 concur). Nonetheless, the view has 
come under attack as being both unnecessary and insufficient for truthmaking. 
Mellor (2003) agrees that truthmakers serve as the ontological ground for their 
respective truths. However, he does not think that necessitation is necessary for 
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truthmaking.24 To illustrate, suppose that there are exactly two chairs, A and B, in the Oval 
Office. Both chairs are blue. In that case, it is true that all the chairs in the Oval Office are 
blue. Pretend for the moment that in such a world there exist four states of affairs: A’s being 
blue, B’s being blue, A’s being in the Oval Office, and B’s being in the Oval Office. 
Armstrong would note, correctly, that the four states of affairs do not necessitate the truth of 
that all the chairs in the Oval Office are blue. There are some worlds in which both blue 
chairs exist, are located in the Oval Office, and yet it is false that all chairs in the Oval Office 
are blue. (Some worlds have a third, red chair.) Hence Armstrong would say that the four 
states of affairs are not a sufficient truthmaker for that all the chairs in the Oval Office are 
blue. Mellor, by contrast, says that the four states of affairs are a truthmaker for that all the 
chairs in the Oval Office are blue in spite of not necessitating it. Those four states of affairs 
are the ontological ground for our truth; the truth is true in virtue of those states of affairs, 
and nothing more. Like all general truths, its truthmaker need not necessitate it.25 We shall 
consider this view again below. 
More commonly, it is the sufficiency of the necessitation relation that is called into 
question (e.g., Restall 1996, Smith 1999, Rodriguez-Pereyra 2002, Lowe 2007, and Merricks 
2007). Consider the familiar example of necessary truths. Every object necessitates every 
necessary truth. In every world in which I exist, two and two are four, and squares have four 
sides. Hence I am a truthmaker, according to TM2, for that two and two are four and that 
squares have four sides. Lewis happily embraces the result (2001: 604). Greg Restall uses the 
examples to motivate a non-classical notion of necessitation and entailment, thereby 
                                                 
24Mellor no longer seems to endorse this view. See his 2009. 
25See also Pendlebury 1986 for a similar view, and Cox 1997 for criticism. Josh Parsons (1999), John Heil 
(2000), Cameron (in his 2005), and Schaffer (2010) also advocate truthmaking in the absence of necessitation. 
Pendlebury 2010 offers a “weakened” form of necessitarianism. 
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preserving the idea that truthmaking is necessitation, but offering a competing notion of 
necessitation (1996; see also Read 2000 and Heathcote 2003). Armstrong himself is troubled 
by the issue, and hopes that something along the line of Restall’s suggestion is tenable.26 
Merricks goes in a different direction, and takes necessary truths to be counterexamples to 
TM2: “a ‘trivial truthmaker’ is not really a truthmaker at all” (2007: 24). It is not the case that 
two and two are four in virtue of my happening to exist, so I am not a truthmaker for that two 
and two are four. Plenty of authors agree (e.g., Rodriguez-Pereyra 2006c). Necessitation, 
therefore, is not sufficient for truthmaking. For Merricks, truthmakers must also be about the 
truths that they make true. Hence: 
(TM3) For all x and y, x is a truthmaker for y if and only if y is about x, and it is 
metaphysically necessary that if x exists, then y is true.27 
 
That two and two are four is not in any plausible sense about me, and so I cannot be its 
truthmaker. That a human exists is about me, however, so I can be a truthmaker for it 
(assuming that I am human in every world where I exist). Of course, that a human exists isn’t 
about me in particular, but neither am I a unique truthmaker for it. As for his aboutness 
relation, Merricks does not say much—he offers only examples of paradigm cases in order to 
help elucidate what he has in mind.28 
Rather than supplementing the necessitation account with some further condition, 
some philosophers have abandoned altogether the necessitation approach to truthmaking. 
                                                 
26See Armstrong 2000: 150, 2003: 14, and 2004: 11. 
27See also Smith 1999: 279 and Künne 2003: 158. Cf. Lewis 2003: 25. 
28Other putative counterexamples to necessitation include my being a truthmaker for the claim that my parents 
exist. Assuming necessity of origins, in every possible world with me, they had to have existed, too. I 
understand the appeal of such cases, but do not find them fully convincing. If my parents and I are so wrapped 
together metaphysically via the necessity of origins, then it is not so far-fetched that I could offer them 
something in the neighborhood of an ontological ground. Or consider this example, due to Katie Elliott: 
Suppose God and the Devil both exist, and are necessary beings. According to TM2, God is a truthmaker for 
‘The Devil exists’ and the Devil is a truthmaker for ‘God exists’. But that gets matters exactly backwards. See 
Smith 1999 for more cases of “malignant necessitators”. 
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One major figure here is E. J. Lowe (2007, 2009), who adopts an “essential dependence” 
account of truthmaking: 
(TM4) For all x and y, x is a truthmaker for y if and only if y is essentially such that it 
is true if x exists. 
 
Here, something’s essence is understood as that in virtue of which a thing is what it is. In 
particular, TM4 is concerned with the essential properties of truth-bearers. What makes a 
truth-bearer the truth-bearer that it is is its meaning.29 Although the sentence type ‘Electrons 
exist’ may not mean the same thing in every possible world, the interpreted sentence token 
‘Electrons exist’ does. So the interpreted sentence token ‘Electrons exist’ is such that it’s true 
if electrons exist (even though the sentence type ‘Electrons exist’ is not so related to 
electrons—but note that it’s not clear that sentence types are bearers of truth anyway). TM4 
also avoids the classic cases of malignant necessitation. That seven and five are twelve is in 
no way essentially related to me, so I do not make it true. But the truth that Rudiger is green 
is such that it is true given the existence of the state of affairs of Rudiger’s being green, or 
perhaps given the existence of the greenness trope belonging to Rudiger. 
Nearby in conceptual real estate is Jonathan Schaffer’s (2010) view of truthmaking 
being a species of grounding: 
(TM5) For all x and y, x is a truthmaker for y if and only if x grounds the truth of y.30 
 
Here is Schaffer’s helpful account of the relation: 
Finally, as to the truthmaking relation, I here impose some heavyweight metaphysical 
assumptions. To begin with, I work within a neo-Aristotelian framework, which 
posits substances and posteriors related by ontological dependence. The substances 
are the ground of being. In other terms, they are fundamental, independent, brute, 
irreducible, sparse, and primary. The posteriors are what need grounds. They are 
derivative, dependent, explicable, reducible, abundant, and secondary. What is 
                                                 
29Cf. Merricks: “each proposition essentially represents whatever it actually represents” (2008: 343). 
30Cf. Kit Fine 2001. 
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posterior is grounded in (derivative from, dependent on, because of, based in) the 
substances. I shall not offer analyses of these correlative notions. But I trust that they 
will at least be familiar. 
 
Perhaps the most natural explication of truthmaking within this neo-Aristotelian 
framework is that truth is grounded in the substances. Truth is dependent. Truth is not 
a basic constituent of reality, and like all dependent abstractions, truth must be made 
from the fundament. Thus I assume that the truthmaking relation is to be identified 
with certain instances of the dependence relation, namely, those which relate 
substance to truth […]. (2010: 309-310) 
 
Schaffer’s account is also capable of avoiding the traditional counterexamples to 
necessitation. Its diagnosis of what goes wrong in those cases is that the malignant 
necessitators are not the proper metaphysical grounds for necessary truths. The truth of that 
seven plus five is twelve is in no way grounded by me. Unlike TM1, which takes the 
truthmaking relation to be primitive, TM5 takes truthmaking to be an instance of the broader 
notion of grounding, which itself may well be a metaphysically basic notion. In any event, all 
divergences from the simple necessitation account seem to derive from a common impulse: a 
simple modal notion such as necessitation is inadequate to do the serious work of 
truthmaking. It’s too cheap as it is, and thus leads to more truthmaking than there actually is. 
Close as it may come, necessitation does not fully capture the notions of dependence, 
grounding, and being true in virtue of with which truthmaker theory begins. 
 
1.2.3. Truthmaking and the analytic/synthetic distinction 
The standard accounts of the truthmaking relation that we have now canvassed are 
formulated with an eye toward solving the problem of malignant necessitators. In the 
remainder of section 1.2, I raise and resolve a different worry. The worry is that accounts like 
TM1 through TM5 hold as a consequence that analytic truths have truthmakers. But 
reflection on the nature of truthmaking and analyticity reveals that analytic truths are not true 
 22
in virtue of the existence of objects, and so any account that suggests otherwise is mistaken. 
Hence, I argue for an account of the truthmaking relation that explicitly forbids analytic 
truths from entering into it. 
Not much has been written on the subject of truthmakers for analytic truths.31 But a 
common observation to make about analytic truths is that they are true solely in virtue of 
their meaning, while synthetic truths are true in virtue of that and something more. Indeed, 
that suggestion is the first candidate that Quine (1951) considers (and dismisses) for drawing 
the analytic/synthetic distinction. The appearance of the phrase ‘in virtue of’ should catch the 
eye of anyone interested in truthmaker theory. Truthmakers are the objects in virtue of which 
truths are true. A natural thought, then, is that analytic truths are made true by their 
meanings.32 Let us take the following as our example of an analytic truth: 
(R) All red things are colored. 
It is no uncontroversial matter saying what meanings are.33 To give us something to work 
with, suppose that the meaning of R is given by the concepts that constitute it.34 We could 
then say, which seems plausible, that R is true in virtue of the concepts RED and COLOR. Our 
concept COLOR is contained inside our concept RED, such that one cannot think that 
something is red without thereby thinking of it as being colored, and so R is true.35 
To evaluate the claim that R is made true by RED and COLOR, we must return to the 
basic insights that drive truthmaker theory. Truthmakers are objects that provide the requisite 
                                                 
31For what little there is, see Armstrong 2004: 109-111, Simons 2007b, Hofmann and Horvath 2008, and 
Schulte Forthcoming: 16-17. For skepticism about any sort of “metaphysical analyticity” see Boghossian 1996. 
32This is the view that Armstrong recommends (2004: 109-110). 
33Armstrong (2004: 109) hopes for a naturalistic account, as do Peter Simons (2007b: 69) and I. 
34It is no uncontroversial matter what concepts are, either. I shall be assuming that they are contingent 
psychological entities, dependent for their existence on the mental activities of concept users. 
35The idea of conceptual containment is, of course, due to Kant (1998: 130; A6/B10-A7/B11). 
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ontological grounds for truths. If R is made true by its constitutive concepts, then R is 
ontologically grounded by RED and COLOR, such that its truth depends upon the existence of 
those concepts. But while it may seem correct to say that R is true in virtue of the two 
concepts, I do not think that it is true because the two concepts provide for it any ontological 
ground. R does not owe its truth to the existence of the two concepts. To see why, consider a 
possible world in which the concepts do not exist, such as a world with no concept users. It is 
true of such a world that red things are colored. After all, it is true of every world that red 
things are colored. R is true regardless of whether anyone has the concepts it employs. Now, 
the fact that R is true of worlds where its putative actual world truthmakers do not exist does 
not show that its putative truthmakers are not its truthmakers in the actual world. I make it 
true that there are humans, even though there are worlds without me where it remains true. 
Still, humans are the kind of thing that make it true that there are humans. That claim is true 
of all and only those worlds where humans exist. If concepts are what make analytic truths 
true, then, by parity of reasoning, they should be true of all and only those worlds where the 
relevant concepts exist. But that is false. Concepts are contingent existences; analyticities are 
necessary truths. If analytic truths are true in virtue of the existence of their constitutive 
concepts, then we lose the ability to account for what would have made analyticities true had 
the world been without any concepts.36 Our concepts cannot make them true in such 
                                                 
36One might, in response, conclude that concepts are, after all, not psychologically contingent entities, but rather 
Platonic or ersatz objects. If so, then they might exist necessarily, and so will be around to serve as truthmakers 
for analyticities. Perhaps there are such things, but notice that to think that analytic truths are grounded in such 
entities is to think that analytic truths are deeply ontologically loaded (as Platonists think of mathematical 
truths). This is not an appealing view of what are supposed to be the most ontologically innocuous of claims. 
But for those who do take on views of concepts that are Fregean (1951), or otherwise take concepts to be 
necessary beings, they need not automatically conclude that analyticities are made true by them, in the sense 
that their truth depends upon the existence of such concepts. The suggestion, explored below, is that concepts 
may help to explain the truth of analyticities despite not making them true. If they do take their necessarily 
existing concepts to be truthmakers for analyticities, they will run into a paradox. (See footnote 63 of this 
chapter.) 
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possibilities, for ex hypothesi they do not exist in such scenarios. For something to be a 
truthmaker, it must at the least exist. 
The right conclusion to draw is that analytic truths are not true in virtue of the 
existence of the concepts that give them their meaning. May we still maintain that analytic 
truths are true in virtue of the concepts that give them meaning? I believe that we can. To do 
so, we need to recognize that the ‘in virtue of’ phraseology need not indicate only one 
relation. Truthmaker theorists reject the idea that truth can be a fundamental constituent of 
reality. Truths require grounds; their truth is owed to something in the world. The truth that 
there are penguins, for example, owes its truth to the various penguins populating the planet. 
Focusing on cases like this, we see that truths often require ontological grounds. Certain 
things have to exist in order for certain truths to be true. But not all truths require ontological 
grounds; ontological positing is not the only means of avoiding brute truths. 
Suppose, then, that there are two distinct kinds of truths. For both kinds, their truth is 
not taken to be fundamental, but rather to be derivative. One kind includes truths like the 
truth that there are penguins that are true in virtue of the world containing certain kinds of 
things. The second kind of truths are ontologically vacuous; their truth is not dependent upon 
the existence or non-existence of anything. Hence, they are necessarily true, true regardless 
of how the world is. Still, their truth is not a brute, fundamental feature of reality; they owe 
their truth not to the existence of the citizens of the world, but to (something in the 
neighborhood of) the meanings of words. ‘All red things are colored’ is true in virtue of the 
concepts RED and COLOR. The sentence is not true in virtue of the existence of the concepts, 
but in some other way. 
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Here, now, is the proposal. Truthmaker theory is a metaphysical enterprise that gives 
an ontological accounting of the truths that we accept. The search for ontological grounds—
the search for truthmakers—is a helpful way of understanding ontological investigation. But 
we should not automatically conclude that all truths require ontological ground. Armstrong 
often recounts how he and Charlie Martin were persuaded that what was wrong with 
phenomenalism and behaviorism was that they appealed to counterfactual truths without 
offering any ontological grounds for them (e.g., 2004: 1-3). Perhaps, though, ontological 
grounds are not the only kind of grounding that truths may have. An ontologically 
ungrounded counterfactual is one thing; an ontologically ungrounded analyticity may well be 
quite another. My view is that truthmaking ambitions are misplaced when applied to analytic 
truths. Analytic truths are ontologically empty; their truth does not depend upon the existence 
of anything whatsoever. Their truth still needs to be accounted for; it’s just that their truth 
admits of a distinctly non-ontological accounting. Synthetic truths, by contrast, are true in 
virtue of the way the world; their truth must admit of a distinctly ontological accounting.37 
On the present suggestion, there are two senses of ‘being true in virtue of’, each 
attaching to one side of the analytic/synthetic divide. Only one involves a kind of ontological 
dependence. That notion is the one central to traditional truthmaker theory. Analytic truths 
are also true in virtue of something, but here we are not employing a relation that involves 
ontological dependence; instead, what seems to be involved is some sort of conceptual 
dependence. Thus, even if analyticities are true in virtue of their constitutive concepts, they 
are not made true by them, in the way those words are usually meant. Unfortunately, giving a 
full analysis of analyticity in terms of this suggestion of conceptual dependence is beyond the 
                                                 
37The view originally considered by Armstrong in his first explicit explorations of truthmaking was that all 
contingent truths have truthmakers (1969: 23, 1989a, 1989b: 88). Rodriguez-Pereyra prefers to restrict 
truthmaking to “an important class of synthetic true propositions”, but doesn’t say why (2005: 18). 
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scope of this project.38 What is crucial for our project—giving an account of the truthmaking 
relation and the truths that stand in it—is to see that analytic truths are not made true in this 
ontological sense, and so must be restricted from the truthmaking relation. 
 
1.2.4. Troubles for truthmaking 
If the foregoing is on the right track, it is mistaken to look for truthmakers for analytic 
truths. Hence, any account of the truthmaking relation that holds as a consequence that 
analyticities do have truthmakers must be mistaken. As I shall now argue, all of the going 
accounts of the truthmaking relation in the literature have precisely this consequence, and so 
we need a different account of what the relation is that holds between a truth and its 
truthmaker. 
Let us begin with TM2, the bare necessitation account of truthmaking. As we saw 
above, many have argued that necessitation is insufficient for truthmaking because it leads to 
trivial truthmakers for necessary truths. According to TM2, every object is a truthmaker for 
every necessary truth. Since analytic truths are necessary truths, TM2 holds that analyticities 
are made true many times over. If analytic truths do not have truthmakers, then truthmaking 
cannot be necessitation. 
It might be more. Hence, Merricks (2007) adopts TM3 and its additional aboutness 
constraint, thereby avoiding the problem of trivial truthmakers for necessities. But TM3 fares 
no better than its predecessor at handling analyticities. Consider, for example: 
 (S) All sentences are sentences. 
S is an analytic truth. It is also a necessary truth, and so is a self-necessitator: it’s impossible 
for S to exist and not be true.39 But S is also about itself; S is about all sentences, S included. 
                                                 
38See Russell 2008 for a recent ambitious attempt to give an account of analyticity. 
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Hence, S is about itself and necessitates itself, and so, according to TM3, makes itself true. 
But S has no truthmaker, since it is analytic. TM3 is false. 
Turn now to Lowe’s essential dependence account of truthmaking (2007). When it 
comes to (interpreted) sentences, it is their meaning that makes them the sentences they are, 
that constitutes their essence. The problem for TM4 is that it holds that all analytic truths 
make themselves true. It is of the essence of analytic truths that they are true regardless of 
what exists; S, being the sentence that it is, is such that, if it exists, it is guaranteed to be true. 
Analytic truths need nothing else around in order to be true; it is their very vacuity that 
makes them analytic. So while I might not make S true, since I do not figure into its essence, 
S does figure into its own essence, such that, according to TM4, it makes itself true. But that 
cannot be, for S has no truthmaker. 
Next consider Jonathan Schaffer’s (2010) view of truthmaking as grounding. Schaffer 
takes grounding to be a primitive notion, but does hold that it is a hyperintensional relation 
that holds between substances and truth. Since grounding is taken as a primitive, it’s hard to 
evaluate definitively whether analyticities provide their own grounds. But we have just 
established that an analyticity’s essence guarantees its truth. Simply in virtue of being S, for 
example, S is true. Further, there doesn’t seem to be anything else that grounds the truth of S. 
As a necessary truth, S would still have been true even if all contingent existences had never 
existed. So S looks to be grounded either in itself (or perhaps its meaning, however 
construed). But that cannot be, since S has no truthmaker, and so by TM5 has no grounds. 
Finally we come to the view that the truthmaking relation is primitive (Rodriguez-Pereyra 
2005). Rodriguez-Pereyra adopts primitivism because, like Merricks, he thinks that 
                                                 
39Here I am taking S to be not just a sentence token, but an interpreted sentence token. After all, S is an example 
of a truth, and sentences are plausibly truth-valued only after they are paired with an interpretation. 
 28
truthmaking is stronger than necessitation. So Rodriguez-Pereyra might be thinking of 
truthmaking exactly along the lines that Merricks does. If so, then it offers no escape from 
our current problem. If he understands it differently, then we need a principled account of 
how it turns out that analyticities are not made true. To give that sort of account, as we shall 
below, we need to reject primitivism and offer in its place an acceptable analysis of the 
truthmaking relation that avoids the problems facing TM2 through TM5. 
 
1.2.5. Settling for the synthetic 
In the previous section I argued that the standard accounts of the truthmaking relation 
allow for analyticities to have truthmakers. (In many cases, they tend to make themselves 
true.) But analyticities are not made true at all; what we need is an account of the 
truthmaking relation that reflects this fact. Truthmaking, at its core, involves a kind of 
ontological dependence. When x is a truthmaker for y, that is because y depends for its truth 
in some sense on the existence of x. But analyticities require no ontological accounting, for 
they do not depend upon the world for their truth. They are ontologically vacuous in the 
sense that their truth is not bound up with what does and does not exist. Their truth still needs 
to be accounted for—lest we have to take them as brute—but not ontologically. Their truth 
must be explained some other way. 
The suggestion we explored above is that analyticities are true in virtue of their 
constituent concepts, where the ‘in virtue of’ involves a kind of conceptual dependence, and 
not the sort of ontological dependence that holds, for example, between me and the truth that 
I exist. Our present task is to offer an account of the truthmaking relation that incorporates 
the best of the existing accounts, but also takes to heart the above considerations involving 
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analyticities. On my account, the truthmaking relation—and so our answer to question 1 
above—is given by the following: 
(TM) For all x and y, x is a truthmaker for y if and only if y is purely synthetic, y 
depends upon the existence of x for its truth, and it is metaphysically 
necessary that if x exists, then y is true. 
 
The first requirement—that truths that are made true be purely synthetic—is due to 
our previous discussion that suggests that the foundational ideas underlying truthmaking 
(ontological grounding and dependence) are misplaced when it comes to analytic truths. I 
appeal to purely synthetic truths in order to explain potentially problematic cases that involve 
truth-functional compounds whose truth depends on analytic atoms.40 Consider the 
distinction between 
(OC) Obama exists, and all red things are colored 
and 
(OD) Obama exists, or all red things are colored. 
OC and OD are both synthetic, but only the latter is purely synthetic. Impurely synthetic 
truths are truth-functional compounds whose truth depends upon the truth-values of their 
constitutive analyticities. OC is impurely synthetic because its truth depends upon the truth of 
its analytic second conjunct. OC is not true in virtue of the existence of anything, which is to 
say that there is no object upon which its (entire) truth depends. To be sure, the truth of its 
first conjunct depends upon the existence of Obama, but its second conjunct is not made true 
by anything. Since analyticities are truthmaker gaps—that is, truths without truthmakers—
                                                 
40Peter Schulte, coming from a different direction, independently lands on the idea (and language) of 
truthmaking applying only to purely synthetic truths (Forthcoming: 16-17). The problem cases I have in mind 
are cousins of the potentially paradoxical sentences we shall meet in section 1.2.6,  sentences like ‘Obama exists, 
and this (entire) sentence has no truthmaker’. If this sentence has a truthmaker, then it’s true and therefore 
doesn’t have a truthmaker. That’s impossible, so it doesn’t have a truthmaker, and so, since Obama exists, it’s 
true. But Obama would count as a truthmaker for it by the lights of TM if not for the restriction to the purely 
synthetic. Thanks go to Rachael Briggs for pointing out such cases to me. 
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they spread their “gappiness” into anything built upon them.41 Hence, in order for a truth to 
have a truthmaker, it must include as a truth-functional part no analyticity upon whose truth 
(or falsity) it depends.42 Such is the case with OD. We can allow that OD has a truthmaker, 
because the truth of OD does not depend upon the truth of its analytic disjunct. On the one 
hand, OD is true in virtue of the existence of Obama (by way of considering its first disjunct). 
On the other hand, OD is true in virtue of RED and COLOR (by way of considering its second 
disjunct). All we have here is the familiar fact that disjunctions can be true in various ways.43 
TM also includes the condition that where x makes true y, y’s truth depends upon the 
existence of x. The notion of dependence is in place in order to satisfy the need for some sort 
of hyperintensional relation that will exclude the familiar cases of trivial truthmaking. Before, 
we saw how the other accounts deal with the task of supplementing (or replacing) the 
intensional notion of necessitation that cannot discriminate between necessary truths.44 In a 
sense, the three notions—aboutness, essential dependence, and grounding—may well come 
to the same thing since they are all attempts to get at whatever it is that ensures that 
truthmaking obtains between the truth that there are even prime numbers and 2 rather than 
                                                 
41There is an obvious parallel here with Kleene’s strong tables (Kleene 1938), according to which disjunction 
between a truth and a truth-value gap is true, and a conjunction between a truth and a truth-value gap is a truth-
value gap. Thanks to Keith Simmons for pointing this out. 
42In his Hempel lectures, Stephen Yablo offers a theory of logical parthood (2008). According to it, the analytic 
atom here is a part of the conjunction, but not the disjunction, for it is entailed by the former but not the latter. 
The thought that the analytic conjunct is a logical part of OC but not OD supports and helps to explain my 
present suggestion that the conjunct’s analyticity “infects” only the former. My thanks to an anonymous referee 
for a related article for this suggestion. 
43Some might draw the moral here that truthmaking should be restricted to synthetic atomic truths (cf. Mulligan, 
Simons, and Smith 1984 and Mellor 2009). I appreciate the sentiment, but what, for example, of modal claims 
and counterfactuals? Many truths do not sit well inside first-order logic, but still call for truthmaker 
investigation. Cf. Pendlebury 2010: 140-141. 
44Note that the difficulty here for truthmaker theorists is similar to the difficulties faced by theorists in other 
areas of philosophy. For example, there are those who want to give possible worlds accounts of propositions 
and truth-conditions (Lewis 1970 and 1986), and those who want to avoid the paradoxes of implication by 
adopting a relevance logic. See Restall 1996, Read 2000, and Heathcote 2003 for discussion of the connections 
between this last topic and truthmaking. 
 31
me.45 We can call that notion whatever we like; if one account really is better than another, 
that must be because one of them produces better results, or admits of a more illuminating 
account.46 
Are there any cases where grounding, aboutness, and essential dependence come 
apart? It is hard to say, especially since those notions are sufficiently vague such that any 
disagreement about their consequences might well be reformulated as disagreements about 
the notion itself. For example, Merricks thinks that negative existentials like ‘There are no 
unicorns’ aren’t about anything at all, and so have no truthmakers. Armstrong, presumably, 
would say that negative existentials are about something—totalities—for negative 
existentials are just the flip side of universal generalizations, which make claims about 
everything all at once. Or consider again ‘There are humans’. That sentence is essentially 
such that it is true if I exist. I also seem to ground its truth. But is it about me? In the most 
natural sense of ‘about’, it’s clearly not; only a complete narcissist could think he was so 
special. So is this a case where Merricks’s account differs from the others? Presumably not, 
since Merricks holds that ‘There are humans’ does satisfy the aboutness condition for me, 
even though it’s not about me in particular (2007: 30). My suspicion is that if we attempt to 
elucidate further the notions of grounding, aboutness, or essential dependence, they will turn 
out to amount to the same thing. After all, such elucidations will be driven by appeals to the 
same set of particular cases where it seems clear whether or not truthmaking obtains. (The 
                                                 
45Cf. Merricks 2008: 335-336. 
46Schaffer (2008a), for instance, argues that grounding is superior to aboutness in that it is a more familiar 
notion, and that aboutness seems to be a notion relevant only to sentences, and not propositions, which perhaps 
are the primary bearers of truth. Lowe himself gives reason to worry about TM4, for it holds that propositions 
can be essentially related to things that don’t exist (2007: 258). For example, ‘There are humans’ is essentially 
such that it is true if Batman exists. Thus, ‘There are humans’ is essentially related to something that doesn’t 
exist, namely, Batman. 
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parties to the various views don’t disagree about the core cases.) For present purposes, let us 
assume that one of these notions is correct; I’ve chosen to call it simply ‘dependence’.47 
Finally we come to necessitation, which I (alongside orthodoxy) continue to maintain  
is a necessary condition on truthmaking. Schaffer, however, rejects necessitation as not 
belonging at all to the theory of truthmaking. He gives three reasons (2010: 320; see also his 
2008a: 309-310). First, taking truthmaking to be necessitation, one is led to trivial 
truthmakers for necessary truths. But such a consideration casts doubt only on necessitation’s 
being sufficient for truthmaking. Second, Schaffer notes that while necessitation is reflexive 
and non-asymmetric, truthmaking is irreflexive and asymmetric. However, this assumption is 
incorrect, for there are cases of reflexive (and thus symmetric) truthmaking: The proposition 
that there are propositions makes itself true, as does the sentence token ‘There are sentence 
tokens’ and the belief that there are beliefs.48 Still, even if Schaffer is correct, his observation 
only shows that truthmaking and necessitation are not identical; the latter could still form part 
of the former. Finally, Schaffer holds that necessitation is a relation between propositions, 
and so not fit to give an account of the truthmaking relation, into which non-truth-bearing 
objects may enter. But here we have a mere terminological quarrel: we are taking 
necessitation to be a cross-categorial relation, something that obtains between an object and a 
truth-bearer. In sum, Schaffer concludes that “It is a mistake to think that talk of dependence 
can be swapped out for talk of any pattern of modal covariation” (2008a: 310). Perhaps, but 
this leads only to the limited conclusion that necessitation is not identical to truthmaking, 
                                                 
47There is much more to explore, of course, on the nature of this dependence. Giving a full account is beyond 
the scope of the present project, but we will encounter the issue again when we turn to the topic of the 
compatibility of truthmaker theory and deflationism about truth (in section 3.2.3). 
48See footnote 17 above. 
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which we are already happy to grant. So I do not take Schaffer to have motivated a rejection 
of necessitation from the business of truthmaking. 
Hugh Mellor (2003), as we saw above, has offered independent reason for rejecting 
necessitation as necessary for truthmaking by considering general truths.49 Consider the very 
last existing dodo, and call him ‘Dodo’. At a certain point in time, t, it was true that there was 
exactly one dodo, namely, Dodo. Dodo himself was not then a necessitator for the truth that 
there is exactly one dodo at t, for it’s possible that Dodo could have existed, but the sentence 
be false (because other dodos might have been around). Nonetheless, Mellor thinks, Dodo 
himself was a perfectly sufficient truthmaker for the claim that there is exactly one dodo at t. 
We have two choices. First, we can hold with Mellor that Dodo makes it true that there is 
exactly one dodo at t, thus rejecting necessitation as necessary for truthmaking. Or, secondly, 
we can hold that Dodo does not make it true, thereby preserving necessitation as a necessary 
condition on truthmaking. In that case, we can either take ‘There is exactly one dodo at t’ to 
be a truthmaker gap (as in Bigelow 1988 and Lewis 2001), or find something else to be its 
truthmaker (such as a totality state of affairs, as in Armstrong 2004). The literature tends to 
go in the second direction (recall that necessitation is the orthodox view), and then divides 
over the right conclusion to draw about what if anything makes general truths true. 
Alongside orthodoxy, I suggest we take the latter view. If necessitation is unnecessary 
for truthmaking, the following is possible: some truth y is true in virtue of the existence of 
some object x, even though it’s possible that x could have existed, but y be false. Looking at 
the expanse of possibilities, we fix in on the ones with x, and see that they are heterogeneous 
with respect to whether y is true. But recall that the point of searching for truthmakers is that 
truths must be held ontologically accountable. On Mellor’s picture of things, once we have 
                                                 
49But again, Mellor no longer seems to endorse this view. See his 2009. 
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done our accounting—by offering a truthmaker for some truth—it does not yet follow that 
the truth is true. For the ontological accounting offered underdetermines the truth-value of 
the target truth. The books have yet to be settled. If the existence of the supposed truthmaker 
doesn’t even guarantee that the truth is true, then in what sense have we given an ontological 
accounting of its truth? Its truth is not yet determined. Mellor accounts for the truth of ‘There 
is exactly one dodo at t’ by pointing merely at Dodo. Yet when we look at the space of 
possibilities, we see that there are some with Dodo where the sentence is true, and some with 
Dodo where the sentence is false. So it seems we haven’t finished our accounting yet. The 
truth of the sentence depends on more than just Dodo—we have to somehow take into 
account the separate, further fact that Dodo is the only dodo.50 
The opponent of necessitation must also hold that Dodo makes the sentence true in 
some possible worlds, but not in others. Now we can see that truthmaking on this view 
cannot be an internal relation—it must be something above and beyond the relata.51 
Armstrong argues that the truthmaking relation is internal, in the sense that it obtains in 
every possible world in which the relata both exist (2004: 9). Since the truthmaking relation 
is not anything above and beyond the relata, there is no need to posit any sort of truthmaking 
universal.52 But if necessitation is unnecessary for the truthmaking relation, the relation is 
external. The relata can both exist, even though the one doesn’t make the other true. Since 
Dodo and ‘There is exactly one dodo at t’ sometimes stand in the truthmaking relation, and 
sometimes do not, we need an account of what makes the difference, of what else it is in the 
                                                 
50Cf. Molnar 2000: 84 and Armstrong 2004: 5-7. Green 2009 argues that such arguments are question-begging. 
51Nor can it be, as Lowe holds, merely a matter of the essential properties of the relata themselves. 
52See David 2005 for worries about Armstrong’s claiming the “ontological free lunch” for his truthmaking 
relation. 
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world that makes the two stand in the relation.53 So in taking truthmaking to be an external 
relation, we need an extra account of whatever else it is that it takes to make two things stand 
in the truthmaking relation. In our case, whether Dodo is a truthmaker for ‘There is exactly 
one dodo at t’ depends upon the existence or absence of other dodos at t. Here we have a 
complicated account of how the truthmaking relation works that takes on an additional 
explanatory burden not borne by the orthodox view. Whether two things stand in the 
truthmaking relation depends upon the existence of other, distinct existences. The simpler 
approach which I favor is to take the truthmaking relation to be an internal one, such that if it 
holds between a pair of relata in one possible world, it holds in every possible world with 
those relata. Otherwise, we are left with a seemingly unprincipled account of what the 
relation is. It would have to be an external relation, such that its obtaining would depend 
upon the existence of other things quite distinct from it.54 
I conclude that we should accept necessitation as a necessary condition on 
truthmaking. Truthmakers are metaphysically sufficient conditions for their truths. If they 
weren’t, then they would not be suited for their fundamental task of giving an ontological 
accounting for their truths. The truthmaker itself should provide the adequate accounting. On 
Mellor’s view, we would need to take the truthmaker plus whatever else was required to 
account for the obtaining of the truthmaking relation in the particular case. On my view, that 
second requirement is vacuous, since truthmaking is an internal relation.55 
                                                 
53Consider how matters stand for closely related supervenience claims. Suppose some set of properties S 
supervenes on some set of base properties B. If it turns out that things differ in their S properties without 
differing in their B properties because of some further (“releasing”) properties R, then it seems that we need to 
rethink the original supervenience base and pack the R properties into the B properties. See Blackburn 1985. 
54See also Armstrong 2005: 275. 
55There is a regress worry here as well. Mellor holds that ‘Dodo is a truthmaker for ‘There is exactly one dodo 
at t’’ is true. But what makes that truth true? Note that Dodo and the sentence ‘There is exactly one dodo at t’ 
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I have presented TM as involving three separate necessary conditions, but two may 
well be redundant. I have given no further analysis of the relevant notion of dependence. 
Hopefully it is familiar. It is supposed to be the notion at work in explaining why I am not a 
truthmaker for necessary truths, and for why RED and COLOR are truthmakers for ‘There are 
concepts’ even though they are not truthmakers for ‘All red things are colored’. It may well 
be that the notion of dependence is such that it has syntheticity and necessitation built right 
into it. If so, then the statement of my account is redundant.56 As stated, though, it makes 
clear that I take necessitation to be a consequence of the truthmaking relation, and that only 
purely synthetic truths may enter into it. 
I have argued for restricting truthmaking to the purely synthetic; one might, however, 
seek to limit it further to just the contingent. The most fundamental idea underlying 
truthmaker theory is that what is true depends upon how the world is. But the truth of 
necessary truths, so goes this line of thought, does not depend upon how the world is. They 
would still have been true regardless of how things had turned out. So necessary truths do not 
even fall under the umbrella of truthmaking.57 I am sympathetic to this line of argument, but 
it has a severe consequence: there could then be no project of giving a truthmaking account 
for the truth of mathematical statements (among perhaps others, such as certain ethical truths). 
Schaffer claims that “there are substantive issues concerning the fundamental grounds for 
                                                 
will not necessitate it, so if we hold that they are the truthmaker for it, we’ll want to know what makes ‘Dodo 
and ‘There is exactly one dodo at t’ are the truthmakers for ‘Dodo is a truthmaker for ‘There is exactly one dodo 
at t’’’ true. 
56Note also that, for my purposes, I am taking the notion of a synthetic truth for granted, and using it to give an 
account of the truthmaking relation. On pain of circularity, one would then have to define the analytic/synthetic 
distinction without appealing back to truthmaking. For one such attempt, again see Russell 2008. If a more 
precise account of dependence could be offered that did not have to make explicit appeal to the 
analytic/synthetic distinction, then we could use that notion to give an account of the analytic/synthetic 
distinction, and thereby answer the Quinean challenge of explicating the elusive distinction. 
57Simons expresses sympathy with this view (2005: 254), as does Mellor (2003: 213). See also Armstrong 1969: 
23, 1989a, and 1989b: 88, and Heathcote 2006: 156, which attributes this position to Wittgenstein (1921). 
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mathematical truths” (2010: 320). If mathematical truths do not have truthmakers by way of 
their necessity, then it appears that we lose the important debate in the philosophy of 
mathematics over what the grounds are for mathematical truth. Restricting truthmakers just 
to contingent truths also spells trouble for necessary beings, be there any. If some entity E is 
a necessary being, then E could not be a truthmaker for ‘E exists’ because that sentence 
would be necessarily true, and necessary truths would not have truthmakers according to 
such restrictions. Now, we might hold with Hume that the very idea of a necessary being is 
simply conceptual confusion (an attempt to turn a matter of fact into a relation of ideas), but 
it would be preferable not to have to assume that from the outset. So we have some reason 
not to immediately divorce necessary truths from truthmaking. 
Still, it might be objected that my account still loses the ability to countenance the 
ontological questions of interest to philosophers of mathematics. After all, many think that 
the truths of mathematics are analytic, and thus would not have truthmakers according to TM. 
But here we may recognize what is actually a strength of my view. There is a substantive 
philosophical question regarding whether the truths of mathematics are analytic or synthetic. 
Consider ‘There is an even prime number’. If that is analytic, then it is true in virtue of its 
meaning, or the containment relations between its constitutive concepts, or something of the 
like. If it is analytic, then it’s not true in virtue of some existing entity, as the mathematical 
Platonist would seem to have to hold.58 If mathematical truths truly are analytic, then their 
truth is not to be accounted for by finding entities in the world that ground it. My account 
gives us that consequence. But if mathematical truths are synthetic, then it seems quite 
plausible that their truth requires a more robust grounding account—an ontological account 
                                                 
58Cf. Cameron 2010, which argues that mathematical truths are trivially true, and hence require no ontological 
grounding. 
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that can be provided by truthmaker theorists. I think Schaffer overstates the point: there are 
substantive issues concerning the fundamental grounds for mathematical truths if 
mathematical truths are synthetic. The antecedent there is a live, substantive philosophical 
issue, and so my account preserves the ontological debate that exists in the philosophy of 
mathematics. The issue over whether mathematics requires ontological grounding nicely 
coincides with the issue over whether mathematical truths are analytic or synthetic. Similarly, 
any truth about a necessary being would seem to be a good candidate for a synthetic 
necessity. ‘E exists’, if necessarily true, is true in virtue of the existence of E, not in virtue of 
the sentence’s meaning. So again, my account gives the preferred answer. Where necessary 
truths are analytic, they are ontologically vacuous and need no ontological grounding. Where 
necessary truths are synthetic (if indeed this ever happens), they may not be ontologically 
vacuous, and thus we can apply truthmaker theory to them. 
 
1.2.6. Paradox avoided 
One advantage of accepting TM and the kind of non-maximalism it entails is that it 
provides a satisfying, consistent account of some potentially paradoxical sentences for 
truthmaker theory. Such sentences were brought into the literature by Peter Milne (2005).59 
Consider the sentence 
(Y) ‘yields a sentence without a truthmaker when appended to its own quotation’ 
yields a sentence without a truthmaker when appended to its own quotation. 
 
Suppose for reductio that Y has a truthmaker. Then Y is true. Thus, the predicate ‘yields a 
sentence without a truthmaker when appended to its own quotation’ truthfully applies to 
                                                 
59Milne’s example is ‘This sentence has no truthmaker’. I have gone with my example because Milne’s employs 
self-reference, which might compromise its status as an analyticity. A sentence that references itself may well 
presuppose its own existence, and so its truth might depend upon not just its meaning, but on its own existence 
as well. 
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itself. So the sentence that it yields via self-predication, which is Y itself, has no truthmaker. 
That contradicts the initial assumption, so Y has no truthmaker. 
Now, if Y has no truthmaker, that seems to leave open four possibilities. It could be 
false, without truth-value, meaningless, or true, in which case it would be a truthmaker gap. 
If Y is false, then the self-application of the predicate yields a sentence with a truthmaker and 
that is therefore true; but since that sentence just is Y, we’ve landed in contradiction. So Y 
can’t be false. If Y is without any truth-value, then it is not true. That means that the 
predicate, applied to itself, does not yield a sentence without a truthmaker, and so the 
sentence it yields, Y, does have a truthmaker and so is true after all. 
Might Y just be meaningless? It’s not at all obvious that it is. The predicate in 
question is perfectly meaningful. It can be predicated truly or falsely. The sentence 
(F) ‘is in French’ yields a sentence without a truthmaker when appended to its 
own quotation 
 
is true, for ‘‘is in French’ is in French’ is false, and thus without a truthmaker. The sentence 
(E) ‘is in English’ yields a sentence without a truthmaker when appended to its 
own quotation 
 
is false, for ‘‘is in English’ is in English’ is true, and, presumably, has a truthmaker (probably 
involving the sentence itself and the English language, however conceived). So the predicate 
itself is sound. Self-application of predicates is likewise unproblematic. Some predicates self-
apply (‘is a predicate’), some don’t (‘is green’). There is no prima facie reason to be 
suspicious of Y’s meaningfulness. 
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But suppose Y is, nevertheless, meaningless.60 In that case, the self-predication of 
‘yields a sentence without a truthmaker when appended to its own quotation’ yields a 
meaningless sentence. But if it’s meaningless, then it doesn’t have a truthmaker. So if Y is 
meaningless, then ‘yields a sentence without a truthmaker when appended to its own 
quotation’ yields a sentence without a truthmaker when appended to its own quotation. And 
that, of course, is exactly what Y says. So if Y is meaningless, then valid reasoning leads to 
the conclusion that it’s true. 
Taking Y to be false, without truth-value, or meaningless all lead to absurdity. The 
only consistent path is to take Y to be true. Now if Y is true, that means that the self-
application of the predicate yields a sentence, Y, without a truthmaker. So there is one 
consistent treatment of Y: it’s a truth without a truthmaker. 
Milne attempts to use sentences like Y to refute maximalism, the thesis that every 
truth has a truthmaker, but such application is contentious. As Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra 
(2006a) argues, anyone who embraces maximalism will treat sentences like Y as being 
paradoxical, to be assimilated with the (strengthened) liar sentence: 
(L) This sentence is not true.61 
According to the maximalist, every truth has a truthmaker. Hence, if Y is true then it has a 
truthmaker, and so paradox arises because Y is true only if it has no truthmaker. In order to 
deal with Y, the maximalist must somehow contain it by setting it aside as not expressing a 
                                                 
60For, someone might object, since the (strengthened) Liar sentence (‘This sentence is not true’) manages to 
arise from the combination of two otherwise natural notions (truth and self-reference), so too might paradox 
spring from Y’s otherwise innocent components. 
61Interestingly, Milne presents ‘This sentence has no truthmaker’ by way of analogy with Gödel sentences, not 
the Liar (2005: 222). Presumably he wants to discourage the natural charge that the sentence is paradoxical and 
so ignorable. 
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proposition,62 or being meaningless, truth-value-less, or otherwise ignorable. They also need 
to diagnose where the seemingly sound reasoning that leads to Y’s being a truthmaker gap 
goes wrong. 
One immediate advantage for non-maximalists is that Y poses no paradox at all for 
them. Non-maximalists accept that there are truths without truthmakers, and so may happily 
admit Y among their number. Y’s prima facie meaningfulness may be preserved, as may the 
reasoning that reveals its truth. Now, it would be desirable to have an independent 
explanation of why Y turns out to be a truthmaker gap. We can find that explanation by 
recognizing that Y is very plausibly an analytic truth. The reasoning involved in 
demonstrating Y’s truth relies on an analytic connection between TRUTH and TRUTHMAKER: 
anything with a truthmaker is true. Logical reasoning alone with the concepts TRUTH and 
TRUTHMAKER reveals Y to be true. Certainly Y is not true in virtue of any empirical states of 
affairs. Analytic truths are true simply because the words that make them up mean what they 
do, regardless of what is going on in the world. Hence, we can recognize their truth provided 
we know what they say and reason soundly with them. Such is the case with Y: once we 
know what a truthmaker is, it’s a simple matter of logic to see that Y doesn’t have one. Y is 
thus best understood as a truth that is true in virtue of its meaning; because the predicate it 
involves means what it does, Y comes out as true, and necessarily so. 
On the account I have offered so far, not all truths have truthmakers, including all 
analyticities. Hence, my account offers a consistent treatment of Y, and an independent 
                                                 
62This is the view favored by Heathcote 2006: 160. 
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explanation for its truthmaker gap status. Like all analytic truths, it has no truthmaker, which 
is exactly the conclusion of our reasoning with it.63 
Consider, now, how other approaches to truthmaker theory must handle Y. The 
maximalist cannot accept that there are truths without truthmakers, and so must find some 
flaw in the reasoning that reveals Y to be true. López de Sa and Zardini (2006 and 2007) 
argue that there must be some flaw in the reasoning, but do not identify what it is. When it 
comes to Milne’s original example (‘This sentence has no truthmaker’), they suspect that the 
problem involves reasoning with “factive” predicates like ‘is true’ and ‘has a truthmaker’, 
where a predicate “is factive iff it is a conceptual truth that a declarative sentence is true if 
the predicate [truly] applies to it” (2006: 155). Note, though, that ‘yields a sentence without a 
truthmaker when appended to its own quotation’ is not factive—it can’t even be applied to 
sentences. So even if López de Sa and Zardini’s response works for Milne’s example, it 
doesn’t work for Y. Maximalists look to be held hostage to a forthcoming solution to the Liar 
paradox if they are to somehow resolve the new paradox from Y. 
Any non-maximalist approach to truthmaker theory has the immediate advantage that 
it need not recognize Y as paradoxical, for it is paradoxical only on the condition that every 
truth has a truthmaker. So non-maximalists can avoid the paradox altogether. But Y does 
cause problems for the standard accounts of the truthmaking relation we surveyed earlier. As 
an analytic truth, Y is a self-necessitator whose essence guarantees its own truth.64 But any 
account of the truthmaking relation that holds as a consequence that Y has a truthmaker is 
                                                 
63Notice that the paradox would resume for those who thought that concepts made true the analyticities that are 
properly composed of them. (See footnote 36 of this chapter.) For then Y would be made true by its constitutive 
concepts, contrary to what we can prove about it. 
64As for Merricks’s account (TM3), the predicate ‘yields a sentence without a truthmaker when appended to its 
own quotation’ would be a truthmaker for Y, for Y is about the predicate in the relevant sense, and is a (trivial) 
necessitator for it, since Y is a necessary truth. 
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false, since Y, provably, has no truthmaker. So non-maximalists who don’t accept TM must 
also somehow contain it, lest it end up refuting their account of the truthmaking relation. 
I offer my package of non-maximalism together with TM as a means of explaining 
what is going on with sentences like Y, and avoiding the paradoxes they pose for other views. 
While my account does not refute other views that try to block the conclusion that Y is a 
truthmaker gap, it does give a consistent account of it that does not hold its resolution 
hostage to a forthcoming solution to the Liar paradox, or future discovery involving what is 
flawed in the (seemingly perfect) reasoning that leads to the conclusion that Y  is a truth 
without a truthmaker. My account takes Y, and the reasoning involving it, at face value. 
 
1.3. The scope of truthmaking 
1.3.1. The doctrinal approach to truthmaking 
We have now settled on an account of what the truthmaking relation is, and hence on 
what it is to be a truthmaker. Truthmakers are grounding necessitators of purely synthetic 
truths.65 It is important to appreciate that I have not argued that all purely synthetic truths 
have truthmakers. I have only argued that if a truth has a truthmaker, then that truth is purely 
synthetic. Still, TM has implications for our second basic truthmaking question, the question 
of how wide the scope of truthmaking extends. Do all truths have truthmakers, or only some 
restricted class? We have already encountered the most obvious answer to the question, 
truthmaker maximalism, according to which all truths have truthmakers. If we proceed with 
TM as our account of truthmaking (as I think we should), full bore maximalism is off the 
table. But stepping back from our adoption of TM and its implications for the scope of 
                                                 
65I use the language of ‘grounds’ here as the inverse of ‘depends’, since nothing else is available. Where A 
depends upon B, B grounds A. I am not thereby assuming the loaded notions of ground found in Kit Fine (2001) 
and Schaffer (2010). 
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truthmaking, let us now consider some of the answers others have offered to our second 
question, so as to better appreciate the landscape of the truthmaking literature. 
First, it seems that no one should be an advocate of truthmaker nihilism—the view 
that there are no truthmakers. As we have already seen, everything is a truthmaker. Take 
some existing object x. It is true that x exists. Further, x is a truthmaker for that x exists, 
regardless of what one specifically thinks about the truthmaking relation.66 So every existing 
object is a truthmaker. Everything there is is a truthmaker. As noted above, truthmakers are 
not a special kind of entity—they’re any entity whatsoever. Consequently, the only 
sustainable way to think that there are no truthmakers is to think (falsely, it goes without 
saying) that nothing exists.67 
Truthmaker maximalism is often taken to be the heart of truthmaker theory.68 
Frequently, in fact, “truthmaker theory” or “the truthmaker principle” is identified with 
truthmaker maximalism. For example, Milne writes: “Truthmaker theory maintains that for 
every truth there is something, some thing, some entity, that makes it true” (2005: 221). 
Marian David offers: “The truth-maker principle says that for every truth there is something 
                                                 
66To my knowledge, Schaffer is the only author who disagrees with this argument, but his disagreement is 
motivated by his other metaphysical interests (i.e., priority monism) (2010). 
67Rodriguez-Pereyra writes that “many people believe that there are no truthmakers and so that there is nothing 
in virtue of which true propositions are true” (2006c: 961). Rodriguez-Pereyra does not name names, but I am 
genuinely curious to hear how they would respond to the utterly uncontroversial argument of this paragraph. 
My guess is that any self-proclaimed truthmaker nihilist is simply dissociating himself from some non-existent 
strawman truthmaker theorist. Perhaps Rodriguez-Pereyra has Davidson in mind, who once claimed that 
“Nothing, however, no thing makes sentences and theories true” (1973-1974: 16). Davidson is here expressing 
his distaste for factive entities, among others (cf. Strawson 1950: 134-135). We know better, for truthmakers are 
not limited to facts. Understood in our sense, everything that exists makes some truth true. Maybe not all truths 
are made true in virtue of something, but it is beyond all doubt that some truths stand in the truthmaking relation. 
68Advocates of maximalism include George Molnar (2000), Cameron (2008d), Schaffer (2010), and of course 
Armstrong (e.g., 2004). Julian Dodd (2002) and Merricks (2007) think that advocates of truthmaking should be 
maximalists. (And because maximalism is false, there should be no advocates of truthmaking!) 
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that makes it true, that every truth has a truth-maker” (2009: 137).69 Maximalism obviously 
accompanies significant theoretical simplicity. But it runs into trouble in certain cases, most 
infamously negative truths. Consider, for example, the true negative existential that there are 
no unicorns.70 A natural thought is that that there are no unicorns is true not in virtue of the 
existence of anything, but precisely because nothing of a certain kind exists.71 If it does have 
a truthmaker, it’s highly contentious what it would be. Historically speaking, the debate over 
negative truths, and whether we must accept negative facts for them to correspond to, is 
already present in Russell (1985) and Wittgenstein (1921). Russell countenanced negative 
facts;72 Wittgenstein abhorred them. Nowadays, many take negative truths to be 
counterexamples to maximalism.73 For them, negative existentials are one source of 
truthmaker gaps. Others are more cavalier. As we have seen, Armstrong (following Russell 
1985) expands his ontology with a totality state of affairs to find a truthmaker for negative 
existentials. Others try to make do with more meager resources, finding truthmakers for 
negative truths without turning to totality facts or negative facts.74 Stephen Mumford 
                                                 
69See also Kierland and Monton 2007: 489. 
70Throughout this work, I shall be supposing, contra Kripke 1972, that that there are no unicorns is only 
contingently true. It strikes me that there is overwhelming linguistic evidence that unicorns are a perfectly 
possible creature. 
71Cf. Pendlebury 2010: 142. 
72In so doing, Russell reports having “nearly produced a riot” at a seminar at Harvard (1985: 74). JC Beall 
(2000) and Dale Jacquette (2010) have recently taken them up. 
73For instance, Mulligan, Simons, and Smith 1984, Bigelow 1988, Lewis 1992 and 2001b, Linsky 1994, Smith 
1999, Dodd 2002 and 2007, Mellor 2003, Cameron 2005, Melia 2005, Mumford 2005, Simons 2005 and 2007a, 
Parsons 2006, and Merricks 2007. 
74For instance, Demos 1917, van Fraassen 1969, Pendlebury 1986 and 2010, Hochberg 1994, Martin 1996, Heil 
2000, Lewis and Rosen 2003, McGrath 2003, Cheyne and Pigden 2006, Kukso 2006, Cameron 2008a, and 
Veber 2008. 
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preserves maximalism by denying the existence of negative truths (2007a and 2007b).75 
Some just end up in aporia (Molnar 2000). Here is Rodriguez-Pereyra: “one also has to find 
a truthmaker, for instance, for negative existential truths, like the truth that there are no 
penguins in the Northern Pole. What that truthmaker is, I don’t claim to know. All I claim is 
that there must be one” (2005: 31). 
Those who retreat from maximalism endorse the existence of truthmaker gaps: truths 
that lack truthmakers. In so doing, however, they do not automatically abandon the 
truthmaking enterprise. Several theorists, although they reject maximalism, endorse a 
different thesis that they claim to be the essence of truthmaker theory. John Bigelow (1988) 
and Lewis (at least in his 2001b)76 advocate the view that while some truths lack truthmakers, 
truths nevertheless supervene on being.77 That there are no Arctic penguins is true not in 
virtue of the existence of some particular thing, but is nonetheless true in virtue of the way 
the world is. Thus, if two worlds W1 and W2 differ with respect to the truth of that there are 
no Arctic penguins, the difference obviously must involve there being Arctic penguins in one, 
but not the other. But in the world with no Arctic penguins, that there are no Arctic penguins 
is not made true by anything existing in the world, contra Armstrong. It is true in virtue of 
the fact that the world lacks any falsemakers—namely, Arctic penguins—for it. Bigelow and 
Lewis disagree on how to formulate their shared idea. Bigelow thinks that the difference 
must be one of existence—if two worlds are distinct in terms of what is true, that is because 
something exists in one of them but not the other. For Lewis, if two worlds are distinct in 
terms of what is true, that is because either there is a difference in what exists, or a difference 
                                                 
75I have a hard time seeing how Mumford’s view is even coherent. For a brief refutation, see Simons 2007a. 
76But see Lewis 2003 and Lewis and Rosen 2003 for a maximalist application of Lewis’s later approach to 
truthmaking that stands as his last word on the topic. 
77Hofmann 2006 also endorses this view. 
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in the distribution of properties and relations among the things that do exist. (So, contra 
Bigelow, two worlds could agree on what exists, but be distinct nonetheless.) Bigelow’s 
principle relieves him of the need to offer truthmakers for negative truths; Lewis’s principle, 
in addition, relieves him of the need to offer truthmakers for contingent predications.78 
We may next acknowledge other advocates of truthmaking who subscribe to neither 
of the above views, which Chris Daly describes as “stronger” and “weaker” versions of the 
truthmaker principle (2005: 85). Mulligan, Simons, and Smith advocate the view that only 
atomic truths have truthmakers (1984; Linsky 1994 agrees), whereas Rodriguez-Pereyra 
thinks that “necessarily the members of an important class of synthetic true propositions, 
including inessential predications, have truthmakers” (2005: 18).79 Roy Sorensen defines the 
“truthmaker principle” as the thesis that “for each contingent truth there must be something 
in the world that makes it true” (2001: 171).80 Barry Smith (1999) also considers a restricted 
view of truthmaking. So we seem to have several different ways that truthmakers have been 
advocated. We have those who, with Armstrong, believe that all truths have truthmakers. We 
have those like Bigelow and Lewis (2001b) who think that truths supervene on being, a view 
entailed by but not entailing Armstrong’s stronger view. Finally, we have those who argue 
for various restricted versions of truthmaking—some, but not all truths have truthmakers.81, 82 
                                                 
78Note that Armstrong’s maximalism is stronger than the other two’s views, such that he too thinks that truth 
supervenes on being. 
79Notice also that Rodriguez-Pereyra adds necessity to his truthmaker principle. Other writers tend not to 
modalize the various truthmaker principles. Nothing will turn on the issue in what follows. 
80See also Armstrong 1989b: 88. 
81The Bigelow/Lewis view is also a kind of restricted view of truthmaking, but is often discussed separately 
from the other restricted views (as in Merricks 2007). So I too shall distinguish it from the others. 
82Beware also of the ambiguity in the literature behind ‘the truthmaker principle’. Most commonly, it is taken to 
refer to truthmaker maximalism—that all truths have truthmakers. But Gerald Vision (2004: 254) and 
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1.3.2. The methodological approach to truthmaking 
Each of the views we have canvassed so far are all particular doctrines: we have 
considered what it is to be an advocate of truthmaking by looking at some of the various 
theses to which advocates of truthmaking subscribe. Theorists typically begin with such a 
doctrine, and then set out to discover what truthmakers are needed to satisfy that doctrine. I 
suggest a different approach.83 My suggestion is that we understand what it is to be an 
advocate of truthmaking as not a kind of doctrinal stance, but rather as a methodological 
stance.84 That methodology is as follows: Metaphysics is the enterprise of giving a complete 
account of the nature of the world. Ontology, specifically, concerns questions of what exists. 
The truthmaking relation takes us from truths that we accept to what it is that exists that 
grounds those truths. So one way of doing ontology is to uncover the best account of what 
the truthmakers are for certain truths. We can accept that approach to ontology even before 
we commit to a strong thesis such as truthmaker maximalism, or that all truth supervenes on 
being. Starting with truths that we accept, we offer a theory of truthmakers for those truths.85 
Now (and here is where I begin to differ from others who are concerned with 
truthmaking) when we reach a trouble spot, a spot where it is difficult to find a plausible 
truthmaker for some truth (or where a truth just seems like it does not require a truthmaker), 
                                                 
Friederike Moltmann (2007: 385), by contrast, use it to refer to truthmaker necessitarianism—that truthmakers 
necessitate their truths. 
83For more criticism of the doctrinal approach to truthmaker theory, see Liggins 2008. 
84Hence I could not disagree more with the very first sentence of Dodd 2007: “To be a truthmaker theorist is to 
commit oneself to a principle stating that the members of a certain class of true propositions have truthmakers” 
(383). Without maximalism, Dodd rejects truthmaking as a “pointless” enterprise not worth pursuing (2002: 70, 
footnote 2; see also his 2007). Naturally, I disagree. 
85The methodology I am here suggesting recommends moving in the direction from truths to truthmakers, not 
the reverse. That is not to say that the set of truths with which we begin our ontological investigations is 
immune from being questioned; we can expect some reflective equilibrium (as in Rawls 1971) to lead us to 
reject certain things we previously took to be true, given the results of our ontological inquiries. See chapter 3 
of Armstrong 2004 for a more elaborate discussion of the direction of inquiry I am upholding. 
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we should pause and weigh our options. Since we have not yet committed ourselves to one of 
the doctrines surveyed above, we have choices in how to respond. Other accounts of 
truthmaking prejudice and limit the choices we have available to us when we are faced with 
troublesome cases. My ultimate suggestion is that by attending to those cases where 
truthmaking runs into the most trouble, we can offer a better doctrine of truthmaking that its 
advocates ought to adopt, and also shed light on the various realism/anti-realism debates that 
plague the metaphysical terrain. Proceeding in such a fashion, we shall not assume that all 
truths have truthmakers (or that all contingent truths have truthmakers, or that all atomic 
truths have truthmakers, etc.).86 Yet it goes without saying that some truths have truthmakers. 
Our interest, then, will be in how we should react when we are unsure of whether some truth 
has a truthmaker, and what consequences it would mean for ontology depending on how we 
answer. Is there something that binds together the class of truths that lack truthmakers, be 
there any such class? If we think there are good grounds for saying that some truths lack 
truthmakers, can we give a principled account of when truths do have truthmakers, and when 
they do not? Does the distinction between those truths with truthmakers and those without 
offer anything by way of elucidating the various realism debates across philosophy? If so, 
can the notion of truthmaking be put to use in solving such disputes? Such questions, which 
will fuel much of this project, come to the fore when particular doctrinal stances are set to the 
side. 
To better appreciate the methodology I am here advocating, it will be useful to 
contrast it with the competing approaches adopted by Armstrong and Merricks. First consider 
Armstrong’s view. Armstrong heartily subscribes to truthmaker maximalism. But he also 
                                                 
86In fact, we are continuing on the assumption that maximalism is false (for we are excluding analytic truths 
from having truthmakers). In other cases, such as negative existentials, we shall be as open minded as possible. 
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articulates how that doctrine invites a metaphysical methodology very much akin to what I 
am suggesting. He writes: 
To postulate certain truthmakers for certain truths is to admit those truthmakers to 
one’s ontology. The complete range of truthmakers admitted constitutes a 
metaphysics, which alerts us to the important point […] that the hunt for truthmakers 
is as controversial and difficult as the enterprise of metaphysics. I think that 
proceeding by looking for truthmakers is an illuminating and useful regimentation of 
the metaphysical enterprise, or at least the enterprise of a realist metaphysics. But it is 
no easy and automatic road to the truth in such matters. (2004: 23) 
 
Here Armstrong is suggesting that, equipped with the doctrine of truthmaker maximalism, we 
can be guided by a methodology that takes us from truths to truthmakers. How should we 
build our preferred ontology? Look to the truths that we accept, offer a theory of what 
truthmakers ground those truths, and read one’s metaphysics off of the list of truthmakers.87 
So far so good. However, Armstrong’s commitment to truthmaker maximalism limits the 
options available to him when we encounter difficult cases in metaphysics. He goes on to 
write: 
We take certain things to be true, and then ask what truthmakers these truths demand. 
It may be that at times we will think that we must have certain truthmakers, and as a 
result add to what we take to be our stock of truths. Or we might find ourselves 
unwilling to postulate certain truthmakers and therefore having to reject what we had 
previously taken to be truths. (2004: 26) 
 
In difficult cases, we find ourselves with truths that we accept, and candidate truthmakers 
that those truths demand that we cannot accept. If we choose not to accept the candidate 
truthmakers, Armstrong says, we must give up the truths.88 So we have two options: give up 
the truth, or countenance the truthmaker. What we cannot do is hold on to the truth, and 
reject its candidate truthmaker. Truthmaker maximalism prevents such an option: if all truths 
                                                 
87This is not to say that truthmaker theory offers a unique account or criterion of ontological commitment in 
competition with Quine’s (1948, 1960), as Cameron (2008c) thinks. We shall take up this topic in greater detail 
in section 4.2. 
88An example of this strategy, to be explored in depth in chapter 5, may be found in J. L. Mackie’s moral error 
theory (1977). 
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have truthmakers, then there is no possibility of accepting a truth but no accompanying 
truthmaker. To do so would be of a piece with the phenomenalists’ or behaviorists’ positing 
the truth of certain counterfactuals without also supplying an ontological ground for them.89 
It would be, in effect, cheating. 
Guided by his commitment to truthmaker maximalism, Armstrong’s methodology 
takes him to conclusions that others are loath to accept. One particularly uncharitable 
commentator chastises certain consequences of Armstrong’s metaphysics as being 
“wrongheaded”, “bizarre”, “implausible”, and “confused” (Melia 2005: 69). Infamously, 
Armstrong admits totality states of affairs into his ontology. Suppose the world has just two 
things, a and b, both of which instantiate the universal F. Here we have two states of affairs: 
a’s being F, and b’s being F. It is true in this world that everything is F. What makes it true 
that everything is F? A natural response is that a is F, that b is F, and a and b are all there is 
in this world. So everything is F. Armstrong takes seriously that response, and finds in it an 
additional state of affairs: a and b’s being all the things in the world. Since the initial two 
states of affairs fail to necessitate that everything is F, we do not yet have a truthmaker for it. 
We need to combine those two with our third totality state of affairs—a state of affairs that 
holds that all the first-order states of affairs are all the first-order states of affairs that there 
are.90 Now we have necessitation, and a genuine truthmaker. Armstrong thinks his totality 
states of affairs are the best available option, and he offers as parsimonious an account of 
them as he can (for instance, he shows how they do double truthmaking duty by also 
handling negative existentials). Despite the bad taste they leave in others’ mouths, totality 
                                                 
89See Armstrong 2004: 1-3 for a discussion and history of the role that arguments against behaviorism and 
phenomenalism have played in the truthmaker literature. 
90See Armstrong 2004: 72-75 for his account of totality states of affairs, and Heil 2006 for criticism. Cheyne 
and Pigden humorously refer to totality states of affairs as “Porky the Pig facts” (2006: 254). Th-th-that’s all f-f-
folks! 
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states of affairs are embraced by Armstrong because he thinks they are the best solution to 
the problem of truthmakers for general and negative truths. Armstrong’s methodology forces 
him, in full ontological honesty, to accept what he thinks are the best candidate truthmakers 
for such truths. Since he is not willing to reject all general truths as false, he owns up to what 
he takes the requisite metaphysical commitments to be. 
One way to interpret Armstrong’s approach to truthmaking is that he is more 
committed to truthmaker maximalism than he is to any particular preconceived metaphysical 
prejudices. If maximalism leads him to postulate totality states of affairs, then he will 
postulate totality states of affairs. If others are prejudiced against such things, the burden is 
on them to produce an alternative truthmaker, or to get out of the truthmaker game. One thing 
is apparent: in Armstrong’s work on truthmakers, truthmaker maximalism is not up for 
question. 
Now compare Armstrong’s view on truthmaking with Merricks’s (2007). Merricks 
(himself ultimately a critic of truthmaking, not an advocate) focuses on truthmaking as 
cheater catching. If the issue of cheating is simply a metaphysician postulating a truth 
without offering any truthmaker, Armstrong would agree. But Merricks goes further. 
Metaphysicians also cheat when they posit “suspicious” properties or entities as candidate 
truthmakers. So one can cheat even when proposing truthmakers for various truths. How is 
this possible? Merricks thinks that truthmaker theorists should build into their accounts of 
truthmaking substantial metaphysical commitments. Specifically, truthmaker theorists need 
to come equipped with an account of what sorts of properties or entities are suspicious. Then, 
if anyone offers a suspicious truthmaker, they can be disregarded as ontological cheaters. 
Hence Merricks writes: 
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To catch certain cheaters, Truthmaker must deem some properties to be suspicious. 
So a fully articulated Truthmaker would tell us which properties are suspicious and 
which are not. […] A full account of which properties are suspicious is itself a full-
blown metaphysics. Thus a fully articulated Truthmaker is not a neutral litmus test 
that competing theories must pass to be taken seriously. Instead, it is one of the 
competitors. (2007: 37) 
 
Whereas Armstrong focuses on truthmaking as a way of discovering what should go into our 
ontology, Merricks focuses on using truthmaking to filter out views that we find unsavory.91 
For Merricks, the truthmaker theorist starts with a metaphysical view, and then weeds out 
views that appeal to what he judges to be metaphysically suspicious. Of course, truthmaker 
theorists need not come to the table with a fully sketched metaphysical theory. But they need 
to have some idea of what is allowable as a truthmaker and what must be disallowed, if 
truthmaking is to fulfill its goal of catching ontological cheaters. 
Different methodologies lead to very different reactions in troubling cases of 
truthmaking. Consider once again negative existentials: it is true, for example, that there are 
no unicorns. What is it in the world that grounds that truth? Committed to truthmaker 
maximalism, Armstrong finds the best candidate truthmaker he can, and embraces it: totality 
states of affairs. Lewis (1992, 2001b), Melia, and Merricks, among others, find totality states 
of affairs unacceptable, and use negative existentials as counterexamples to truthmaker 
maximalism. In the hands of George Molnar, someone committed both to maximalism and 
the suspiciousness of totality states of affairs, the case of negative existentials leads to aporia: 
“We need positive truthmakers for negative truths but we have no good theory of what these 
                                                 
91The difference in focus is perhaps best explained by the fact that one of Merricks’s favored metaphysical 
views, presentism, has been argued against in the name of truthmaking. Presentism, it is said, advocates the 
existence of truths about the past while explicitly denying that the things those truths are about exist. Hence 
presentism is accused of cheating, of trying to earn truths without the requisite metaphysical commitments. See 
Lewis 1992: 219, Bigelow 1996, Sider 2001, Armstrong 2004, chapter 11, Keller 2004, Parsons 2005, Crisp 
2007, Heathwood 2007, Kierland and Monton 2007, Merricks 2007, chapter 6, Stoneham 2009, Tallant 2009a 
and 2009b, and Goff 2010 for related discussion. 
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might be. […] It is an impasse and at present I cannot see the way out” (2000: 85; recall also 
Rodriguez-Pereyra 2005: 31). 
The methodology I have prescribed for advocates of truthmaking avoids the doctrinal 
commitments that Armstrong and Merricks both require. Both kinds of doctrines are risky 
additions to truthmaker theory. First, Armstrong admits that he does not have an argument 
for truthmaker maximalism, the doctrine that informs his approach to truthmaking.92 Rather, 
he simply hopes that “philosophers of realist inclinations will be immediately attracted to the 
idea that a truth, any truth, should depend for its truth on something ‘outside’ it, in virtue of 
which it is true” (2004: 7; see also his 1989b: 89). Bigelow says much the same: 
I have sometimes tried to stop believing in the Truthmaker axiom. Yet I have never 
really succeeded. Without some such axiom, I find I have no adequate anchor to hold 
me from drifting onto the shoals of some sort of pragmatism or idealism. And that is 
altogether uncongenial to me; I am a congenital realist about almost everything. 
(1988: 123) 
 
Armstrong and Bigelow both announce their instant and automatic attraction to truthmaking. 
Both cite canonical cases of cheaters (phenomenalists, behaviorists) as instances where the 
fundamental idea behind truthmaking seems to have been violated. Truthmaker theory seems 
to say exactly what is wrong with such theories. Still, many have wondered whether the gut 
instinct motivating Armstrong and Bigelow is enough to justify belief in maximalism. 
(Indeed, Bigelow ends up not believing in truthmaker maximalism). Lewis captured the 
sentiment of many when we wrote: 
All too often, philosophical positions posit truths that fail to supervene on being. 
Consider phenomenalism, with its brute counterfactual truths about nonexistent 
                                                 
92Nor does anyone else seem to have a good argument for maximalism, though Cameron attempts one in his 
2008d. He thinks that all truths need truthmakers because he thinks that all truths require grounds, and takes for 
granted (falsely) that grounding can only be accomplished by truthmaking (see section 4.2). Cameron also 
thinks (again falsely) that truthmaker theory is a theory of truth, and so applies across the board (see chapter 2). 
And, finally, Cameron (falsely) equates the project of giving truthmakers with the project of giving “reasons for 
truth” (108). See section 1.4 for the problems with this view. 
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experience. Armstrong has told us how Charlie Martin long ago persuaded him to 
smell a rat. […] Right! But the way Martin explained the bad smell, namely as the 
stink of truths without truth-makers, cast suspicion not only on the ratty 
counterfactuals that well deserved it, but also on innocent negative existentials and 
predications. By all means find something wrong with phenomenalist counterfactuals. 
But if my denial that there are arctic penguins is likewise true without benefit of any 
truth-maker, true just because there aren't any arctic penguins to make it false, then is 
it really a companion in guilt? (1992: 218-219) 
 
Lewis is here acknowledging what is right about truthmaker theory, and for what purpose it 
can be used. But, he thinks, truthmaker maximalism is the wrong response to phenomenalism 
et alia. He who offers no truthmaker for that there are no Arctic penguins is different in kind 
from he who offers no truthmaker for that if I were to be staring at an emerald, I would be 
having a greenish experience. The latter is guilty, certainly. But the former is no companion 
in guilt. Lewis does not here tell us why one is a cheater, and one is not. (Though he suggests 
that the phenomenalist is somehow denying supervenience.) Yet if we are not going to 
advocate truthmaker maximalism, we will want a principled account of when truths do have 
truthmakers, and when they do not. Such an account has not been offered, and one goal of 
this project to move toward forming one. 
Truthmaker maximalism, as we have seen, is a very controversial thesis. Some think 
it is quite appealing as is; others think the thesis far outstrips its motivation. On the latter 
view, there is something right about truthmaking, but not enough to justify maximalism. I 
have no argument for it, and neither does Armstrong, its biggest supporter. Besides, we have 
already argued against it. But even setting aside negative existentials and analytic truths, we 
still have to face the question whether there are any more truthmaker gaps to be found. 
(Ethical truths? Mathematical truths? Certain counterfactuals?) Without being committed to 
some restricted maximalist doctrine from the outset, we can entertain the thought that 
perhaps there are more truths that lack truthmakers. Furthermore, had we been committed to 
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maximalism from the outset, we could not have explored the live possibility that truthmaker 
theory might be misapplied to the class of analytic truths. Armstrong’s methodology forbids 
such explorations. My hypothesis is that we can make some metaphysical progress by 
attending to the similarities among truths where we may be disinclined to supply truthmakers. 
Thinking about truthmaker gaps might also shed some light on various realism debates across 
philosophy. If so, we should keep an open mind as to which truths have truthmakers, and 
which do not. 
Merricks’s methodology is also risky in that it must build into truthmaker theory an 
opinionated stance as to what kinds of thing exist. Being front-loaded with metaphysical 
prejudice, then, it’s unclear how considerations involving truthmaking can help make 
progress in ontological debates. Truthmaking on Merricks’s conception is not of much utility 
for building one’s ontology. One must already have an ontology, and then use truthmaking 
principles to refute competing metaphysical views. But where does one acquire one’s 
metaphysical preferences and prejudices? Armstrong looks to truthmaking; Merricks 
obviously cannot, for on his view we can wield the notion of a truthmaker only after we have 
committed ourselves ontologically. Hence there is a substantial gulf between Armstrong’s 
truthmaking as ontology building and Merricks’s truthmaking as cheater catching. 
Given that I am starting this inquiry as metaphysically neutral as possible, I cannot 
accept Merricks’s truthmaker methodology any more than I can accept Armstrong’s. Besides, 
I think it is of less philosophical interest to label someone a cheater than it is to put on full 
display his or her full metaphysical commitments. One might, should he be naturally 
suspicious of totality states of affairs (or any kind of states of affairs for that matter), be 
inclined to call Armstrong a cheater. A more substantive response, however, is to appreciate 
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Armstrong’s proposed metaphysics, and then evaluate it according to all the traditional 
modes of theory choice with which we normally operate. We might think that the benefit of 
advocating truthmaking is that it enables us to saddle the phenomenalist (et alia) with 
cheating. My suggestion to the contrary is that advocating truthmaking enables us to see that 
the phenomenalist is committed to a metaphysics with brute counterfactual truths. Does that 
make him a cheater? Only if his view is conclusively untenable. But in philosophy, diversity 
reigns, and the expanse of logical space is far and wide. Philosophers hold radically different 
views, and consensus is hard to find. To call a philosopher a cheater is to assume from the 
outset that the philosopher’s view simply cannot be true, or is somehow against the “rules” 
(whatever those might be!) of philosophical discourse. But where is the knock down 
argument against the possibility of brute counterfactual truths about perceptual experiences? 
Or consider Marc Lange’s (2009) view of laws of nature, which depend for their existence 
upon the truth of certain counterfactuals (the truth of which is then taken to be 
metaphysically brute). Contemporary philosophical consensus may be naturally prejudiced 
against such views, but that does not mean that they are not fair playing contenders. (No one 
who plunged into the depths of Laws and Lawmakers would be inclined to call Lange a 
philosophical cheat.) Yet in labeling a view as a cheat, we seem to be excluding it from the 
possible positions we might hold, or that can be held in good philosophical conscience. If 
such views are cheaters by default, then there can be no hope of reasonable discourse 
between them and anyone interested in truthmaking. The virtue of truthmaker theory is that it 
exposes to the world the ontological and metaphysical commitments that a proponent of a 
certain view must accept. Truthmaking is a call to ontological honesty. Once a proposed 
ontology is exposed, we can take it or leave it. I see no advantage in further labeling views 
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we may wish to set aside as cheaters, as if such views do not count as legitimate, fair playing 
philosophical contenders. 
I suggest, then, that we set aside both an explicit commitment to any particular 
truthmaking doctrine, and also the inclination to saddle unsavory philosophical views as 
cheaters.93 We want to make progress in ontology, and a methodology closer to Armstrong’s 
will enable that. What is dissatisfying in Armstrong’s methodology is his unshakable 
commitment to truthmaker maximalism, for which he himself admits he has no argument 
despite its being a most contentious and substantial metaphysical thesis. Further, my hope is 
to reach some philosophical insight by contemplating the class of truths that lack truthmakers, 
however large. So we must be open to the possibility that some truths—even purely synthetic 
truths—lack truthmakers. We can allow ourselves to be methodological maximalists—we 
may assume initially that any given truth has a truthmaker. Hence we can understand 
ontology building as a kind of search after truthmakers. But when we run into troublesome 
cases, we may, upon seasoned reflection, decide that the best response is that the truth 
requires no truthmaker.94 Not much work has been done on the question of when or why 
certain truths lack truthmakers. Any maximalist simply does not entertain the possibility. 
Others take it to be obvious that some truths lack truthmakers, but we have yet to see a 
systematic investigation into the distinction between truths that have truthmakers, and those 
                                                 
93Similarly, I do not at the outset want to assume the truth of the Bigelow/Lewis principle that truth supervenes 
on being. Like most others in the literature, I find the view rather appealing and fairly plausible, more so than 
the stronger thesis of truthmaker maximalism. But Merricks contests it (see chapter 4 of his 2007), as does Jody 
Azzouni (2006), and we may see reason later on to reject it as well in certain cases. See also Kierland and 
Monton 2007 for doubts. 
94Cf. Tallant 2009b: 414-415. 
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that do not. The hypothesis of this work is that by attending to that distinction, we will be led 
to fruitful metaphysical insight.95 
 
1.4. Conclusion 
We have now explored the first two topics that any truthmaker theorist must confront: 
what the truthmaking relation is, and which truths stand in it. We have argued in favor of TM, 
that view that truthmakers are things that properly ground and necessitate purely synthetic 
truths. And we have adopted methodological maximalism, which does not outright assume 
the bold metaphysical thesis that all truths have truthmakers, but instead is open to the 
possibility that there are truthmaker gaps (even beyond analytic truths). Methodological 
maximalism respects the legitimacy of truthmaker theory, and posits truthmakers when they 
are needed. But as the maximalism is merely methodological, it is also open to considering 
the existence of truths without truthmakers (even synthetic ones), and then to assess what 
relevance such truths have for metaphysical views that arise during philosophical debate. 
There is a third question that faces truthmaker theorists: what truthmakers are there? 
Having settled what a truthmaker is, and when and where we need to look for them, the 
natural next step is to offer an account of just what truthmakers there are. Giving an answer 
to this third question is by no means an easy task. As noted by Armstrong above, to give an 
account of what truthmakers there are just is to give a metaphysics. For everything that exists 
is a truthmaker (and there are no non-existent truthmakers!), so to give an exhaustive account 
                                                 
95Compare Hartry Field’s methodological deflationism about truth: “All I really hope to motivate here is that we 
should be “methodological deflationists”: that is, we should start out assuming deflationism as a working 
hypothesis; we should adhere to it unless and until we find ourselves reconstructing what amounts to the 
inflationist's relation “S has the truth conditions p”. So methodological deflationism is simply a methodological 
policy, which if pursued could lead to the discovery that deflationism in the original sense (“metaphysical 
deflationism”) is workable or could lead to the discovery that inflationism is inevitable” (1994a: 263). 
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of what truthmakers there are is tantamount to offering a full ontological inventory. It is no 
goal of this project to accomplish quite so much. Nor shall we be taking on the much more 
modest task of offering truthmaker arguments for the existence or non-existence of certain 
kinds of entities. Armstrong, famously, uses truthmaker arguments to insist on the reality of 
states of affairs (see, for example, his 1997 and 2004). Others think the existence of tropes 
falls out of truthmaker arguments (e.g., Cameron 2008a). Lewis ingeniously uses ordinary 
objects under counterpart relations as truthmakers (2003). It is not my intention to enter into 
this fray. Rather, I want to employ truthmaker theory for purposes for which it has yet to be 
applied. Specifically, I am interested in what truthmaker theory has to tell us about the theory 
of truth, and what it has to tell us about the issues surrounding realism and anti-realism. 
Having settled the necessary preliminaries, we can now proceed and approach those new 
topics. 
In closing, let me make one final comment about how I think we should approach 
truthmaker theory. It is sometimes claimed that truthmaker theory is an explanatory theory, 
or that the truthmaking relation is an explanatory relation.96 While I do not contest that 
truthmaker theory offers explanations, I think that the appeal to explanation here (as with 
similar claims elsewhere in philosophy) is either hopelessly vague or trivial and 
uninformative. Every philosophical theory is explanatory. Every philosophical investigation 
hopes to produce explanation, understanding, elucidation, illumination, etc. There is nothing 
special about truthmaker theory that makes it particularly explanatory. Indeed, the claim that 
                                                 
96See, for instance, McFetridge 1990, Molnar 2000: 82, Daly 2005, Liggins 2005, Rodriguez-Pereyra 2005, 
Smith and Simon 2007, Vision 2010, and Schulte Forthcoming. Ian McFetridge’s “truthmaker principle”, also 
endorsed by David Liggins, is the following: For every sentence which is true there must be some explanation 
of why it is true (1990: 42). The principle looks to me more like an offering of the principle of sufficient reason 
rather than something distinctly involving truthmakers. (Though there might be something to the suggestion that 
truthmaker maximalism offers a reading of just what the principle of sufficient reason is.) Casting further 
suspicion on his associating his principle with truthmaking, McFetridge immediately (and rather dubiously) 
goes on to associate truthmaking with Tarski-style theories of truth. See Dodd 2000: 16, endnote 10. 
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truthmakers explain their truths is empty, absent some account of what counts as an adequate 
explanation. 
I flag this point only because the appeal to explanation has led to considerable 
misunderstanding about the project of truthmaker theory, and has led some to dismiss it all 
too quickly. For example, on nearly all accounts,97 I am a truthmaker for that a human exists. 
Do I plausibly serve as an explanation for the truth of that a human exists? My existence is 
definitely a metaphysically sufficient condition for the truth of that a human exists. But I 
wonder in what contexts, in the actual world where there are plenty of other humans around, 
my existence would be considered an adequate explanation. I imagine that someone who 
wanted to know why it is true that a human exists would prefer an explanation that relied on 
evolutionary principles, or perhaps theological ones. There may be contexts where offering 
the existence of a truthmaker does count as an adequate explanation of some truth. But there 
are contexts where it does not. What, then, is it for the truthmaking relation to be explanatory? 
Must it be explanatory in every context? At least one? The former answer is impossibly 
demanding, the latter trivially satisfiable (just imagine a context where offering a sufficient 
condition counts as an explanation). Absent any further account of what is required, the 
requirement that truthmaking be explanatory is empty. In any event, it is deeply mistaken to 
think that there is one single explanation of any given truth. Quite to the contrary, there is a 
giant multiplicity of explanatory projects. The notion of explanation is deeply contextual and 
pragmatic, and the practice of giving and asking for explanations can be appreciated only by 
                                                 
97The notable exception again being Schaffer 2010. 
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understanding just what sort of explanatory demand has been made, and what would count as 
a satisfactory answer to a given explanatory request.98 
Hence, I think that it is simply unhelpful and uninformative to label truthmaker theory 
as a kind of “explanatory theory”, as if that title earned it any special philosophical 
distinction. As I have been urging, what is illuminating about truthmaker theory is that it 
offers an attractive approach to asking and answering specifically ontological questions, 
questions about what there is. Truthmaker theory speaks to questions about what there must 
be in the world in order for various truths to be true. Those not interested in such ontological 
questions will not feel the pull of truthmaker theory. But that some are not bitten by the 
ontological bug is no objection to the legitimacy and interest of the truthmaking enterprise. 
Their explanatory demands simply are not ours. One might call the business of offering 
truthmakers a kind of “ontological explanation”, as in Smith and Simon 2007. Speak 
however you prefer. I only urge that we wield the notion of explanation very hesitantly. 
Truthmaker theory does provide ontological illumination; it in no way provides complete or 
exhaustive illumination about any particular truth. It is a mistake to think that it was ever 
intended to do so. 
 
1.5. Appendix: truthmakers and truth-conditions 
Thus far, our investigations have been thoroughly metaphysical. To embrace a 
collection of truthmakers is to embrace a metaphysics. Still, it will be worthwhile to explore 
                                                 
98Obviously I am presupposing that the notion of explanation is contextual. But how can that be denied? The 
contextual nature of explanation should be recognized for what it is: plain Moorean fact. The sooner 
philosophers realize this the better. It is simply evident that there is no single explanatory request for some 
simple truth, say, that Adam ate the apple. Why did Adam eat the apple? Why did Adam eat the apple? Why did 
Adam eat the apple? For a single truth, we have several explanations, depending on the contrast class generated 
by the request. Which explanation is appropriate is a matter that must be settled (at least in part) by context. I 
borrow the example (and general approach to explanation) from van Fraassen 1980: 127. 
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briefly what connections there may be between truthmakers, on the one hand, and the 
semantic concepts of truth-condition and meaning on the other. Such an investigation may be 
useful even if only to clear up or anticipate any potential misconceptions that may still be 
lurking about the notion of truthmaking. Others have conflated the notion of a truthmaker 
and the notion of a truth-condition (e.g., Blackburn 1986: 119 and Vision 2003; see also 
Jacquette 1996 and 2010 for overly-semanticized accounts of truthmaking). The point of this 
appendix is to forestall anyone making such an identification. I do not think that the notion of 
truthmaking can or should play any pivotal role in the philosophy of language, as I think it 
can in metaphysics.99 Still, let us pause to explore how we should understand the relationship 
between truthmaking and the theory of meaning.100 
First off, we can set aside for the most part the family of “use” theories of meaning. 
Such theories draw their inspiration from the work of Wittgenstein (1953) and Wilfrid Sellars 
(1954), and perhaps have reached their highest sophistication in the work of Robert Brandom 
(1994). Use theories offer accounts of the meaning of natural language statements by 
appealing to social practices and conventions. Words and sentences have their meanings in 
virtue of the roles they play in certain kinds of social practice. What is absent from the 
foreground of such theories is the notion of truth. Meanings of statements are determined via 
their social roles, not via their truth-conditions. Thus, use theories of meaning and truthmaker 
theory seem to be orthogonal to one another. Our attention, then, shall focus on theories of 
meaning that incorporate the notion of truth-conditions. 
                                                 
99Cf. Vision 2005: “There is all the difference in the world between identifying truth-conditions and identifying 
their satisfaction” (376). 
100See also Mellor 2009: 278-280. 
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For truth-conditional accounts of meaning, we must turn first, of course, to the work 
of Davidson (e.g., his 1967 and 1984). The basic idea behind Davidson’s semantic project is 
that (at least part of) a theory of meaning for a language is given by a Tarski-style semantic 
definition of truth for that language (Tarski 1956). That definition of truth will consist of a 
number of axioms that serve to satisfy Alfred Tarski’s “Convention T”, which states that an 
adequate definition of truth must entail a series of “T-sentences” conforming to the following 
schema: 
(T) s is true if and only if p. 
 
Here ‘s’ stands for some sentence in the language, and p gives the truth-condition for that 
sentence. A definition of truth for a language in Tarski’s sense will offer an instance of T for 
every sentence of the language. The collection of such axioms constitute (or partially 
constitute) a theory of meaning for a language. Hence Davidson writes: 
the definition [of truth] works by giving necessary and sufficient conditions for the 
truth of every sentence, and to give truth conditions is a way of giving the meaning of 
a sentence. To know the semantic concept of truth for a language is to know what it is 
for a sentence—any sentence—to be true, and this amounts, in one good sense we can 
give to the phrase, to understanding the language. (1967: 310) 
 
At the very least, then, a complete theory of meaning for a language will offer the truth-
conditions for each sentence belonging to it. Now, the relationship between s and p will not 
always be one of disquotation. Not all sentences wear their “logical form” on their sleeves. 
The linguist and/or philosopher bears the burden of giving a satisfying account of the correct 
logical form of certain sentences. To name one common example, Davidson argues that 
certain sentences that involve change entail that there are events. Since Davidson accepts that 
some sentences involving change are true, he embraces a metaphysics of events (1966). 
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By contrast with Davidson’s “extensional” approach to truth-conditions, other 
philosophers have advocated “intensional” approaches to meaning (e.g., Lewis 1970). Briefly, 
according to such views, the meaning of a sentence can be identified with the set of possible 
worlds in which that sentence is true. 
In order to ask what the relationship is that holds between truth-conditions and 
truthmakers, we must know what truth-conditions are. On the Lewisian approach, truth-
conditions are sets of possible worlds. For Davidson, truth-conditions are given by the right-
hand side of his T-sentences. Davidson might therefore think of truth-conditions 
linguistically—they are sentences, propositions, or states of affairs (linguistically understood, 
not objectually like Armstrong and Mellor). Either way, we can see an important difference 
between truthmakers and truth-conditions. 
Let us attend first to truth-conditions in the spirit of Davidson. Except in rare cases, 
truthmakers will not be truth-conditions. I am not a truth-condition for any sentence; neither 
are you. But we are truthmakers. Here is the rare case: Taking truth-conditions to be 
propositions (and propositions to exist), the proposition that there are propositions is both a 
truth-condition for ‘There are propositions’ and a truthmaker (but not the only one) for 
‘There are propositions’ as well. If truth-conditions exist, they like everything else will be a 
truthmaker for at least some truth. But in most cases, a sentence’s truth-condition will not be 
its truthmaker, as most sentences are not about truth-conditions. The proposition that snow is 
white is not a truthmaker for ‘Snow is white’, for there are worlds in which the proposition 
exists (for propositions are necessary creatures), but where ‘Snow is white’ is false. 
The stark difference between truthmakers and truth-conditions is quite unsurprising. 
For one thing, only truths have truthmakers. Falsehoods do not have truthmakers. But truths 
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and falsehoods do not diverge on the subject of truth-conditions: they are both possessed of 
them. Further, while many truths have multiple truthmakers, it is not the case that any truth 
has multiple truth-conditions.101 Take the truth that there are humans. Each and every human 
that exists counts as a truthmaker for that truth (assuming that we humans are essentially so). 
But the sentence ‘There are humans’ has a single truth-condition: that there be humans. 
Finally, note that the truthmaker theorist stresses the perhaps obvious point that truthmakers 
must exist. Truthmaker theorists may take no recourse to non-existent entities in their 
truthmaking theories. The very idea of truthmaking is founded on the idea that truths are 
grounded in reality—in what exists. So no advocate of truthmaking would ever cite 
something that does not exist as a truthmaker for some truth. Truthmakers must be found 
inside one’s ontology. (And, indeed, truthmakers are found everywhere inside one’s 
ontology.) 
But it is not hard to imagine a truth-conditional theorist of meaning offering the 
following (admittedly optional) line of reasoning: The truth-conditions for falsehoods are 
non-existent states of affairs. The truth-condition for ‘Snow is green’ is the state of affairs of 
snow’s being green, and that state of affairs does not exist. So the truth-condition for ‘Snow 
is green’ is a non-existent state of affairs. Here we have an account of truth-conditions that 
appeals to what does not exist;102 the analogous path is in no way open to the truthmaker 
theorist. Of course, one might instead say that the truth-conditions for false sentences are 
non-obtaining states of affairs. Here, the truth-condition for ‘Snow is white’ is the obtaining 
                                                 
101Or so I assume. I am assuming that the truth-condition for, say, a disjunctive sentence is itself a disjunction, 
not that the sentence has two separate truth-conditions. But perhaps that assumption about the individuation of 
truth-conditions is not warranted without argument. 
102I do recommend this line. It flirts too strongly with Meinongianism. I admit that I do not know what 
Davidson himself thinks truth-conditions are, because he does not believe in the existence of propositions, or of 
facts. Are they just further sentences? Why then are sentences not just their own truth-condition? 
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of the state of affairs of snow’s being white. Such a view avoids recourse to non-existent 
states of affairs, but at the cost of embracing the existence of necessarily existing states of 
affairs, understood either Platonically or ersatzly. Such things, even if they exist, will 
typically not be truthmakers for those sentences for which they are the truth-conditions. No 
necessary being can be a truthmaker for a contingent truth.103 No matter how one chooses to 
articulate what truth-conditions are, they will end up being importantly different from 
truthmakers. 
Turning now to Lewis’s intensional account of truth-conditions, we can bring out 
another fundamental contrast between the theory of truth-conditions and the theory of 
truthmaking. For Lewis, the meaning of a sentence is given by all the worlds in which the 
sentence is true. Let us then identify the truth-conditions of a sentence with the set of worlds 
in which that sentence is true. On that view, truth-conditions just are groups of possible 
worlds, and so it makes little sense to ask whether a sentence has different truth-conditions in 
different possible worlds.104 But contrast that case with truthmaking. Here we can say that 
truths have different truthmakers in different possible worlds. I am a perfectly adequate 
truthmaker for that there are humans. Note that when I say that I am a truthmaker for that 
there are humans, it is implicit that I am taking myself to exist in the actual world, and that 
that there are humans is true in the actual world. Advocates of truthmaking, after all, search 
after the truthmakers (the things that exist in the actual world) for the truths that they accept 
(those things that are true in the actual world). So when I speak of x being a truthmaker for y, 
I am discussing a relation that obtains in the actual world. It would be false to say that 
                                                 
103Proof: Suppose necessary being T makes true contingent proposition p. Hence, by TM, in every world in 
which T exists, p is true. But T exists in every world, and so p is true in every world. But that is impossible, 
since p is contingent. 
104Thanks go to Keith Simmons here for explicitly pushing me on this point. 
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Batman is a truthmaker for that there are humans, for Batman does not exist. One’s stock of 
truthmakers is exhausted by the contents of one’s ontology. Moreover, it also would be false 
to say that Batman is a truthmaker for that Batman exists, because that Batman exists is not 
true, and hence not made true by anything.105 Nonetheless, we can employ counterfactual 
language when discussing truthmaking. Batman might have been a truthmaker for that there 
are humans, had he only existed. 
Further, although I am a truthmaker for that there are humans, I might not have 
existed, and hence might have failed to be a truthmaker for that there are humans. 
Furthermore, it might have turned out that none of the truthmakers for that there are humans 
existed, but that some other humans did in their place. In that counterfactual situation, there 
would have been truthmakers for that there are humans, but the stock of truthmakers 
available in that scenario would be completely disjoint from the actual stock of truthmakers. 
It might have been the case that Batman was the only human. If so, then he would be the sole 
(minimal) truthmaker for that there are humans. In more loaded language: there are possible 
worlds where the only humans that exist are humans that do not exist in the actual world. 
Nonetheless, in those worlds that there are humans is made true by the various (non-actual) 
humans that exist in those worlds. While we can speak truly when speaking counterfactually 
about truthmakers, the important point to remember is that truthmaking theorists are 
interested ultimately in what actually exists—truthmaking is first and foremost an ontological 
project. We certainly can describe what exists in non-actual possible worlds, but doing so is 
of no immediate help to determining our ontology, understood as the study of what (actually) 
exists. 
                                                 
105I beg my reader to let us set aside for the moment the worrisome questions about fiction that call our attention 
to senses in which that Batman exists might be true. 
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Despite their differences, the modal reading of truth-conditions interacts in interesting 
ways with truthmaking. On the Lewisian view, when we ask after the truth-condition of a 
sentence, we are directed to a space of possible worlds. Similarly, when we ask after the 
truthmaker for a sentence, we also need to consider a space of possible worlds, for 
truthmaking is an irreducibly modal notion.106 How do these two inquiries intersect? In 
general, the actual world always will belong to the set of possible worlds given by any 
particular truth’s truth-condition. So will all the possible worlds in which the truth’s 
truthmakers exist. Consider again the true sentence ‘There are humans’. The truth-condition 
for ‘There are humans’ is given by the set of all possible worlds in which ‘There are humans’ 
is true (that is, the set of all possible worlds in which there are humans). So any possible 
world that includes a human being belongs to that set. Call that set ‘S’. Since ‘There are 
humans’ is true (true in the actual world), our world W@ is a member of S. I am one of the 
several billion truthmakers for ‘There are humans’. I (or one of my counterparts) also exist in 
many possible worlds. Since I am essentially human, in each and every world in which I exist, 
‘There are humans’ is true. So every world in which I exist is a member of S. The same goes 
for every other truthmaker for ‘There are humans’. So if we take the set of (actual world) 
truthmakers for ‘There are humans’, and then define a set of possible worlds that includes all 
the worlds where at least one of the (actual world) truthmakers for ‘There are humans’ exists, 
we will have a subset of S. In the present case, we in fact have a proper subset. For also 
included in S are possible worlds where the only humans that exist are ones that do not exist 
in the actual world. The world where Batman is the only human belongs to S, as does the one 
with only Billy Budd. The idea here is that there are possible worlds where a sentence is true, 
and yet none of its (actual world) truthmakers exist. That is not to say that in that world the 
                                                 
106See Fox 1987 and Merricks 2007: 11-14 for why truthmaker theory requires an account of de re modality. 
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truth lacks a truthmaker. Billy Budd is a truthmaker for that there are humans in the worlds 
(but only in those worlds) where he exists. Billy Budd is no truthmaker for that there are 
humans, but he would have been had the world been graced with the existence of the lovable 
but unjustly doomed seaman. 
Now let us generalize. Identify the truth-conditions of some sentence s with the set of 
possible worlds S that includes all and only those worlds where s is true. Suppose s is in fact 
true, and has some truthmakers, collected together in the set T. The set of possible worlds U 
in which at least one member of T exists is a subset, possibly a proper subset, of S. There are 
some cases where U and S will be coextensive. Consider the true sentence ‘Asay exists’. S is 
here given by the space of worlds where I exist. I of course am the truthmaker for ‘Asay 
exists’. Hence I appear to exhaust T.107 The set of worlds in which at least one member of T 
(i.e., me) exists just is the set of worlds where ‘Asay exists’ is true. So here U and S are the 
same. But in many cases, U will be a proper subset of S because there are “merely possible” 
but non-actual potential truthmakers for many actual truths (like Batman for that there are 
humans). Also note that if we were maximalists (such that, necessarily, all truths have 
truthmakers), the truth-conditions of a sentence will give the space of possible worlds in 
which that sentence has a truthmaker. For any world in which some sentence s has a 
truthmaker is a world in which s is true. Any such world will belong therefore to the set of 
worlds given by the truth-condition of s. But as we just saw, some of the possible worlds 
given by the meaning of a sentence are of little interest to truthmaking. Truthmaker theorists 
are “actual-world chauvinists”, to borrow Armstrong’s phrase (1989a: 56). They want to 
                                                 
107It might be thought that there are other truthmakers for ‘Asay exists’. For example, there is the mereological 
sum of myself and Cuba. So add that to T. Still, T will generate the same U, for there are no worlds where the 
mereological sum of myself and Cuba exists, but I do not. To generate a distinct U, we would need a truthmaker 
for ‘Asay exists’ that is wholly separate from me, and I fail to see what that could be. 
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know what exists in the actual world. That some merely possible thing makes true some 
sentence in another distant possible world is of no matter to real ontology. To find 
truthmakers, we must look to the actual world.108 
The foregoing shows how the notion of truthmaking and the notion of truth-
conditions come apart in fundamental ways. In essence, the former is an ontological notion, 
an instrument of metaphysics. The latter is linguistic, the tool of the philosopher of language. 
Still, truthmakers and truth-conditions are similar in their both being bonded to the notion of 
truth, and not only nominally. The Lewisian version of the theory of meaning and truthmaker 
theory both employ some overlapping modal metaphysics. The set of possible worlds that 
give the meaning to a sentence is the very same set of worlds that contain the potential 
truthmakers for that sentence (when that sentence does indeed have a truthmaker). There are 
no worlds, on pain of incoherence, that possess a truthmaker for s but that fail to be a world 
where s is true. But determining that set of worlds does not settle the question of what the 
actual truthmakers are for the actual truths in the actual world. Those questions are what fuel 
the truthmaking enterprise. The truth-conditions give us an array of possible worlds, but to 
find truthmakers we must look only around our own world.
                                                 
108The chauvinism here does not preclude in any way an interest in truths about other possible worlds. The 
truthmaker maximalist who thinks that there are true claims about other possible worlds must offer truthmakers 
for those truths as well. Armstrong himself is a fictionalist about possible worlds and sentences that employ 
them, but not about claims of possibility and necessity (1989a). He certainly is in the business of offering 
truthmakers for modal truths (see his 1989a, 1997, 2000, 2003, 2004, and 2007). See Pawl 2010 for criticism of 
Armstrong’s account of truthmakers for truths about possibility. 
 
2. Truthmaking and Truth 
In the last chapter, I proposed that we understand truthmaker theory not as requiring a 
commitment to a specific doctrine (such as the view that all truths have truthmakers), but 
rather to a particular kind of methodology. We should approach metaphysical questions by 
considering whether certain kinds of truths have truthmakers, and what they might be. But 
we should not assume antecedently that any particular truth does have a truthmaker. We 
should pay particular attention to troublesome cases, and to what insights we can draw from 
the set of truths that we take, upon reflection, to require no truthmaker. We have already seen 
how being open to the possibility of truthmaker gaps in certain domains allows us to take a 
more nuanced approach to ontological issues surrounding analytic truths. 
In this chapter I want to take up another question that also is related to how we should 
understand the nature of truthmaker theory. Does the theory of truthmaking offer a theory of 
truth? Or is truthmaker theory a separate enterprise from the theory of truth? Put another way: 
is truthmaker theory a competitor with the traditional theories of truth (correspondence, 
coherence, pragmatism, epistemicism, deflationism), or is it another kind of beast 
altogether?1 Some take it to be obvious that truthmaker theory offers a theory of truth, while 
others think truthmaker theory in no way offers a theory of truth. The difficulty in the 
question over whether truthmaker theory offers a theory of truth is accentuated by the 
difficulty regarding what the nature is of correspondence theories of truth. For those who 
think that truthmaking offers a theory of truth often think that truthmaker theory just is a 
                                                 
1One thing seems fairly uncontroversial: truthmaker theorists are not interested in giving the meaning of the 
word ‘true’ for natural language speakers. See Smith and Simon 2007 and Horwich 2008. 
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correspondence theory of truth (or perhaps a new and improved version). But the 
correspondence theory has long been an elusive creature, and radically different theories 
have been associated with the name.2 The confusion involved in attempting to articulate what 
correspondence theories are inevitably bleeds into the problem of deciding whether 
truthmaker theory should itself be understood as a kind of correspondence theory.3 
I shall argue that truthmaker theory is not a theory of truth, and thus a fortiori is not 
any kind of correspondence theory of truth. By ‘theory of truth’ I mean any theory that 
attempts to give an account of the nature of truth. The paradigm examples are familiar: there 
are correspondence, coherence, pragmatic, epistemic, and deflationary accounts. Recalling 
again the terminology of Lewis 1983, not all accounts need be analyses (or otherwise 
reductive).4 One might, like Davidson and Frege, take truth to be primitive.5, 6 Regardless of 
                                                 
2For instance, the correspondence account defended by Russell (1912, 1985) is distinct from the view defended 
by J. L. Austin (1950, 1961), and both are quite different from the view Davidson defends (see the relevant 
discussions in Kirkham 1992 and Künne 2003). In his 1969, Davidson calls his view a correspondence account, 
but later retracts the identification (1990: 302). Sometimes (and quite baffling, in my opinion) the 
correspondence theory is identified with the causal theory of reference (see Leeds 2007: 2, which is following 
Kitcher 2001 and 2002; cf. Lynch 2009). This usage may well trace back to the influence of Field 1972. 
3Another roadblock to answering our current question involves the obscurity involved in what it is to offer a 
theory of truth at all. See Soames 1984 for discussion of the issue, and Lynch 2009 for a more contemporary 
approach to the question. 
4Here I part ways with Merricks, who thinks all accounts are analyses (2007: 14). As a result, Merricks’s own 
theory of truth—primitivism—does not count, by his own lights, as an account of truth! 
5Slightly muddying the waters, Davidson and the others sometimes speak of the definition of truth, not an 
analysis of it. Davidson specifically discusses how it is a mistake to define truth. I take it by ‘define’ here he 
means what others mean by ‘analyze’. For if not, then in Davidson’s view lexicographers have been making 
fools of themselves, for the entry for ‘truth’ is filled in every dictionary worth its salt. 
6For defenses of primitivism, see Moore 1899, Russell 1904, Frege 1956, Cartwright 1987, Davidson 1990 and 
1996, Sosa 1993a and 1993c, McGinn 2000, Wiggins 2002, Lowe 2007 and 2009, and Merricks 2007. 
Alexander Nehamas attributes primitivism to Nietzsche (1998: 243, endnote 57). I also detect it in Descartes 
(1991: 139; AT II: 597). Armstrong himself comes close to admitting something like primitivism (2004: 17), 
and Schaffer admits sympathy with the view (2008a: 309). Note that Vision (2004), quite idiosyncratically, 
considers primitivist views to be species of nihilism. He claims to be following Soames 1999 in this, but 
Soames actually identifies “nihilism” with the redundancy view of truth (and in turn claims to be following 
Tarski (1969: 66) in this identification). 
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whether truth can be analyzed into further more basic concepts or not, one thing, I shall argue, 
is clear: truth cannot adequately be analyzed in terms of truthmaking. 
The layout of this chapter is as follows. First, I explain why many theorists think that 
truthmaker theory does offer a theory of truth; in particular, many truthmaker theorists view 
truthmaker theory as offering an improved version of a correspondence theory of truth. Next 
I distance myself from the arguments of other theorists who share my conclusion that 
truthmaker theory is not a theory of truth. Understanding where their arguments go wrong 
will help us better understand the nature of truthmaker theory. Having set those faulty 
arguments aside, I offer my own argument for why truthmaker theory is not a theory of truth. 
Finally, I return to the topic of why so many have seen correspondence in truthmaking, and 
offer a diagnosis of why truthmaker theory is thought to capture the best of correspondence 
theories. In a sense, I do agree with those who see correspondence in truthmaking: 
truthmaker theory does capture what’s important about correspondence theories of truth, but 
it maintains those theoretical virtues in spite of not offering a theory of truth. As a result, 
truthmaker theory promises to uphold the virtues of correspondence theories without 
incurring the same costs. 
 
2.1. Seeing truth in truthmaking 
The assumption that truthmaker theory offers a theory of truth is quite prevalent. 
Many simply seem to take it for granted that truthmaker theory offers a theory of truth 
(Armstrong 1997, Newman 2002, Rodriguez-Pereyra 2006a, Clementz 2007). John O’Leary-
Hawthorne and Graham Oppy present truthmaker theory as offering an account of the 
“hidden essence” of truth (1997: 175-176). Ross Cameron makes the connection fully 
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explicit, claiming that truthmaker theory “is a theory about what it is for a proposition to be 
true” (2008a: 412; cf. his 2008d: 108). 
Perhaps even more commonly, theorists tend to accept that there is at least a close 
relationship, if not full identity, between truthmaker theory and the correspondence theory of 
truth. Adolf Rami observes that truthmaker theorists generally aim to “vindicate” the 
correspondence theory of truth (2009: 2).7 Cameron writes that it is natural but not obligatory 
for advocates of truthmaking to accept a correspondence theory of truth (2008b: 263). 
Bigelow candidly equates the two (1988: 122), as do Molnar (2000: 85), and Josh Parsons 
(2009: 217).8 Julian Dodd takes truthmaker maximalism “to be the distinctive intuition 
motivating correspondence theories of truth” (2000: 2). Stephen Read writes that the 
correspondence theory has experienced a “revival” in the form of truthmaker theory (2000: 
67).9 Kevin Mulligan, Peter Simons, and Barry Smith present their trope-based truthmaker 
theory as a “philosophically non-neutral correspondence theory” (1984: 288-289). Fox (1987) 
and Michael Lynch (1998: 119) both seem to understand truthmaker theory as a kind of 
correspondence theory, and JC Beall’s discussion of truthmakers invokes the language of 
correspondence (2000: 266).10 Bernard Linsky treats truthmaking as a necessary component 
of correspondence theories (1994: 192), whereas Mumford thinks that those attracted to 
correspondence will also be attracted to truthmaker theories (2007b: 313). Finally, Alex 
Oliver writes that the 
                                                 
7Horwich agrees, though he thinks (alongside Rami) that they are unsuccessful in doing so (2008: 258). 
8See also Dummett 1958-1959: 157 and 1976: 89, Bigelow and Pargetter 1990: 442, Rodriguez-Pereyra 1999, 
McGinn 2000: 90, Alston 2002: 11, Schantz 2002: 80, Bloomfield 2003: 513, Heathcote 2003, Alward 2004: 74, 
Mumford 2005, Beall and Glanzberg 2008: 171, Hochberg 2009, and Young 2009: 566. 
9Sorensen seems to agree (2001, chapter 11), as does Stephen Neale (2001: 86). 
10See also Searle 1995, chapter 9, Englebretsen 2010, and Fumerton 2010. 
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truth-maker principle is a sanitised version of a correspondence theory of truth, shorn 
of the unworkable idea of truth as a kind of pictorial resemblance, but retaining the 
doctrine that the world is independent of linguistic description and must be a certain 
way in order for a given sentence to be true of it. (1996: 69). 
 
I think, then, that we should try to understand why so many have seen correspondence in 
truthmaking, even though they are not the same (and even though, as I shall argue in this 
chapter and the next, the latter undermines the former). 
Again, many simply seem just to assume that truthmaker theory is a theory of truth. 
To understand why this assumption seems so natural, we may look to the truthmaker theory 
of Armstrong, who is perhaps the leading advocate for understanding truthmaking as a kind 
of correspondence theory. Armstrong writes that “the Correspondence theory tells us that, 
since truths require a truthmaker, there is something in the world that corresponds to a true 
proposition. The correspondent and the truthmaker are the same thing” (1997: 128; see also 
his 1997: 14, 2000: 150, and 2004: 16-17).11 Armstrong’s motivation for thinking of 
truthmaking as a kind of correspondence theory draws from two sources. First, both the 
correspondence theorist and the advocate of truthmakers suppose truth to involve a relational 
notion. Specifically, they understand truth as a relational property. Something is true when it 
stands in a certain relation to something else. A common charge against the correspondence 
theorist is that the correspondence relation is left mysterious (see, for example, Cousin 1950 
and Blackburn 1984b: 225-226). Armstrong argues that the truthmaker theorist has a solution: 
the long invoked correspondence relation just is the truthmaking relation. The truthmaking 
relation is a two-place relation that holds between truths and their truthmakers. So the murky 
notion of correspondence can be replaced by the much clearer notion of truthmaking. 
                                                 
11Recall that even though Armstrong thinks truthmaker theory vindicates correspondence theories of truth, he 
does not think that truthmaking offers a reductive analysis of truth, for he recognizes that the truthmaking 
relation already takes for granted the notion of truth (2004: 17). 
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Second, Armstrong thinks that truthmaker theory shares with correspondence theories 
the goal of explicitly connecting truth with reality. According to the truthmaker maximalist, 
for any truth there is a truthmaker, something that exists in the actual world. There is no truth 
without some accompanying ontology. Correspondence theories also typically express the 
idea that truths are grounded in reality. Whether correspondence is cashed out as “truths 
corresponding with reality” or “truths corresponding to fact”, the driving idea behind 
correspondence theories seems to be that there is no truth without ontology. The language of 
“reality” and “fact” is thus employed. Correspondence theorists’ ontological interests are 
especially apparent when their view is contrasted with its coherentist and pragmatist 
competitors, whose notions of coherence and utility seem explicitly divorced from 
ontologically loaded notions like facts and reality. The slogan ‘no truth without ontology’ is 
central to both the truthmaker theorist and the correspondence theorist, and is one main 
reason why many have sought to identify the two views.12 
Hence, Armstrong sees truthmaker theory (in its maximalist incarnation) as offering a 
preferable understanding of correspondence. In addition to identifying the correspondence 
relation with the truthmaking relation, he goes on to mention two additional advantages of 
taking correspondence to be truthmaking. First, every truthmaker theorist (with one 
exception) grants that the truthmaking relation is many-many.13 For any given truth there are 
multiple truthmakers that make it true, and for any truthmaker there are infinitely many truths 
                                                 
12There is a long tradition of claiming that the correspondence rhetoric that connects truth and reality is vacuous, 
and something that any theory of truth can adopt. While I have my reservations, the issue is one we cannot yet 
settle at the moment, but will take up later in section 2.4. Of related and more recent interest has been the 
question whether deflationists can embrace correspondence rhetoric. For discussion see (in addition to chapter 3) 
Rorty 1972: 662, Blackburn 1984b, Horwich 1990, Wright 1992, Searle 1998, Lewis 2001a and 2001b, Hill 
2002, Daly 2005, Lynch 2009: 110, and Young 2009. 
13Cf. what Kit Fine says regarding circumstances in his 1982. The exception here is Schaffer (2010), who is a 
monist about truthmakers: there’s only one truthmaker (the world), so his truthmaking relation is one-many. 
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that it makes true. I make it true both that I exist and that there are humans, and that there are 
humans is made true by each and every human. Hence truthmaker theory is not stuck with 
what Armstrong calls the “bane of the [traditional] correspondence theory”, namely, that the 
correspondence relation is one-one (2004: 16).14 Presumably, the worry with a one-one 
correspondence relation is that it would require a very unparsimonious universe filled with a 
diversity of colorful kinds of facts. Since there are atomic truths, disjunctive truths, 
conjunctive truths, negative truths, and subjunctive truths among others, to account for them 
there would have to be atomic facts, disjunctive facts, conjunctive facts, negative facts, and 
subjunctive facts among others. Facts—at least when understood as objects, and not as mere 
nominalizations of true truth-bearers—are already metaphysical anathema to many 
philosophers. The additional kinds of facts that would be needed to sustain a one-one 
correspondence relation would be even more abominable. Recall the riot that Russell nearly 
ignited at that famous Harvard seminar. By casting off any suggestion of a one-one 
correspondence relation, one can avoid positing the existence of the more ontologically 
suspicious kinds of facts. The trade-off, however, is that one must put a more limited supply 
of facts to greater work.15 Since we would prefer not to posit a unique fact for every truth, the 
truthmakers for some truths may prove elusive. As Armstrong observes, “The discovery of 
                                                 
14As far as I can tell, the only philosophers who have ever explicitly embraced a one-one correspondence 
relation are Moore (1953: 256), William Alston (1996: 38) and John Searle (1995: 219). Armstrong never cites 
any philosopher who holds the one-one view, but repeatedly speaks of how the correspondence theory has long 
been saddled with it. I find his insistence somewhat puzzling, since Russell, Armstrong’s metaphysical 
predecessor and an early defender of correspondence, eschewed any kind of one-one correspondence between 
truths and facts. 
15And here we open the door to many mysteries in the field of realism. How could there be such things as moral 
facts? But if there are none, then how can moral claims be true? Our truthmaking project is perfectly equipped 
to answer such questions, and we shall take them up in later chapters. 
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what are in fact truthmakers for a particular truth can be as difficult and controversial as the 
whole enterprise of ontology” (2000: 150).16 
Secondly, Armstrong classifies the truthmaking relation as an internal relation. As 
such, on his view the relation is ontologically innocuous. According to Armstrong, an 
internal relation is one that supervenes upon its relata. If the relation obtains in every possible 
world in which the relata both exist, then the relation is nothing above and beyond its relata. 
The numbers 3 and 5, for instance, stand in the less than relation: 3 is less than 5. Now, in 
every world in which 3 and 5 exist, they stand in that very same relation. It is not the case 
that it is possible that 3 and 5 both exist, and yet 3 fail to be less than 5. Hence less than is an 
internal relation.17 Armstrong claims that since internal relations supervene upon their relata, 
they are an “ontological free lunch”—they are no addition of being above and beyond the 
being posited by the relata. Hence internal relations can be “added” to one’s worldview at no 
additional ontological cost for they are already included; they are, in effect, “packaged 
together” with the base on which they supervene (Armstrong 1997: 129 and 2004: 9). As 
such, the truthmaking relation does not have to be considered a universal (in Armstrong’s 
sense, most elaborately presented in his 1978), or a “sparse” or “natural” relation (in the 
language of Lewis 1983). On Armstrong’s view, we should posit universals only when they 
are needed as truthmakers (or other kinds of metaphysical laborers). But we need no extra 
                                                 
16Note that on a linguistic view of facts, a one-one correspondence between truth and fact is wholly 
unobjectionable. On the linguistic view, “Facts are not units of any sort, but are explained by how fact locutions 
are used, so that speaking about facts is merely a general way of speaking of how things are in the world” 
(Newman 2002: 142). The fact that snow is white just is the true proposition <Snow is white>. Certainly facts in 
the linguistic sense are no good as truthmakers. Any correspondence theory that relied on such a notion of a fact 
naturally would find correspondence to be vacuous (Searle 1998). P. F. Strawson famously captured that 
sentiment when he wrote: “Of course, statements and facts fit. They were made for each other. If you prise the 
statements off the world you prise the facts off it too; but the world would be none the poorer” (1950: 137). Cf. 
the distinction between plebian and patrician facts in Smith and Simon 2007. 
17Other examples might include being the same species as and being identical with. 
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universals to stand underneath internal relations, as their existence is guaranteed by the 
existence of their relata alone.18 Hence there is no relational universal makes true. Such a 
result is to be expected, since Armstrong and Lewis both conceive of the sparse properties 
and relations as being those that have causal powers. The truthmaking relation is decidedly 
not a causal relation, as all parties to the table agree. Hence Armstrong can identify the 
truthmaking relation in an ontologically innocuous way. There is no additional ontological 
commitment involved in positing a making true relation above and beyond the commitments 
involved in positing truths and their truthmakers. So Armstrong can avoid the classic charge 
often made against substantive theories of truth that says that the property of truth is 
metaphysically suspicious. Armstrong would agree. There is no thing, no universal, that all 
true sentences, beliefs, and the like have in common. We do not have to posit truth alongside 
mass, charge, and the like in our inventory of the world’s universals; neither do we have to 
posit makes true as a fundamental, irreducible, or “natural” relation.19 
Supposing that Armstrong’s view of truthmaking as an internal relation is tenable (but 
see David 2005), it is clear why advocates of correspondence should be attracted to 
truthmaking. Truthmaking understood as an internal, many-many relation avoids many of the 
objections long associated with correspondence theories. At the same time, it is explicit about 
the appealing truth-ontology connection that has long made correspondence theories the 
“default” view of truth in the eyes of many. Truthmaker theory and traditional 
correspondence theories of truth certainly share much in common; such commonalities are 
                                                 
18For a similar view, see Simons 2010. 
19In the next chapter, I argue more forcefully against the existence of any such metaphysically robust 
understanding of truth. 
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responsible for convincing many that truthmaker theory offers a theory of truth. However, 
truthmaker theory does not offer a theory of truth, as we shall see in the following sections. 
 
2.2. How not to separate truth and truthmaking 
Not everyone thinks that truthmaker theory offers a theory of truth. Many have 
argued that there is a division of labor between theories of truth and theories of 
truthmaking.20 I wholeheartedly agree. But before getting to my own argument, let me 
distance myself from arguments to the same conclusion by other writers. Some argue that 
truthmaker theory offers no theory of truth at all, while some offer arguments to the more 
specific conclusion that truthmaker theory is not a correspondence theory of truth. By seeing 
where these arguments go wrong, we can better understand the nature of truthmaker theory. 
First let us consider those writers who resist the specific identification between 
truthmaker theory and correspondence theory. Chris Daly argues that truthmaking is not 
correspondence because while the latter is an equivalence relation, the former is not. 
Truthmaking must be understood as an explanatory relation, such that it is asymmetric and 
non-transitive (2005: 95). First, we might wonder why Daly thinks correspondence must be 
understood as an equivalence relation, and thus why any account of the correspondence 
theory that denied that correspondence was an equivalence relation would thereby be 
incoherent. In typical first pass formulations of correspondence theories, no mention is made 
of the logical properties of the relation. To say that all truths correspond to the facts or to 
reality is one thing; to say that the correspondence relation is an equivalence relation is 
another (completely optional) thing entirely. Perhaps Daly thinks that the everyday, non-
                                                 
20See Lewis 2001a and 2001b, Daly 2005, Merricks 2007, Smith and Simon 2007, Horwich 2008, David 2009, 
Mellor 2009, and Rami 2009. 
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philosophical notion of correspondence is an equivalence relation, and thus extends it to the 
philosophical case. But again, it is optional whether a robust philosophical theory of a certain 
name should take on the properties of everyday notions that happen to employ the same 
name. If there are theoretical merits to offering a correspondence theory that denies that 
correspondence is an equivalence relation, then I can see no conceptually mandatory reason 
to deny its formulation. At most, one might quibble about whether we should properly call 
such a theory a correspondence theory. I shall not dispute about a word; speak however you 
prefer. Thus I see no argument for why correspondence must be an equivalence relation, and 
Daly has none to offer either. 
As for Daly’s second premise, that the truthmaking relation must be an explanatory 
relation and hence asymmetrical and non-transitive, consider the following remarks. First, it 
goes without saying that explanation is a notoriously controversial notion, and in the 
truthmaker literature it is unclear just what role it is supposed to play. I have already taken up 
this contentious topic in the conclusion to the previous chapter (section 1.4). We should be 
hesitant when wielding the notion of explanation. Furthermore, even if it is granted that the 
truthmaking relation is explanatory, it does not follow that it has the properties Daly claims 
for it. For example, there are some accounts of explanation according to which explanation is 
not asymmetrical (e.g., van Fraassen 1980, chapter 5). Finally, it is evident that the 
truthmaking relation is not asymmetrical (nor is it symmetrical). There are cases of reflexive 
truthmaking (e.g., the proposition that there are propositions makes itself true), and so cases 
of symmetric truthmaking. Daly’s argument provides no good reason for not identifying 
truthmaking with correspondence. 
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Next let us consider the view of Matthew McGrath, who also objects to the supposed 
identity between correspondence and truthmaking. McGrath (2003) argues against those who 
take truthmaker theory to motivate acceptance of a correspondence theory of truth (and hence 
rejection of deflationary views of truth), for McGrath thinks that deflationism and 
truthmaking are compatible (where deflationism and correspondence are not). To fuel his 
argument, McGrath distinguishes between two notions of truthmaking. There is existential 
truthmaking: truths have existential truthmakers when they are true in virtue of the existence 
of some worldly object. And there is non-existential truthmaking: truths have non-existential 
truthmakers when their truth is “accounted for” by something. McGrath admits that he does 
not have a “developed theory” of his notion of accounting, but the upshot of his view is that 
propositions are what account for truths (2003: 674). By way of analogy, he considers 
questions such as: What makes this painting beautiful? Another way to ask that question is: 
What accounts for this painting’s beauty? Here the request is not for some thing in any 
ontological sense, but rather a further fact (understood not in the way Armstrong, Mellor, and 
Russell understand facts; here facts just are truths). So it is a fact that the painting is beautiful, 
and that truth is accounted for by some further fact. Nowhere, however, is there a request for 
some extra ontology to ground the truths. Hence we have X accounting for Y, where X and Y 
are both propositions. The distinction between the two forms of truthmaking can be seen in 
the following two formulations (McGrath 2003: 683): 
(ABOUT) If a proposition is true, then something about the world makes it true. 
 
(IN)  If a proposition is true, then something in the world makes it true.  
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Truthmakers, as conceived by all other parties to our debate, are the items in the world that 
make true truth-bearers true. McGrath’s things that are about the world are propositions.21 It 
is trivial, McGrath claims, that the proposition that snow is white is what accounts for the 
truth of that snow is white. The proposition that snow is white is about the world, and is what 
makes true that snow is white in the non-existential sense. So what makes it true that snow is 
white is just that snow is white. 
McGrath’s strategy is to say that “our basic truthmaking intuitions” (whatever those 
might be, even supposing there are such things) are completely exhausted by the principle 
given by ABOUT. But since the truthmaker literature has failed to distinguish ABOUT from 
IN, truthmaking advocates have confusedly attempted to account for their truthmaking 
“intuitions” by adopting IN and the subsequent metaphysical investigations and 
commitments that accompany it. But once we realize that ABOUT gives us enough to satisfy 
our truthmaking inclinations, we can see that there is no problem in saying that propositions 
make themselves true (in the non-existential sense). Saying as much is completely trivial. 
Furthermore, we lose the motivation for embracing IN and the whole business of searching 
after existential truthmakers. Having realized that non-existential truthmaking is the genuine 
kind of truthmaking, we can see that there is no basis for identifying it with the 
correspondence theory; in fact, McGrath draws the conclusion that non-existential 
truthmaking is perfectly consistent with deflationary views of truth. 
I have severe reservations about McGrath’s argument.22 The better explanation for 
why the literature has not distinguished IN from ABOUT is not that it is blind to the 
                                                 
21Though since McGrath takes propositions to exist, and therefore to be in the world, I do not see why IN 
doesn’t just follow from ABOUT. 
22See also Vision 2005: 368-371 for more criticism. 
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distinction, but that ABOUT is an empty principle. Truthmaking is motivated by the thought 
that truths are grounded in and depend upon reality, that there is a direct link between truth 
and ontology. IN makes that connection explicit. ABOUT speaks to it not at all. If ABOUT 
were all there were to truthmaking, then truthmaker advocates would be completely impotent 
at finding fault with theories that posited truths in the absence of any accompanying ontology. 
Consider the phenomenalist’s admission of there being counterfactual truths about possible 
experiences that lack any ontological ground. On McGrath’s view, the phenomenalist may 
claim that each of his true counterfactuals are made true (in the non-existential sense) by 
themselves, and thus he has satisfied the maximalist truthmaker theorist’s demand for a 
truthmaker for every truth. Thus, if McGrath is right about truthmaking, then the very idea 
behind truthmaker theory, down to its very initial motivation, is thoroughly misguided. 
Where Armstrong and Martin say that truthmaking insights reveal the flaws in behaviorism 
and phenomenalism, McGrath would say that the “flaws” they detected are mere bogies. The 
phenomenalists’ and behaviorists’ counterfactuals satisfy all the demands of a proper 
understanding of truthmaking. After all, every theory whatsoever (even the inconsistent ones!) 
satisfies the demands of truthmaking, for every claim serves as a truthmaker for itself (in 
McGrath’s sense). On McGrath’s view, truthmaking cuts no metaphysical ice whatsoever. 
Perhaps McGrath is right, and all “truthmaking intuitions” are satisfied by an empty 
principle. Armstrong, Bigelow, Lewis, Mellor, Schaffer, and the others are guilty of a simple 
conflation between real (non-existential) truthmaking and pie in the sky (existential) 
truthmaking. It is far more plausible, it seems to me, that McGrath simply does not share the 
pull of the truthmaking literature, and finds IN to be false. After all, many leading advocates 
of truthmaking take IN to be false; IN just is a statement of truthmaker maximalism, which 
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we have already argued against. McGrath seems driven to maintain the words ‘All truths 
have truthmakers’ by draining them of any content, and missing the spirit that originally 
supported them. It is not important to maintain words. The better view is that it might be the 
case that not all truths have truthmakers, and that there is something important to be noticed, 
something that can bring insight to metaphysical inquiry, about the differences between those 
truths that do have truthmakers, and those that do not. 
Setting my deep reservations about McGrath’s view aside, it is still not clear that his 
argument is any threat to the supposed identity between truthmaker theory and 
correspondence theory. It is clear throughout his paper that McGrath thinks that existential 
truthmaking can reasonably be identified with the correspondence theory, whereas non-
existential truthmaking is consistent with deflationism, and therefore not to be identified with 
the correspondence theory. McGrath, it is worth noting, thinks that he has an explanation for 
why talk of correspondence has sometimes been taken to be trivial, and sometimes 
substantive. If correspondence is cashed out in terms of non-existential truthmaking, then we 
see that the language of correspondence is consistent with any view of truth. But if 
correspondence is cashed out in terms of existential truthmaking, then we have a 
metaphysically substantive theory of truth on our hands (2003: 682). (McGrath assumes, 
falsely, that truthmaker advocates must posit factive entities like Armstrong’s states of 
affairs.) If we accept, as I am urging, that non-existential truthmaking is an empty notion that 
is of no interest to truthmaker theory, then we see that real truthmaking is existential 
truthmaking, which is, even on McGrath’s view, plausibly identified with correspondence. 
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Hence, McGrath’s argument for the non-identity between truthmaking and correspondence 
rests on an implausible account of how truthmaking should be understood.23 
David Lewis has also argued both that truthmaker theory is not the correspondence 
theory of truth, and, moreover, is no theory of truth at all. In a pair of provocative pieces, 
Lewis explores what is required for something to be a theory of truth (2001a, 2001b). 
Between the two papers, Lewis sets out to show that there are genuine theories of truth, but 
that correspondence theories and truthmaker theories do not number among their ranks. As 
for the weaker thesis, Lewis argues that truthmaking is not correspondence because, while 
one relatum in each correspondence relation is always a fact (or state of affairs), it is not the 
case that one relatum in each truthmaking relation is always a fact (or state of affairs). Thus 
the two relations are not identical (2001a: 278). For example, Socrates is a truthmaker for 
that Socrates exists. Socrates is no fact. But for the correspondence theorist, says Lewis, all 
correspondents are facts. To answer Lewis’s objection here, I suggest we simply defer to 
Marian David’s response: 
champions of truthmaking might simply concede the point saying that they are not 
wedded to correspondence with facts—correspondence with various bits of reality, 
including facts but also other things, might be good enough to deserve the name 
‘correspondence theory’. (2004: 46) 
 
Indeed, the union of ‘correspondence’ and ‘fact’ is a twentieth century innovation. For much 
of philosophical history, truth was taken to be correspondence with (non-factive) objects (see 
Künne 2003). Lewis’s argument relies on a needlessly narrow understanding of what 
correspondence theories are. 
Lewis’s argument for the stronger conclusion that truthmaker theory offers no theory 
of truth at all is more involved. Lewis first grants that deflationary theories of truth (e.g., 
                                                 
23In an earlier paper, McGrath seems to recognize (I think correctly) that truthmaker theorists are interested in 
accounting for truths themselves, and not that in which the truth of some truth consists (1997: 88-89). 
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Quine 1970, Horwich 1990, and Field 1994a) are genuine theories of truth. Such theories 
admit the legitimacy of all instances24 of some version or other of the truth schema, and 
further claim that the sum of the instances (more or less) is all the theory of truth that there is. 
For example, Paul Horwich recognizes the propositional version of the T-schema, and thinks 
that our a priori acceptance of it and its instances exhausts our understanding of truth:25 
(T2) The proposition that p is true if and only if p. 
 
Hartry Field and Quine prefer to work with sentences: 
(T3) ‘p’ is true if and only if p. 
 
Other theories of truth (Lewis calls them “grand theories of truth”) must be consistent with 
the instances of T2 and T3, and offer in addition some further schema 
(X) ‘p’ is true if and only if ‘p’ satisfies X 
 
where ‘satisfies X’ is filled in with the appropriate analysis. Hence: 
(X1) ‘p’ is true if and only if ‘p’ corresponds with the facts. 
 
(X2) ‘p’ is true if and only if ‘p’ coheres in the best belief system. 
 
(X3) ‘p’ is true if and only if ‘p’ is useful to believe. 
 
(X4) ‘p’ is true if and only if ‘p’ satisfies some special epistemic condition. 
 
(X5) ‘p’ is true if and only if ‘p’ has a truthmaker. 
 
Combining one of the grand schemas with the initial truth schema, we end up with a series of 
axioms, such as ‘Kermit is green if and only if ‘Kermit is green’ has some truthmaker’ and 
‘Orville likes popcorn if and only if ‘Orville likes popcorn’ has some truthmaker’. Faced 
with such axioms, Lewis concludes: “the deflationary conception and the grand theory 
coexist peacefully. But by taking them together, we find that the grand theory was not after 
                                                 
24All non-pathological instances, in the case of Horwich (1990). 
25Almost. Horwich later adds to his deflationary account the axiom that only propositions are true (1998: 43). 
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all a theory about truth. It was a theory of many things” (2001b: 603). Here, we see that the 
“truthmaker theory of truth” given by X5 is actually a theory about Kermit and Orville, 
greenness and popcorn, and so forth. What the axioms of the truthmaker theory do not make 
use of is the notion of truth. So Lewis is suggesting that our traditional theories of truth are 
none of them theories of truth, for, when combined with one of the truth schemas, they yield 
axioms that are not at all about truth. In particular, one cannot use X5 to give a truthmaker 
theory of truth. 
Lewis seems to be of two minds regarding what he has written on theories of truth. 
As just cited, his 2001b describes all the usual theories of truth as not being theories of truth 
after all. Yet in his 2001a, he wields his idea differentially to dismiss only correspondence 
and truthmaker theories as not being theories of truth. The other grand theories are let off the 
hook; it is just supposed, contra his own 2001b, that they are legitimate theories of truth. 
Lewis’s ambivalence here suggests that his argument for why certain theories fail to qualify 
as theories of truth is fatally flawed, and that we should not use it to resolve our question of 
whether truthmaker theory can offer a theory of truth. Recall that Lewis thinks that when we 
combine the truth schema with one of the grand theory schemas, we end up with an infinity 
of axioms, none of which are about truth.26 Lewis concludes that such theories “are theories 
of many things,” and hence that “the mention of truth is just an abbreviatory device” (2001b: 
604).27 But notice that, by employing his technique, it becomes impossible to offer a theory 
                                                 
26Actually, at least some of the axioms will involve truth, namely, those axioms that involve sentences which 
use ‘truth’. One such axiom is: ‘Pilate asked after the nature of truth’ is true if and only if Pilate asked after the 
nature of truth. 
27Lewis’s point here, when applied to truthmaking, was made explicit much earlier, by both John Fox (1987: 
189) and Bigelow (1988: 125-127). Both writers acknowledge the point that Lewis is making—that ‘true’ is 
playing an abbreviatory role in the statements of truthmaker theory—and for all that they happily persist in 
thinking of truthmaker theory, now contra Lewis, as an articulation of the correspondence theory of truth. 
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of truth. As Marian David points out, Lewis’s argument form even reveals the deflationary 
theory of truth not to be a theory of truth (2004: 46). From T3 and its instances we get: 
(O) ‘Orville likes popcorn’ is true if and only if Orville likes popcorn. 
 
Combining O with the truth schema (T3) we can derive: 
(O') Orville likes popcorn if and only if Orville likes popcorn. 
 
All the axioms of the deflationary theory of truth, when combined with the truth schema, 
yield axioms like O', none of which28 concerns truth. Since the deflationary theory of truth, 
like all the grand theories of truth, is nothing but “a bundle of claims that are not at all about 
truth, it should not be called a ‘theory of truth’” (Lewis 2001a: 279). Moreover, any possible 
future theory we might offer in attempts to elucidate the nature of truth would fall victim to 
Lewis’s argument, supposing only minimally that any such future theory is consistent with 
the T-sentences. For any time we offer an analysis of what it is for a sentence (proposition, 
belief, statement, or what have you) to be true, the truth schema will lie in waiting, able to 
transform our intended theory of truth into a theory of everything else besides.29 
We have two options. First, we could use the argument as a reductio ad absurdum 
against Lewis’s account of what a theory of truth is, for what would a theory of truth be if 
none of the classical contenders qualify? Any theory of truth that satisfies Tarski’s adequacy 
condition of entailing the T-sentences will fall prey to Lewis’s argument. So any minimally 
successful theory of truth will not count as a theory of truth! Or we might take the conclusion 
                                                 
Wolfgang Künne seems to side with Lewis on the issue (2003: 164). I do as well, but for my own reasons that 
will be discussed below. 
28But recall footnote 26. 
29Lewis’s argument seems fatally flawed in a number of ways. The form of the argument is as follows. He 
shows how a theory T committed to theses A and B entails C. A and B, by the way, make use of X. But C is not 
about X. Therefore, because C is not about X, T is not about X. But wait—T still includes A and B, and A and 
B are about X! A and B don’t disappear from the theory simply because they imply something else. 
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seriously, and use it to motivate an idea that some deflationists have long advocated, that 
there simply is no theory to be had of truth. Philosophers have been laboring in error when 
they have proclaimed there to be a substantive project known as “the theory of truth”. 
Consider what Ayer had to say on the subject: “there is no problem of truth as it is ordinarily 
conceived” (1952: 89). Still, mainstream deflationists like Horwich or Field are not out to 
deny that their own minimalist theories are theories of truth. They offer, after all, deflationary 
theories of truth. Myself, I am happy to accept both options. Lewis’s argumentative strategy 
is dialectically flawed (even by its own lights, as David 2004 expertly shows). Nonetheless, 
he has highlighted, even if inadvertently, what I take to be an important deflationary insight, 
namely, that the theory of truth, in whatever form, is really a theory of everything: a theory 
about truths. And truths cover all. So theories of truth are indeed about everything (at least 
from this deflationary perspective), but we should not thereby disqualify them from being 
theories of truth. Theories of truth are about everything! 
For the reasons we have now seen, Lewis’s argument to the effect that truthmaker 
theory does not offer a theory of truth fails.30 Finally, we may consider Merricks’s argument 
for the same conclusion. Merricks agrees with Lewis that not only is truthmaker theory not a 
correspondence theory, it is not a theory of truth at all. Merricks thinks that theories of truth 
must offer an analysis of ‘being true’. Truthmaker theory offers no such analysis. Therefore, 
truthmaker theory is not a theory of truth. Here is Merricks: 
Truthmaker [i.e., truthmaker maximalism] says that every claim has ontological 
commitments of a certain sort. And Truthmaker catches cheaters who fail to meet 
those ontological commitments. But none of these claims about ontological 
commitment amount to—or even look remotely like—a theory of the nature of truth 
                                                 
30See also the rest of David 2004 and Vision 2004 for more reasons why Lewis’s argument is dissatisfactory. 
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[…] Because Truthmaker offers no analysis of being true, Truthmaker is not the 
correspondence theory of truth. (2007: 15)31 
 
Not only is truthmaker theory not a correspondence theory, it is not a theory of truth at all, 
for it fails to analyze ‘being true’. The truthmaker theorist thinks that a sentence (or 
proposition or what have you) is true in virtue of the existence of something that makes it 
true. But, Merricks thinks, the truthmaker theorist’s idea does not offer an analysis of what it 
is to be true. It gives, we might say, an ontological requirement for something to be true. But 
it does not unpack what ‘being true’ is. 
The fundamental flaw with Merricks’s argument is simply that it imposes too strong a 
requirement on the theory of truth. In effect, he requires, contra Lewis 1983, that all accounts 
be analyses. Defenders of primitivist conceptions of truth reject such a requirement; they 
hold that truth is not something that can be further analyzed. It belongs to our stock of 
primitives—it is something we use to understand other less fundamental notions. Those who 
take truth to be one of our primitive notions do not thereby hold no theory of truth; quite to 
the contrary, they hold a primitivist theory of truth. Merricks himself even advocates a 
primitivist theory (2007: 181-187). So while I agree with Merricks that truthmaker theory 
offers no theory of truth, I do not endorse his argument. Furthermore, it is open to an objector 
to suggest that even if Merricks doesn’t see truthmaking put to good use as a theory of truth, 
one might nevertheless try to put truthmaking to work in such a capacity. However, such a 
project cannot succeed: truthmaker theory cannot be put to work as elucidating the nature of 
truth. Instead, truthmaker theory presupposes an antecedent notion of truth, as I shall now 
argue. 
 
                                                 
31For similar comments, see Horwich 2008 and Mellor 2009. 
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2.3. Truthmaker theory is not a theory of truth 
We have now seen several flawed reasons for advocating a separation of labor 
between truth and truthmaking. Merricks’s reasoning, however, was close to the truth. 
Truthmaker theorists, we argue, are best understood as not offering an analysis of truth. Still, 
certain truthmaker theorists disagree with Merricks and me here, and respond that they do 
indeed intend the notion of having a truthmaker to be giving an analysis of what it is to be 
true.32 As with X5 above, to be true just is to have a truthmaker. This route, however, is 
unavailable to the truthmaker theorist. The reason is quite simple: the truthmaking relation 
itself must be defined in terms of truth. So truthmaking already presupposes the notion of 
truth; to rely on truthmaking to offer an analysis of truth would be to admit a viciously 
circular analysis.33 Turning back to the last chapter, one can notice that all of the accounts of 
the truthmaking relation given there employ either ‘is true’ or ‘truth’. Further, any other 
account of the truthmaking relation is going to involve truth, for it must account for the truth 
of truth-bearers, and not their other features. Accordingly, truthmaker theory cannot offer an 
analysis of truth, for it must already presuppose one.34 
To see why truthmaker theory itself is not in the business of offering a theory of truth, 
consider first that truthmaker maximalism—the thesis that every truth has a truthmaker—
would have to be not only true but a necessary part of truthmaker theory itself if truthmaker 
theory were to offer a theory of truth. If truth consists (at least in part) in having a truthmaker, 
                                                 
32See again all those authors cited in section 2.1. 
33Merricks himself also makes this point (2007: 15), but doesn’t explore it as deeply as I am about to. Cf. David 
2009: 144 and Schulte Forthcoming: 8. 
34Armstrong also recognizes this fact, and as a result refrains from calling his “theory of the nature of truth” a 
definition of truth (2004: 17). Instead, he thinks his truthmaker principle offers necessary and sufficient 
conditions for something to be true. Armstrong goes on to express sympathy with (something like) a primitive 
conception of truth. 
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then every truth would have to have a truthmaker.35 Otherwise there would be truths whose 
truth could not be accounted for by truthmaking. But maximalism is not a sine qua non of 
truthmaker theory, and so truthmaker theory by itself offers no theory of truth.36 
As we have already seen, many truthmaker theorists reject maximalism (e.g., Bigelow 
1988 and Lewis 2001b), though of course the matter is controversial. The paradigm 
counterexamples of truthmaker gaps—truths without truthmakers—are negative existentials. 
It is true that there are no hobbits, but perhaps it need not follow that there exists something 
making it true that there are no hobbits. To think otherwise is to suppose that one must 
ground one’s “atheism” (about hobbits) with a separate kind of “theism” (about, say, 
negative facts, absences, or totalities)37. Regardless of whether this stance is the correct 
response to the problem of negative existentials, it is a defensible one, and one available to 
truthmaker theorists. Since one may be a truthmaker theorist without being a maximalist, 
truthmaker theorists qua truthmaker theorists are not in the business of offering a theory of 
truth. 
Now, some philosophers think that in abandoning maximalism, we abandon 
truthmaker theory altogether.38 On such a view, there simply is no room in truthmaker theory 
for non-maximalism. George Molnar writes that admitting that some truths do not have 
truthmakers is “the way of ontological frivolousness. It is a truly desperate resort” (2000: 85). 
But this response is too quick. The foundational idea underlying truthmaker theory is that 
truth depends upon reality. Truths are true in virtue of the way the world is. Negative 
                                                 
35Cf. Smith and Simon 2007. 
36Armstrong even claims that “most” truthmaker theorists reject maximalism, though he thinks they incur a 
substantial theoretical debt by doing so (2006: 245). 
37See, respectively, Russell 1985, Martin 1996, and Armstrong 2004. 
38See, for instance, Cameron 2008a: 412. 
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existentials do depend upon the way of the world for their truth—they depend on there not 
being any of the relevant things around. The case is very different for the suspicious 
phenomenalist and behaviorist counterfactuals that motivated contemporary truthmaker 
theory in the first place.39 Here philosophers were positing truths that depended in no way 
upon the world for their truth.40 But such counterfactuals are nothing like the negative truths 
involving hobbits or Arctic penguins. The latter are still true in virtue of the way of the world, 
even if no particular entities exist that necessitate those truths. The truth that there are no 
Arctic penguins admits of a perfectly worldly explanation; its truth is no metaphysical 
mystery.  Not all truthmaker gaps, then, are alike. Some are offensive to the spirit of 
truthmaking; others are not.41 So there are good reasons for rejecting truthmaker maximalism 
that are not reasons for rejecting truthmaker theory itself. Since rejecting maximalism is no 
automatic offense to truthmaker theory, it follows that truthmaker theory is not in the 
business of giving a theory of truth. 
Putting truthmaking to work as a theory of truth requires a commitment to 
maximalism. But not even maximalists can employ truthmaking in order to adequately say 
what truth is, for the truthmaking relation itself must be defined in terms of truth, and so any 
such analysis is circular. As we have seen, all of the accounts in the literature regarding the 
nature of the truthmaking relation (including the one for which I have argued) employ an 
antecedent notion of truth. For most, truthmaking is (at least) a matter of necessitation: x is a 
truthmaker for y only if it is metaphysically necessary that if x exists, then y is true. Hence, 
the necessitation condition already employs the notion of truth. The other approaches share 
                                                 
39See Armstrong 2004: 1-3. 
40A recent defense of truthmaker-less counterfactuals can be found in Lange 2009, which employs them in 
defending an account of the laws of nature. 
41Cf. Lewis 1992: 218-219. 
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this same feature. Any yet-to-be-defended account of the truthmaking relation is going to 
have to involve truth, for it must account for the truth of truth-bearers, and not their other 
features. On pain of circularity, anyone trying to build a theory of truth from a theory of 
truthmaking must somehow dispense with truth from the notion of truthmaking. 
Perhaps the advocates of a “truthmaker theory of truth” might respond by accepting 
the circularity point, but persisting in thinking that their theories still constitute a kind of 
correspondence theory. Such a theorist might simply identify the truthmaking relation with 
the correspondence relation, and identify the class of truthmakers as the class of 
corresponding objects (which may or may not be limited to facts or states of affairs, if such 
things are included at all). Here we have a many-many correspondence relation, and a class 
of correspondents that need not be limited solely to facts; perhaps this is what Oliver has in 
mind by a “sanitised” correspondence theory. Indeed, Armstrong sometimes thinks of his 
truthmaker theory in just these terms (1997: 128). Can truthmaker theorists of this sort think 
of their theory as being a kind of correspondence theory? Such theorists can call their view 
whatever they want, but must realize that their “correspondence theory” is not in fact a theory 
of truth, if such theories aim to be non-circular analyses of the property of truth (as are all the 
traditional theories of truth).42 The circularity worry is avoided, in other words, only if we 
accept that the new “correspondence theory” on offer is not actually a theory of truth. For as 
we have seen, the truthmaking relation presupposes the notion of truth, and so any 
correspondence relation that is itself the truthmaking relation already presupposes the notion 
of truth. I have been assuming that correspondence theories of truth do aim to reveal the 
nature of truth in this way. If correspondence theory just is truthmaker theory, so be it. But 
                                                 
42Of course, many things might be meant by ‘theory of truth’, and I have no interest in arguing that truthmaker 
theory cannot offer a theory of truth in any sense whatsoever. Nevertheless, what I mean by an adequate theory 
of truth fits well with the ambitions of the traditional contenders. 
 97
then we should not think of correspondence theories as being theories of truth in the 
traditional sense. 
It might also be thought that the appearance of truth in the above accounts is 
innocuous, and that it can be dispensed with by utilizing a familiar maneuver from the 
deflationist’s toolkit. For deflationary theories of truth, ‘true’ is primarily a logical device 
useful for expressing generalizations (among other things), and is not used to predicate a 
substantive property that admits of further metaphysical analysis (as correspondence and 
coherentist accounts hold). For instance, instead of reasserting each and every individual 
thing that Kant ever wrote, I can simply say that everything that Kant wrote is true. 
Substantive theorists of truth can acknowledge such logical features of the truth predicate, so 
long as they reject the thesis distinctive to deflationism that such logical features exhaust all 
there is to be said about truth. So we might hold that we can give an account of the 
truthmaking relation that relies on ‘true’ only as a device for generalization,43 and that hence 
can emerge truth-free. 
This deflationist-inspired response, however, is not available to those who seek to use 
their truthmaker theory for revealing the nature of truth.44 For expository purposes, let us 
stick with the necessitation condition on truthmaking: 
(N) For all x and y, x is a truthmaker for y only if it is metaphysically necessary 
that if x exists, then y is true. 
 
Equipped with N, we may use it in giving a necessary condition for our truthmaking account 
of truth: 
                                                 
43For the generalizing role of ‘true’ in truthmaker theory, see Fox 1987: 189, Bigelow 1988: 125-127, Lewis 
2001a: 278 and 2001b: 603-604, and Künne 2003: 164. 
44 It is a perfectly fine response for those who are deflationists about truth and want to understand the axioms of 
truthmaker theory, as I discuss below. 
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(TT1) For all y, y is true only if there exists some x such that it is metaphysically 
necessary that if x exists, then y is true. 
 
Noticing the way that ‘is true’ is redundant, we may turn TT1 into: 
(TT2) For all y, y is true only if there exists some x such that it is metaphysically 
necessary that if x exists, then y. 
 
TT2 avoids TT1’s use of ‘true’, but at the cost of unintelligibility. The quantifier 
accompanying ‘x’ is the ordinary objectual quantifier. If we also quantify over ‘y’ 
objectually—substituting it with truth-bearers like sentences, beliefs, and propositions—then 
the final substitution will fail. We would have the following bit of nonsense as an instance: 
(1) ‘Bill will kill Jill’ is true only if there exists some x such that it is 
metaphysically necessary that if x exists, then ‘Bill will kill Jill’. 
 
What we need at the end of the instance is a used sentence, not a mentioned one. For example: 
(2) ‘Bill will kill Jill’ is true only if there exists some x such that it is 
metaphysically necessary that if x exists, then Bill will kill Jill. 
 
In order to derive axioms like 2, we need to transform TT2 into: 
(TT3) For all y, ‘y’ is true only if there exists some x such that it is metaphysically 
necessary that if x exists, then y.45 
 
To interpret TT3, we need to employ both objectual quantification (for ‘x’) and substitutional 
quantification, for ‘y’ is now varying over sentential expressions. (Otherwise we would be 
unintelligibly quantifying objects into quotes.) 
There is a serious problem, however, with resorting to substitutional quantification 
here: the traditional semantics given for the substitutional quantifiers already employs the 
notion of truth. As Horwich notes: “the notion of substitutional quantification is trivially 
interdefinable with that of truth and itself requires theoretical elucidation” (1990: 27; see also 
Kripke 1976). A particular substitutionally quantified sentence ‘Σx(…x…)’ is true if and only 
                                                 
45TT3 is built for sentences. We could replace the ‘‘y’’ with ‘the proposition that y’ for a propositional version, 
or ‘the belief that y’ for a belief version. The problem persists despite what we take truth-bearers to be. 
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if there is an expression (from the relevant substitution class) such that substituting it for ‘x’ 
in ‘…x…’ yields a true sentence. A universally substitutionally quantified sentence 
‘Πx(…x…)’ is true if and only if every expression (from the relevant substitution class) is 
such that substituting it for ‘x’ in ‘…x…’ yields a true sentence. Employing substitutional 
quantification to define the truthmaking relation still leaves us with an explicitly circular 
definition of truth.46 Thus, in order to rely on something like TT3 to offer a truth-free 
truthmaker theory of truth, we have to formulate an account of substitutional quantification 
that in turn does not rely on the notion of truth.47, 48 
Perhaps the answer for the truthmaker theorist seeking to analyze truth in terms of 
truthmaking lies not in substitutional quantification, but in infinite lists. Horwich (1990) 
thinks that truth cannot be defined finitely because he rejects as circular any substitutionally 
quantified truth schema. Truth is defined instead by the T-sentences, the infinitely many non-
paradoxical instances of the propositional truth schema: the proposition that p is true if and 
only if p. Perhaps we can do the same for TT1. Even if we cannot adequately remove ‘is true’ 
                                                 
46It has been pointed out to me by an anonymous referee for a related paper that defining truth in terms of 
objectual quantification, or even any logical connective for that matter, will also result in circularity as these 
notions may also need to be defined in terms of truth. If so, then there is no special problem with substitutional 
quantification. If these other logical notions are also defined in terms of truth, then so much the worse for 
anyone trying to define truth, including truthmaker theorists. I take this to be a strong argument in favor of 
primitivism. 
47Christopher Hill (2002) has attempted such a project in his recent work (though his interests are disconnected 
from truthmaking). His aim is to offer an inferentialist treatment of substitutional quantification. This is not the 
place to evaluate Hill’s proposal in full (see Simmons 2006 for more criticism), but I have some initial doubts. 
One may well wonder whether the notion of inference will admit of a full elucidation without somehow relying 
on truth. It seems like inference is just another notion that we can make better sense of if we have a notion of 
truth already in hand. Regardless of the success of a project like Hill’s, truthmaker theorists who want their 
theory to serve double duty as a theory of truth have a steep hill to climb here (no pun intended). 
48One might respond by rejecting the semantics for the substitutional quantifiers given here, and taking them 
instead as logical primitives. (Thanks to Thomas Hofweber and Jody Azzouni for pointing out this response.) 
This maneuver does indeed sidestep the circularity worry, but invokes a theoretical primitive that requires some 
further theoretical justification. It’s unclear what could motivate taking on this additional primitive, given that 
the advocate of TT3 doesn’t get to say anything above and beyond what a deflationist who accepts truthmaker 
theory can say. 
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from TT1, we can take its instances, pair them with the T-sentences, and derive both 2 and 
the following: 
(3) ‘Jill will kill Bill’ is true only if there exists some x such that it is 
metaphysically necessary that if x exists, then Jill will kill Bill. 
 
(4) ‘Jill will thrill Bill’ is true only if there exists some x such that it is 
metaphysically necessary that if x exists, then Jill will thrill Bill. 
 
Here we have some of the needed non-circular axioms of our truthmaker theory of truth. One 
could point to 2, 3, 4, and countless others and suggest that they are the key to understanding 
the nature of truth, just as Horwich points to the list of T-sentences and says that they are the 
key to understanding the nature of truth. Call this view ‘TT4’. 
TT4 faces three major difficulties. First, anyone who advocates such a view 
relinquishes the ability to give a finitely stateable theory of truth, a common desideratum for 
non-deflationary theories of truth.49 By “going infinite”, a view concedes that nothing in 
general can be said about a particular notion—truth may be defined only implicitly, not 
explicitly. Such an attitude is appropriate for deflationary views of truth that deny that there 
is anything in common between truths.50 Substantive theories of truth, however, do hold that 
there are important commonalities between truths, and thus the absence of an explicit, 
general statement of what it is in which truth consists is a serious shortcoming.51 
                                                 
49See David 1994: 107-110. 
50Which is not to say that all deflationists are happy with the infinite approach. See Hill 2002 and Künne 2003. 
51There is another closely related worry about pairing a substantive theory of truth with the infinite list approach. 
If truth is defined by or in conjunction with an infinity of T-sentences, then truth appears to be defined in terms 
of all the many notions that appear in those T-sentences. This lead Anil Gupta to charge that, according to 
infinitary deflationists, “an understanding of ‘true’ requires the possession of massive conceptual resources” 
(1993: 69). In short, you don’t understand truth unless you understand everything. Deflationists may well find 
something right in this conclusion: you don’t understand the truth of ‘Electrons are negatively charged’ unless 
you understand what electrons and negative charge are, for the truth of ‘Electrons are negatively charged’ 
consists in nothing more than the negative charge of electrons. Substantivists about truth say that its truth 
consists in something else (something that is common to all and only truths), like correspondence with the facts 
or coherence in an ideal system or warranted assertibility. So the thought that truth has to be defined in terms of 
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Secondly, T4 exhibits a sort of motivational schizophrenia. Anyone who takes 2, 3, 4, 
and their cousins to constitute a theory of truth is advocating a union between anti-
deflationist attitudes about truth (that it has an underlying nature, to be given by truthmaking) 
with deflationary maneuvers for dispensing with truth. It is deflationists who avail 
themselves of infinite lists, not those who think that the nature of truth can be analyzed into 
further, more basic notions. The tension between these competing attitudes can best be 
appreciated by noting how this view treats the two instances of ‘true’ appearing in TT1 very 
differently. The first appearance of ‘true’ presents truth as something in need of further 
analysis—something that is to be more fully explained by whatever follows the conditional. 
But the second appearance of ‘true’ is treated as a mere logical device that is in principle 
dispensable. 
Finally, TT4 requires a problematic relationship to the T-sentences. We arrive at 2, 3, 
and 4 by deriving them from the circular instances of TT1 and the T-sentences. For example, 
we can pair the following instance of TT1 
‘Bill will kill Jill’ is true only if there exists some x such that it is metaphysically 
necessary that if x exists, then ‘Bill will kill Jill’ is true. 
 
with the T-sentence 
‘Bill will kill Jill’ is true if and only Bill will kill Jill 
 
in order to derive 2. To arrive at TT4, then, we need to employ the T-sentences. Now, TT4 
cannot take the T-sentences to be the explanatorily basic facts about truth—that would be to 
                                                 
everything does not sit well with substantive theories of truth. (The reference to understanding here is 
dispensable. Even if truth consists in something that is not immediately accessible to our understanding—as 
water’s chemical composition need not be available to someone who can deploy the water concept—no 
substantivist should be happy reducing the property of truth to everything that appears in a T-sentence, i.e., 
everything whatsoever. Truth would turn out to be the most complicated property imaginable.) To connect this 
thought with TT4, defining truth in terms of truthmaking, but then defining the latter in terms of everything in 
this infinitary way is of no help to the substantivist about truth, and offers no advance in our understanding of 
truth beyond standard deflationism. 
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concede deflationism—but neither can the advocate of TT4 take them to be explained by TT4, 
for that would involve an explanatory circularity. Moreover, most theorists of truth 
acknowledge what Tarski calls “Convention T”, which holds that any adequate theory of 
truth must entail all the T-sentences (1956: 187-188). The idea is that the T-sentences 
provide a sort of “check” on a theory of truth; any theory of truth that fails to produce the T-
sentences is thereby defective as an account of truth. TT4’s relationship to the T-sentences, 
however, compromises the purpose of Convention T. TT4 must be front-loaded with the T-
sentences in order to derive its axioms, and so the convention provides no meaningful 
constraint on it. TT4 trivially satisfies the constraint by taking all the T-sentences for granted. 
One might expect this result from deflationism, which takes the theory of truth to be 
exhausted by the T-sentences. But non-deflationary theorists of truth typically hold that their 
theories need to be derived independently of the T-sentences, lest they end up using truth to 
say what truth is. TT4 is unique among theories of truth in virtue of its awkwardly taking the 
T-sentences for granted without taking them to be the explanatorily fundamental facts about 
truth. 
The proper way to understand 2, 3, 4, and their cousins is not to think of them as 
revealing the nature of truth, of what the shared essence is between all and only truths. If any 
infinite list of axioms is to reveal the nature of truth, it’s the list of T-sentences. What 2, 3, 
and 4 are, however, are axioms of how a deflationist unhappy with substitutional 
quantification should understand truthmaker maximalism. Because such axioms are available, 
the cogency of truthmaker maximalism is no immediate threat to deflationism. Deflationism 
about truth and truthmaker maximalism are perfectly consistent doctrines.52 What we do not 
                                                 
52For more on this compatibility see section 3.2. 
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have here is a treatment of the nature of truth itself, of what feature it is that is shared 
between all and only truths. The deflationary tactics we have employed show that 
deflationists may accept truthmaker maximalism; what the tactics should not be used for is 
revealing any underlying essence to the nature of truth in terms of truthmakers. 
 
2.4. Truthmaking against correspondence 
We have now seen why truthmaker theory does not and cannot offer a theory of 
truth.53 A fortiori, then, truthmaker theory does not and cannot offer a correspondence theory 
of truth. Yet someone might protest here that something has gone terribly wrong. Truthmaker 
theory just is a kind of correspondence theory, goes the objection. Anyone who thinks 
otherwise has misunderstood the project. Now, we began the chapter by explaining why 
many have seen a theory of truth inside truthmaking. We may now harness those similarities, 
and use them to undermine correspondence theories. What I shall now argue for is the claim 
that truthmaker theory, precisely because of its similarity to correspondence theories, actually 
serves to undermine the need for adopting any correspondence theory of truth. Truthmaker 
theory captures the theoretical motivations that underlie correspondence theories and make 
them seem so natural. But truthmaker theory can satisfy those motivations at lesser 
theoretical cost. Hence, those who are attracted to correspondence theories should become 
truthmaker theorists (and reject correspondence theories of truth). 
It is a truism nowadays that some version or other of a correspondence theory of truth 
is taken to be the default, natural, or pre-theoretical understanding of truth. Here is Richard 
Cartwright: “I think we are all inclined toward some form of “correspondence” theory of 
truth” (1987: 73). Accordingly, opponents of correspondence agree that they need to show 
                                                 
53By ‘adequate’ here I mean non-circular and finitely stateable. 
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either why the default understanding is misguided, or why they also are entitled to the 
language and notion of correspondence. Richard Rorty (1986) would argue that the very 
notion of correspondence naively presupposes an untenably strong form of representationalist 
realism, whereas Horwich (1990) would argue that deflationists have sufficient resources to 
claim (without compromising their deflationism) that truths correspond to reality.54 
Regardless, then, of what views philosophers of truth ultimately settle on, everyone seems to 
agree that we must start with correspondence theories, for there at least seems to be 
something right about them. Unfortunately, many writers are not terribly explicit about what 
it is about correspondence that seems so natural—it’s just taken to be obvious that 
correspondence is the natural way to think about truth. Let us see if we can’t tease out the 
real motivations behind correspondence. 
First, it seems clear in the literature that many writers, regardless of their views on 
truth, simply take it as a datum that truths correspond with the facts (or, more broadly, with 
reality). What we have here is a platitude that any theory of truth must uphold, even if not 
with the substance originally intended. Enemies of correspondence such as Simon Blackburn 
(1984b: 224), Horwich (1990: 110-125), Dorothy Grover (1992: 32), Crispin Wright (1992), 
and Hill (2002) all agree that it is platitudinous that truths correspond to reality. So while it is 
true that truths correspond with reality, such a claim is not indicative of anything substantial, 
or something that should compel us to adopt a more robust understanding of truth. In some 
cases, ‘corresponds with reality’ is simply taken to be synonymous with or just a roundabout 
way of saying ‘is true’ (Ramsey 1927: 158, Blackburn 1984: 225).55 Still, one potential 
                                                 
54Young 2009 adamantly disagrees. 
55Here is Cousin 1950: “the correspondence theory of truth, though convenient and (non-committally speaking) 
undoubtedly correct, is something of a fraud. For whereas it seems to enlighten us by pointing to some relation 
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motivation for adopting a substantive correspondence theory is that doing so guarantees that 
we preserve the platitudinous connection between truth and reality. Our opponents of 
correspondence would say that doing so is overkill, and that we can preserve the connection 
without adopting a metaphysically substantive theory of truth (a sentiment to which I shall 
agree in the end). What I do not agree with, however, is that Tarski’s T-sentences (or 
deflationary accounts that rely on them alone) all by themselves satisfy correspondence 
inclinations, as Quine expressed when he wrote that disquotationalism alone is “the valid 
residue of the correspondence theory of truth” (1990: 93).56 To preserve correspondence, I 
shall argue, we need something more than deflationism, but something less than a 
correspondence theory. One can imagine just what sort of theory I think is called for. As we 
shall see, it is truthmaker theory that is the valid residue of the correspondence theory of 
truth. 
Advocates of correspondence may fire back by saying that although their deflationary 
opponents might be able to show that they too may employ the language of correspondence, 
they fail to preserve any of the important, intended substance behind the platitude that truths 
correspond to reality. Wright nicely presents that sentiment on behalf of the irritated 
correspondence theorist: 
while the minimalist can perhaps use such manipulations to entitle himself to the 
phrase “represents the facts”, or “corresponds to reality”, as a permissible gloss on “is 
true”, he does not thereby earn the intended substance. This intended substance is […] 
the idea that, crudely, talk of “representation of the facts” is not just admissible 
                                                 
which one articulated structure (the proposition) bears to another (the fact), it long ago turned out to be, if so 
understood, impossibly vague. And this is because, if I am right, it never was more than a vague formula giving 
a sort of schema or rule for the construction of explanations of T-statements” (168). 
56See also Karl Popper, who thinks that the T-sentences vindicate not only correspondence intuitions, but the 
correspondence theory itself (1963: 223-228). (Putnam claims that Popper here “simply doesn’t know what he 
is talking about” (1985: 72).) Tarski himself at times seems to endorse this view (1956: 153), and at other times 
reject it (1944: 342-343). Alan Musgrave thinks that Tarski’s semantic conception of truth provides all the 
correspondence we could ever want (1989: 387; Levin 1984 agrees). See also Searle 1995, chapter 9. 
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phrasing, a harmless gloss on talk of truth, but incorporates a philosophically 
correct—as we might say, seriously dyadic—perspective on the truth predicate (at 
least for discourses where realism is appropriate). (1992: 83) 
 
When correspondence theorists claim that truths are true in virtue of their corresponding with 
reality, they do not take themselves to be uttering a tautology—that truths are true in virtue of 
being true.57 The notion of correspondence is taken to be an elucidation or analysis of that in 
which truth consists—or perhaps of what it is that truth depends upon—and not a mere 
rephrasing. Wright suggests that the principal idea behind correspondence is that truth is 
dyadic. The motivation can’t be merely that truth is dyadic, for other theories of truth (e.g., 
coherence) also take truth to be a relational notion. Rather, it is important to the 
correspondence theorist that truth signals a particular kind of dyadic relation, one obtaining 
between something linguistic and something worldly. In short, correspondence theorists 
insist that we must not leave the world out of our account of truth.58 
Hence, there is broad consensus among theorists of truth that there is something to the 
notion of correspondence that needs to be preserved, whether it is a platitude (Blackburn, 
Wright) or intuition (Grover, Horwich, Hill).59 Not unrelated, I think, to our correspondence 
platitude is a second motivation for correspondence theories. Correspondence theories have 
long been taken to be the essence of some form of metaphysical realism, or at least a 
powerful weapon in opposing anti-realism of various stripes. In the early twentieth century, 
                                                 
57Rather than being tautologous, the idea that truths are true in virtue of being true may well be incoherent, or 
otherwise deeply metaphysically problematic. As Schaffer (2010) makes clear, he thinks that the ‘in virtue of’ 
relation is the asymmetric notion of grounding. Something cannot be grounded in itself, or depend upon itself. 
The idea of truth depending upon itself (rather than upon something more fundamental) is deeply disturbing to 
truthmaker theorists. 
58Consider also this passage from Wright: “In general, we’d want to think both that there’s a real distinction 
marked by the classification of some propositions as true and others as false, and that it is a distinction which 
cannot generally be understood without reference to things which are not themselves propositions, and so 
cannot be understood in intrinsicist or coherentist terms” (1999: 37). 
59For more on the “correspondence intuition”, see Putnam 1983, Searle 1998, Künne 2003: 149, and Douven 
and Hindriks 2005. 
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realists (most prominently Russell and G. E. Moore) sided with correspondence; idealists 
(e.g., Harold Joachim (1906) and F. H. Bradley (1907)) took to coherence.60 Later on, more 
modern anti-realists (in the vein of Michael Dummett and certain time-slices of Hilary 
Putnam) gravitated toward epistemic or pragmatic theories of truth. Now, I shall argue later 
on for neutrality between positions regarding realism and positions regarding truth. 
Nevertheless, it is easy to understand why many have taken correspondence to be a natural 
ally of realism. To the extent, then, that realism (whatever it is) seems compelling, 
correspondence, too, will appear compelling and well motivated. Consider this passage from 
Dummett’s seminal paper on truth: 
the correspondence theory expresses one important feature of the concept of truth 
which is not expressed by the law “It is true that p if and only if p” and which we 
have so far left quite out of account: that a statement is true only if there is something 
in the world in virtue of which it is true. Although we no longer accept the 
correspondence theory, we remain realists au fond; we retain in our thinking a 
fundamentally realist conception of truth. Realism consists in the belief that for any 
statement there must be something in virtue of which either it or its negation is true 
[…]. (1958-1959: 157) 
 
Let me make a few observations about this particularly pregnant passage. First, notice how 
Dummett thinks that the axioms of a deflationary definition of truth (e.g., ‘It is true that snow 
is white if and only if snow is white’) are not enough to establish correspondence or satisfy 
realist inclinations. The T-sentences make no explicit mention of the world, which is exactly 
the complaint of the correspondence theorist we canvassed earlier. Next, notice how quickly 
Dummett moves from the correspondence theory of truth to realism. He obviously thinks that 
the two stand or fall together (he of course thinks the latter). It is particularly interesting that 
Dummett describes the correspondence theory not as the view that truths must correspond to 
some fact or other, but rather as the view that truths are true in virtue of something that exists 
                                                 
60But see Candlish 1989, according to which Bradley is frequently but mistakenly taken to be a coherence 
theorist. Candlish blames Russell (1989: 334). 
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in the world. It would be anachronistic to attribute contemporary thoughts of truthmaking to 
Dummett here, though it is notable that he uses the very language that truthmaker theorists 
currently adopt. Finally, notice that Dummett here does not identify realism simply with 
bivalence, as Dummett’s view is often characterized. Realism about a domain does not 
consist merely in the statements of that domain all being either true or false; rather, realism is 
the view that all the statements in the domain are true or false in virtue of something that 
exists. Realism about a domain seems for Dummett to be something akin to all the statements 
of a domain or their negations having truthmakers. 
If Dummett is correct, then another key motivation for correspondence (which is not 
altogether distinct from the ones already explored) is that truths are true in virtue of things in 
the world, that truths are properly grounded in what exists. Such a view is, of course, the very 
heart of truthmaker theory. But the motivation is still satisfied by traditional correspondence 
theories, fact-based or object-based. If truths correspond to facts (as is the most common 
view nowadays), then facts are the objects in virtue of which truths are true. Such a view is 
taken by Dummett to be very close to realism. Other authors agree (e.g., Blackburn, Arthur 
Fine, and Putnam). 
I agree in spirit with Dummett’s diagnosis about the attraction of correspondence. 
However, I would describe the motivation slightly differently (and so not bias the issue too 
strongly in favor of truthmaking). I think the core motivation behind correspondence theories 
of truth is the idea that truths carry ontological and metaphysical commitments.61 Those 
commitments are, as Dummett puts it, the objects in virtue of which the truths are true. More 
                                                 
61Cf. Lewis, who notes that “truths are about things, they don’t float in a void” (1992: 218). 
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colloquially, the basic idea is just that truths are worldly.62 Truths are true in virtue of the 
world. The naturalness behind correspondence cannot be that it is obvious that there must be 
some metaphysical relation that obtains between two distinct things in order for something to 
be true. The correspondence “intuition” must be grounded in something more natural than the 
posits of complicated metaphysical theorizing.63 Instead, the reason correspondence seems so 
obviously correct is that we acknowledge that it is the objects in the world that are 
“responsible” for truths’ being true. It’s the chair in the corner of my bedroom that is 
responsible for the truth of that there’s a chair in the corner of my bedroom. Absent that 
object, that truth would vanish. The ontological and metaphysical commitments of what we 
take to be true are not always apparent to us; but that they have them is a basic idea that we 
can all acknowledge without any effort. What makes non-worldly accounts of truth (such as 
coherence and pragmatic accounts) so counterintuitive is that they relax the ontological 
requirements on truth. It is possible for it to be incredibly useful for me to believe that there 
is a chair in the corner of my bedroom even if there is not one. It is possible that final science 
may agree. Thus, on some accounts of truth, it could be true that there is a chair in the corner 
of my bedroom, even though no such chair exists. It is not my aim at the moment to refute 
such views;64 rather, we need only see how radical such conclusions are in order to 
                                                 
62By this expression I don’t mean to be pointing out the fact that truth-bearers exist (though of course they do). I 
mean to be pointing to the fact that truth-bearers are true because other things (that usually aren’t truth-bearers) 
exist. That snow is white is true because of the way of the world. 
63The scare quotes are to mark the fact that the use of the word ‘intuition’ here is not mine, but belongs to the 
literature. I do not know what an intuition is (I doubt anyone else does, either), and I certainly do not want to 
jump into the contemporary foray of the role that intuitions play in philosophy. ‘Intuition’ is not one of my 
words. If any debate in philosophy is more confused than the debate over “realism”, it surely must be the one 
over “intuitions”.  
64But let’s do it anyway: Some claim p might satisfy some pragmatic account of truth in virtue of the great 
utility that might be involved in believing p. Thus p is true. But what p says is the case may not obtain, since 
utility and reality, sadly, do not overlap of necessity. So such a theory holds that it is possible for p to be true 
even though what p says is not the case. We have met a reductio already (for non-sentential T-sentences are 
 110
appreciate why it is perfectly natural to think that truths carry ontological or metaphysical 
commitments, and to make plausible the idea that such commitments are what supply the 
correspondence theory its natural plausibility. Truth is worldly, and that’s why the theory of 
truth starts with correspondence theories.65 
That truth is worldly, that truths carry ontological and metaphysical commitments, is 
what I propose to be the essence of the correspondence intuition that even deflationists claim 
to want to uphold. Correspondence theories are attractive because they make explicit the tight 
connection between what is true and what exists. Notice that if I am correct in my diagnosis, 
then deflationists are correct that they, too, can maintain the correspondence intuition. For 
nothing about deflationary theories of truth prevents them from being coupled with some 
criterion or other of ontological commitment. Simply consider Quine, who upheld both 
disquotationalism about truth (1970) and his criterion of ontological commitment—that to be 
is to be the value of a bound variable in a properly regimented theory (1948, 1960). Being a 
deflationist about truth does not exclude one from holding substantive ontological views 
about other matters, or engaging in serious metaphysical inquiry.66 Further, my proposal 
nicely explains what can seem so bizarre about those like Rorty and Arthur Fine who eschew 
                                                 
necessarily true), but let’s press further. In our case, we are, in effect, simply denying a T-sentence: It’s true that 
there’s a chair in the corner of my bedroom even though there isn’t a chair in the corner of my bedroom. And T-
sentences are true in all possible worlds, at least when we’re allowed to hold meanings fixed across them. T-
sentences are possibly false only because semantic trickery may be afoot; that is not the case in our example 
(and only problematic for T-sentences involving sentences), so the pragmatic theory of truth here is false. This 
argument, of course, is older than us all. See, for instance, Stout 1907 and Russell 1908. There are, of course, 
formidable replies to such arguments, but for my money these arguments are sound. See also the discussion at 
section 4.5. 
65Cf. Strawson: “But one of the merits of the name—‘correspondence’—is that it brings out the point that over 
against judgement and belief is the natural world or reality, the things and events to which our judgements or 
beliefs relate or which they are about; and that it is how things are in the natural world, in reality or in fact, that 
determines whether our judgements or beliefs are true or false” (1992: 51). 
66Note also that Quine himself is happy to admit that “No sentence is true but reality makes it so” (1970: 10). 
One can reject correspondence and maintain that truths are true in virtue of the way the world is. My guess is 
that Quine would not be pleased with the recent interest in truthmaking, in spite of his own employment of the 
relevant language. We shall take this topic up further in section 4.2. 
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correspondence altogether (and don’t try to maintain it at all). On my view, the natural thing 
to say about the truth of that there are gorillas is that it is the actual gorillas out in the world 
that are responsible for that claim’s being true. It would be incoherent to think that that there 
are gorillas could be true in spite of their having gone extinct or never evolving in the first 
place. Such minimal claims are all we need to do justice to whatever it is that is naturally 
plausible about correspondence. Who, I wonder, would be so bold to deny that that there are 
gorillas is true in virtue of actual existing gorillas? Yet philosophers like Rorty and Fine (see 
any of his 1984a, 1984b, or 1986) are happy to dismiss the very idea of ontological 
commitment as so much metaphysical hooey. Fine even claims that the “natural” ontological 
attitude is to think that while it’s true that there are gorillas (for Science says so), we should 
not therefore embrace an ontology that includes gorillas—we should not be realists about 
gorillas. When we see just how modest the basic motivations behind correspondence theories 
are, we see just how radical (and misguided) it is to deny them whole hog.67 
The basic appeal to correspondence accounts, then, is simply the idea that truths are 
intimately connected with reality, with the way the world is. It is thus no surprise that 
correspondence has often been equated with realism (too quickly, in my view). What is so 
strikingly unintuitive about coherence, pragmatic, and epistemic accounts of truth is that they 
tie truth to something other than the world—to other propositions, practical utility, or 
properties of our evidence gathering abilities. It is the worldliness of correspondence 
                                                 
67Part of the problem here is that folks like Rorty and Fine try to push a distinction between the truth of ‘There 
are gorillas’ and the truth of ‘There really are gorillas in the World’. I for one see no distinction, and sense that 
Rorty and Fine are attacking a straw man. Fine’s invocation of words like ‘fantasy’ and ‘paradise’ to describe 
realism should lead him to rethink whether he has fairly characterized his opponent (1984b: 102). See Musgrave 
1989. I’m obviously sympathetic to the familiar idea that self-proclaimed quietists are really just realists who 
employ overblown rhetoric. See footnote 13 in section 4.1. 
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accounts that gives them their default status.68 Equipped with philosophical jargon, the best 
way we may express the correspondence intuition and the worldliness of truth is that truths 
carry ontological and metaphysical commitments, that what is true has immediate 
consequences for what there is, and how it is.69 
If my diagnosis is correct, then the driving force behind correspondence theories and 
truthmaker theory is one and the same: we need to account for the metaphysical and 
ontological implications that accompany truths. Hence, many have taken the two kinds of 
theories to be one and the same, since they appear to be responses to the very same instinct. 
But they are not. Correspondence theory aims to reveal the nature of truth itself—it seeks to 
give an analysis of the property of truth in terms of facts and a correspondence relation. 
Truthmaker theory aims to reveal the ontological grounds for truths—the things in the world 
on which particular truths depend. So truthmaker theory is also motivated by the worldliness 
of truth. In fact, as I shall now argue, it captures that worldliness better than do 
correspondence theories. Hence, those who are attracted to correspondence theory should 
reject it and adopt truthmaker theory instead. 
Traditionally, truthmaker theorists have faced difficulties in trying to spell out their 
core notions: what is correspondence, and what is a fact? Facts are often thought to be 
ontologically burdensome, and it can be difficult accounting for what they are without 
antecedently relying on the notion of truth. A first reason to prefer truthmaker theory is that it 
tends to be more ontologically economical with respect to facts than correspondence theory. 
On any standard correspondence account, for anything one takes to be true there must be 
                                                 
68In section 4.5, I relate the worldliness of truth described here to what others (particularly Alston—see his 1996 
and 2001) have dubbed “realism” about truth. As I argue later, bringing up realism in this context is more likely 
to confuse than to illuminate. 
69This idea will get systematic treatment in section 4.2. 
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some fact in one’s ontology to which it corresponds. Take, for example, the truth that there 
are penguins. A correspondence theorist must take that truth to correspond to some fact—call 
it ‘P’. So the truth that there are penguins here commits us not only to the existence of 
penguins, but to P as well. But here we have ontological overkill. What we need are penguins, 
not P, to satisfy the “correspondence intuition” with respect to the truth that there are 
penguins. That claim is true because of the existence of penguins, not because of the very 
different sort of entity P. The correspondence theory’s extra addition here is playing no 
helpful role. So in the case of many truths we do not need any facts at all to account for their 
truth or to satisfy the worldly nature of such truths, and so postulating them is excessive. 
Hence, even if one adopts a theory of truthmakers that involves facts (as does Armstrong’s, 
for example), one need not posit as many kinds of facts as does the correspondence theorist. 
A second reason to favor truthmaker theory is that it avoids the traditional problem 
facing correspondence theorists of giving a satisfying account of the correspondence relation. 
At least in its very simple version where for every distinct truth there is a distinct fact, 
correspondence theories offer an overloaded and unilluminating ontology. The world is a 
world of facts, and those facts come in various shades: positive, negative, conjunctive, 
disjunctive, existential, ethical, aesthetic, counterfactual, etc. A one-one correspondence 
relation comes with ontological extravagance, but a more subtle relation is notoriously 
difficult to articulate. The truthmaking relation, by contrast, is a many-many relation, and so 
we do not need a distinct kind of truthmaker for each kind of truth. Furthermore, though 
correspondence is usually taken to hold with respect to facts and facts alone,70 anything can 
be (and everything is) a truthmaker. We have met this argument already. Take any existing 
entity x: x is a truthmaker for the truth that x exists. The world is a world of truthmakers; 
                                                 
70Though again, this is something of a recent (i.e., twentieth-century) development. See Künne 2003: 94. 
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accordingly, the very idea of a truthmaker is not limited to any particular ontological 
worldview. Even the nominalist’s world is a world full of truthmakers. So truthmaker 
theorists have far greater ontological flexibility and resources when satisfying the 
correspondence intuition. Besides, facts aren’t the only things that can ground truth—
consider again the truth that there are penguins. If the world is more than a world of facts (a 
Moorean truth, I dare say), then the rest of the world provides grounds for truths, too. 
In addition to dodging some of the traditional problems for correspondence theories, 
truthmaker theory also enjoys some other theoretical advantages. Truthmaker theory scores 
points for theoretical economy by speaking to a number of metaphysical concerns at once. 
Truthmaker theorists disagree as to what sorts of entities we should posit in order to serve as 
truthmakers. For example, is truthmaker theory better served by Armstrongian states of 
affairs or by tropes?71 Notice that these sorts of metaphysical posits are also front and center 
in the traditional debate over the existence of universals, and the debate over how to account 
for the genuine resemblances between objects and their causal powers (more on this in the 
next chapter). Tropes, as well as the universals that partially compose Armstrongian states of 
affairs, are the kinds of entities that metaphysicians posit in order to ground the objective 
resemblances between things, to solve the “problem of the one over the many”, and to 
understand the nature of the powers that objects possess (see Lewis 1983). Truthmaker 
theorists can use their posited truthmakers to satisfy the correspondence intuition (by 
grounding truths in worldly objects) while at the same time tackling the problem of 
universals and accounting for causality. It is not at all obvious, though, that the 
correspondence theorist’s facts can be immediately used to account for genuine resemblances 
                                                 
71See Armstrong 1997 and 2004 for extensive discussion of the relative merits of states of affairs versus tropes 
in truthmaker theory. 
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and causal powers. A familiar worry for the correspondence theorist’s posits is that they are 
ad hoc: they serve no purpose other than their role in correspondence theory.72 
To be fair, correspondence theorists can use their realm of facts to account for 
resemblance and causality if they understand their posits in terms of universals and 
particulars, as does Armstrong. But recall that correspondence theorists need more facts than 
does Armstrong—they need the fact P to correspond to the truth that there are penguins, the 
fact A to correspond to the truth that there are aardvarks, and plenty more. What’s unclear is 
what metaphysical role P and A are supposed to serve other than filling in the gaps of 
correspondence theory.73 Furthermore, if correspondence theorists are to make the case that 
their facts can be used to solve other metaphysical issues because their facts are composed of 
universals, then it looks like their hands are tied when it comes to the traditional questions 
concerning realism about universals. Correspondence theorists, for instance, are not free to 
explore the merits of trope theory, lest they end up in ontological extravagance with a world 
made up by universals and tropes.74 Truthmaker theorists, by contrast, are not so constrained. 
They are free to explore the competing merits of universals and tropes (and other positions in 
the realism/nominalism debate) without being antecedently committed to a world of facts and 
universals. 
Finally, truthmaker theory also provides greater theoretical flexibility than 
correspondence theory when it comes to accounting for traditionally problematic truths. 
                                                 
72Cf. Quine 1990: “facts contribute nothing beyond their specious support of a correspondence theory” (80). See 
also Davidson 1996: “facts or states of affairs have never been shown to play a useful role in semantics” (266). 
73It’s also unclear how such “existential facts” can be composed of universals. Is there a universal existence? 
Correspondence theory now look to be committed to the further view, not so popular nowadays, that existence 
is a property. 
74One might try to build a correspondence theory around truths corresponding to tropes rather than facts. 
(Something like this is operant in Mulligan, Simons, and Smith 1984.) This is a hard road to travel, for it’s 
unclear how tropes can be used to account for negative existentials and general truths, for instance. 
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Consider again the trickiest set of truths for truthmaker theory: negative existentials. What 
makes it true that there are no hobbits? Perhaps there are negative facts (Russell 1985), 
absences (Martin 1996), or one giant totality state of affairs (Armstrong 2004) that make it 
true. But we have seen another option: perhaps negative existentials don’t have truthmakers 
at all (Bigelow 1988, Lewis 1992 and 2001b). Truthmaker maximalism is not a sine qua non 
of truthmaker theory. It may be that the best response to negative existentials is not to ground 
their truth in existing entities. Thus, it may be that not all truths have truthmakers, a 
consequence that is perfectly consistent with the spirit of truthmaker theory. But if some 
correspondence theory is the correct theory of truth, then every truth must have a 
corresponding object. There can be no “non-maximalist” correspondence theory. If truth just 
is correspondence with fact, then every truth has to correspond with some fact or other. 
Hence, correspondence theorists’ hands are more tied than are truthmaker theorists’ when it 
comes to handling negative existentials. There is a highly appealing route available to 
truthmaker theorists that is closed off to correspondence theorists. 
Rather than adding facts and a correspondence relation to our ontology, we need to 
account for the worldliness of truth via a theory of truthmakers. Truthmaker theory 
accomplishes that task without being biased as to the nature of what those objects are (for 
truthmakers are not limited only to certain kinds of ontologies), without relying on ad hoc 
posits, and without positing the existence of a one-one correspondence relation. Truthmaker 
theory is the more economical, ontologically flexible, and theoretically desirable means for 
preserving the motivation behind correspondence theory. 
As I have argued, truthmaker theory is not a theory of truth, but it does advance the 
debate over the nature of truth. In particular, it helps to undermine the motivation for 
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accepting a correspondence theory of truth, precisely because of the similarities between the 
two theories. In fact, we can now see correspondence theories in a new light. One way to 
read correspondence theories—which I find quite illuminating—is to read them as trying to 
do two distinct theoretical tasks in tandem: they seek to offer an account of the nature of 
truth—saying what it is in common between all and only truths—and to offer a theory of 
truthmaking—saying what it is in the world on which those truths depend.75 Because 
correspondence theories can be seen to be doing both sorts of work—and not clearly 
distinguishing between the two—it is no great surprise that many conflate the two projects, 
and think that the downfall of correspondence theories is accompanied by the downfall of 
metaphysics. But truth may well have no such nature (as we shall explore in the next chapter), 
rendering the correspondence theorist’s first theoretical aim unnecessary. And the 
truthmaking account on offer by traditional correspondence theories is, it’s fair to say, rather 
“flat-footed”.76 What makes it true that p is that the fact that p. What makes it true that q is 
the fact that q. At least in its very simple version where for every distinct truth there is a 
distinct fact, correspondence theories offer an overloaded and unilluminating ontology. The 
world is a world of facts and nothing else, and those facts come in various shades: positive, 
negative, conjunctive, disjunctive, existential, counterfactual, etc. A one-one correspondence 
relation is extravagant; but a more subtle relation, as noted earlier, is famously difficult to 
articulate. We’re better off ditching the correspondence program altogether. There is no 
nature to truth, and the grounds needed for truth is a topic more usefully and flexibly 
explored via truthmaker theory. 
                                                 
75Cf. David 2009. 
76This expression I owe to Blackburn, who uses it to describe various realist explanations about certain topics 
better handled by pragmatists. 
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The thesis I am urging can be distilled down to the following: the fundamental 
motivations driving correspondence accounts of truth are actually better served by well 
worked-out theories of ontological and metaphysical commitment than by more traditional 
attempts at giving a correspondence theory of truth.77 Rather than adding facts and a 
correspondence relation to our ontology, we need to locate the worldliness of truth via a 
theory of metaphysical commitment, a theory that articulates what the metaphysical and 
ontological consequences are for all that we take to be true. Truthmaker theory, of course, is 
nothing but a theory of such metaphysical commitments. As a result, it is perfectly suited to 
ground the inclinations that make the notion of correspondence seem so natural. For a fully 
articulated truthmaker theory will tell us precisely what it is in the world that properly 
grounds the statements we take to be true.78 Furthermore, truthmaker theory accomplishes 
that task without being biased as to the nature of what those corresponding objects are (for 
truthmakers are not limited only to certain kinds of ontologies), and without positing the 
existence of a supposedly mysterious correspondence relation that has long been the 
embarrassment of traditional correspondence theorists. Even further, since truthmaker theory 
is not necessarily bound by truthmaker maximalism, we can make room for truths that do not 
carry ontological or metaphysical commitments, thus making room for a more subtle 
approach to realism debates.79 By trying to ground the worldliness of truth in an additional 
                                                 
77As we’ve seen, Dummett may have made exactly this point inadvertently when he used what now goes for 
truthmaking language in describing the real essence of correspondence truth. 
78Stefano Caputo agrees with my take on the correspondence intuition, and argues that truthmaking is the “one 
thing needed [to] be saved in the correspondence theory” (2007: 276). 
79Merricks (2007) does a good job of showing how many of the classic counterexamples to truthmaker 
maximalism (e.g., negative existentials and subjunctive conditionals) can also be used as counterexamples to 
correspondence theories of truth. At this point, I uphold only the generic (but not universal) claim that truths 
carry ontological and metaphysical commitments. Thus we have room, unlike correspondence theorists, for 
understanding truths that have no truthmaker. 
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realm of fact, correspondence theorists have gone too far in their ontological ambitions.80 To 
do proper justice to the worldliness of truth, we must—as far as is possible—locate the 
ontological ground of our familiar truths (that there is snow) in the familiar objects those 
truths are about (snow). Otherwise we lose touch with what was supposed to be obvious and 
natural about correspondence theories of truth. Truthmaker theory is perfectly suited to 
perform precisely that task. 
When I claim that truthmaker theories undermine correspondence theories, what I 
mean is that truthmaker theory is better suited to accommodate the worldliness of truth, 
which is what I claim to be the real source of what makes correspondence truth seem so 
natural and intuitive.81 Truthmaker theory accommodates the correspondence intuition, and 
does so in an ontologically neutral way (at least if truthmaker theory is practiced according to 
the methods I have been advocating). Further, by eschewing correspondence accounts of 
truth, we do not have to bear the burden of offering an account of the correspondence relation. 
The lack of an adequate account has been a favorite target of opponents for over a century 
now. But truthmaker theory does not simply relieve us of the need to offer a correspondence 
relation; truthmaker theory shows why positing any sort of metaphysically robust property or 
relation of truth is misguided. Doing so, when combined with truthmaker theory, leads to 
unacceptable metaphysical consequences. Correspondence accounts posit the existence of a 
                                                 
80I do allow that there might be other motivations for adopting an ontology of facts—truthmaking motivations, 
for instance. Armstrong’s work from his 1978 to the present does just that quite admirably. The point to 
recognize is that even if facts serve as good truthmakers, they need not enter into our theory of truth. By the 
same token, if one thinks that there are facts or states of affairs, then one should believe in them because of his 
or her theory of truthmakers, not of truth. 
81Cf. David: “friends of the truth-maker principle maintain that it captures something (important) that is right in 
the correspondence theory; and those not sympathetic towards the correspondence theory would add that it 
captures all that is right in the correspondence theory, which is not very much” (2009: 137). I consider myself 
to be someone friendly to truthmaking, but unsympathetic toward correspondence (though I distance myself 
from the thought that there is “not very much” right about correspondence views). 
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two-place correspondence relation, but other theories of truth are metaphysically substantive 
as well. In the next chapter, we shall see how positing any robust property of truth is a fatal 
mistake.
 
3. Truthmaking and Deflationary Truth 
Given that truthmaker theory does not offer a theory of truth, it is in no way obvious 
that truthmaking and deflationism about truth should come into any conflict. They are simply 
up to different things. Now, the leading advocates of deflationary theories of truth, it is safe 
to say, are not the leading advocates of truthmaker theory. Unsurprisingly, if many 
(mistakenly) have taken truthmaker theory to be a kind of correspondence theory, then of 
course it will be thought that truthmaker theory and deflationism are incompatible. But they 
are not. In fact, advocates of truthmakers have an argument for a certain kind of deflationary 
thesis, namely, that there is no metaphysically substantive property of truth. The goal of the 
present chapter is to articulate just what deflationary theories of truth are, and then show how 
they are perfectly compatible with the kind of truthmaking investigation in which we are 
interested. It is often thought that the ambitious approach to metaphysics employed by 
truthmaker theorists sits uneasily with deflationary perspectives on truth. But such an attitude, 
I hope to show, is mistaken. Deflationists can (and should be) truthmaker theorists. Finally, I 
argue that truthmaker theory actually serves to undermine any metaphysically robust 
approach to the property of truth (and so I shall say precisely what “metaphysically robust” 
comes to here). 
 
3.1. Deflationary theories of truth 
Just as there is no single correspondence theory of truth, there is no single 
deflationary theory of truth. ‘Deflationism’ denotes a genre that includes many species. I do 
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not wish to set myself up in a trap by saying what defines all and only deflationary theories, 
for any such account will likely be susceptible to immediate refutation by counterexample. 
Wolfgang Künne, finding ‘deflationism’ to be so amorphous a term as to be without any 
salvageable consistent meaning, recommends adding it to Otto Neurath’s Index Verborum 
Prohibitorum (2003: 20). Let us rest content with taking deflationism as a notion admitting 
merely of family resemblance. Thankfully, there is a fair consensus as to what views count as 
deflationary. Loci classici include Ramsey 1927, Strawson 1949, Ayer 1952, Quine 1970, 
Grover, Camp, and Belnap 1975, Leeds 1978, Williams 1986, Horwich 1990, and Field 
1994a. David 1994 is perhaps the most thorough analysis and critique of the deflationary 
camp. Such views attempt to distinguish themselves from more substantive or “inflationary” 
views like the correspondence, coherence, pragmatic, and epistemic accounts.1 
There are various theses to which various figures in the deflationary camp subscribe, 
though it is hard to find any universal agreement. F. P. Ramsey (1927) is typically heralded 
as the father of the redundancy view of truth, which offers that to predicate truth of a 
sentence is merely to produce a sentence that says nothing more than the original (see also 
Ayer 1952). To say that ‘Snow is white’ is true is no more than to say that snow is white. 
Hence the predication of truth is merely redundant, or, in Blackburn’s helpful phrase, 
“transparent” (1984b). The redundancy theorist’s view here, however, is not proprietary to 
redundancy theory. Frege admits it whole-heartedly (1956), though few if any find his 
primitivism about truth (or his thinking that truth is the referent of all truths—see his 1952) 
                                                 
1Where does Tarski fall? I leave the matter to Tarski scholars. For some discussion see Musgrave 1996 and 
Künne 2003. See also footnote 56 of the previous chapter. 
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deserving of the label ‘deflationist’.2 Moreover, I think that everyone should admit the 
transparency claim, deflationist or not.3 Subtleties aside, it seems that the truth of granting 
that ‘‘Snow is white’ is true’ and ‘Snow is white’ are equivalent in some sense is guaranteed 
by the validity of the truth schema,4 here in its disquotational version: 
(T3) ‘p’ is true if and only if p. 
 
It is difficult to imagine anyone disagreeing with the disquotation schema, at least under 
some interpretation or other. Under what conditions would the two sides of the biconditional 
have differing truth-values?5 Perhaps one could argue that although the truth-values never 
differ, the quoted side that predicates truth still may differ in meaning (or some other respect) 
from the disquoted side. Even so, there still would be some sense of equivalence obtaining 
between the two (even if only material equivalence). If anything distinguishes the 
redundancy view from other theories of truth, it must be in claiming that there is nothing else 
to be said about truth. 
Similar comments apply to the disquotational views defended by Quine (1970) and 
Field (1994a). (Disquotationalism is also the specific target of David 1994.) According to 
Quine, disquotationalism is “the valid residue of the correspondence theory of truth” (1990: 
                                                 
2Hence, Frege may best be understood as someone who is deflationist about the word ‘truth’ but not about truth 
itself (understood as a concept or property). See the distinction below between the different kinds of 
deflationism. 
3One example of a non-deflationist who nevertheless accepts Ramsey’s point about transparency may well be 
Ramsey himself. In his 1927, Ramsey expresses sympathy with pragmatism, suggesting the possibility that he 
accepted the transparency view of ‘is true’ while adopting a pragmatic account of truth. See Loar 1980. But see 
also Young 2009, which places Ramsey in opposition to pragmatic theories, and in favor of correspondence 
theories. 
4Which, in turn, is validated by the inferential role that ‘is true’ plays in English. One need not subscribe to 
deflationism in order to embrace the T-sentences. One need only be a competent speaker of English. 
5Indeed, there are subtleties at work here that may lead some to criticize the disquotation schema. Does the 
schema ensure that meaning is preserved across the biconditional? What are meanings anyway? Can the schema 
adequately handle ambiguity and context-sensitivity? It is worth mentioning that Field, the most ardent 
contemporary defender of the disquotational theory of truth, recommends an account of the disquotation schema 
that is more sophisticated than the one that I have offered (1994a). 
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93). The disquotationalists go beyond the redundancy theorists by articulating some of the 
logical properties of the truth predicate. After granting the legitimacy of the disquotation 
schema, advocates of the disquotational view note how the truth predicate enables us to make 
certain kinds of generalizations that otherwise would be inexpressible. We can make 
generalizations such as ‘All conditionals of the form ‘p only if p’ are true’ without 
enumerating each and every instance of the generalization. (Besides, it’s not at all clear that 
the enumeration of instances even means the same thing as the generalization—see David 
2004. If not, then the truth predicate lets us say something that we couldn’t say without it. If 
they do mean the same thing, then the truth predicate is an enormous convenience.) Such an 
enumeration would be infinitely long, and so remain inexpressible by finite creatures like us. 
Similarly, we can state that surely something Kant said is true without bothering to mention 
the gigantic disjunction of each of Kant’s claims. Furthermore, we can use truth to state 
sentences like ‘What Bill said yesterday is true’ even if we have forgotten what Bill said. 
Here we have a case of using ‘true’ to make blind truth ascriptions.6 Had we remembered 
that he had said that Cheney is a gorilla, we could simply have forgone the truth predicate 
and just said that Cheney is a gorilla. The fact that our language has a truth predicate proves 
to be a very useful feature of it. 
But again: what here is up for debate? The account of the linguistic and logical 
properties of the truth predicate discovered and articulated by disquotationalists seems to be 
exactly right. They are common ground. Need the correspondence theorist deny the linguistic 
felicities enabled by the truth predicate? Of course not. If the disquotational view is to 
separate itself from other views of truth, it must distinguish itself with a negative claim: that 
the linguistic properties of the truth predicate exhaust everything there is to say about truth. 
                                                 
6Azzouni makes much of the topic of blind ascriptions in his work on truth. See his 2001, 2004, and 2006. 
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For the disquotationalist, the truth predicate does not have the feature, say, of assigning to 
sentences a substantive property that admits of philosophical analysis. 
Similar to disquotational theories are those theories that employ propositions rather 
than sentences (Horwich 1990 and 1998, Künne 2003). Such theorists subscribe to a 
denominalization schema rather than a disquotation schema: 
(T2) The proposition that p is true if and only if p. 
 
Worries about T2 arise immediately regarding just how to formulate this proposition 
postulating position. (We can set aside for the moment any particular worries about 
propositions themselves.) Horwich offers his “minimalist” theory of truth as being exhausted 
by the infinite list of the (non-paradoxical) instances of T2.7 As such, his theory of truth is, by 
his own admission, not able to be stated. Others have attempted to accept T2 as a universal 
generalization, and then appeal to an account of substitutional quantification (in a version 
which does not in turn depend upon the notion of truth) in order to render it intelligible (Hill 
2002, Künne 2003). Again, there seems to be nothing objectionable to T2 as it stands. 
Assuming it to be intelligible, it is nothing but a source of acceptable truths. Thus, 
denominalizers must distinguish themselves by denying that there is more to be said about 
truth. 
The prosentential theory does manage to set itself apart from the other deflationary 
views (Grover, Camp, and Belnap 1975, Grover 1992 and 2001).8 On the prosentential view, 
‘true’ is no part of any predicate. It is instead part of a prosentence. The prosentential 
application of truth is most apparent in exchanges like the following: 
                                                 
7As noted previously, Horwich later adds to his deflationary account the axiom that only propositions are true 
(1998: 43). 
8See also Brandom 1994, which departs somewhat from the other prosententialist views. 
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Bill: Cheney is a gorilla. 
 
Jill: That is true. 
 
According to the prosentential theory, Jill uses ‘is true’ not as a predicate applying to Bill’s 
sentence, but as part of a prosentence, namely, ‘That is true’. Rather than stating Bill’s very 
sentence again, Jill “lazily” uses the prosentence as a replacement. In effect, Jill just says 
what Bill says; she does not say something about what Bill said. Similarly, had she said ‘He 
is a gorilla’, Jill “lazily” would have used the pronoun ‘he’ rather than mention Cheney again 
explicitly. There certainly is something correct about such anaphoric uses of ‘is true’; 
everyone can admit that Jill is wielding ‘true’ in a perfectly acceptable fashion. What is 
distinctive to prosentential theories is that they take such anaphoric uses to be both primary 
and exhaustive: uses of ‘true’ always must be understood in the manner of prosententialism. 
Unlike the other deflationary theses, I think the prosententialist’s is proprietary and unique to 
their camp. The prosentential view, like its other deflationary siblings, is motivated by the 
desire to dodge traditional philosophical problems involving truth. If ‘true’ is not even a 
predicate, then there arises no metaphysical question as to its status as a robust metaphysical 
property, or whatever.9 But given that the motivations underlying prosententialism can be 
satisfied by other deflationary views that do not require its distinctive and controversial 
commitments, I shall set it aside in what follows. 
Setting prosententialism aside, then, we can see that most of the positive things that 
deflationists say about truth are claims that can and should be accepted by anyone, 
                                                 
9Maybe. For those who take the existence of properties to be a serious ontological matter, there will be no 
identification of a property for every predicate. (Here we are employing a “sparse” sense of ‘property’ in the 
language of Lewis 1983.) But if there is no one-one correlation between properties and predicates, such that 
there are predicates that correspond to no property, then there might also be properties that correspond to no 
predicate. (Just think of any properties we have yet to discover.) I admit that holding that view about truth in 
particular would be in need of enormous defense, but the theoretical possibility exists. 
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deflationist or not. What is distinctive about deflationism is the set of negative claims that its 
proponents must endorse. For instance, deflationary theories of truth are often defined (more 
often than not, it is worth noticing, by their opponents) simply as the thesis that there is no 
property of truth (e.g., Boghossian 1990: 161, Kirkham 1992: 307, Alston 1996: 41, Lynch 
1998: 112, Merricks 2007: 187, and Young 2009: 564). Sometimes we are told that 
deflationists believe something along the lines of there being no “metaphysically 
substantive” or “robust” property of truth (e.g., Putnam 1991: 2, Wright 1992: 13, Blackburn 
1998: 75, and Engel 2002: 41). Those simple definitions are correct in spirit, but 
unacceptably vague, and far too simple to capture the subtleties in various deflationary 
theories. Furthermore, the notion of a property is one of the most elusive in all of 
metaphysics, and the term ‘property’ is one of the most flexible. There are several 
conceptions at work in the philosophical literature; as a result, appealing to properties in any 
philosophical definition without proper qualification is certain to lead to confusion, 
ambiguity, and talking at cross purposes. 
Besides, there is more to deflationism than just the question of whether there is a 
property of truth.10 If we follow Dorit Bar-On and Keith Simmons (2007), we can divide 
deflationism into three distinct theses: linguistic, conceptual, and metaphysical 
deflationism.11 Only metaphysical deflationism speaks to the issue as to whether there is a 
(substantive) property of truth or not. Metaphysical deflationists, naturally, do not believe 
that there is such a property. We take up this thesis in great detail below. Linguistic 
deflationists uphold the thesis that the predicate ‘is true’ does not serve to introduce 
                                                 
10See O’Leary-Hawthorne and Oppy 1997 and Azzouni 2006 for nice discussions of the varieties of deflationary 
truth. 
11Cf. Lynch’s very similar tripartite account of deflationism: “that the concept of truth is a mere logical device, 
that the property of truth is a metaphysically transparent property, and that truth plays no significant explanatory 
role” (2009: 108). 
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propositional or cognitive content to a statement, but rather has purely logical functions 
(denominalizing, disquoting, generalizing, etc.). We have already seen a variety of competing 
views that take certain linguistic features as more primary than others. The idea common to 
linguistic deflationists is that the various logical roles of the truth predicate exhaust its 
linguistic use. Conceptual deflationists argue that truth is not an explanatory concept, or one 
that can be used to elucidate other philosophical notions such as assertion, meaning, and 
belief. Beyond its role as a logical device, truth bears no explanatory weight (though its 
logical features may be exploited in giving accounts of other notions). Neither do conceptual 
deflationists think that we need to appeal to any other semantic or metaphysical notions to 
understand the nature of truth. Truth is conceptually isolated—it stands on, and holds up no 
other important concepts. Here is Michael Williams: “the function of truth talk is wholly 
expressive, thus never explanatory. […] What makes deflationary views deflationary is their 
insistence that the importance of truth talk is exhausted by its expressive function” (1999: 
547; see also chapter 3 of Horwich 1990 and Williams 2002). Hence, deflationists think that 
they can account for everything there is to account for about truth by relying on nothing more 
than the minimal resources of their theories.12 
To get a better sense of the deflationary thesis that truth is conceptually thin, consider 
two cases. One is handled easily by the deflationist; the other poses more substantive 
difficulties. Suppose, falsely, that knowledge is justified true belief.13 Here we have an 
analysis of knowledge that explicitly appeals to truth. Sans truth, there is no guarantee of 
knowledge to be found merely in justified belief (pace Sutton 2007). Still, the presence of 
                                                 
12Gupta calls this the “adequacy thesis” (1993: 361). See David 2002 for discussion. Field argues against 
conceptual deflationism in his 1986 before adopting it in his 1994a. 
13But see Weatherson 2003. 
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truth in our account of knowledge is handled easily by the deflationist. True, S knows that p 
only if p is true. But the deflationist (and non-deflationists too, for that matter) may claim 
that ‘true’ is used in the analysis merely as a useful shortcut. For S knows that p only if p is 
‘Snow is white’ and snow is white, or if p is ‘Cheney is a gorilla’ and Cheney is a gorilla, or 
if p is ‘Bill kills Jill’ and Bill kills Jill, and so forth. The appeal to truth in our false account 
of knowledge poses no problem for conceptual deflationism. 
Contrast the knowledge case with that of assertion. Here, Bar-On and Simmons (2007) 
have argued forcefully against the deflationist by arguing that an adequate account of 
assertion requires a conceptual connection to truth that cannot be allowed by the deflationist. 
Following Frege, they suggest that we do not succeed in making an assertion merely by 
predicating ‘is true’ of some thought. The actor on the stage no more asserts that Cheney is a 
gorilla by saying ‘It is true that Cheney is a gorilla’ than by saying ‘Cheney is a gorilla’. As 
Frege writes, “In order to put something forward as true, we do not need a special predicate: 
we only need the assertoric force with which the sentence is uttered” (1979: 233). To 
understand what assertoric force is, one must rely on a prior understanding of truth. But that 
reliance on truth goes beyond its role in disquotation and denominalization. For if what it is 
to assert p is to put forward p as true, we cannot simply drop the use of ‘true’ here in typical 
deflationist fashion. To assert p is not simply to put forward p. We can conjecture that p, we 
can deny that p, we can wonder whether p. All are modes of putting forward p. But to capture 
what is distinctive about assertion, we must rely on a prior conception of truth, one that goes 
beyond truth’s role as a device for disquotation and denominalization. Hence, Bar-On and 
Simmons argue against conceptual deflationism on the grounds that we have an important 
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conceptual connection between truth and assertion that is left unaccounted for by the various 
linguistic and logical properties of the truth predicate.14 
Different theorists adopt different combinations of these deflationary theses. Frege 
(1956) upholds linguistic deflationism, but rejects conceptual deflationism (and probably 
metaphysical deflationism, too, depending upon how it’s construed). Horwich (1990) 
upholds linguistic and conceptual deflationism, but rejects metaphysical deflationism.15 Jody 
Azzouni adopts (something like) linguistic and metaphysical deflationism, but stresses how 
they must be argued for along very different lines (2006: 109). Ultimately, I advance a view 
that is metaphysically deflationist and conceptually substantivist (because primitivist). As for 
linguistic deflationism, it seems compelling, at least for “first-order” appearances of ‘true’ 
like ‘It is true that snow is white’ that directly apply truth to truth-bearers. Certain “second-
order” appearance of ‘true’ such as in ‘To assert is to present as true’, however, are 
potentially more problematic (see Simmons 2006). Still, once the issues of metaphysical and 
conceptual deflationism are resolved, nothing terribly philosophically interesting will remain 
that turns on linguistic deflationism (at least for the purposes of the present project). In any 
event, we shall not be focusing on linguistic deflationism, and truthmaking puts no particular 
pressure on it.16 
                                                 
14See also Bar-On, Horisk, and Lycan 2000 for an argument to the effect that deflationists cannot offer an 
adequate theory of meaning. Wright (1992, chapter 1 and 2001) puts forward for an argument that deflationists 
cannot capture a distinct norm involved in truth. In my 2009 I argue that constructive empiricism, via its 
reliance on the semantic conception of theories, cannot adopt a deflationary conception of truth in articulating 
what is at stake between realists and anti-realists. See also Gupta 1993, which shares the suspicion that 
deflationists cannot account for “all the facts about truth”. 
15At least, Horwich admits that there is a property of truth, but not a substantive property of truth (1990: 38-41). 
Perhaps the best interpretation of Horwich is that he would agree with metaphysical deflationism, at least as we 
are about to understand it. 
16Here is a very brief argument against linguistic deflationism. The strengthened liar sentence (‘This sentence is 
not true’) is a case of a well-formed English sentence whose employment of ‘true’ cannot be disquoted away. 
Ditto for the truth teller (‘This sentence is true’). So, even in principle, all uses of ‘true’ in English cannot be 
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3.2. The compatibility of truthmaking and deflationism 
3.2.1. The case against compatibility 
Now let us investigate whether there is anything in the notion of truthmaking that 
conflicts with deflationary perspectives on truth.17 Earlier I briefly argued that truthmaker 
nihilism—the thesis that there are no truthmakers—is untenable. Everything is a truthmaker 
for at least some truth, namely, the truth that that very thing exists. Granting that premise, 
truthmaker nihilism is true just in case nothing exists. But something exists, so truthmaker 
nihilism is false. Is it possible, though, that something could fail to be a truthmaker for the 
truth that it exists? I do not think so. Some object X is a truthmaker for that X exists just in 
case that X exists is purely synthetic (it certainly seems to be, lest a matter of fact turn into a 
relation of ideas), that the truth of that X exists depends upon the existence of X (no worries 
about mismatched truthmaking here), and it is metaphysically necessary that if X exists, then 
that X exists is true. To deny that last condition is tantamount to admitting a possible world in 
which X exists, but where that X exists is not true. Here we have a failure of the truth schema, 
for X exists if and only if that X exists is true. No one should deny an instance of the truth 
schema. Certainly no deflationist should deny an instance of the truth schema! Deflationists 
even typically hold that the instances of the disquotation and denominalization schemas are 
necessary truths. So deflationists have no business in endorsing truthmaker nihilism. If there 
                                                 
done away with without giving up on some expressive resources of the language. (Maybe this would be a good 
thing, given my examples!) 
17Recall that McGrath also takes up the question of deflationism and truthmaking in his appropriately titled 
2003. As we saw, the kind of truthmaking he finds to be consistent with deflationism is empty. He seems to take 
it for granted that the notion of truthmaking that he doesn’t like (which I have identified as the kind of 
truthmaking of interest to the rest of the literature) is inconsistent with deflationism. 
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are any versions of deflationary truth that are inconsistent with there being instances of 
truthmaking, those versions are false.18 
One reason—perhaps the most fundamental reason—why one might take truthmaking 
and deflationism to be at odds with one another is due to the mistaken belief that truthmaker 
theory just is a theory of truth (correspondence truth even), and thus is a competitor with and 
not an ally to deflationism.19 The last chapter has taken care of that confusion. We need to 
separate the project of giving the nature of truth from the project of understanding and 
uncovering the metaphysical and ontological underpinnings or grounds of the truths that we 
accept. Since truthmaking deals with the latter project, and not the former, it does not come 
into immediate conflict with deflationary theories. 
A second reason to worry that truthmaking and deflationism come into conflict 
involves a mistaken understanding about the nature of deflationism about truth. The idea is 
that in adopting deflationism about truth, one gives up on the substantial kinds of ontological 
and metaphysical inquiries that characterize truthmaker theory.20 Here we have a conflation 
                                                 
18James Young (2009) argues that deflationists who avail themselves of truthmaking talk (he cites Horwich 
1998: 104-105 and Strawson 1998) in so doing betray their rejection of deflationism and acceptance of 
correspondence. His argument, of course, crucially relies on the false identification of truthmaker theory and 
correspondence theory. Vision suggests that “at first glance it would appear that deflationists must simply deny 
that anything accounts for a proposition’s being true” (2005: 365). Such a glance is distorted, for it again 
assumes too tight a connection between truth and truthmaking. 
19See Armstrong 2006: 245, which suggests that those who posit truths without truthmakers might have a 
deflationary view of truth in mind when so doing. See also Armstrong 2005, Cameron 2008d: 108, and 
Mumford 2005: 269. Underlying this hunch is the idea that truths with truthmakers enjoy a kind of 
correspondence truth, while truthmaker gaps enjoy a kind of deflationary truth. Such dualisms about truth 
should be avoided in the extreme. (Armstrong agrees.) But the issue here is not about whether there are different 
kinds of truth because truthmaker theory is not a theory of truth at all. 
20See Horgan and Timmons 2000, which describes deflationary theories of truth as ones “that attempt to make 
sense of truth ascription without robust metaphysical commitments” (146). I detect a similar sentiment in 
Blackburn (particularly salient at his 2009: 207-208). Deflationary views may hold that sentences need not be 
committed to facts or a correspondence relation in order to be true, but it’s no part of deflationism to say that 
truths carry no metaphysical commitments at all, as the following discussion will make manifest. Vision writes 
that some deflationists “draw the more ambitious conclusion that there is no need for worldly truthmakers 
anywhere”, but he does not name names (2008: 47; see also his 2003). 
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between two theoretically distinct deflationary attitudes. On the one hand there is the 
deflationary view of truth. On the other hand there is a deflationary view toward metaphysics. 
To be a deflationist about truth is not automatically to be a deflationist about metaphysics. 
Hence, one can be a deflationist about truth but not about metaphysics more generally, and 
so engage in truthmaker theory. Deflationism about truth offers an account of the nature (or 
lack thereof) of truth; truthmaker theory offers an account of what the ontological 
implications are of what we take to be true. Absent an account of how the former forecloses 
on the latter, there is no reason to think that being a deflationist would prevent one from 
engaging in the latter task.21 
It may be a sociological fact that most deflationists about truth (or at least the most 
vocal and prominent defenders of the view) have deflationary attitudes toward metaphysics. 
But here we have a matter of fact, and not a matter of logic. If there is any slope from 
deflationism about truth to deflationism about metaphysics (which I doubt), it is not all that 
slippery. In fact, there would be a kind of irony to be found in a deflationist about truth’s 
thinking that truthmaking was somehow inconsistent with his own theory, or with 
metaphysical investigation more generally. It would be ironic for deflationists to resist 
truthmaker theory because they thought that such metaphysical investigation was barred on 
deflationary grounds, for to do so is to underestimate the power of deflationary theories of 
truth, and to assign to truth an inflated theoretical role that it does not possess. As we shall 
see in detail shortly, the enterprise of truthmaker theory and the enterprise of taking on 
                                                 
21No good reason, anyway. Lynch presents the deflationist as someone who thinks that “nothing makes 
judgments true” (2009: 163). We have already seen why any truthmaker nihilist, in our sense, is saddled with a 
dilemma between an empty universe and contradiction. Lynch is thinking that the only things that could make 
judgments true are substantive properties of truth (cf. Davidson 1973-1974: 16, which seems to assume that 
only facts can be truthmakers). Hence, since a deflationist believes in no such things, the deflationist will deny 
that judgments are made true. But this is not how we should be thinking about truthmaking. In fact, the very 
argument of this chapter will show why taking any property of truth to have truthmaking powers is 
metaphysically devastating. 
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metaphysical and ontological commitments need not presuppose a substantive theory of truth. 
We can understand the role that truth plays in truthmaker theory and metaphysics more 
generally in typical deflationary fashion. Indeed, in the next chapter we will see more clearly 
why metaphysical debates are best pursued not in terms of the theory of truth. So to think that 
deflationism about truth leads to a rejection of truthmaking is to underestimate the resources 
of deflationary theories. Deflationists should not underestimate the power of their own view! 
To be a deflationist about truth, then, is not to be some sort of metaphysical nihilist or 
quietist. Certainly no such view emerged during our tour of the various kinds of deflationism 
surveyed above. Further, simply consider someone like Quine, who adopts two separate 
theses. First, he is a deflationist about truth; on his disquotationalist view, truth is merely a 
device for disquotation, abbreviation, and the like (1970). Second, he adopts his criterion for 
ontological commitment: to ontologically commit oneself to something is to quantify over it 
in some theory one accepts (once it is properly regimented into first-order logic) (1960). Now, 
Quine begrudgingly admits that he must take on some robust mathematical commitments 
because he accepts theories that quantify over mathematical entities, such as sets. Quine, in 
other words, takes on some hefty metaphysical commitments, but not in any way because of 
his deflationist theory of truth.22 That Quine denies that ‘There are sets’ stands in the 
correspondence relation to some fact is beside the point. Further, although Quine would 
admit that there is nothing more to the truth of ‘There are sets’ than there being sets, he 
would not thereby deny that ‘There are sets’ incurs ontological commitments.23 The lesson 
here, which I think has been underappreciated, is that even if truth is not a metaphysically 
                                                 
22Cf. Grover 2001: 512-514, which makes a similar point. 
23Again, ontological commitments, strictly speaking, only follow regimented sentences, not those in the 
vernacular. 
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substantive notion, it does not follow that truths themselves lack metaphysical substance. 
Truths carry metaphysical commitments, even if those commitments are not to special 
entities called ‘facts’ or a correspondence relation. 
Hence, deflationism is no easy road to metaphysical anti-realism (or quietism). 
Rejecting correspondence theories of truth does not (contra Fine 1984b and Rorty 1986) 
ensure that one abandons realist commitments. For too long, it has been thought that one’s 
attitudes about truth settle one’s attitudes about debates over realism. According to that line 
of thought, it might make sense why abandoning correspondence theories of truth might be 
thought to accompany an overall deflationary perspective on metaphysical questions, and so 
a rejection of truthmaking. But this is not so. Careful thinking about deflationary theories of 
truth on the one hand, and truthmaker theory on the other, shows that the theory of truth and 
the topic of realism come apart. We shall take up this topic in full detail in the next chapter. 
In the meantime, we need only appreciate that being a deflationist about truth does not 
foreclose on the possibility of taking up ontological questions (even if there is nothing 
positively ontological to say about truth itself). Hence, deflationism about truth does not 
foreclose on the possibility of taking up truthmaking.24 
I have now dispelled what I think are the two main reasons why one might think that 
truthmaker theory and deflationism cannot coexist. Both reasons rely on a misunderstanding 
either of truthmaker theory (that it is a theory of truth) or of deflationism (that it requires a 
deflationary attitude toward metaphysics). If there is an incompatibility between truthmaking 
and deflationism when both properly understood, it will emerge, if at all, in the details. So let 
                                                 
24From here on, when I use ‘deflationism’ I will refer to deflationism about truth. I shall not refer to the 
character of the global metaphysical deflationist introduced in the previous paragraphs as a ‘deflationist’ 
simpliciter, for doing so invites the very confusion I was dispelling in those paragraphs. 
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us consider whether truthmaker theory as we have been understanding it is consistent with 
each of the three deflationary theses: metaphysical, conceptual, and linguistic deflationism. 
 
3.2.2. Truthmaking and linguistic deflationism 
Linguistic deflationism, recall, is the view that the function of ‘is true’ in our 
language is limited to its logical and linguistic features. Our question, then, is whether the 
appearance of ‘true’ in truthmaker theory is playing any additional role. Lewis doesn’t think 
so, and thus writes that “the Truthmaker Principle coexists peacefully with the deflationary 
conception of truth” (2001b: 605). Lewis argues for that claim by noting how we may 
combine the axioms of truthmaker theory with the T-schemas in order to produce theorems in 
which ‘true’ does not appear. Hence we may combine the T-sentence 
(1) The proposition that Cheney is a gorilla is true if and only if Cheney is a 
gorilla. 
 
and the following axiom of truthmaker maximalism (coupled with Lewis’s necessitation 
account of the truthmaking relation) 
(2) The proposition that Cheney is a gorilla is true if and only if there is 
something whose existence necessitates that Cheney is a gorilla 
 
in order to conclude: 
(3) Cheney is a gorilla if and only if there is something whose existence 
necessitates that Cheney is a gorilla. 
 
1 is an instance of T2, the denominalization schema (The proposition that p is true if and only 
if p); 2 is an instance of truthmaker maximalism combined with the necessitation account of 
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the truthmaking relation, TM2. Nothing prohibits us from combining the two in all relevant 
cases, so the two theories from which they follow must be consistent with each other.25 
Now, we have rejected TM2 in favor of TM. And TM invokes truth twice over: 
(TM) For all x and y, x is a truthmaker for y if and only if y is purely synthetic, y 
depends upon the existence of x for its truth, and it is metaphysically 
necessary that if x exists, then y is true. 
 
Take the final clause first, with its use of ‘is true’. Here we may see that the predicate is 
playing its familiar role as a device for generalization. Rather than state TM as a universal 
generalization, we could point to the infinite series of its axioms, pair it with the series of T-
sentences, and disquote the ‘is true’ away. For example: 
(4) Cheney is a truthmaker for ‘Cheney is a gorilla’ if and only if ‘Cheney is a 
gorilla’ is purely synthetic, ‘Cheney is a gorilla’ depends upon the existence 
of Cheney for its truth, and it is metaphysically necessary that if Cheney exists, 
then Cheney is a gorilla. 
 
Now, there are issues surrounding the viability of such infinite lists.26 But those issues are 
internal to the viability of deflationism all on its own. The combination with truthmaker 
theory here is not at issue.27 
What, now, about the other appearance of truth in TM? When x is a truthmaker for y, 
y depends upon the existence of x for its truth. Does this use of ‘truth’ pose any problem for 
the linguistic deflationist? Not obviously. For the deflationist can find the appearance of 
‘truth’ here dispensable in the familiar way. For example, suppose alongside Armstrong 1983 
that what makes it true that all copper is conductive is the state of affairs of the universals 
                                                 
25Again, this point has been noticed before. See Fox 1987: 189, Bigelow 1988: 125-127, Lewis 2001b: 604, 
Künne 2003: 169, Merricks 2007: 187-188, footnote 14, and Horwich 2008: 263. 
26This terrain is well covered. See Horwich 1990, David 1994: 107-110, Hill 2002, and Künne 2003. 
27Note also that the problem I raised for employing such lists in the previous chapter dealt with those who might 
try to reduce the concept of truth down to truthmaking. Such lists are out of place with those who are resisting 
deflationism by offering truthmaking as the essence of truth. We are here embracing deflationism (if only to 
show its consistency with truthmaking), and so may make use of such lists. 
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copper and conductivity standing in the necessitation relation. Call that state of affairs ‘N’. N 
is the truthmaker for the truth that all copper is conductive; call this true truth-bearer ‘T’. T 
depends upon N for its truth. That is to say, T is true because of N. Now we can disquote: All 
copper is conductive because of N. Leaving out ‘because’, we might instead say: T is true in 
virtue of N. Here again we can disquote: All copper is conductive in virtue of N. We could 
also say, bypassing truth altogether, that N grounds T. This is just yet another way of 
articulating the main idea that TM is trying to capture (namely, that truthmaking requires 
some sort of hyperintensional notion). Hence, we can see here that the role of ‘truth’ in TM 
is its usual abbreviatory function, and so TM puts no special pressure on linguistic 
deflationism about ‘true’ and ‘truth’. Furthermore, truthmaker theory makes no claims about 
how ‘true’ and ‘truth’ work in English, and so is neutral with respect to the truth of linguistic 
deflationism. Now, it’s an important question whether these notions of dependence, being 
true in virtue of, and grounding themselves presuppose some non-deflationary notion of truth. 
But that is a question for conceptual deflationism, to which we may now turn. 
 
3.2.3. Truthmaking and conceptual deflationism 
Next we come to conceptual deflationism, the view that truth is a conceptually and 
explanatorily lightweight notion. In offering analyses of philosophical concepts, deflationists 
avoid appealing to truth, except in using it as a handy abbreviatory device. Truth is not to be 
analyzed in terms of other interesting concepts, nor are other interesting concepts to be 
analyzed in terms of truth. Truth stands on nothing solid, and nothing stands on it. As a result, 
deflationists must shy away from appealing to truth in giving accounts of other notions 
important to philosophy (at least, in any way that goes beyond employing truth’s various 
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logical and linguistic features). The job of the deflationist is either to show how we can offer 
such analyses without appealing to truth at all, or to show how any such reliance on truth in 
the analyses does not go above and beyond truth’s minimal role for disquotation, 
denominalization, and the like. 
Recall Bar-On and Simmons’s critique of deflationism with respect to its inability to 
offer an adequate account of assertion (2007). Unlike the case of, say, knowledge, a 
philosophical understanding of assertion seems to require a non-deflationary attitude toward 
truth. Supposing their critique to be sound, we now can ask whether the case of truthmaking 
goes the way of knowledge, or of assertion. If the former, then deflationism is no barrier to 
truthmaking. If the latter, then advocates of truthmaking must find deflationism inadequate.28 
We are understanding truthmaker theory in terms of three necessary and jointly 
sufficient conditions. Hence, for deflationism and truthmaking to be compatible, we must 
show that deflationists can accept the three notions of being purely synthetic, dependence, 
and necessitation. Let us take up the last one first. Necessitation, given our modal 
understanding of it, does invoke truth (for x necessitates y where it is metaphysically 
necessary that if x exists, then y is true). But we have dealt with this appearance of truth 
already—‘true’ shows up here playing no more than its usual abbreviatory role, and can be 
dispensed with altogether if we employ an infinite statement of the truthmaking relation. The 
notion of necessitation does presuppose some account of de re modality, but that is no threat 
                                                 
28Going further, if deflationism did turn out to be unable to countenance any claims about truthmaking, then we 
would have a very strong argument against deflationary theories of truth. For we have already seen the costs 
associated with maintaining that there are no truthmakers. 
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to deflationism. To be a deflationist about truth is not to reject that objects have essential and 
non-essential features.29 
Second, we need to be able to draw a distinction between the analytic and the 
synthetic in a way that does not compromise deflationism. There is certainly no prima facie 
worry here (otherwise Quine could have refuted the analytic/synthetic distinction by simply 
endorsing his disquotationalism). I have made passing gestures toward understanding 
analyticity in terms of relations between concepts. For example, there is the Kantian 
conception of analyticity in terms of conceptual containment. Sentences of the form ‘All F 
are G’ are analytic if and only if the concept of G is contained inside the concept of F. (As 
MALE may be contained inside BACHELOR.) According to Paul Boghossian’s epistemological 
conception of analyticity, a sentence is analytic just in case someone’s grasping its meaning 
is sufficient to make that person justified in believing it (1996: 363). ‘All bachelors are male’ 
is analytic just in case someone who knows what it means is justified in believing that all 
bachelors are male. Justification may well be best understood in terms of truth, but not in any 
way that compromises deflationism. For example, one might be justified in believing some 
sentence ‘p’ just in case one’s evidence makes it probable that ‘p’ is true. But that is just to 
say that one’s evidence makes it probable that p. So long as some such conception of 
analyticity is available, deflationism is no barrier to truthmaking. 
Finally we come to the notion of dependence. I haven’t given a precise account of the 
notion of dependence, but recall that its raison d'être is to satisfy a hyperintensional 
relevance constraint on truthmaking, such that you and I do not end up as truthmakers for all 
necessary truths. Because of this needed relevance constraint, we cannot give a purely modal 
                                                 
29Again, one who is suspicious about all metaphysical inquiry might have worries about de re modal properties, 
but this is an entirely optional kind of metaphysical deflationism, one to which no deflationist about truth as 
such is committed. 
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account of dependence (according to which dependence would amount to no more than the 
already explored necessitation condition). Further, the requisite kind of dependence needed 
for truthmaking, I argued, is missing in the case of analyticities. The truth of ‘Red things are 
colored’ does not depend upon the existence of the concepts RED and COLOR, even if those 
concepts and the relations between them somehow account for the analyticity’s truth. Is the 
deflationist under any pressure to reject this notion of dependence? 
Here is an argument that suggests that there is.30 The dependence involved in 
truthmaking is not just any old sort of dependence. It is a particular kind of dependence—one 
that holds between the truth of a truth-bearer and an object in the world. There are other sorts 
of dependence: causal dependence, the dependence of the mental on the physical, the 
dependence of the ethical on the natural. Truthmaking involves a special kind of dependence, 
a dependence uniquely related to truth, and so gives the lie to the deflationist thesis that there 
is nothing explanatorily potent about the concept of truth. Let us dig into the notion of 
dependence here and see if indeed it is something that deflationists cannot accept. 
Take the truth that snow is white. Suppose we’re discussing my belief that snow is 
white.31 This belief stands in a number of dependency relationships with a number of 
different things. The existence of the belief depends upon my current neural configurations, 
dispositions, and the like. Because of the existence of those things, my belief exists. My 
belief may also stand in causal relations to other things, such as the event of my witnessing 
some falling snow to be white. Here we have my belief caused by a certain event. Because 
that event happened, my belief was brought about. But it is not because of any of those things 
                                                 
30This argument is due to Dorit Bar-On, and I thank her for bringing it to my attention. 
31The choice of a belief here as my example truth-bearer is due to the contingency of its existence, a feature not 
shared, perhaps, by propositions. 
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that my belief is true. My belief is true because of the existence of its truthmaker—let’s 
suppose it’s the (Armstrongian) state of affairs of snow’s being white. Because that state of 
affairs exists, my belief is true. So my belief stands in various dependency relations to a 
variety of different kinds of things. Some of those things account for its existence, others 
account for its truth. But the dependency relation is different in each case, and the fact that 
one is uniquely relevant to the truth of my belief shows that there is something explanatorily 
potent about truth, such that deflationists may not embrace the relevant kind of dependency. 
Recall the argument against deflationism involving assertion. I can conjecture that 
snow is white, or I can assert that snow is white. There is a difference, and it seems 
impossible—according to Frege—to say what that is without relying on some antecedent 
notion of truth. Similarly, the argument goes, my belief (call it ‘B’) that snow is white 
depends in one sense upon the existence of my neurological-dispositional state D, and my 
belief that snow is white depends in a different sense upon the existence of S, the state of 
affairs of snow’s being white. So B depends on D, and it also depends on S. The 
incompatibilist between deflationism and truthmaking must argue that the dependency 
between B and S cannot be understood without relying on truth in a non-deflationary way. 
But I think it can be so understood. B depends upon S. We know what sort of 
dependence is at stake: the truth of B (not its existence) depends upon the existence of S. But 
speaking of the truth of B here amounts to no more than speaking of snow’s being white. 
According to deflationists, when we talk about “the truth of my belief that snow is white” 
we’re talking about no more and no less than snow’s being white. And deflationists, just like 
everyone else, are entitled to talk about snow’s being white. If pressed as to what the 
expression ‘snow’s being white’ refers to, they may divide amongst themselves, or not take a 
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stand. It need not necessarily refer to S, that Armstrongian state of affairs that posits snow 
and whiteness standing in some sort of non-mereological composition relation—not everyone 
who concerns themselves with snow’s being white (like Tarski, say) is committed to 
Armstrongian metaphysics. Hence, saying that the truth of B depends upon the existence of S 
is equivalent to saying that snow’s being white depends upon the existence of S. Similarly, as 
above, copper’s being conductive depends upon the existence of N (that relation between 
universals). 
Still, given that S is the state of affairs of snow’s being white, my claim here might 
sound somewhat trivial: snow’s being white depends upon the existence of snow’s being 
white. But the trivial sound to this sentence (or, perhaps more troubling, the absurdity of 
something depending upon itself) seems to be due to an equivocation on the repeated phrase. 
Whatever the first instance of ‘snow’s being white’ refers to, it’s not S, which is what the 
second instance refers to. For the first instance is supposed to be something that all parties to 
the debate are entitled to. But remember that taking S (an object, recall, not a truth-bearer) to 
be the truthmaker for snow’s being white is a substantive metaphysical position. Others don’t 
take snow’s being white to depend upon S, but rather upon a series of tropes, say, or lumps of 
snow under a certain counterpart relation. The point is that these theorists can agree on 
snow’s being white (that is, they can agree that it’s true that snow is white), but disagree 
about what that depends on. Or consider other sorts of truths: That objects fall to the ground 
when released depends upon the existence of the laws of nature, certain initial conditions, etc. 
The notion of dependence here is a genuinely metaphysical one, but is not compromised by a 
deflationary conception of truth. 
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The notion of dependence in TM does not threaten conceptual deflationism. Talk of 
the truth of one thing depending upon the existence of another can indeed be countenanced 
by deflationists. This becomes even more apparent when we step beyond the neutral position 
I advocate in TM and look at some specific accounts of just what kind of dependence is at 
stake in truthmaking. Consider, for example, how Lowe thinks about the dependence in 
question (2007, 2009). Lowe thinks truthmaking is a matter of “essential dependence”, such 
that what makes true what is a matter explicated in terms of objects’ essential features. It is of 
the essence of my belief that snow is white to be true if S exists. It wouldn’t be the belief that 
it is if it didn’t meet that condition. The reason that Socrates himself makes it true that there 
are humans, but not that there are philosophers, is because Socrates is essentially such that if 
he exists, then ‘There are humans’ is true (but not such that if he exists, then ‘There are 
philosophers’ is true). Which is to say, it is of the essence of Socrates that if he exists, then 
there are humans, but it is not of the essence of Socrates that if he exists, then there are 
philosophers. So talk of objects making claims true or not in virtue of essential properties can 
be made without talking about truth at all. The truthmaker theorist’s commitment here is to 
genuine de re modal features of objects, not to a substantive conception of truth. Once we dig 
into the details of dependence, we can see how it does not compromise deflationism. 
Finally, let’s consider some remarks that Schaffer makes about dependency. Schaffer 
thinks that the dependency relevant to truthmaking is one of grounding, and he finds the 
same notion of grounding in other corners of philosophy (2008a: 311). For example, he 
thinks that Socrates is grounds for the singleton {Socrates}, and not vice versa. He also think 
the same notion of grounding is present in Euthyphro cases (truthmaking being one of them, 
as I pointed out in chapter 1). The properties being pious and being beloved by all the gods 
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are coextensive, but the latter is grounded by the former, and not vice versa. These particular 
cases of dependency rely on various metaphysical assumptions, but they do not in any way 
depend upon a substantive view of truth. If Schaffer is correct that the dependency involved 
in truthmaking is the same sort of dependency in these other cases, then deflationists can 
admit truthmaking just as much as they can admit the existence Euthyphro contrasts. 
We may now conclude that truthmaker theory does not compromise linguistic or 
conceptual deflationism. Accordingly, we may concur with Lewis in holding that “the point 
of mentioning truth [in our account of truthmaking] was that it allowed us to formulate the 
Truthmaker Principle concisely, rather than as an infinite list of claims about all manner of 
things” (2001b: 605). 
Before moving on, it will be instructive to be absolutely clear on the dialectic at this 
point. I have been assuming that deflationist responses to the familiar challenges are tenable, 
or at the least rationally defensible. The same sorts of moves that deflationists make to meet 
other challenges can be applied in similar fashion to issues involved with truthmaking. If 
those maneuvers are respectable for other questions, they are respectable here. That said, if 
such maneuvers are ultimately found to be unsatisfying, then deflationism itself is an 
inherently unstable view, and so truthmaker theorists should stay clear. So if there are 
problems with the strategies I have used here to show the compatibility of truthmaking and 
deflationism, those problems will likely surface in the other traditional challenges to 
deflationism. If at the end of the day truthmaker theory and conceptual deflationism turn out 
to be incompatible, then it still seems that the incompatibility is not anything peculiar to 
truthmaker theory. 
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3.2.4. Truthmaking and metaphysical deflationism 
So finally we come to metaphysical deflationism: there is no (substantive) property of 
truth. The thesis as it stands is fairly empty. What sense of ‘property’ is being invoked? We 
cannot evaluate the substance of the thesis independently of any view as to what properties 
are. Unfortunately, no one in the literature has offered much by way of an explanation of just 
what a substantive property of truth is supposed to be. Our goal is to remedy that deficit. My 
suggestion is that we bring to bear on the theory of truth the theory of properties that is 
already up and running in the domain of metaphysics. Metaphysicians have an answer to the 
question ‘What is a substantive property?’, and the debate over the nature of truth would 
benefit by attending to it. 
The topic of the nature and existence of properties is as old as philosophy. Plato’s 
theory of forms is among the first attempts to articulate a developed theory of properties. We 
shall briefly survey the current philosophical landscape on properties, but we should first deal 
with a more humdrum notion of a property. Properties, in that sense, are just things we can 
attribute to objects.32 If the chair is green and expensive, then it has those two properties, the 
property of being green and the property of being expensive. Now, as for truth, no one need 
deny that some sentences, propositions, statements, and beliefs are true. I have many 
beliefs—some are unpopular, some are complex, some are unfounded, and some are true. 
Since some beliefs are true, some beliefs have the property of being true. So, there is a 
property of truth.33 What we have said here amounts to little more than saying that ‘true’ is a 
predicate of our language, one which we can truthfully apply to and withhold from various 
                                                 
32Cf. Shoemaker 1979: “There is a broad sense of the word “property” in which there is a property 
corresponding to any grammatical predicate” (331). 
33For some interesting issues raised by such arguments, see Hofweber 2005b. 
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objects. The same story could be told for ‘exists’. Some things exist; some do not. Thus, 
some things have the property of existence, so existence is a property.34 Many of my beliefs 
have the property of being true, and they all have the property of existence. But so far I have 
said nothing intended to be philosophically controversial, or even philosophically relevant. 
When philosophers deny that truth is a property, or that existence is a property, they do not 
deny any of the truisms I have been canvassing in this paragraph. The simple reason is that 
we need not, and should not, read our metaphysical theories directly off of the surface 
grammar of our language. In the case of existence, we all know now that we should treat 
existential claims as quantified statements, not predicative statements (but see McGinn 2000 
and Azzouni 2004). Similarly, some have argued that, despite appearances to the contrary, 
‘true’ does not function in English as a predicate (Strawson 1949, Grover, Camp, and Belnap 
1975). Our question is whether ascriptions of truth in English are ascriptions of a property in 
some philosophical sense. The issue is not simply whether there are things that are true, for 
that is beyond dispute. But it is not enough simply to say that our question instead is whether 
there is a “real” or a “robust” or a “substantive” or a “metaphysical” property of truth. Those 
sayings are too murky; what we need is an examination of the various philosophical theories 
that can give content to the thesis that there is no property of truth. The literature on 
properties is rich, extensive, and well known; as such, there is no reason not to appeal to it 
directly in discussing whether there is a property of truth. Once we have given the thesis of 
metaphysical deflationism some philosophical substance, we shall be able to investigate its 
truth, and its compatibility with truthmaker theory. So let us turn to a discussion of the 
various things it could mean for there to be no property of truth. 
                                                 
34Cf. Lowe 2007, which argues that ‘is true’ is in the category of “formal ontological predicates”, which 
includes ‘exists’ and ‘is identical with’ (239). No such predicate is taken to correspond to a universal or set of 
tropes. See McGinn 2000 for an extended defense of this sort of view. 
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The very first philosophical debate over realism was a debate over properties. Realists 
admitted the existence of universals; nominalists opposed such things, denying their 
existence.35 We can begin our discussion of properties by dividing philosophical attitudes 
about them into those same two camps. There are the realists, who admit the existence of 
universals, and there are the nominalists, who deny them. What are universals? Universals 
are objects that can exist multiply instantiated, and fully exist in each of their instantiations. 
They are the things held in common by objects that share a property. They are universal in 
that they may occupy multiple objects at the same time. If charge is a universal, then 
electrons E1 and E2 are both charged in virtue of their both instantiating or partaking in 
charge. The nature of instantiation, or what it is for a universal to inhere in or attach to a 
particular is one of the most ancient of all metaphysical puzzles, and lies far outside our 
scope here.36 For our purposes, we just need to think of universals as entities distinct from 
particulars, but that can inhere in multiple particulars. There are many different accounts of 
what universals are; we shall attend to some of those disagreements momentarily. 
Nominalism is the view that there are no universals, that reality is exhausted by the 
particular. Thus it is false to claim that there are things that enjoy separate existence, and yet 
can inhere in multiple, distinct objects. Nominalists claim ontological parsimony as a virtue 
of their view. Realists and nominalists alike grant the category of the particular, but realists 
go on to posit the category of the universal as well, adding to their ontological inventories. 
However, so the realist claims, the sacrifice to parsimony is justified by increased 
                                                 
35In categorizing the debate over properties, I follow Armstrong’s categorization of the philosophical landscape 
(e.g., in his 1978, 1989b, and 1997). Hence I identify nominalism with the denial of the existence of universals, 
not with the denial of “abstract” (better: non spatio-temporal) objects, in the Quinean sense. The former usage is 
more traditional; the latter understanding of “nominalism” is more relevant to discussions of naturalism than to 
the existence of properties. 
36For a fine contemporary, but historically informed exploration of the nature of predication (and its connection 
to truth), see Davidson 2005. 
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explanatory power. And so what we have here is a classic form of metaphysical debate. The 
realist charges that the nominalist cannot account for all the facts (Armstrong 1978, 1980). 
The nominalist replies that he can, or charges tu quoque that positing entities is no 
explanation at all (Devitt 1980). Our job here is not to focus on the problem of universals per 
se, but to see what implications the different views on universals have for metaphysical 
deflationism. 
In addition to distinguishing between realism and nominalism, we may further divide 
both camps into their extreme and moderate versions. Extreme realism is a view that 
Armstrong attributes to Plato, and is the view that universals exist independently of their 
being instantiated. Plato’s forms do not exist in the natural world—they have their own realm 
of being. Thus, the forms are transcendent. Moderate realism, which Armstrong attributes 
(though somewhat hesitantly) to Aristotle and ultimately endorses himself, is the view that 
universals exist, but can exist only when instantiated. Thus, there are no uninstantiated 
universals. All universals are therefore immanent. On the moderate view, universals are 
located in space and time; they are located wherever and whenever it is that the particulars in 
which they inhere are located. Note that realism, in either its extreme or its moderate form, is 
not committed to the thesis that there is a universal corresponding to every predicate. That 
some things are mauve does not entail, for the realist, that there is a universal mauve. The 
question of what universals there are must be taken up by the usual philosophical and 
empirical means. 
We may identify moderate nominalism with the thesis that, while there are no 
universals, there are tropes. Tropes in philosophy are understood as particularized properties. 
They are individual, particular objects, and thus not universal. So while E1 and E2 are both 
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charged, they are not charged in virtue of some single thing. Rather, E1 is charged because 
there is a charge trope CE1 that belongs to E1, and a second charge trope CE2 that belongs to 
E2. CE1 and CE2 are distinct entities, though there are various things we might say about them 
and their relationship to one another. For instance, we might hold that they both belong to the 
same class of C tropes, which may or may not be a “natural” class (in the lingo of Lewis 
1983), and that they may or may not belong to the class in virtue of some (perhaps brute) 
kind of resemblance. Tropes are posited to do the metaphysical work of universals without 
compromising a monistic ontology of particulars. The view is moderate because it recognizes, 
along with realism, the need for some entity to play a role in the metaphysics of properties. 
There are of course a variety of trope theories available; we shall not delve into the details. 
Finally, we can understand extreme nominalism as the denial that there are universals 
or tropes, or, more generally, as the claim that there is no need to posit entities at all in order 
to offer a satisfactory account of the metaphysics of properties (e.g., Davidson 2005). So 
whereas all the other theories have distinct entities to point to (universals or tropes) when 
explaining why E1 and E2 are both charged (and how they share something in common), the 
extreme nominalist can say at most that E1 and E2 are both charged because they both belong 
to the class of charged things. But it is not the case that E1 and E2 are charged in virtue of any 
thing, particular or universal. Some extreme nominalists may wish to distinguish some 
classes from others. Lewis admits that some classes are more natural than others, where what 
it is to be natural is taken as a primitive (1983). One might, for instance, hold that the 
collection of electrons form a perfectly natural class, while the collection of grue objects do 
not. The most extreme nominalist of all will deny that any class is any more natural than any 
other, or perhaps deny altogether that there are classes (Goodman 1956). 
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The landscape, then, is divided into realism and nominalism, each of which can be 
divided into moderate and extreme versions. Accordingly, we may isolate a number of theses 
one might hold with respect to the property of truth, if it exists. We can call these the various 
accounts of just what metaphysical substantivism of truth can be: 
(MS1) There is a transcendent universal truth. 
 
(MS2) There is an immanent universal truth. 
 
(MS3) There is a resemblance class of truth tropes. 
 
(MS4) There is a natural class of truths. 
 
(MS5) There are truths. 
 
First let me make some simple observations. There are, of course, many versions of each of 
our four kinds of philosophical views on properties. We could articulate even more specific 
theses that give more precise specifications of what the property of truth is, and then 
investigate their truth. Doing so would bog us down in the dirty details of the philosophy of 
properties, and it is not our ambition to consider every possible view of properties that has 
been offered. Nevertheless, it is important that we disambiguate to some degree the claim 
that there is a property of truth. We shall have to be satisfied with this medium level of 
specificity. 
Next, notice that there is no denying MS5. In fact, denying it is self-undermining. If, 
per reductio, there are no truths, then it is true that there are no truths. But then there is a 
truth, and so we have reduced “truth nihilism” to absurdity. So while even the most extreme 
nominalist must grant MS5, he rejects the others for their false metaphysical posits. 
Finally, note that we can distinguish between rejecting certain of these theses on 
grounds simply due to one’s views regarding the theory of properties, and on grounds 
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specifically to do with truth. One can reject the first four and still be a Platonic realist about 
universals. But if one is already committed on the problem of universals, that commitment 
will limit his choices when it comes to the metaphysical status of truth. The moderate realist, 
for instance, will reject MS1 and MS3 simply in virtue of his committed view on properties. 
(MS4 may come for free if he accepts any of the other three first theses.) Whether he also 
rejects MS2 will depend on his specific attitudes about truth. 
I have taken the time to delve into the metaphysical debate over properties precisely 
because I think the question of just what it is to be a substantive property has too long been 
skirted around in the literature on deflationism. Our question is whether such a thesis is 
compatible with truthmaker theory, and we cannot address that question until we give it some 
content. To be a metaphysical deflationist, then, is to reject all of MS1 through MS4. To think 
that truth is a metaphysically substantive property is to think either that the class of true 
things forms a natural class, or that there is some truth universal or class of truth tropes. One 
helpful way to think about metaphysical substantivism is that it is the view that truth is a 
sparse property. Many philosophers accept that there is more to objects sharing a feature than 
merely their falling under the same predicate. Green objects resemble one another in a way 
that grue objects do not. As a result, they distinguish between the sparse and abundant 
properties. The sparse properties are those that account for the genuine resemblances 
between objects. Abundant properties, by contrast, can be shared between objects without 
bestowing any resemblance upon them. There need not be any genuine feature held in 
common between all the objects within a three mile radius of Obama’s nose, though there are 
features held in common between all samples of gold. What MS1 through MS4 share is the 
view that truth is among the sparse properties. Everyone, presumably, can grant that truth is a 
 153
property in the abundant sense. In the next section, I shall argue that truthmaker theory offers 
a very powerful argument in favor of metaphysical deflationism, and hence against MS1 
through MS4. But our current question is simply whether metaphysical deflationism is 
consistent with truthmaker theory. 
Let us first assume a metaphysics of universals. Suppose even that one believes that 
the truthmaking relation is a universal (even though it is not). One would not then be forced 
to conclude that truth is a universal. Given all the facts about truthmaking—that is, given all 
the instances of the truthmaking relation—we would settle all the facts about the truths. At 
least, we would if maximalism were true—so let’s suppose that it is for the sake of 
convenience.37 For example, suppose that there are two instances of the truthmaking relation: 
A makes true B, and C makes true D. It follows automatically that B is true, and that D is 
true. Here ‘is true’ is understood as a mere relational predicate. A truth-bearer satisfies the 
truth predicate just in case it stands in the truthmaking relation to something else. What is 
important to note is that all the “ontological work” being done here is performed by the 
truthmaking universal. There is no need to posit a second universal of truth. To employ the 
controversial language of supervenience, we could say that all the truth facts supervene on 
the truthmaking facts, which, ex hypothesi, we are taking to be more fundamental 
ontologically. 
Suppose now that there is no truthmaking universal. Such is Armstrong’s actual view, 
since he thinks that no internal relation (including truthmaking) is a universal. To account for 
relations, we posit universals only when the terms of the relata are insufficient for grounding 
the relation. Given both a truth, say, that a exists, and an object, a, there is no further thing 
                                                 
37Note that if even maximalist truthmaking is consistent with deflationism, then surely non-maximalist 
truthmaking is as well. 
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we need to add to our ontology to guarantee that a and that a exists stand in the truthmaking 
relation. For it is impossible to imagine a world possessed of a and yet have it be a world 
where that a exists turns out to be false. All the truthmaking relations are guaranteed to 
obtain, once the facts about what the truth-bearers are and what exists are settled. Marian 
David summarizes Armstrong’s attitude with the following slogan: “Be serious about 
truthmakers but not so serious about truth and truthmaking” (2005: 147). If deflationism 
about truth is taken to be the rejection of any universal of truth and truthmaking, then 
Armstrong is in that sense a deflationist. But such deflationism is no obstacle to robust 
truthmaker theory. 
Consider next the potential deflationist thesis that there are no truth tropes. Someone 
might hold the view that while there is no universal truth—no single thing possessed by all 
and only true things—there are truth tropes. All the particular instances of the truth tropes 
would then form a resemblance class. On such a view, we can call the truth of ‘Snow is 
white’ ‘T1’, the truth of ‘Grass is green’ ‘T2’, and so forth. T1 and T2 are distinct entities, 
though they resemble each other and hence belong to a resemblance class including all and 
only the truth tropes. I do not know of anyone who holds such a view about truth, and its 
rejection poses no problem for truthmaker theorists. For one thing, Armstrong is a nihilist 
about truth tropes (and all tropes more generally), but that interferes in no way with his 
truthmaking ambitions. Even those who embrace trope theory and truthmaker theory do not 
turn to any truth trope to fund their ontological ambitions (Mulligan, Simons, and Smith 1984, 
Lowe 2007, Cameron 2008a). Suppose it is true that a is F. To find a truthmaker for that truth, 
truthmaker theorists do not posit a truth trope; rather, they posit an F trope. The truthmaker 
for ‘a is F’ is Fa, an F trope belonging to a that falls under the resemblance class of all and 
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only tropes that belong to F things. There is no need to appeal to an additional class of truth 
tropes—truths are true in virtue of tropes, sure, but truth tropes in particular are an 
extraneous and unnecessary ontological addition. So not only is truthmaking perfectly 
consistent with there being no truth tropes, truthmaker theory (even when fueled by trope 
theory) undermines the need for positing any class of truth tropes. (This argument will be 
developed in greater detail below.) 
Truthmaking is consistent, then, with there being no universal truth or any truth 
tropes. I do not see any trouble for the truthmaker theorist in denying MS4, either. Nowhere 
in the truthmaking literature does anyone suggest that truth must be understood as a natural 
kind. Even Lewis, who adopts the natural properties framework, gives no suggestion that he 
thinks truth is among the privileged properties. Besides, there are independent reasons for 
rejecting it that we shall survey below. The upshot, then, is that metaphysical deflationism—
the rejection of MS1 through MS4—is perfectly compatible with truthmaker theory. It is easy 
to see why. All the “truth facts” supervene upon all the “truthmaking facts”. And all the 
truthmaking facts supervene upon the objects in the world. So there need be no universals 
underlying the property of being true, or the truthmaking relation. So truthmaker theorists 
need not reject metaphysical deflationism, for it is no obstacle to truthmaking theory. As 
Armstrong’s work shows, the truthmaker theorist is interested in ontology, and in offering an 
ambitious metaphysics concerned with what kind of ontology is needed to ground the truths 
that we accept. To do that ontological work, truthmaker theorists offer a full metaphysical 
system; one needs a robust ontology to fund truthmaker theory, not simply an appeal to a 
universal or trope underlying the truth predicate. 
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Deflationists have long said that there is nothing shared in common between truths. 
‘Snow is white’ and ‘Grass is green’ are both true, but not because they share a common 
property. The truthmaker theorist agrees wholeheartedly. Each truth needs individual 
attention, for there is no single thing (like a truth universal or truth trope) that makes truths 
true. Recall Armstrong’s admonition (via David 2005) that we be serious about truthmakers, 
not about truth and truthmaking. Hence, serious advocates of truthmaking ought to agree 
with the deflationist’s suspicion about there being a robust metaphysics of truth. In doing so, 
one is not thereby abandoning any robust metaphysics that underlies the truths that we accept. 
Deflationism about truth, as we explored earlier, should not be understood as being 
tantamount to a rejection of metaphysics as a worthwhile philosophical enterprise. As a result, 
deflationism about truth in no way seems compromised by a robust commitment to 
truthmaker theory. There may be good reasons for doubting the truth of deflationism, but 
truthmaking per se is not among them. 
 
3.3. Truthmaking against substantive truth 
I have now argued that truthmaker theory and deflationism about truth form a 
consistent pair. That conclusion is less striking once we recognize that truthmaker theory 
itself is not any kind of theory of truth. Nevertheless, I have gone to great length to show that 
the two theories are compatible. In this section, I want to argue for what is perhaps a more 
shocking thesis: truthmaker theory actually undermines substantive theories of truth. Not 
only is (a certain kind of) deflationism consistent with truthmaker theory, it is actually the 
only rationally compelling view about the metaphysics of truth to which the truthmaker 
theorist should subscribe. In the last chapter we saw how truthmaker theory undermines the 
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motivation for accepting correspondence theories by better accounting for the basic 
motivations that favor correspondence accounts over their competitors. The argument of this 
section has even wider implications: any theory of truth that posits a metaphysically robust 
property of truth is undermined by truthmaker theory. Hence, I shall be arguing that adopting 
truthmaker theory gives us sufficient reason for rejecting MS1 through MS4 above. Truth is 
not among the sparse properties. 
As always, I adhere to methodological neutrality, and do not wish to tackle the 
problem of universals on its own terms, or even take a stand. Our object is to argue in favor 
of metaphysical deflationism, so as to show that there is no metaphysically substantive 
property of truth, regardless of how we might understand that thesis. Accordingly, I take our 
present task to be the one of refuting MS1 through MS4. Metaphysical deflationism is the 
view that there is no substantive property of truth, which we now can take to be a denial that 
truth is any of the various things philosophers mean when they discuss the nature of 
properties.38 Now, it should be evident that if we adopt the most extreme form of nominalism, 
then metaphysical deflationism is secure. If there is no metaphysical notion of a property at 
all, then a fortiori there is no metaphysical notion of a property of truth. So we could argue 
for metaphysical deflationism by arguing for extreme nominalism about properties (sans any 
account of naturalness). But that is not our project. Thinking directly about truth can lead us 
to reject theses MS1 through MS4; we do not need to import any controversial assumptions 
about the metaphysics of properties. Let us turn, then, to the refutation of our four theses. The 
argument will run in two different directions. First, I shall argue that there is no theoretical 
need to posit any such substantive property of truth. Doing so is gratuitous. Then I shall 
                                                 
38Cf. O’Leary-Hawthorne and Price 1996: 278 on “substantial” or “thick” truth, and Azzouni’s notion of 
“metaphysical truth deflationism” (2006). 
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argue that even if we do posit such a property, we are led to some disastrous metaphysical 
conclusions. 
 
3.3.1. No need for truth 
The first step to arguing against metaphysical substantivism involves appreciating the 
truthmaking role that properties play. Those who embrace the existence of universals or 
tropes do so not only because such things account for the resemblances between objects, but 
also because they are able to serve as truthmakers for contingent predicative truths. Suppose, 
for example, that Smith is six feet tall. Smith himself is not a truthmaker for the truth that 
Smith is six feet tall, since the existence of Smith himself does not guarantee that the 
proposition is true. It is possible for Smith to exist and not be six feet tall. Something else is 
needed to account for the truth of the claim. Someone who accepted universals would hold 
that what makes it true is a state of affairs—the compound object composed of both Smith 
and the six feet tall universal (e.g., Armstrong 1997). Someone who accepted tropes would 
hold that what makes it true is a particular six feet tall trope that uniquely belongs to Smith 
(e.g., Lowe 2007). 
Notice, then, the truthmaking powers that belong to tropes and universals. For any 
object x that instantiates some universal F, it will be true that x is F, and the state of affairs 
composed of x and F will make that claim true. For any object x that possesses a trope of type 
T, it will be true that x is T, and the trope will make that claim true. Now suppose that truth is 
a metaphysically substantive property, such that there is a universal truth or collection of 
truth tropes. Any time a truth bearer is true, it will instantiate that universal, or possess a truth 
trope. Just as all green things instantiate green, or possess resembling green tropes, all true 
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things—so says the substantivist about truth—instantiate truth, or possess resembling truth 
tropes. 
We may now notice how the substantivist about truth has abundant truthmaking 
resources for contingent predications. For ease of exposition, suppose there are propositions. 
The proposition <Smith is six feet tall> is true, and true in virtue of either a six feet tall trope 
that belongs to Smith, or the state of affairs composed of Smith and the universal six feet tall. 
But the proposition itself instantiates truth (thereby creating a new state of affairs), or 
possesses a truth trope. Those entities themselves are also truthmakers for the proposition, as 
their existence guarantees the truth of the proposition. The realist now has two states of 
affairs that serve to make the proposition true (Smith’s bearing six feet tall, and the 
proposition’s bearing truth), just as the moderate nominalist has two tropes available to serve 
as truthmakers (a six feet tall trope, and a truth trope). 
Now, it is no objection to a view that it provides redundant truthmakers for truths. 
There is no one-one correspondence between truths and truthmakers. What is important to 
realize now is how the two truthmakers available to the substantivist are distinct entities. 
Two objects are distinct just in case the existence of at least one does not depend upon the 
existence of the other. Two objects are fully distinct just in case neither depends on the 
existence of the other for its existence. Fully distinct objects are distinct objects between 
which no necessary connections obtain. Suppose, for example, that some particular a 
contingently instantiates the universal F. The state of affairs (a, F) composed of the two 
objects is a distinct existence from its components a and F because its components could 
exist without the state of affairs existing. Such would be the case were a to exist but not be F, 
though something else was. But though (a, F) is distinct from both a and F, it is not fully 
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distinct from them. States of affairs are necessarily connected to their components: (a, F) 
depends upon its constituents, for it cannot exist unless a and F both do.39 
Consider now the two truthmakers that the realist has available for <Smith is six feet 
tall>.40 One is a state of affairs composed of Smith and six feet tall. The other is a state of 
affairs composed of the proposition and truth. I contend that these two objects are most 
plausibly understood as being fully distinct entities.41 As I shall now argue, they do not 
depend upon one another for their existence. 
If there are necessary connections between the two states of affairs, then those 
connections ought to be traceable to other necessary connections obtaining between their 
components. Otherwise we will be forced to take the connection to be brute. Consider a 
familiar case of necessarily connected states of affairs: imagine a length of wire L that 
instantiates the two universals made of copper and electrically conductive. The state of 
affairs of L’s being made of copper is necessarily connected to the state of affairs of L’s 
being electrically conductive. What explains the necessary connection between the two states 
of affairs is the necessary connection between the two universals: conductivity necessarily 
accompanies copper. That sort of connection is not to be found in our case. The two 
universals—truth and six feet tall—do not depend upon each other for their existence; they’re 
just separate, unique universals. They are instantiated by very different kinds of objects: very 
few, if any, true truth-bearers are six feet tall! Further, the connection we are looking for 
cannot be accounted for by finding a connection between universals, because we don’t have 
                                                 
39It is just these sorts of necessary connections between distinct existences that lead Lewis (1992, 2001b) to find 
fault with Armstrong’s realism. 
40Exactly parallel marks apply for the moderate nominalist here. 
41Similarly, I contend that the truth trope belonging to <Smith is six feet tall> is a distinct existence from the six 
feet tall trope belonging to Smith. 
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one single object instantiating two universals. We are trying to account for a connection 
between a proposition and a certain universal on the one hand, and a person and a very 
different universal on the other. Our two states of affairs don’t even share a common 
component, and so accounting for their mutual dependence is all the more difficult. 
The usual channels for accounting for necessary connections between states of affairs 
do not seem open to the realist about truth. Even so, it might still be thought that, 
nevertheless, the states of affairs themselves are necessarily connected. The view is that the 
proposition <Smith is six feet tall> cannot bind to truth unless Smith himself binds to six feet 
tall. One might just bite the bullet here and accept the necessary connection as brute, and 
thereby forswear giving any account of the connection. After all, states of affairs themselves 
may well involve some sort of brute connection to their components, so perhaps there is no 
more harm in admitting some further necessary connections between different states of 
affairs. 
While such a view may be defensible, it does come at a cost. Accepting that there are 
necessary connections between distinct existences is tantamount to restricting the free 
recombination of distinct existences. When two universals are very different in their nature, 
they ought to be able to freely recombine, irrespective of what the other is doing. Other 
universals like green and red may well impose constraints on one another—objects that are 
green can’t be red. But such failures of recombination are due to the intrinsic 
incompatibilities in the universals. It’s not obvious that the same can be said for truth and six 
feet tall. As we’ve already seen, they don’t even tend to instantiate the same kinds of objects. 
Failures of free recombination, of course, worry some philosophers—Humeans and 
Lewisians, for example—more than others. But even those who are untroubled by the 
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presence of necessary connections between distinct existences must recognize that the 
substantivist about truth takes on an extra explanatory burden that the deflationist does not. 
The substantivist posits the existence of two very different states of affairs that are composed 
of very different sorts of things, and holds that these two distinct states of affairs nevertheless 
necessitate the existence of each other. If a view posits the brute existence of necessary 
connections between distinct existences, it incurs a theoretical cost. Such views impose 
greater structure on the world—things of type X can’t exist unless different things of type Y 
also exist. 
Such costs can indeed be justified. Armstrong (1983), for example, posits the 
existence of necessary connections between distinct universals in order to give an adequate 
account of the laws of nature. Further, as we have already seen, Armstrong grants the 
existence of states of affairs—despite their own inherent necessary connection to their 
components—because he employs them as truthmakers for contingent predications. So 
positing such necessary connections is not in and of itself fatal to a view. Still, positing brute 
necessary connections should not be done lightly, and should be done only to serve a greater 
theoretical purpose. The very same can be said for positing entities (or a notion of naturalness) 
at all with respect to the metaphysics of properties. Universals, tropes, and natural properties 
are not posited without cause; one need not believe that for every predicate there is a 
corresponding universal or set of tropes, or that every property is natural. Not every property 
deserves to be sparse. What reasons, then, can justify these various metaphysical posits, such 
as universals, tropes, naturalness, states of affairs, or necessary connections between them? 
The answer is threefold. Here is David Lewis, describing Armstrong’s moderate 
realism: “universals are sparse. There are the universals that there must be to ground the 
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objective resemblances and the causal powers of things, and there is no reason to believe in 
any more” (1983: 345). Lewis here identifies two of the sources of justification for 
metaphysical positing in the theory of properties. We posit universals (or tropes or 
naturalness) when we need them to account for the genuine resemblances between objects. 
What separates the collection of green objects from the collection of grue objects is that the 
former all share a single universal (green), which cannot be said for the various grue objects. 
We also posit universals (or tropes or naturalness) when we need them to account for 
the causal properties of objects. The thought here is that objects have their causal powers in 
virtue of the properties they enjoy. The sparse properties are, in Armstrong’s phrase, “the 
ontologically significant properties of objects, those in terms of which the world’s work is 
done” (2004: 17). Armstrong often refers to the “Eleatic Principle”, according to which 
nothing exists except that which has causal powers (e.g., 1997: 41-43; see Oddie 1982 for 
discussion). Being massive or charged or conductive are the sorts of properties that account 
for the causal order of the world; it is these properties, and not being three feet from Obama 
or being either in Alaska or Madagascar that figure into the causal laws of nature. 
A third and final reason for positing universals and tropes involves, as before, their 
use as truthmakers. Objects and their properties, whether understood in terms of universals or 
tropes, are needed to serve as the ontological grounds for the truths about the world. Truths 
are true in virtue of the existence of both objects and their properties. 
There are three sources of justification, then, for positing that a particular property 
belongs among the sparse properties. The sparse properties are those that account for the 
genuine resemblances between objects, have causal powers, and are needed as truthmakers. 
We should posit such properties (and any necessary connections between them) only if doing 
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so serves those needs. Our next question to consider is whether treating truth as a sparse 
property will fulfill any of these metaphysical purposes. 
First consider the topic of resemblance. Sparse properties are those that account for 
genuine resemblances between objects. Objects resemble one another in virtue of 
instantiating the same universal, possessing resembling tropes, or belonging to the same 
natural class. Now, not all classes exhibit any real resemblance—such is supposed to be the 
distinction between the class of green objects and the class of grue objects. Our question is 
whether the truths are more like the green things or the grue things. Notice just how diverse 
is the collection of truths. It’s true that snow is white, that Obama is president, that hobbits 
don’t exist, and that if I were to drop a piece of chalk it would fall to the floor. The class of 
truths is one remarkably heterogeneous collection. Indeed, each truth seems to be its own 
individual affair. The proposition that snow is white is true in virtue of snow’s being white, 
the proposition that Obama is president is true in virtue of Obama’s being president, and so 
on. The idea on hand here is one familiar to deflationists—the truth of <Snow is white> does 
not “consist in the same thing” as the truth of <Obama is president>. Sure, they “resemble” 
one another in that they are both true, but the resemblance stops there. They are both true, but 
for entirely separate reasons. The shared greenness of two things, by contrast, may well 
admit of a common explanation, due to a genuine property shared by both. The class of truths, 
it seems, is a great candidate for being a perfectly unnatural class. If so, there is no need to 
promote truth to the status of a sparse property on the basis of shared resemblances between 
truths, for there are none.42 
                                                 
42Azzouni writes that ‘true’ belongs to the set of “words that needn’t even be seen as candidates for being 
‘natural-kind’ terms” (2010: 89). 
 165
It also seems unlikely that anyone would posit truth to serve any genuine causal role. 
We may posit mass and charge so that they may discharge their causal duties, but truth 
seems to be an altogether different beast. It is strange to think that truth would be the sort of 
thing that contributes to the causal order of the world studied by empirical science. By what 
mechanism would truth interact with the other universals in order to bring about various 
effects?43 Why does truth not figure into any physical laws or equations? 
Still, it may seem natural to make causal judgments involving truth, as in ‘The truth 
of my beliefs caused me to ace my exam’. Deflationists have a metaphysically innocuous 
account of what is being said here, and it doesn’t involve a causally active truth property.44 
Suppose the exam has a single question: which U.S. president was succeeded by his own 
predecessor? Because I believe that Benjamin Harrison was succeeded by his own 
predecessor, that belief in part causes my hand to write the answer, which in turn causes the 
instructor to give me full credit. What is crucial is that I believe that Benjamin Harrison was 
succeeded by his own predecessor, and that Benjamin Harrison was indeed succeeded by his 
own predecessor. Nowhere are we forced to posit a causally active universal truth to account 
for my success. The appeal to truth in the initial causal judgment is nothing but another 
instance of the useful anaphoric and abbreviatory features of ‘truth’ and ‘true’. Rather than 
saying that my belief that Benjamin Harrison was succeeded by his own predecessor when 
Benjamin Harrison was indeed succeeded by his own predecessor caused me to ace the exam, 
                                                 
43Cf. Levin 1984: 126, O’Leary-Hawthorne and Price 1996: 278, and McGinn 2000: 108. Damnjanovic 2005 
argues that given the account of causal-explanatory properties defended by Jackson and Pettit 1990a and 1990b, 
deflationists might be committed to the view that even if truth is a logical property, it may nonetheless be a 
causal-explanatory property. 
44See Williams 1986 and chapter 3 of Horwich 1990 for the kind of deflationary account of such explanatory 
demands that I am upholding, and Field 1986 and Kitcher 2001 and 2002 for criticism. For more on the 
“success” argument against deflationism, see Putnam 1978, Horwich 1982, Levin 1984, Leeds 1995, and 
Damnjanovic 2005. 
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I can abbreviate and say that it’s the truth of my belief that caused my academic success. The 
generalizing feature of ‘truth’ becomes even more apparent in cases where I need to appeal to 
several of my true beliefs, rather than just one, in accounting for some particular practical 
success. Assuming the case is typical, even if we do appeal to truth in certain causal 
judgments, doing so only reveals the familiar logical and linguistic functions of ‘truth’; such 
judgments do not push us into thinking that there is a universal truth beholden with causal 
powers.45 
We do not need to posit a universal truth, then, in order to play some indispensable 
causal role. After all, truth does not seem to enter into our best empirical theories, and no 
laws of nature employ it. However, truth does seem to play a role in other laws, namely, the 
laws of logic. And just as certain properties entering into causal laws gives us reason to posit 
universals corresponding to them, so too might we think there is a truth universal by virtue of 
its figuring into logical laws.46 But again, the fact that the laws of logic involve truth does not 
show that the laws are about truth, or that they require a notion of truth that evades 
deflationary analysis. Such logical uses of truth were front and center of Quine’s deflationary 
analysis of the logical functions of the truth predicate (1970).47 
                                                 
45It seems that other causal judgments that involve truth can be handled similarly. The judgment ‘The truth of 
scientific theories causes them to succeed’ can be analyzed in typical deflationary manner. The key is to notice 
that ‘the truth of scientific theories’ is always shorthand for ‘that scientific theories entail that there is gravity, 
and there is gravity, or that scientific theories entail that there are electrons, and there are electrons’, and so 
forth. The thought behind the original judgment is that it is the specific content of true theories—rather than the 
content of false theories—which causes practical success. Hence, theory T1 (which includes, say, a true theory 
of gravity) causes successful prediction of planetary orbits where T2 (which includes a false theory of gravity) 
does not. What is thought to do all the causing in the judgment is the actual causal content of the theory, not any 
specific causal power belonging to truth. After all, no scientific theory (at least none that I’ve ever heard of) 
employs a causally active property truth. 
46I owe this helpful suggestion to Matt Kotzen. 
47Cf. Horwich 1990: 75-77. 
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Finally we come to truthmaking: does promoting truth into a sparse property provide 
us with any needed truthmaking resources? As we saw above, positing a universal truth or set 
of truth tropes provides us with redundant truthmakers, not useful ones. Many truthmaker 
theorists rely on universals, states of affairs, and tropes in order to provide truthmakers; what 
they do not do is posit universals, states of affairs, and tropes specifically to do with truth. As 
before, the state of affairs of Smith’s being six feet tall and Smith’s six feet tall trope are 
perfectly adequate truthmakers for <Smith is six feet tall>. We do not need another state of 
affairs or trope involving truth to properly ground the truth of the proposition. Other kinds of 
propositions do not call for a sparse truth property, either. Existential propositions like 
<There are penguins> don’t require truth tropes or states of affairs; they just require penguins. 
Negative existential propositions, as we know, raise notorious truthmaker questions: what 
makes it true that there are no hobbits? Perhaps there are negative facts (Russell 1985), 
absences (Martin 1996), or one giant totality fact (Armstrong 2004) that make it true, or 
perhaps it doesn’t have any truthmaker at all (Lewis 2001b). Regardless of who is correct 
here, no one thinks that what we need is a sparse property of truth to bind to the negative 
existential proposition. 
Initially, the following line of reasoning might have seemed correct. All electrons 
share something in common, for all electrons are charged. Therefore they share a common 
universal: charge.  Electrons are charged in virtue of their each instantiating the universal 
charge. Similarly, all true propositions (say) share something in common, for all true 
propositions are true. Therefore they share a common universal: truth. Propositions are true 
in virtue of their instantiating the universal truth. Further, what makes it true that E1 is 
charged is that E1 instantiates charge, and what makes it true that proposition P1 is true is that 
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P1 instantiates truth.48 The cases seem exactly parallel. But we are now in a position to see 
the mistake. Truth need not be a property of propositions in the way that charge is a property 
of electrons. When propositions are true, they are true in virtue of their truthmakers. When 
electrons are charged, they are charged in virtue of their instantiating the universal charge. 
The cases are actually quite different; only the latter suggests the need for a universal. 
To suppose that we need a universal truth to account for the truth of propositions is to 
make a common mistake, namely, to think that predications of truth add substance to a claim. 
It is true that there are penguins if and only if there are penguins. That triviality, it is often 
said, is countenanced by all theories of truth. Any truthmaker for the right-hand side of the 
biconditional, then, will be a truthmaker for the left-hand side.49 But it is evident that any old 
penguin is sufficient to guarantee the truth of the right-hand side. And so it guarantees the 
truth of the left-hand side as well. The left-hand side, despite its predication of truth, actually 
posits no additional metaphysical substance beyond what is already posited by the right-hand 
side. If it did, it would be impossible to infer it is true that p from that p, which is a perfectly 
valid form of inference (as is its converse). Since penguins alone sufficiently account for the 
truth of <There are penguins>, we do not need to say that there is, in addition, a universal 
                                                 
48This line of thought is readily apparent in Lynch 2009. On Lynch’s pluralist view, truth is a property that can 
be multiply realized. In domain A, propositions are true by virtue of having the property “corresponding with 
the facts”, whereas in domain B, propositions are true by virtue of having the property “superwarranted”. The 
language of being true in virtue of having one of the various truth properties can be found throughout the work. 
Lynch does not give an account of what he means by ‘property’. 
49Supposing, at least, that the T-sentences are necessary. I happen to think that some T-sentences are clearly 
contingent (namely, those generated by the sentential version T3), while some are clearly necessary (namely, 
those generated by the statement version T1 and the propositional version T2). The T-sentence in this paragraph 
goes the way of the necessary versions. The only contingency that arises in T-sentences is due to the fact that 
words can change their meaning in different possible worlds, and nothing more. Relatedly, this means that 
truthmakers for sentences may be more complicated than the truthmakers for the propositions they express. For 
if some sentence S expresses some true proposition P, it seems that the truthmaker for S will include whatever 
the truthmaker is for P combined with whatever makes it true that S expresses P. This subtlety can largely be 
ignored for our purposes. 
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truth which the proposition instantiates. Penguins handle the metaphysical labor all by 
themselves. 
What we have here is little more than the familiar recognition that “Ramsey’s ladder” 
is horizontal (see Blackburn 1998). It may appear that there is a metaphysical ladder to climb 
between that p, that p is true, that p is really, objectively true, that p is true in the eye of God, 
and so forth. But all those claims are no more substantive than the original claim that p. It is 
a mistake to suppose that in climbing the ladder we have gained any ontological altitude. The 
view from the top is the same as the view from the bottom. Because the ladder is 
horizontal,50 we do not need additional truthmakers for any rung of the ladder besides the one 
holding up the original rung for that p. 
So far, we have seen that if a proposition has a truthmaker, then that truthmaker by 
itself is sufficient to account for the proposition’s truth. There is no reason to suppose that all 
truths are true in virtue of their instantiating a single thing, as is the case with other shared 
properties. Rather, each truth is different.51 As deflationists have long urged, the truth of that 
snow is white does not “consist” in the same thing as the truth of that grass is green. The 
former is true in virtue of snow’s being white, the latter in virtue of grass’s being green. It is 
a mistake to look for something in common between them. Now, if both have truthmakers, 
                                                 
50Which is not to say, contra Blackburn, that the ladder is lying on the ground (1998: 78). If a truth’s “lying on 
the ground” amounts to its not having any ontological or metaphysical substance, then nothing about the 
equivalence between that p and that p is true should lead us to think that both claims are devoid of metaphysical 
substance. (I do not know if that is what Blackburn means by the ladder lying on the ground, but I suspect he 
has something like that in mind when he speaks of truths coming “on the cheap” or “for free”, given the 
deflationist view. See Zangwill 1992: 163.) The correct insight to draw is that that p and that p is true have 
exactly the same metaphysical and ontological commitments, however substantive those may be. Deflating that 
p is true down to that p does not show that that p is a metaphysical lightweight. Try this instance: Lewis’s claim 
that there is a pluriverse of concrete possible worlds (1986). My suspicion is that those who think that there is 
any easy inference from deflationism about truth to anti-realism are conflating the horizontal nature of the 
ladder (which is correct) with the ladder’s lying on the ground (which is open to question). 
51Recall the view endorsed by Lowe (2007: 259) that ‘is true’ is nothing but a formal ontological predicate. 
Horwich holds a similar view (1990: 38). Compare: do all existing things share something in common, namely, 
the universal existence? 
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then we can say that they both share the property of “having a truthmaker”. But recall that we 
showed earlier that the truthmaking relation requires no corresponding universal. The terms 
of the relation are sufficient to guarantee that the relation obtains, and thus we need not posit 
any universal to ground the relation. 
Further, the term ‘truthmaker’ is just like ‘truth’ in that it deceptively suggests that 
there is something in common between all truthmakers. The two truths that there are 
electrons and that there are penguins both have truthmakers, sure, but those are, for example, 
E1 and some individual penguin. There is very little in common between electrons and 
penguins. So while both are truthmakers (everything, recall, is a truthmaker), what we really 
have are a “there-being-electrons-maker” on the one hand, and a “there-being-penguins-
maker” on the other. The common term ‘truthmaker’ glosses over the differences between 
truthmakers, just as ‘truth’ glosses over the differences between truths.52 Truthmaker 
theorists, then, subscribe to the same “piecemeal” approach to truths that deflationists have 
long advocated. Each truth has its own subject matter; the truth of each individual truth is a 
matter of what that truth is about, and nothing else. There need not be any metaphysical 
overlap between truths with different subject matter of what it is in which their truth consists. 
As a result, we do not need to turn to any universal truth to provide a common subject matter, 
for there simply is none. 
I have so far been more or less assuming so far that the universal truth is not needed 
to perform any truthmaking labor. The truth that there are penguins is made true by penguins, 
and the truth that electrons are charged is made true by electrons, charge, and/or whatever 
else one might think is needed to serve as a predicative truthmaker (a state of affairs, trope, 
object under a counterpart relation, or what have you). Ordinarily, truths are not themselves 
                                                 
52Many thanks to John Roberts, to whom I owe this keen observation. 
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about truth, and so we wouldn’t even think to look to truth as a truthmaker. Even in many 
cases where ‘true’ and ‘truth’ appear in true sentences, we should not turn to truth as a 
truthmaker. ‘There are electrons’ and ‘It is true that there are electrons’ are both true in virtue 
of the various actual electrons; that ‘true’ appears in the latter adds no extra incentive for 
thinking that it is made true in part by a universal truth. Similarly, the true claim ‘There is 
some truth to Kant’s views on metaphysics’ is true in virtue of whatever it is in virtue of 
which Kant’s various true metaphysical claims are true. If it is true that space and time are 
pure forms of intuition, and that what makes that claim true is X, then X also makes true the 
generic claim ‘There is some truth to Kant’s views on metaphysics’ (together with whatever 
makes it true that Kant said that space and time are pure forms of intuition). In general, 
wherever traditional deflationists have given an account of the role of ‘true’ and ‘truth’ in our 
language, we can borrow that account to show how such appearances do not generate any 
extra metaphysical burdens when it comes to truthmaking. 
Still, there are cases that challenge deflationary accounts of truth. Consider, for 
example, the claim that to assert is to present as true. Here we have a truth that, it has been 
argued, evades typical deflationary analysis (Bar-On and Simmons 2007). Such examples, as 
we have seen, put pressure on conceptual deflationism, the view that truth is not conceptually 
connected to other notions beyond its role as a disquotational, denominalizing, and 
generalizing device. But even if such claims pose a problem for conceptual deflationism, it 
does not follow that they place similar pressure on metaphysical deflationism. Still, the best 
examples, it seems, for undermining metaphysical deflationism are the same as those that 
attempt to undermine conceptual deflationism. In our example—that to assert is to present as 
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true—what we have, I believe, is a conceptual truth, and probably an analytic one at that.53 
We are offering an analysis (or elucidation, or definition, or what have you) of the concept of 
assertion by making use of the concept of truth. Now, it is a familiar dictum that conceptual 
truths are true in virtue of the meaning of their constituents. That bachelors are unmarried is 
true in virtue of the fact that the concept BACHELOR includes in some sense the concept 
UNMARRIED. Whatever else they are or do, our concepts license us to make various 
inferences. From ‘X is a bachelor’ we may infer ‘X is unmarried’. Whatever concepts are 
(and I have no firm view on the matter), they guarantee that such inferences are valid. Our 
concepts being what they are, then, it is true that to assert is to present as true (assuming that 
Frege is correct; but see Williamson 1996). That claim holds in virtue of our concepts TRUTH 
and ASSERTION. (Recall that even if the claim is true in virtue of the concepts, it is not true in 
virtue of the existence of those concepts). We do not need to posit any universals—concepts 
do the job for us. Conceptual truths, it should be clear, simply are not ontologically loaded. It 
goes without saying that that bachelors are unmarried is true even in certain possible worlds 
where there are no bachelors. In one such world, children are all married off while they are 
infants, so no one reaches adulthood unmarried. Nevertheless, it remains true in such worlds 
that bachelors are unmarried—it’s just that there are none. Similarly, that to assert is to 
present as true would be true in our world even if there were no assertions, for that truth does 
not commit us to any. 
In sum, the best candidates for truths that might need a universal truth as a truthmaker 
(or other ontological ground) are those truths that evade deflationary analysis. Such truths 
make explicit and indispensable mention of truth, and thus we cannot simply disquote or 
                                                 
53Of course one might think that not all conceptual truths are analytic, though I do not see the motivation for 
that kind of view. Analytic truths are true in virtue of their constituents’ meanings, which are best understood in 
terms of concepts. 
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denominalize away the appearances of ‘truth’ and ‘true’ therein. But those truths are going to 
be conceptual truths, for they are the result of identifying important conceptual connections 
between truth and other concepts, and thus do not even fall under the umbrella of 
truthmaking. The problem truths are potential problems for conceptual deflationism only, 
and accordingly rely on our concept TRUTH (which we have), not a universal truth (which 
does not exist). Opponents of conceptual deflationism argue that truth has conceptual 
connections to other notions that go beyond its traditional deflationary role. But even if truth 
is a rich and explanatory concept, it does not follow that there is a universal lurking behind it. 
We should not posit a universal for every concept, just as we should not posit a universal for 
every predicate.54 
All told, the positive case for treating truth as a sparse property is weak. The class of 
truths is a great candidate for not exhibiting genuine resemblance, truth is not a causal 
property, and truth is not needed as a property to serve any truthmaking function. 
Consequently, we have undermined the motivation for believing any of MS1 through MS4. 
There is simply no need for truth.55 
 
3.3.2. Taking truth to absurdity 
Now we may turn to a second line of argument against metaphysical substantivism. If 
there were such a thing as a universal truth or set of truth tropes, then they would provide an 
                                                 
54Plenty of our concepts are explanatorily useful, even if they correspond to no universal. We can go a long way 
toward explaining the behavior of teenagers by way of employing COOL, though cool certainly does not exist. 
Certain moral concepts may help explain lots of behavior and lots of our moral beliefs, even if there are no 
moral properties (metaphysically understood). 
55Here’s another little argument against substantivism. If truth exists, then every true proposition instantiates it, 
and so for any true proposition, there will be a state of affairs of that proposition’s bearing truth that will make 
that proposition true. So, taking truth to exist entails truthmaker maximalism. So reasons for rejecting 
maximalism (whether from Milne’s paradoxical sentences, or my concerns from analyticity, or considerations 
involving negative existentials) are reasons for rejecting substantivism about truth. 
 174
army of redundant truthmakers. That fact in and of itself is no objection to substantivism 
about truth; the real problem is that they would provide an army of fully distinct redundant 
truthmakers. If so, then the view runs straight into contradiction. 
This second argument against metaphysical substantivism about truth takes the form 
of a dilemma. Suppose that any of MS1 through MS3 is true. Then it is the case that for any 
truth p, there will be both its familiar truthmaker F and a redundant truthmaker for it R.56 F 
and R are either fully distinct, or there are necessary connections between them. If F and R 
are fully distinct, then R can exist even if F doesn’t. R is a truthmaker for p, and so p can be 
true even if F does not exist. Below, this will be seen to be contradictory. If F and R are not 
fully distinct, then there must be some metaphysical justification for positing the existence of 
R and its brute necessary connection to F. But there is no such justification, and so the view 
is unmotivated. Hence, metaphysical substantivism about truth is either contradictory or 
unmotivated. 
Let us dig into this argument with a concrete example. Take again our sample true 
proposition, <Smith is six feet tall>. The “familiar” truthmaker F here is either the realist’s 
state of affairs composed of Smith and the universal six feet tall, or the moderate nominalist’s 
six feet tall trope that belongs to Smith. The “redundant” truthmaker R here is either the state 
of affairs composed of <Smith is six feet tall> and truth or the truth trope belonging to 
<Smith is six feet tall>. F and R are either fully distinct existences, or there are necessary 
connections between them, in which case at least one of them depends for its existence upon 
the existence of the other. Either way leads to trouble. 
                                                 
56I’m here supposing truthmaker maximalism—the claim that every truth has a truthmaker. Those who reject 
maximalism, as we have, must also reject substantivism about truth, because substantivism entails maximalism. 
(See footnote 55. On substantivism, there will be an R for every p.) 
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If F and R are fully distinct, then it’s possible for R to exist and for F to fail to exist. 
Notice just what this possibility is. We have the proposition <Smith is six feet tall> 
instantiating truth, and so we have a true proposition. But this is also a possibility where 
Smith does not instantiate six feet tall. What we have, in other words, is a possible scenario in 
which Smith is not six feet tall, even though the proposition <Smith is six feet tall> is true. 
But that is impossible, since, necessarily, the proposition that Smith is six feet tall is true if 
and only if Smith is six feet tall. If F and R are fully distinct, then substantivism about truth 
reduces to absurdity. 
Suppose, then, that F and R are not fully distinct; their existence is tied up with one 
another, such that R cannot exist unless F also exists. I argued already in the previous section 
that this view is implausible; there are no obvious grounds for taking F and R to be 
necessarily connected, and so to find them so connected must involve positing a brute 
necessary connection between them. But we should posit entities like R, and their brute 
necessary connection to more familiar things like F, only when there are compelling 
metaphysical reasons for doing so, such as accounting for resemblance, causality, and 
truthmaking. R is not needed for any of those things, so positing its existence and its brute 
connection to F is unmotivated. 
Notice also that this argument does not rely specifically on truth being a property 
rather than a relation. Suppose for instance that truth is instead a two-place universal. (The 
correspondence theorist might have such a view in mind.) So suppose that the proposition 
<Smith is six feet tall> stands in the truth relational universal to some correspondent, C. Here 
we have three things: the proposition, the relational universal truth, and the correspondent C. 
The proposition is true, and so the state of affairs composed of the three entities exists. There 
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seem to be two options for what C could be. It could just be the familiar truthmaker F (or 
something not fully distinct from it), in which case F itself is all we need to account for the 
truth of the proposition. The detour through the relational universal is unnecessary. Or C 
could be something fully distinct from F. In that case, the state of affairs of the proposition’s 
standing in the truth relation to C could exist even if F doesn’t, for ex hypothesi they are fully 
distinct entities. And here the original argument resumes: C and F being fully distinct leads 
either to contradiction or an unmotivated metaphysics. 
Given that truthmaker theory is available to provide the requisite grounds for truths, 
metaphysical substantivism about truth is either contradictory or unmotivated. Even for those 
who embrace a serious metaphysics of properties, we can see that there is no need to take 
truth to be a metaphysically serious property. Indeed, it seems that there would be absolutely 
no need for any property besides truth if we embraced substantivism about truth. If all we 
need is R to account for the truth of <Smith is six feet tall>, then we don’t need Smith or the 
property of being six feet tall. The proposition and truth do all the necessary labor themselves. 
If truth were a distinct entity, we could use it to create a possible world in which all the 
propositions true in the actual world are true (by having each of those propositions instantiate 
truth), despite none of the familiar objects of the actual world existing in it. But that is absurd. 
Yet if truth can’t do that labor by itself—if it needs help from things like Smith and six feet 
tall—then it’s just a metaphysical deadbeat, with nothing of its own to contribute. 
 
3.3.3. Unnatural truth 
The previous argument was directed specifically at MS1 through MS3. Let us now 
give a little special attention to MS4, the Lewisian-flavored view that while there is no 
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universal truth or resemblance class of truth tropes, there is a natural class of truths. (Note 
that there is no reason to suppose that Lewis himself would have endorsed MS4. I’m quite 
sure he would have dismissed it without reservation.) In his seminal paper “New Work for a 
Theory of Universals”, Lewis distinguishes between properties and natural properties.57 
Properties are any old class of objects. The property red is just the class of red things 
(including merely possible red things, for Lewis). The property grue is just the class of grue 
things. Since any collection of objects forms a property, the notion of a property itself is 
undiscriminating. In Lewis’s phrase, “Properties carve reality at the joints—and everywhere 
else as well” (1983: 346). Since such an undiscriminating notion of a property is unable to 
perform any of the metaphysical work from above that is undertaken by tropes and universals, 
Lewis proposes that we think of there being an “élite minority of special properties” that he 
deems to be natural, where naturalness is allowed to come in degrees, and taken to be a 
theoretical primitive (ibid.). The natural properties are those that serve to account for 
resemblances between objects, and for performing the world’s causal duties. Might positing 
truth as a natural property be of any such use? My answer, unsurprisingly, is ‘no’. Because 
much of the groundwork has been laid above, we can make short shrift of MS4. 
In thinking about MS4, we may first observe that the property truth definitely exists, 
for there are truths. Whatever those truths are, collect them together, and name the class 
‘truth’. Let us assume that the members of truth are all propositions, for the sake of simplicity. 
If we follow Lewis, we should include in truth all the merely possible truths, thus including 
the entire collection of non-contradictory propositions. Otherwise, we may just include all 
actual truths as members of truth. 
                                                 
57See also Quinton 1957-1958. 
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Now the question is whether we have anything to gain by positing truth as belonging 
to that special club of natural properties, alongside such things as, say, charge and mass. We 
do not. The simple reason why is that, as above, there is no special labor for a promoted truth 
to perform. I have stressed all along the insight common to deflationists and truthmaker 
theorists alike that there is nothing in common between truths—it is false to say that truths 
are true in virtue of their sharing some common feature. In fact, when we do suppose them to 
have something in common, we see how quickly we run into absurdity. The truth that snow is 
white and the truth that Chapel Hill is in North Carolina share very little, if anything, in 
common. The class of true propositions is one remarkably heterogeneous collection. The 
property truth thus seems to be a perfect candidate for being perfectly non-natural! 
Consequently, we seek in vain if we look for something metaphysically substantial to 
account for the “resemblances” between truths. The truth of each proposition is its own 
private affair; that electrons exist is true in virtue of electrons, and that penguins exist is true 
in virtue of penguins. Simply put, there are no objective resemblances between truths for 
which we need to account. To account for why all the various true propositions are true, we 
have to consider each proposition on its own terms and attend to its individual metaphysical 
and ontological commitments. It is true because the world provides the requisite substance, 
but that is not some single, common feature to be accounted for by a philosophical notion of 
a property. As a result, we do not need to bestow naturalness upon truth for purposes of 
accounting for the (non-existent) objective resemblances between truths. 
Furthermore, if we did grant to truth the caliber of being natural, should we not also 
bestow it upon the property falsity? The class of truths and the class of falsities seem to be 
equally deserving of being natural properties. They are equally homogeneous (which is to say, 
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not at all), and the members of one have just as much in common with one another as do the 
members of the other. But if we have any reservations about attributing causal powers, say, 
to truth, we should definitely have reservations about attributing causal powers to falsity. 
After all, if we do think that true theories have causal powers in virtue of their being natural, 
we should think that false theories also have causal powers, since falsity has as good a claim 
to naturalness as does truth. (The problem is exacerbated if we follow Lewis in allowing 
possibilia into properties, for then truth and falsity will both include each and every 
contingent proposition, including all the empirical ones, which presumably are the members 
of the class most likely to be responsible for causal activities.) We should, of course, treat 
truth and falsity the same with respect to naturalness. Neither property is natural. 
 
3.3.4. Closing remarks 
We have now considered the four main theses that are the most salient rejections of 
metaphysical deflationism. They all suffer from the same defects. They all turn to a 
metaphysical category that is normally reserved for giving satisfying accounts of truthmaking, 
resemblance, and causality. But, as we have seen, the motivations that drive us to posit 
metaphysically substantive properties simply do not apply when it comes to truth. Truths do 
not share objective resemblances, nor does truth itself have a causal role to play in the 
universe. Furthermore, we do not need metaphysically loaded notions of truth to serve as 
truthmakers; the objects that truths are about perform that need on their own. If we were to 
posit truth as being an independently existing thing (or set of things), it would have 
truthmaking capabilities that would take us directly to absurdity. We do not need a robust 
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property of truth to account for the truths we find in the world, and it was a mistake ever to 
think that we should look for one.58, 59 
Given that no one has approached the issue of metaphysical deflationism and 
substantivism about truth in the manner that I have been, it’s unclear whether anyone has 
explicitly adopted metaphysical substantivism as we have been understanding it. Certainly 
many have said that they think truth is a robust, metaphysically loaded property. Consider, 
for example, many of the recent defenders of correspondence theories. In his recent defense, 
Andrew Newman (2002) defends a correspondence theory in the context of realism about 
universals. Newman thinks that truth is a property—that there is something shared by all and 
only true things. Hence, given his defense of realism about universals, it seems likely that he 
is committed to thinking of truth as being one such universal. He even suggests that truth 
might be a natural kind (2002: 45). Richard Fumerton writes that “realists” about truth (more 
on that topic later, in section 4.5) must think that there’s a property of truth, but needn’t be 
realists about universals (2002: 4). But if they are realists about universals, does that mean 
that they must think that there’s a universal truth? Presumably, lest realism about truth turn 
                                                 
58Cf. Lowe: “I do not consider that a true proposition is one that exemplifies the universal truth, nor that it 
possesses a truth trope or mode, whether or not conceived as a particular instance of such a universal” (2007: 
237). Lowe points out that if truth did consist in a truth-bearer engaging with a universal or trope, then its truth 
would “just be a matter of how that proposition was ‘in itself’”, which misses the relational nature of truth—that 
true propositions owe their truth to something else (ibid.). Lowe and I travel different paths to the same thesis, 
but I am happy to endorse nearly everything he says on the matter. It is worth noting that Lowe is the only 
writer I have ever come across who considers bringing the going metaphysical accounts of properties to bear on 
the topic of truth. 
59Note that Armstrong agrees with the substance of my view here, but not the packaging. It is central to his 
account of truthmaking that the truthmaking relation (necessitation) is an internal relation, and thus “no addition 
of being” above and beyond the relata. Truth itself may easily be seen as supervening on the instances of 
truthmaking, and thus there is no need for a universal truth. Thus, he subscribes to metaphysical deflationism 
(perhaps without even realizing it). Recall how David has summarized Armstrong’s view: “Be serious about 
truthmakers but not so serious about truth and truthmaking” (2005: 147). That Armstrong sometimes calls his 
view a correspondence theory of truth is unfortunate, because he posits no additional relation beyond the relata, 
and no set of objects specifically for truths to correspond to (see his 1997: 128, 2004: 16-17, and 2010). One 
can call the truthmaking relation “correspondence”, and say that the objects that truths correspond to just are 
their truthmakers, but what we have here is just a theory of truthmaking, and not a kind of metaphysically 
substantive correspondence theory that has been our target here. 
 181
out to be consistent with its deflationary opponent. Gerald Vision (2004) also defends the 
existence of a truth property, but is completely silent as to what kind of property it is. Lynch 
(2009) is a pluralist (or functionalist) about truth in that he thinks truth sometimes consists in 
correspondence with the facts, sometimes in being superwarranted, and perhaps something 
else in other cases. Lynch is also silent on what he means by ‘property’, but he is very clear 
that truths are true in virtue of their having one of those properties. He explicitly says that the 
truth properties are what make truths true: “Propositions about different subjects can be made 
true by distinct properties each of which plays the truth-role” (2009: 77).60 Others who shy 
away from correspondence accounts have endorsed the idea that truth is a property, and in so 
doing take themselves to be rejecting deflationism, but fall silent on what metaphysical story 
they think underlies the property (Alston 1996, Merricks 2007). 
The complete silence on the topic is frustrating, to say the least, given how often 
opponents of deflationism appeal to there being a metaphysically robust property of truth in 
order to distinguish themselves from deflationists.61 Anyone who accepts my account of 
metaphysical substantivism about truth can see that it is false, and not a view worth holding. 
Anyone who rejects my account faces the challenge of saying just what it is that a 
metaphysically substantive property of truth would be, if not a universal, trope, or natural 
class (and why deflationists are not entitled to it). 
                                                 
60Cf. Fine 1984b: “these ideas of correspondence and approximate truth are supposed to explain what makes the 
truth true” (97). 
61My guess is that most theorists would prefer to remain agnostic about how we should understand the truth 
property, and hence they remain silent on what they mean by ‘property’. Substantivists defend the view that 
truth is a substantive property, but remain neutral on the more general issue of realism and nominalism. Still, 
regardless of which view one takes on the realism/nominalism debate, there will be a distinction needing to be 
drawn between the sparse and abundant properties. Substantivists about truth, presumably, will always think 
that truth falls on the sparse side of the divide. (Everyone can agree that truth is among the abundant properties.) 
What my argument shows is that regardless of where one settles on the realism/nominalism side, truth cannot 
belong on the sparse side of the divide. 
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3.4. Conclusion 
In a very interesting passage, Armstrong comes very close to the view we are now 
adopting (though he packages it quite differently). After describing his own personal 
“unstable oscillation” between the redundancy and correspondence theories of truth—he 
invokes the famous debate between Austin (1950) and Strawson (1950)62—Armstrong offers 
his theory of truthmaking as enabling a reconciliation between the two competing theories. 
He writes: 
The suggestion now to be put forward is that we can accept both theories. Both tell us 
something true about the nature of truth. The Redundancy theory gives us a true 
account of the semantics of the truth predicate, but it stays at the level of truths. At a 
deeper, ontological, level the Correspondence theory tells us that, since truths require 
a truthmaker, there is something in the world that corresponds to a true proposition. 
The correspondent and the truthmaker are the same thing. (1997: 128) 
 
Like Armstrong, we have found in truthmaker theory something of a happy compromise 
between deflationism about truth and the correspondence theory of truth. Truthmaker theory 
as I have defended it, in effect, embraces the best of both worlds. With deflationism, 
truthmaker theory shares the idea that each truth is unique. There is nothing in common 
between all truths—truthmaker theorists approach truths in piecemeal fashion, just like 
deflationists. There need not be any property shared by all truths, and it is metaphysically 
devastating to install one. As such, we avoid having to posit any metaphysically substantive 
property of truth. In so doing, we end up rejecting correspondence theories of truth (and 
plenty more besides). Nevertheless, as we saw in the last chapter, truthmaker theory 
preserves the important ideas that drive correspondence theories, and make them seem so 
natural. Truthmaker theory preserves the worldliness of truth that correspondence insists on 
(and deflationism falls silent on). It even accounts for the worldliness better by providing a 
                                                 
62A debate, by the way, which included a third interlocutor, seemingly forgotten to history (Cousin 1950). 
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world of truthmakers (and not necessarily a world of facts). Where Armstrong says that we 
can accept both the redundancy view and the correspondence view, I say that we may accept 
metaphysical deflationism, but preserve the ontological motivation behind correspondence 
theories (that truths are “worldly”—that they accompany ontological and metaphysical 
commitments). 
In arguing against there being any metaphysical substance to the notion of truth, I 
have not yet sealed the deal for deflationism, for there is more to deflationism about truth 
than simply metaphysical deflationism. Truthmaker theorists (and everyone else besides) 
should indeed embrace metaphysical deflationism. There is no property of truth, where 
‘property’ is understood in the terms of any of the standard metaphysical positions. But 
whether conceptual deflationism is true is still up for grabs; truthmaking is neutral on the 
issue, for nothing in it relies on anything more than a deflationary account of truth. However, 
since metaphysical deflationism is true, we should reject any theory of truth that posits a 
loaded property of truth. I take it that most of the versions of most of the traditional 
theories—correspondence, coherence, pragmatic, epistemic—are committed to metaphysical 
substantivism.63 The parties to the debate, at least, often use the language that such views are 
committed to a robust property of truth. If so, they are false. If those views can be 
resuscitated in a way such that they are not committed to a metaphysically substantive 
account of truth, then they can deflect my argument. It’s just not terribly clear what such 
views would be, or why they would be anathema to deflationists. In any event, anyone 
hoping to defend one of the traditional theories in the face of my argument must find a way 
to offer a substantive theory in a metaphysically deflationary way. 
                                                 
63Lynch’s view seems to be multiply committed to metaphysical substantivism, given that he thinks there are 
many properties that realize truth (though he thinks truth itself is a unique, single property immanent to its 
multiple realizers). 
 184
In the meantime, suppose that we can now set aside the traditional theories of truth. 
To my mind, the best remaining candidates are conceptual deflationism (e.g., Horwich and 
Field) and conceptual primitivism (e.g., Frege and Davidson). Hence, I think that truthmaker 
theory reveals that if truth (the concept of truth, that is) is substantive, then it is primitive. 
Truthmaker theory by itself does not tell between the two, but focuses the debate 
nevertheless. The primitivist thinks that our concept of truth is an explanatorily interesting 
notion, and one that can figure into analyses of other notions in ways that go beyond truth’s 
logical features. But the primitivist need not think that truth is a property in any 
metaphysically substantive sense—the foundational role it plays in our conceptual scheme is 
not one that needs the aid of any causal or truthmaking powers.64 Indeed, primitivists 
shouldn’t think that truth is a metaphysically substantive property, if the argument of this 
chapter is correct. Consequently, I think that adopting truthmaker theory should push the 
philosophical debate over truth in a new direction, even though it does not offer any theory of 
truth of its own. The debate now should be waged not between deflationists and advocates of 
correspondence (or other substantive accounts), but between conceptual deflationists and 
conceptual primitivists. 
We may conclude with one final lesson we can learn from the relationship between 
deflationism and truthmaker theory. I mentioned above that Quine was wrong to identify the 
T-schema as “the valid residue of the correspondence theory of truth” (1990: 93). Instead, the 
valid residue of the correspondence theory is the idea at the center of truthmaker theory: that 
truths are grounded in reality—that truths accompany metaphysical and ontological 
                                                 
64My money, then, is on there being no metaphysically substantive property of truth, but there being a 
substantive concept of truth. Compare this view with its inverse in Alston 2002, which discusses there being a 
deflationary concept of truth paired with a more robust property of truth. Alston and I share the desire of 
somehow reconciling what is right about deflationism with what is right about correspondence theories, albeit in 
very different ways. 
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commitments. Quine would have been closer to the truth had he said that it’s his criterion for 
ontological commitment that is the grain of truth in the correspondence theory.65 As I have 
argued, truthmaker theory shares the fundamental motivation underlying correspondence 
theory, and satisfies it better. There is an important lesson here for deflationists. Opponents 
of correspondence accounts typically find something legitimate about them nevertheless, and 
go to some length in order to show how they too can maintain the language of 
correspondence, or countenance the “correspondence intuition” (e.g., Horwich 1990, Wright 
1992, Hill 2002). While I agree that deflationists can uphold what is right about 
correspondence theories, I don’t think they can accomplish it via their own theories.66  
The axioms of deflationary theories of truth are typically just T-sentences, such as: 
 
(5) The proposition that snow is white is true if and only if snow is white. 
 
Nothing about the T-sentence itself shows that the truth in question here—that snow is 
white—depends in any way upon reality. It’s one thing to say that ‘Snow is white’ is true if 
and only if snow is white. It’s quite another to say that ‘Snow is white’ has a truthmaker, and 
to say just what that truthmaker is. A T-sentence states that there is some sort of equivalence 
holding between its two sides, but is silent about how those two sides, if true, depend upon 
the world. 
Many theorists, however, write as if the “worldliness” of truth is built right into the T-
sentences already—in their right hand conditions, most likely.67 But the right-hand side of a 
T-sentence does nothing to state what the truthmaker is for the truth-bearer mentioned on the 
                                                 
65More on Quine on ontological commitment in section 4.2. 
66Here I disagree with Horwich 1990. 
67See, for instance, Popper 1963: 223-228, Quine 1970: 10-11 and 1990: 81, and Vision 2003. James Young 
(2009) advocates a view of this sort, and thinks that some canonical deflationists like Ramsey and Strawson are 
actually correspondence theorists. See Ramsey 1991 and Strawson 1998. 
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left-hand side. The right-hand side is just another truth in need of a truthmaker. Of course, 
‘Socrates is a philosopher’ is true if and only if Socrates is a philosopher. Everyone can agree 
to that. But the issue of what makes it true that Socrates is a philosopher is a substantive and 
contentious issue—is it an Armstrongian state of affairs, trope, Socrates himself under a 
counterpart relation, or perhaps nothing at all?68 T-sentences do nothing to settle the issue 
about what a truth’s truthmaker is, or even if it has one. Hence, someone might subscribe to 5 
and yet think that the world does not have to be any way in order for either of its conditions 
to be true—here I am thinking of Rorty and Arthur Fine, who think ontological positions are 
bunk. They think that we can accept the truth of all sorts of claims, and yet not take on any 
ontological worldview. 
Consider also Jody Azzouni’s brand of mathematical nominalism (2004).69 He agrees 
that ‘There are numbers’ is true, and is happy to grant the truth of the T-sentence 
(6) ‘There are numbers’ is true if and only if there are numbers. 
For all that, he does not think that ‘There are numbers’ is made true by reality (or at least a 
reality including numbers). The point is that the world doesn’t automatically “show up” in 
the right-hand side of the biconditional. Accepting the T-sentences is one thing; to think that 
their conditions are ontologically loaded is quite another. One needs an account of 
truthmaking in order to take a stand on how and whether truths depend upon reality. The T-
sentences themselves don’t offer that. To suppose otherwise is to bring to the table an 
antecedent understanding of how truth depends upon reality, which is precisely to bring to 
the table an antecedent understanding of truthmaking. 
                                                 
68See, respectively, Armstrong 2004, Lowe 2007, Lewis 2003, and Lewis 2001b. 
69See also Hofweber 2005a. 
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My recommendation to deflationists (and to opponents of correspondence accounts 
more generally) is that they continue thinking that they too can salvage what is right about 
correspondence theories. But to do so, they have to admit some sort of theory of truthmaking 
in order to meet the challenge. The worldliness of truth is not accounted for simply by the T-
sentences; they need to be supplemented by a theory of truthmakers. Fortunately, 
deflationism is no obstacle to truthmaker theory. To save the “correspondence intuition”, 
deflationists need only embrace some sort of theory of truthmaking.70 
 
                                                 
70David writes: “One usually regards Quine as the father of contemporary deflationism about truth. Yet, serious 
concern for the idea that truths are made true by reality is often seen as a sign of inflationary thinking about 
truth” (2008: 275, footnote 2). David’s concern here is with the early pages of Quine 1970, which embraces the 
idea that truths are made true by reality, and marries it (and even perhaps attempts to reduce it) to his 
disquotational view of truth. We now are in a position to understand what is going on. One’s theory of truth and 
one’s view on truthmaking and/or ontological commitment need to be separated, as Quine admirably does. The 
fact that many philosophers have not fully appreciated the distinction, as David points out, leads some to think 
that truthmaking talk (including Quine’s own words here) just is “inflationary” talk about truth. (This seems to 
be the view of O’Leary-Hawthorne and Oppy 1997.) We know better. The role of ‘truth’ in truthmaker theory is 
just like the role of truth everywhere else—it is serving as a handy abbreviatory device. To think that ‘There are 
gorillas’ is made true by gorillas is good common sense, and good truthmaker theory. To think that deflationists 
about truth must deny that ‘There are gorillas’ is made true by gorillas is to impose on them an indefensible and 
(in my view) contradictory position. Careful attention to the distinction between truth and truthmaking is of 
paramount importance. To be a deflationist about truth is emphatically not to be a deflationist about 
metaphysical inquiry. Once more for good measure: that truth is not a metaphysically substantive notion in no 
way entails that truths themselves carry no metaphysical substance. 
 
4. Truthmaking and Realism 
The first three chapters have covered the topic of truthmaker theory, its nature, and 
how it relates to the theory of truth. Now we turn to the topic of realism and anti-realism, 
with the intent of showing how truthmaker theory can reveal what is at stake in this perennial 
metaphysical debate, and how we can make some progress within it. The goal of the present 
chapter is to offer a truthmaker-based account of realism. To get there, however, we have 
some corrective work to do. First, we must appreciate why the theory of truth is not the 
driving force behind debates about realism. Second, we must appreciate why the theory of 
truthmakers is not a theory of ontological commitment, akin to Quine’s. Once those issues 
are handled, we can turn to how truthmaker theory can inform metaphysical debates about 
realism. In subsequent chapters, we take up particular realism debates specifically: moral 
realism in the next chapter, and scientific realism in the final chapter. 
 
4.1. Truth and realism: a defense of neutrality 
Discussions of realism in philosophy have never strayed very far from the topic of 
truth. Although there is substantial disagreement regarding just how closely tied the two 
notions are, it is undeniable that the two (justly or not) have been brought to bear on one 
another quite frequently. Our task now is to establish how best we should understand the 
interconnections that do or do not obtain between truth and realism. I favor the view of what 
I shall call neutrality: the positions one stakes out in one of the debates do not force one’s 
hand regarding the positions one stakes out in the other debate. Opposing neutrality is the 
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view that certain theses one might hold regarding truth or realism commits one to specific 
theses regarding the other. The neutralist view is not only correct, but methodologically 
preferable as well. I have already advocated methodological maximalism and methodological 
deflationism. Let me now add to the list methodological neutrality: In defending a particular 
philosophical position, one should avoid as far as is possible taking on substantive 
commitments in other philosophical areas. The further two domains of philosophy are from 
one another, the more reluctant one should be to undertake a substantive commitment in one 
in order to defend a substantive commitment in the other. I do not mean to be rejecting out of 
hand a more holistic conception of theory construction according to which one’s 
commitments in one area shape and inform one’s commitments in many (if not all) other 
areas. Certainly the positions we stake out for ourselves greatly influence the other positions 
we adopt. But in advancing a certain philosophical thesis, its plausibility and attractiveness 
will in part be a function of what other commitments it requires. The fewer substantive 
auxiliary commitments that are required, the more potential allies the view can gain (for it 
rules out fewer of those who may not be able to grant the auxiliary commitments). 
Methodologically speaking, then, neutrality between truth and realism is to be favored. And, 
in fact, I believe it to be true as well. 
Looking back at the history of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, we 
can see that neutrality was not the leading view.1 One way to view the dialectic between the 
British idealists and the early analytic philosophers is through the lens of the theory of truth. 
British Hegelians like Joachim (1906) and Bradley (1907) found the notion of 
                                                 
1Here is Putnam: “That one could have a theory of truth which is neutral with respect to epistemological 
questions, and even with respect to the great metaphysical issue of realism versus idealism, would have seemed 
preposterous to a nineteenth-century philosopher” (1978: 9). Cf. Blackburn 1980, where “realism vs. 
instrumentalism” is characterized as a debate in the theory of truth. 
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correspondence truth lacking, and advocated in its place a more holistic coherence theory of 
truth.2 While idealism and coherence came together in British Hegelianism, realism and 
correspondence came together in the early work of Russell (1912, chapter 12) and Moore 
(1953, chapter 15). Interestingly, both sides seemed to be motivated by the desire to thwart 
skepticism.3 The idealists, finding truth as correspondence to be radically independent of the 
mental, judged such truth to be inaccessible and hence unknowable.4 The realists, finding 
truth as coherence to be far too dependent on the mental, judged such views unable to 
countenance the reality of an independently existing external world. The foes of realism have 
long since multiplied in number, and idealism is no longer at the front lines of the battle 
between realists and their opponents.5 Further, the debate in the theory of truth is now fought 
primarily between deflationists and substantivists; the dialectic between correspondence and 
coherence accounts has been comparatively quiet for some time.6 So while I note the 
historical non-neutrality that operated in turn-of-the-century British philosophy, I shall not 
discuss it any further, for non-neutrality returned with a vengeance decades later. 
The gulf that separates neutralists from non-neutralists nowadays does not coincide 
with the gulfs that separate realists and anti-realists. One finds neutralists among realists, 
anti-realists, and even the quietists who seek to undermine, transcend, or erase the issue. The 
same is true for non-neutralists. Leading advocates of neutrality include Michael Devitt 
                                                 
2But see again Candlish 1989. 
3Cf. Davidson 1990: 298-299. 
4This sentiment still exists in our time, though it is more often wielded by pragmatists nowadays. See Putnam’s 
various discussions of “internal” and “metaphysical” realism (e.g., his 1978, 1981, chapter 3, 1982a, 1982b, and 
1987), Ellis 1985, and Jardine 1986. 
5However, some, like Putnam (1978) and Fine (1986), are happy to assimilate contemporary anti-realisms as 
kinds of idealism. 
6But see Walker 1989 and Young 2001 for recent discussion and defense, respectively, of coherence theories. 
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(1984, 1991, 2006), a firm defender of realism, and Horwich (1990, 1996, 2006), who now 
defends a kind of quietism.7 Influential non-neutralists include quietists like Arthur Fine 
(1984a, 1984b, 1986), realists like Philip Kitcher (2001, 2002), quasi-realists such as 
Blackburn (1971), and the ever hard to place Putnam (1978, 1981).8 Dummett’s rampant 
non-neutrality (1958-1959, 1982) deserves a category all its own. Neutralists argue that the 
topics of truth and realism are orthogonal. Their arguments tend to show how a careful 
articulation of the two topics reveals that they do not intersect, and they then go on to explain 
why it is often mistakenly thought that they do. Non-neutralists often identify realism with 
some form of correspondence theory of truth, or argue that correspondence truth is a 
necessary component of realism. Fine argues in addition that various anti-realisms also 
import particular theories of truth (usually pragmatic or epistemically-laced ones) as a 
necessary component (1984a, 1984b, 1986). My attempt in this section is to debunk non-
neutrality, and to show why it nevertheless is tempting. 
The most comprehensive way to argue for neutrality is to articulate various theories 
about the nature of truth, articulate various realist and anti-realist theses, and then 
demonstrate the consistency of the various combinations. Doing so would require us to 
articulate what realism is. That is dangerous ground, and we’re going to put it off for as long 
as possible. ‘Realism’ is a slippery term, and realism has many faces.9 Still, Horwich (1996) 
and Devitt (1984, 1991) have taken on just that approach in their work on the subject, and for 
the most part I am happy to endorse everything they say. (Though their arguments, of 
                                                 
7See also Tarski 1944, David 1994: 18, footnote 2, Van Cleve 1996, Azzouni 2000, and Alston 2001: 48. 
8See also Bonjour 1985: 160, Railton 1986, Wright 1986 and 1992, Fales 1988, Jennings 1989: 240, Matheson 
1989, Bigelow and Pargetter 1990: 442, Musgrave 1996: 23, Timmons 1999: 36, Taylor 2006, Williams 2006, 
and Lynch 2009. 
9See, for instance, Horwich 1982 and its distinction between three kinds of realism. Cf. Putnam 1982a, and its 
three distinct kinds of realism. 
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practical necessity, cannot engage every thesis that has been put forth in the name of either 
truth or realism.) Let us see how far we can get without fully committing to what realism is 
or is not. We can simply say again that realism, whatever else it is, involves some level of 
metaphysical commitment, some acknowledgement of the reality of some domain of thought. 
First suppose that one is a deflationist about truth. Does deflationism prevent one 
from taking on any of the substantive metaphysical commitments that are characteristic of 
realism? Absolutely not. As our earlier discussion in section 3.2.1 made clear, deflationism 
about truth does not preclude taking on a criterion or theory of ontological commitment, or 
from embracing truthmaker theory. In slogan form, we can say that to take truth as 
metaphysically minimal is not to take truths as metaphysically minimal. True, to say that it is 
true that there are moral properties is no more metaphysically committing than it is to say 
that there are moral properties. But to say that there are moral properties is metaphysically 
committing—it commits one to moral properties! Deflationism is neither here nor there when 
it comes to realist metaphysical commitments. The metaphysical substance comes from what 
is accepted as true, not in the predication of truth to what is accepted. So deflationism does 
not preclude taking on realist positions. 
Neither does it require doing so. One might refuse to take on any notion of 
ontological commitment, or, with Azzouni (2006), think that truths can be true in spite of 
their not making any metaphysical difference to the world. One might, like Rorty, have no 
truck whatsoever with the notion of ontological commitment, banishing it from philosophy as 
so much metaphysical mumbo jumbo (1986). Fine’s “natural ontological attitude” similarly 
(and oxymoronically) takes no ontological stand (1984b). Taking the natural ontological 
attitude toward some domain involves accepting the pronouncements of that domain as true, 
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but then taking no stand whatsoever regarding the theory of truth or truthmaking that is most 
adequate for that domain.10 Fine and Rorty are best understood as allowing whatever the 
deflationist says about truth, accepting the dictates of what the experts in a domain say as 
true, but then severing any bridge between truth and ontology that one might build via a 
theory of truthmakers. Realist commitments (or the avoidance of such) come via the 
combination of what one takes to be true taken together with one’s theory of what makes 
those truths true, not via one’s theory of truth. Hence, if one accepts deflationism about truth, 
one is not precluded from taking on realist commitments (as in Quine), nor is one forced to 
countenance them (as in Rorty and Fine). Deflationism and realism are neutral with respect 
to one another.11 Should one still have lingering worries that correspondence truth is a 
necessary component of realism, I suggest he consider Quine’s view regarding sets.12 Quine 
is a realist about sets because he believes in a theory that quantifies over sets (and he is a 
realist about everything over which he quantifies). So Quine believes in sets. That he rejects 
the claim that ‘There are sets’ stands in the correspondence relation to some non-linguistic 
fact is simply beside the point.13 
                                                 
10Funny, then, that what Fine calls the natural ontological attitude (or ‘NOA’, pronounced as in ‘Noah’) actually 
requires taking no attitude regarding ontology: “NOA, as such, has no specific ontological commitments” (1986: 
176). More to the point, the NOAer (pronounced as in ‘knower’) is forbidden from taking on any ontological 
commitments. In Musgrave’s characteristically clever phrase, the NOAer is a know-nothing (1989: 391). Some 
readers familiar with Fine may claim not to see this reading of him in his work. I shall make good on my 
interpretation in detail below, in section 6.1. 
11For a competing view, see Boghossian’s argument (1990) to the effect that deflationists cannot be non-
factualists. This is not the place to take on Boghossian’s argument, but suffice it to say that I find his 
characterizations of the relevant positions unfamiliar and misleading. 
12Or consider Lewis’s modal realism (1986). Lewis is no correspondence theorist (2001a), and thus rejects the 
claim that ‘There is a pluriverse of possible worlds’ stands in the correspondence relation to some fact. But he is 
as realist as it comes with respect to possible worlds. His realism is due to what he is willing to predicate truth 
of, not to the predication itself. 
13A familiar charge to make against quietists is that they, despite their anti-philosophical ambitions, are just 
realists who employ overblown rhetoric. Hence Devitt (1991) thinks Rorty is a realist, Musgrave (1989) thinks 
Fine is a realist, and David (2006) thinks Horwich is a realist. Similarly, many think that quasi-realists just are 
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Suppose now that one endorses some version or other of a correspondence theory of 
truth. Here we might think that our hands are forced, for correspondence just is 
correspondence with reality. But let us be careful here. Correspondence theories are about 
what truth is; they say nothing about what exists, or what is real. Correspondence theories 
themselves do not entail that certain elements of reality—the elements that are relevant to 
realism—exist. It is no consequence of any correspondence theory of truth that numbers exist, 
or that numbers are a genuine portion of reality. To establish realism, one must go beyond 
embracing a correspondence theory of truth. One must take on other kinds of commitments; 
one’s realism will emerge only via those additional commitments, not simply by way of 
one’s acceptance of a correspondence theory of truth. Error theorists about a domain, for 
example, can embrace a correspondence theory of truth; yet they avoid taking on any realist 
commitments by not committing to any truths in the domain. So correspondence theories by 
themselves do not force realist commitments on anyone. Nor, of course, do they preclude it. 
One can accept that truth is correspondence to reality, and then go on to embrace the truth 
(and hence realist commitments) of many different domains of discourse. 
                                                 
realists (see Blackburn 1993d). One thought as to what is going on here is that our quietists are happy to admit 
everything that their realist (supposed) opponent says—explaining the appearance of realism—but separate 
themselves only by disavowing any connection between the truth of what they say and its ontological 
commitments. The quietists’ critics may not have in mind the possibility that one could do without any criterion 
of ontological commitment or theory of truthmakers, or think that truths might carry no metaphysical 
commitments. (Quine (1970: 89) thought it impossible to do without his own, for he thought the criterion to be 
trivial!) But that is what I think the quietists are up to. Quietists themselves are not so clear on the matter. A 
familiar motif in Rorty (e.g., in his 1986) is that once we dump the notion of correspondence truth, we are freed 
from representation, metaphysics, and the like. But Rorty does not earn his quietism via his rejection of 
correspondence truth—to think one earns one’s anti-realism via rejecting correspondence truth is to betray one’s 
false belief in non-neutrality between truth and realism. One earns quietism by disavowing all criteria of 
ontological or metaphysical commitment, not via disavowing correspondence theories of truth. Otherwise all 
deflationists—Quine included—would be quietists, or at least global anti-realists. Now, it remains to be seen 
whether the technique of disavowing all ontological and metaphysical commitments is even coherent. I shall 
assume for the time being that it is. Still, would a quietist reject my utterly modest claim that there are 
truthmakers (and hence things to which we are ontologically committed)? If he does, I have him on a dilemma 
between an empty universe and an incoherent doctrine. Perhaps philosophers find realism inside quietism in the 
interest of charity, and rescuing the view from incoherence. 
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Regardless of whether one adopts a correspondence or deflationary account of truth, 
then, one is free to embrace either realist or anti-realist commitments. One’s attitude with 
regard to truth does not determine one’s attitude with regard to realism. Hence, we have 
established neutrality between (at least two prominent varieties of) truth and realism.14 Still, 
one might feel duped after reading my last paragraph. Granted, says my objector, 
correspondence theories by themselves do not force realist commitments, but they do force 
realist commitments as soon as we accept any truths. And that is exactly right, and exactly 
what we should expect.15 Correspondence theories make explicit the fact that any truth 
requires some sort of metaphysical commitment. Quine, recall, bridges truth and reality via 
his criterion of ontological commitment, not via his theory of truth. Correspondence theorists 
build the bridge directly by including within their theory of truth a theory of truthmakers (as I 
argued in section 2.4). Deflationism is more ontologically flexible, for it does not come with 
any theory of truthmakers already installed. 
But denying that truth is substantive (while admitting that there are truths) does not, 
all by its lonesome, automatically leave one with a metaphysically thin worldview. If one 
wants to preserve the truth of a domain and be anti-realist about it—what Kit Fine (2001) 
                                                 
14Coherence views of truth may very well be connected to various kinds of anti-realism, as our historical 
prelude suggests. Consider also the link between epistemic theories of truth and Dummettian anti-realism 
(though Horwich 1996 argues for neutrality even here). As my interest in the theory of truth is limited to 
correspondence, deflationary, and primitivist varieties, I am mainly interested in neutrality between realism and 
those theories of truth. Still, I suspect alongside Horwich that neutrality applies across the board. 
15At the same time, consider what the NOAer might say, even if he embraced a correspondence theory of truth. 
‘There are electrons’ is true. Therefore it corresponds to some fact. So what? If one doesn’t believe in ontology 
in the first place, then I don’t see how believing in a fact is any extra ontological commitment. Again, I doubt 
that rejecting ontology altogether is a coherent enterprise. Do they really think that nothing exists? Maybe they 
think things exist, of course, but that nothing really exists in the World. Here I recommend again the following 
existence schema: For all x, x exists if and only if x really exists in the World. 
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calls “non-skeptical” anti-realism—it is not enough simply to embrace deflationism.16 
Deflationism may very well enable such non-skeptical anti-realism, but it in no way entails it. 
One also must argue, in order to secure one’s anti-realism, that the correct account of what 
makes the truths in some domain true is consistent with desert landscapes. Many writers in 
the metaethical literature have attempted to maintain a kind of anti-realism in the face of 
granting that there are moral truths (Blackburn, Allan Gibbard, Wright, and others). 
Deflationary views of truth (or, at least, non-correspondence views) are a necessary 
ingredient in those enterprises because such philosophers require a theory of metaphysical 
and ontological commitment that will not force realist commitments, and deflationism by 
itself (unlike correspondence theories) is silent regarding metaphysical and ontological 
commitment. So one doesn’t earn one’s anti-realism by denying that truth is substantive; one 
must show instead that the metaphysical and ontological commitments of some domain fail 
to be metaphysically substantive (such that they are permissible for anti-realists). One must 
show, in other words, that the truths themselves fail to be substantive. 
We are now in a position to diagnose why many have not recognized the truth of 
neutrality (see also Devitt 1991: 48-50). One of my main suggestions is that the theory of 
truth and the theory of truthmaking traditionally have not been distinguished adequately. 
People see realism in correspondence theories of truth because they see inside it a weighty 
                                                 
16It seems to be fairly common to claim otherwise, as if deflationism alone secured anti-realism. For instance, 
see Shafer-Landau 2003: 31, Azzouni 2006: 110, and Chrisman 2009: 9. Also note that Armstrong (2006) 
tentatively suggests equating truthmaker gaps with deflationism (245), and in turn (in his 2004) equating non-
gaps with realism (5). Hence, he also seems to be thinking of deflationism and anti-realism going hand in hand. 
Horgan and Timmons 2006b seems to assume something similar. It seems to be a consequence of Wright’s 
approach to realism debates that deflationists cannot be realists (e.g., his 1988b, 1992, and 1995). I have 
difficulty making sense of Liggins’s claim that “It is said that we have the intuition […] that the redundancy 
theory of truth is incompatible with realism” (2005: 103). Liggins cites no one who actually makes such a claim. 
Perhaps he has in mind some remarks found in Blackburn: “part of what is at stake in accepting Ramsey’s 
[redundancy] theory is whether there is a genuine issue over realism and anti-realism” (1980: 354). I do not 
know what an intuition is, but the one proposed here seems far-fetched, to say the least. Besides, even if “we” 
have such an intuition, we shouldn’t. It’s false. 
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theory of truthmaking and ontological commitment—truths are committed to the existence of 
worldly facts or entities, which serve as both correspondents and truthmakers. Hence they 
think realism can be avoided merely by eschewing correspondence. But eschewing 
correspondence is no rejection of the very notion of metaphysics and ontology—otherwise all 
deflationists would be quietists! Some deflationists would be happy with that conclusion (e.g., 
Horwich), but quietism is by no means required (as in Quine and Lewis). Deflationism, after 
all, is such a thin and meager theory. It is absolutely silent regarding the idea of truthmaking 
and ontological commitment, and hence neutral regarding the truth or falsity of realism.17 
Following Horwich 1996, we can identify another reason why some have not 
recognized neutrality, namely, that many accounts of the nature of realism define it explicitly 
in terms of truth. For a small sample, see van Fraassen 1980, Leplin 1984, Railton 1986, and 
Sayre-McCord 1986. At first glance, such reliance may appear to be a violation of conceptual 
deflationism, the idea that truth is not connected conceptually to other notions, at least not in 
any way not accounted for by the logical and linguistic properties of truth that deflationists 
have identified. But recall our discussion in the previous chapter, where we found there to be 
concepts that rely on truth in a conceptually innocent way (as with knowledge and 
truthmaking), and concepts that may not (as with assertion). We cannot infer automatically 
from some concept being defined in terms of truth that conceptual deflationism has been 
violated.18 In his 1996, Horwich shows how such statements of realism that are defined in 
                                                 
17Just imagine: how could a series of T-biconditionals possibly dictate one’s deepest metaphysical convictions? 
Recall the irony involved in admitting a deflationary theory of truth, but then thinking that the theory cannot 
handle all applications of the notion of truth, such as the role it plays in realism debates. 
18Putnam seems to make the mistake of thinking otherwise (1982a: 196). 
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terms of truth can be handled easily by deflationists.19 If, for instance, to be a realist is to 
think that theories aim at the truth, that amounts to no more than the fact that if snow is white, 
then theories aim to entail ‘Snow is white’, and if grass is green, then theories aim to entail 
‘Grass is green’, and so forth. 
Other reasons why many have admitted non-neutrality are historical (as above) and 
sociological. Dummett (1958-1959, 1982) attempts to reformulate the entire debate over 
realism by removing it from the realm of metaphysics and placing it squarely in the domain 
of the philosophy of language. Realism, for Dummett, is no metaphysical doctrine; rather, it 
is a semantic thesis, a view about how the truth predicate operates in various domains of 
discourse. Putnam (1978, 1981) did much to further the influence of Dummett’s semantic 
understanding of realism. Wright’s not entirely neutral discussion of truth and realism (1992) 
has also been very influential, as has been Fine’s work on the explicitly anti-neutral natural 
ontological attitude (1984a, 1984b, 1986). This is not the place to argue that all approaches to 
the topic of realism that put semantics before metaphysics are misguided (Devitt 1991 
already has covered that ground rather considerably; see also Bigelow and Pargetter 1990). 
We shall engage such views when appropriate. In the meantime, I hope adequately to have 
demonstrated that we can make sense of realism independently of what position we stake out 
regarding truth. Consequently, I hope that much of what I say in the following pages 
regarding the debates between realists and anti-realists can be common ground between 
deflationists and substantivists. It would be unfortunate if one of those camps could not get 
on board with my approach to understanding realism. 
                                                 
19But see my 2009, which argues that deflationists cannot accommodate Bas van Fraassen’s statement of 
scientific realism (together with the semantic conception of theories). 
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Now, in defending neutrality between truth and realism, I have been setting myself up 
for defending a rampant non-neutrality between truthmaking and realism. Truthmaker theory 
offers us an approach to the topic of metaphysical and ontological commitment, even if it 
does not offer us a theory of truth (or a criterion for ontological commitment directly 
analogous to Quine’s).20 As such, truthmaking can offer us a way of understanding where 
realist and anti-realist commitments lie. The suggestion, then, is that what divides realists and 
anti-realists is not their views regarding the nature of truth, but rather how they wield the 
notion of truthmaking.21 Truthmaking is a metaphysical notion through and through. As such, 
it is a natural choice for a tool to employ in sorting out realism debates. We will do well to 
leave behind any suspicion that realism debates boil down to debates about the nature of truth. 
At bottom, so goes my suggestion, they are debates about truthmakers.22 
 
4.2. Truthmaking and commitments ontological and metaphysical 
Up until now in this chapter, I have spoken fairly loosely and freely in terms of 
ontological commitment, metaphysical commitment, and truthmaking. In this section I want 
to be much more specific as to how truthmaker theory relates to issues concerning 
ontological and metaphysical commitment. Some have argued that truthmaker theory offers a 
criterion of ontological commitment that is in competition with Quine’s view on the subject 
(Heil 2003, Armstrong 2004, Liggins 2005, MacBride 2005, Cameron 2008c, Mellor 2009). 
                                                 
20For the connections between truthmaking and ontological commitment—which we shall be taking up in the 
following pages—see Cameron 2008c and 2008d and Schaffer 2008b. 
21Cf. Blackburn: “in the philosophy of these things [i.e., realism debates], it is not what you end up saying, but 
how you get to say it, that defines your ‘ism’” (1993c: 7; see also his 1988: 363). I hesitate in attributing 
thoughts of truthmaking to Blackburn here (which he would surely deny), but his words nicely fit with our 
approach. 
22Cf. Pettit 1996: “The difference between what truth involves in the different [realist and anti-realist] areas will 
be explained by reference to the different subject-matters: the different truth-conditions, and the different truth-
makers, in each discourse” (886). 
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Some think that truthmaker theory offers an account of ontological commitment that is 
consistent with Quine’s criterion (Parsons 1999). Finally, some think that truthmaker theory 
offers no theory of ontological commitment at all (Rodriguez-Pereyra 2000, Schaffer 2008b). 
My own view lies in the last camp, though I sympathize with the first.23 Our approach to 
truthmaking is perfectly consistent with Quine’s criterion, though it is up to something 
slightly different, but very close. Truthmaker theory, we might say, offers an account of 
metaphysical commitment. At the risk of multiplying labels (one should not multiply labels 
beyond necessity), I think that drawing a distinction between metaphysical and ontological 
commitment has important theoretical benefits. The goal of this section is to explain what 
those are. 
 
4.2.1. Quine on ontological commitment 
Quine brought the notion of ontological commitment to philosophical consciousness 
in his seminal paper “On What There Is”. There, Quine coins the slogan “To be is to be the 
value of a variable” (1948: 32). The idea is that one is ontologically committed to an entity 
                                                 
23I do not sympathize with Parsons’ view. Parsons thinks that “it would seem that one can be both a Quinean 
about ontological commitment, and endorse the truthmaker principle” (1999: 328). On its face, that claim is true, 
and something we are upholding in this project. But what Parsons means is that the original Quinean criterion 
can be understood as offering a theory of truthmakers, which is wrong. By ‘truthmaker principle’ Parsons 
means truthmaker maximalism. Parsons’ claim is defensible only if he understands something by ‘truthmaker’ 
that we do not. For us, truthmakers are grounding necessitators of purely synthetic truths. Parsons defends his 
claim by suggesting a notion of a truthmaker for a sentence that is synonymous with the Quinean ontological 
commitments of a sentence. So a is a truthmaker for the contingent predication ‘Fa’ in Parsons’ sense, though 
not in ours. Hence, one can be both a Quinean about ontological commitment and endorse it as a truthmaker 
principle only if one renders the combination trivial by defining the truthmaker principle in terms of Quinean 
ontological commitment. Then of course the two are compatible. Or are they? On Parsons’ idiosyncratic reading 
of the truthmaker principle, for every truth “there is some thing such that the sentence cannot become false 
without a qualitative change, a non-Cambridge change, in that thing” (1999: 327). What, then, is the truthmaker 
for that there are no unicorns, regimented as ‘¬∃xUx’? The Quinean says: that sentence has no ontological 
commitments whatsoever. What thing would Parsons have the Quinean point to in order to serve as the 
truthmaker (in Parson’s sense) for our negative existential? The only option, it seems, would be to point vaguely 
at “the world” as a whole. But that is certainly not the Quinean ontological commitment required by ¬∃xUx or 
any other negative existential. If the Quinean speaks of his ontological commitments as truthmakers, he should 
reject truthmaker maximalism, for negative existentials carry no ontological commitment, and hence have no 
truthmakers (in his sense). 
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just in case that entity falls into the domain of the quantifiers of the regimentation into first-
order predicate logic of a theory that one accepts to be true. (The restriction of ontological 
commitment to theoretical regimentations is not yet found in Quine 1948, though it is present 
in Quine 1960.) Here is Quine: 
The variables of quantification, ‘something’, ‘nothing’, ‘everything’, range over our 
whole ontology, whatever it may be; and we are convicted of a particular ontological 
presupposition if, and only if, the alleged presuppositum has to be reckoned among 
the entities over which our variables range in order to render one of our affirmations 
true. (1948: 32) 
 
For any predicate F and any theory T, T entails ‘∃xFx’ if and only if T is ontologically 
committed to there being Fs. Specifically, T entails ‘Fa’ only if T is ontologically committed 
to the existence of a (or, more precisely, what is denoted by ‘a’). Since commitment follows 
quantification, we see that Quineans are committed only to particulars (those things that fill 
the universe of discourse, the ontological correlates to subject terms), and not to any 
ontological correlate to predicates. Thus, where T entails ‘Fa’, T is committed to a, and to 
there being Fs, but not to F, F-ness, or anything else that might be supposed to “stand 
underneath” the predicate. In Armstrong’s words, Quine has here “stacked the ontological 
deck against predicates as opposed to subject terms” (2004: 23). Not surprisingly, Quine’s 
criterion fits well with an extreme nominalist metaphysics that rejects creatures like 
universals and tropes that are sometimes advocated as being the referents of (only certain) 
predicates.24 
Ontology is the study of what exists. Quine’s criterion, in effect, says that the way to 
study ontology is to look at the domain of objects over which true theories quantify. What is 
                                                 
24For an extended critical treatment of Quine’s criterion, see Azzouni 2004 and Rayo 2007. See also Lowe 2007, 
which argues that Quine “has nothing intelligible to say about ontology” (242). I would like to subscribe to the 
Quinean view, but I am troubled by the plainly Moorean fact that English allows for quantification over non-
existent objects (e.g., ‘There are things that don’t exist’ and ‘God doesn’t exist’). See Lycan 1994 for a terrific 
exploration of the relevant issues here. 
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there? Everything: our ontology is fully exhausted by that over which we are willing to 
quantify. If I believe that there are horses, then I am ontologically committed to horses. If I 
believe that there is a God, then I am a committed theist. If goblins, ghosts, and gremlins are 
not a part of my ontology, then I must not quantify over them. Competing views like 
Azzouni’s (2004, 2007) and Cameron’s (2008c, 2010) allow for quantification over objects 
to which we are not ontologically committed. For Azzouni, if I believe that there are numbers, 
say, it is still an open question whether I am ontologically committed to the existence of 
numbers.25 Hence, commitment does not follow from the quantifiers.26 Truthmaker theorists 
also are in the business of ontological investigation. The idea driving truthmaker theory is 
that truths are grounded in the world—in the objects that populate the universe. We posit just 
enough truthmakers to ground the truths that we accept, and nothing more. As Armstrong 
notes, offering an exhaustive account of truthmakers constitutes offering an exhaustive 
metaphysics. Hence, many truthmaker theorists see themselves as engaged in giving a theory 
of ontological commitment: one is ontologically committed to all and only things that one 
takes to be truthmakers. 
Now, I admit that one is ontologically committed to all and only things that one takes 
to be truthmakers. The reason why is that, as I have argued, everything is a truthmaker—for 
the truth that it exists, and perhaps others. It is impossible for something to exist, and yet not 
                                                 
25Cameron’s view is more distressing. He thinks that ‘There are numbers’ is true even though there aren’t 
numbers. That unapologetic rejection of a T-sentence (and the accompanying contradiction) is not something to 
which Azzouni assents. 
26Azzouni prefers employing an existence predicate to express ontological commitments, though he could just 
as well regiment his theories using two kinds of existential quantification—one committing, one non-
committing. For a view that employs this last suggestion, see Hofweber 2000. 
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be a truthmaker. Furthermore, there are no truthmakers that do not exist.27 (There isn’t 
anything that doesn’t exist.) The world just is the totality of truthmakers. Why, then, do I 
maintain that truthmaker theory is not a theory of ontological commitment? 
The main answer is that truthmaker theory—at least in the way I employ it—is 
already presupposing Quine’s criterion.28 To see why, consider a dialectic between an 
Armstrongian who believes in states of affairs, a truthmaking trope theorist, and a Quinean 
nominalist. Let us say that they all agree to the following truth about some electron E: 
(1) E is charged. 
 
All take 1 to be true. (Set aside issues about regimentation for the moment. Suppose that 1 is 
simply regimented into ‘Ce’.) But the three disagree as to what its truthmaker is. The 
Armstrongian thinks that a state of affairs makes 1 true: a complex object composed non-
mereologically of the electron E and the universal charge. The truthmaking trope theorist 
thinks that what makes 1 true is a charge trope CE that belongs to E. Quine himself doesn’t 
ask the truthmaking question, but presumably he would say that 1’s ontological commitment 
is to E, and E alone. There is no further truthmaking question.29 
Truthmaker theorists have thus been inclined to see their views as competing with 
Quine’s: Armstrong thinks 1 is ontologically committed to a state of affairs, the trope theorist 
thinks it’s committed to a trope, and Quine thinks it’s just committed to an electron. But 
notice that the disagreements here need not be over the ontological commitments of 1. For 
                                                 
27Which is not to say that we cannot use counterfactual truthmaking language. If Batman had existed, then he 
would have been a truthmaker for that Batman exists. That doesn’t make Batman a truthmaker. He doesn’t exist. 
But in possible worlds where he does, he is a truthmaker. Normally, then, my calling something a truthmaker is 
shorthand for calling it a truthmaker in the actual world. (The same goes, of course, for almost everything we 
ordinarily say.) 
28My thanks to Bill Lycan for driving home this point to me. See also Schaffer 2008b. 
29But see Lewis 2003, which tries to combine robust truthmaking theory with Quinean ontological scruples. Of 
course, traveling with Lewis down this path involves giving up some Quinean scruples about modality. No 
matter: who wants to live in a desert anyway? 
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notice that there are other truths in the neighborhood that are not accepted by all parties to the 
debate: 
(2) There is a state of affairs charge(E). 
 
(3) There is a charge trope CE. 
 
The Armstrongian accepts 2 but rejects 3, and the trope theorist does the reverse. Quine 
rejects both.30 Notice that 2 and 3 are themselves ordinary existential judgments. Here we 
have quantification over different kinds of objects, and it is precisely the truth of these 
quantified claims that is at issue between the competing truthmaker theorists. The lesson here 
is not that the different parties disagree as to the ontological commitments of 1—they can all 
agree that 1 is committed to E and E alone—but that they disagree as to the truth of 
subsequent claims like 2 and 3. What 2 and 3 reveal is that truthmaker theorists are already 
granting that commitments follow quantification, if indeed they use sentences like 2 and 3 in 
order to express their views. As Schaffer puts the point, “truthmaker commitments are 
parasitic upon quantifier commitments, and so the truthmaker view cannot possibly replace 
the quantifier view” (2008b: 16). After all, imagine what a completed truthmaker theory 
would look like: it would be a long list of existential claims. There is the truthmaker A, and 
the truthmaker B, and the truthmaker C, and so forth. The theory itself would employ 
quantification in order to say what truthmakers there are. It would quantify over the 
truthmakers there are, and no more. So orthodox truthmaker theory is already presupposing 
the orthodox view of ontological commitment.31 
                                                 
30Notice that Quine rejects 2 and 3 on independent grounds; he doesn’t reject them because of his criterion. 
That’s why to disagree with Quine about 2 and 3 is not necessarily to disagree with his criterion. 
31It is open to the truthmaker theorist, then, to doubt Quine’s criterion on independent grounds, since the views 
are orthogonal. If a truthmaker theorist takes that route, then his quantifiers should not be assumed to carry 
ontological commitment. However the truthmaker theorist identifies ontological commitment (perhaps with 
Azzouni’s existence predicate), he must ensure that his commitments include all and only his truthmakers. 
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Now, that truthmaker theory (usually) presupposes the Quinean criterion of 
ontological commitment is no reason to suppose that truthmaker theory has no dispute with 
Quinean approaches to metaphysical inquiry. Truthmaker theorists do typically disagree with 
Quine; it’s just that the disagreement is better understood in terms other than about the proper 
criterion of ontological commitment.32 In particular, truthmaker theorists bring out the fact 
that what makes a truth true is not necessarily the same thing as its ontological commitments. 
The truthmakers and ontological commitments coincide for simple existentials, such as that 
E exists, but for few others (as we saw with 1). Consider counterfactuals: the question of 
what makes them true is an important and difficult one; but the issue of what counterfactuals’ 
Quinean commitments are is a non-starter, since they can’t even be regimented into first-
order logic. Negative existentials, to take another example, have no Quinean commitments, 
but the question of what makes them true is a live one. 
As a result, truthmaker theorists do not think that all ontological questions with 
respect to some truth are settled once we figure out what its ontological commitments are. 
(This seems to be the real disagreement that truthmaker theorists have with Quinean 
metaphysics.) There is an important insight to be noticed here. Even if all parties to the table 
agree about the meaning of some statement (or about how it should be regimented into a 
formal language), they may disagree nonetheless about what makes it true, about what it is 
                                                 
Since most truthmaker theorists seem to assume that quantifiers carry commitments, they are already assuming 
the Quinean view. Now, an interesting exception might be Cameron 2008c. Cameron seeks to deny, for 
example, that ‘There are numbers’ is made true by numbers. Cameron’s view—as Schaffer also observes 
(2008b: 16)—requires a bifurcated view of quantification, such that the quantifiers sometimes carry 
commitments, and sometimes do not. So Cameron may not be assuming Quine’s criterion (which is not to say 
that his view doesn’t invite serious problems—see again Schaffer 2008b). 
32Schaffer 2008b is an excellent discussion of how ontological commitment and truthmaking come apart, and 
contains several more arguments as to why the two are not one and the same. On the issue of truthmaker theory 
not being a theory of ontological commitment, I am in full agreement with Schaffer. Where I get off board with 
Schaffer’s overall truthmaking program involves—at least for starters—his monism about truthmakers (2010). 
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that exists in the world that accounts for its truth. Metaphysical questions, in effect, are in no 
way resolved simply by answering semantic questions. Those who subscribe to truthmaker 
theory thus endorse the autonomy of metaphysical inquiry.33 If metaphysical questions were 
exhausted by questions of ontological commitment, then Quine would have been right to 
“stack the deck” against predicates. But anyone who takes the metaphysics of properties 
seriously will recognize that there are inquiries worth exploring that go beyond the question 
of what something’s ontological commitments are. 
I do not take the truthmaker theorist, then, to be in conflict with the Quinean criterion 
for ontological commitment. In what follows, I shall simply be assuming it. Nonetheless, I 
think truthmaker theorists do approach metaphysical inquiry quite differently.34 Let us now 
consider some possible advantages that the truthmaker theorist has over the Quinean when it 
comes to engaging in metaphysical investigation. 
First, the Quinean restriction to drawing out the ontological commitments only of 
regimentations into first-order predicate logic is far too constraining nowadays. Consider 
some of the questions the Quinean must reject: What are the ontological grounds of modal 
claims? What are the truthmakers for counterfactuals? What makes negative existentials true? 
What ontological commitments accompany the truths of (non-regimented) claims made in 
the vernacular? Here we seem to have different open roads of metaphysical inquiry that must 
be blocked off by the Quinean. The issue of what the truthmakers are for truths of necessity 
and possibility has long been of interest to truthmaker theorists; anyone who thought such a 
project worthwhile would be wise to leave behind Quine’s metaphysical methodology. 
                                                 
33Herein lies the grain of truth in Cameron’s observation that the Quinean criterion takes “a wrong-turn: serious 
ontological questions are being decided by linguistic facts” (2008c: 5). 
34Cf. Lewis: “I submit that, just as [Armstrong] has an unfamiliar notion of analysis, so he has an unfamiliar 
notion of ontology. Pace Quine, his question is not: what is there? But rather: what does it take to provide truth-
makers for all the truths?” (1992: 216). 
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Further, counterfactuals have no place in first-order predicate logic (nor does any other non-
material conditional), yet there is a substantive metaphysical project in determining what the 
ontological grounds for true counterfactuals are. Nor is it clear that ontological commitment 
cannot be found in ordinary, vernacular discourse.35 Truthmaker theorists are not limited in 
locating their metaphysical commitments only within their preferred regimentations. Besides, 
where are the regimentations from which we derive our preferred ontologies? It seems that 
we can ask and answer metaphysical questions prior to undergoing the labor-intensive task of 
regimenting our preferred theories into first-order logic. Truthmaker theory is not constrained 
by such chores. It can seek to find the ontological presuppositions of ordinary discourse. 
 
4.2.2. Metaphysical commitments and discriminating propositions 
In what follows, then, I shall understand by ‘ontological commitment’ precisely what 
Quine means; I shall continue to assume, in other words, that ontological commitment 
follows quantification. By ‘metaphysical commitment’ I mean something broader: one takes 
on a metaphysical commitment when one takes on a commitment as to a way that the world 
is. Metaphysics is the study of reality, and what’s real exhausts the way the world is. When 
we take on metaphysical commitments, we take the world to be one way rather than other; 
we rule out, in other words, certain possible worlds from being actual. Truthmaker theorists 
are interested in offering an account of metaphysical commitment. They think that certain 
metaphysical questions remain even after we settle the Quinean issue of what the ontological 
commitments are of what we take to be true. The methodology we have been assuming is the 
following: Starting with some truth we accept, we ask what it is in the world that makes it 
                                                 
35See Azzouni 2007 for skepticism about locating ontological commitment outside of theoretical regimentations. 
(On this point Azzouni agrees with Quine.) I have argued elsewhere that ontological commitments are indeed 
expressible in the vernacular (2010). 
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true. If we deem the truth to have a truthmaker, we can equate that truthmaker with the 
truth’s metaphysical commitments. If we deem the truth to be a truthmaker gap, we may still 
ask what serves as the ontological ground for that truth. Even if nothing properly necessitates 
it, it still may be true in virtue of the way the world is. Whatever that account involves we 
may also count as the metaphysical commitments of the truth. Metaphysical commitments 
track different ways the world may be. If we knew everything that is true, we would know 
everything there was to know about metaphysics, everything there was to know about the 
world. Truthmaker theorists are engaged in the project of understanding how the world is, 
and do so by investigating what the ontological grounds are for what is true. 
In an earlier chapter, I identified the key idea underlying correspondence theories as 
the thought that truth was somehow tied to the world—it is precisely the worldliness of truth 
that makes correspondence theories seem correct, and I have argued that truthmaker theory is 
the better way to account for the natural idea that truths are connected to the world. The 
worldliness of truth, I said, consisted in the fact that truths accompany ontological and 
metaphysical commitments. Truths may have ontological and metaphysical commitments 
even when they do not have truthmakers. Again, assume that negative existentials like that 
there are no Arctic penguins have no truthmakers. They have no ontological commitments 
either. But they do have metaphysical commitments—their truth makes a difference to the 
world, and to our worldview when we believe them. 
In order to better understand the idea of a truth “making a difference” to the world, let 
me introduce the term discriminating proposition.36 A proposition is discriminating only if it 
divides the space of possible worlds in two: one set where the proposition is true, and another 
                                                 
36Note that my choice of truth-bearers here is merely for convenience. I maintain my pluralistic neutrality about 
truth-bearers. 
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where the proposition is false. The proposition <There are penguins> divides the set of 
possible worlds in two: there are the worlds with penguins, and the worlds without. 
Necessarily true propositions and necessarily false propositions are non-discriminating. All 
contingent propositions are potentially discriminating. Assuming the truth of the law of non-
contradiction, the two sets of worlds picked out by a discriminating proposition will not 
overlap. So any given contingent proposition can be used to generate two disjoint sets of 
possible worlds—call them the ‘T set’ of worlds for the ones where the proposition is true, 
and the ‘F set’ of worlds for the ones where the proposition is false.37 But let me add another 
condition to the notion of a discriminating proposition. The truthmaker theorist’s idea is that 
for any two worlds, one from the T set and one from the F set, there must be some 
metaphysical difference between the two worlds. Obviously the two worlds disagree as to the 
truth of the proposition. But they must disagree about something else as well. For we are 
taking truth to be something that requires grounds—recall Schaffer’s observation that truth is 
not fundamental, it’s “made from the fundament” (2010: 310). Long before advocating 
truthmaker maximalism, or anything explicitly connected to his contemporary, systematic 
truthmaker theory, Armstrong succinctly captured this idea: 
It seems obvious, furthermore, that for every true contingent proposition there must 
be something in the world (in the largest sense of 'something') that makes the 
proposition true. For consider any true contingent proposition, and imagine that it is 
false. We must automatically imagine some difference in the world. (1969: 23) 
 
Now, different truthmaker theorists disagree as to what kind of difference that metaphysical 
difference has to be. Bigelow (1988) thinks that any T world and any F world must disagree 
about something that exists—all metaphysical differences are ontological differences, in 
other words. Armstrong agrees. Lewis (1992, 2001b) thinks that any T world and any F 
                                                 
37 The T set and the F set may not be exhaustive if some propositions are truth-value-less in some possible 
worlds (if, for example, they include non-denoting terms in such worlds). 
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world must disagree either about something that exists, or, in case the two worlds agree on 
what exists, about the properties those objects have or the relations that obtain between 
them.38 What is objectionable to the truthmaker theorist is the suggestion that there might be 
a contingent truth that nevertheless did not discriminate in one of those ways. A 
discriminating proposition, then, is one that cleaves the space of possible worlds into two 
non-overlapping sets, such that any pair of worlds from each admits of a metaphysical 
difference. When a proposition is discriminating, its truth or falsity allows for some sort of 
metaphysical accountability. We can trace the truth or falsity of a proposition to the 
difference that it makes in the world. The traditional worry about behaviorist and 
phenomenalist theories was that they posited certain counterfactuals as being true, even 
though their truth seemed in no way to reflect anything about the world. Their truth was not 
held metaphysically accountable. The only option left seems to be that their truth is simply 
metaphysically brute—it is taken to be fundamental. 
Philosophers—those interested in metaphysics, anyway—have long disagreed as to 
what is most fundamental. Truthmaker theorists are quite disinclined to take truths as 
fundamental: truths owe their truth to something else, and it is the truthmaker theorist’s task 
to say just what. Armed with this view, a truthmaker theorist might be inclined to reject out 
of hand any theory that posited certain truths as being metaphysically brute. I do not wish to 
be quite so dogmatic. Perhaps some truths are fundamental. Every theory has its primitives, 
and its choice of primitives is just one factor among many to consider when the various 
theoretical advantages and disadvantages that accompany every philosophical theory are 
                                                 
38Here again we have the two versions of the “supervenience” principle—see section 1.3.1. I think we can 
present the idea without invoking the disputed term ‘supervenience’. Some (e.g., Schaffer 2010) are quite 
skeptical that a mere supervenience relation is sufficient to support the theoretical work required by a 
truthmaking theorist. I tend to agree. 
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weighed.39 Hence, I think that the truthmaker theorist’s proper response to a view like 
Lange’s (2009) that takes certain counterfactuals as being brute is not outright dismissal (on 
the charge of “cheating” or “violating the truthmaker principle”), but cautious and open-
minded skepticism. To the extent that someone is attracted to truthmaker theory, one should 
be suspicious of ungrounded truths. But one should not refuse to engage such theories. Like 
all truthmaker theorists, I believe that some truths accompany metaphysical commitments—
that truths are discriminating, we may now say. But whether all contingent truths are 
discriminating is another matter, and one I shall not assume (nor does anyone in the industry 
have an argument for it). I think that being open to the possibility that there are non-
discriminating truths might help make sense of certain issues about realism, and admitting 
their possibility is not in and of itself a rejection of the insights that motivate truthmaker 
theory. Everyone, after all, is committed to there being truthmakers. The interesting question 
is just how far and wide truthmaking considerations apply.40 
Truthmaker theorists tend to be committed to the idea that all contingent propositions 
are discriminating.41 Take the proposition <There are penguins>. Take one of its T worlds 
and one of its F worlds. For any such pair, there will be a metaphysical difference between 
them—one will have a penguin and the other won’t. The same can be said of the proposition 
<There are no Arctic penguins>, or <Obama is president>. In the latter case, the actual world 
differs from every F world either in that Obama does not exist in those worlds, or that he 
does but is not president. Hence, maximalists like Armstrong and non-maximalists like 
Bigelow and Lewis can agree that all contingent propositions are discriminating. For even if 
                                                 
39See Goodman 1954: 37. 
40For Lange’s own response to the possible charge of ontological cheating, see his 2009: 188-189. 
41Cameron expresses something similar by his principle of the “substantiality of contingency” (2010: 412). 
 212
<There are no Arctic penguins> has no truthmaker, it most certainly is a discriminating 
proposition. Hence we see non-maximalists like Bigelow and Lewis proudly adopt 
truthmaker theory in spite of rejecting maximalism.42 The core idea behind truthmaker 
theory—that truths carry metaphysical commitments—is now captured by the idea that 
contingent propositions are discriminating. When propositions are discriminating, their truth 
or falsity is held metaphysically accountable, thus satisfying the demand that truths be 
grounded in the world—that they owe their truth to something else.43 
 
4.2.3. Azzouni and non-discriminating truthmaker gaps 
If I have presented the above ideas compellingly, it might seem mysterious why 
anyone would accept the idea that a contingent proposition could be non-discriminating. 
What would it be for a proposition to be true, even though its truth made no difference to the 
way the world was? Here we have hit upon what Azzouni calls a widespread assumption that 
has “powerfully shaped philosophy for a very long time” (2006: 3). Azzouni labels the 
assumption ‘the truthmaker assumption’, and thinks that it has had a tight grip on 
metaphysics, regardless of whether its practitioners have self-consciously labored under the 
banner of truthmaking. Azzouni is interested in the possibility that the truthmaker assumption 
is wrong. Rejecting that assumption allows one to embrace that possibility that “truth 
vehicles can be true without there being a metaphysical trace in the world that their truth 
reflects” (Azzouni 2006: 5). Azzouni, in other words, happily embraces the existence of 
truths that are non-discriminating: their truth leaves no trace in the world. Neither, then, does 
                                                 
42But see MacBride 2005, which argues that Lewis ultimately “has come to damn the truthmaker principle with 
faint praise” (139). 
43Excepting, recall, the cases of reflexive truthmaking. These are still grounded, though they provide their own 
grounds by, in effect, being about themselves in the right way. 
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their falsity. When we have a non-discriminating proposition, it seems that we can have two 
worlds such that they differ in no metaphysical respect—they agree on what exists, and on 
what (natural) properties those things have and what relations obtain between them—but yet 
differ over the truth of the proposition. Such propositions can admit of no metaphysical 
grounds—anything on offer would equally be on offer in the qualitatively identical world 
where it’s false. It would just be a brute fact in the T world that the proposition was true, and 
a brute fact in the F world that the proposition was false. If this situation seems puzzling (or 
just downright unbelievable), count yourself among those attracted by truthmaking. 
Azzouni’s striking view here fits well with another controversial view of his—the 
anti-Quinean thesis that the quantifiers do not accompany ontological commitment (2004). 
Hence, there can be true existential propositions—such as <There are numbers>—even 
though numbers are nowhere to be found in the ontological inventory of the world. Azzouni 
locates ontological commitments by employing an existence predicate; whatever makes it 
into the existence predicate of a fully regimented theory is what we’re ontologically 
committed to when we are committed to the truth of the theory. If we use ‘EXIST’ to denote 
that predicate, we can express Azzouni’s view by saying that he thinks there exist things that 
do not EXIST. Sure, <There are numbers> quantifies over numbers, but only <There are 
numbers that EXIST> is ontologically committed to there being numbers. 
Despite its unorthodox nature, the benefits of Azzouni’s view are easy to see. If the 
truth of mathematics is indispensable to the practice of science, as Quine (1948) and Putnam 
(1971) have famously argued, then belief in some scientific theory will involve all of the 
ontological commitments of the mathematics that the theory presupposes. Since mathematics 
quantifies over entities such as sets, the Quinean criterion entails that any theory that 
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incorporates mathematics is ontologically committed to sets. Sets, of course, are anathema to 
nominalists. Hence an advantage of Azzouni’s view is that the truth of mathematics, even 
with its quantification over sets, does not entail the real existence of mathematical entities. 
Azzouni’s view is tailor-made for those who seek to quantify over sets, numbers, or whatever 
without being ontologically committed to them. Others are forced either to reject the 
indispensability of the truth of mathematics (Field 1980), or begrudgingly accept with Quine 
the existence of mathematical entities. Azzouni need not face such a choice. Azzouni’s view 
is also of use in solving puzzles regarding fictional entities, non-existent “entities”, and other 
cases where there are truths about things that do not exist. Azzouni can grant the truth of 
<There exist fictional ducks, such as Donald and Howard> without being ontologically 
committed to fictional ducks. If we can have existential truth without any accompanying 
ontology, then we can maintain a robust nominalism without running error theories on many 
natural domains of discourse. 
Azzouni, then, would have us separate the following propositions: 
(4) <There are numbers> 
 
(5) <There are numbers that EXIST> 
 
For convenience, let us call 4 an existential proposition, and 5 an ontological proposition. 
Azzouni might be prepared to acknowledge that 4 is what we are calling a non-discriminating 
proposition. 5 is ontologically committing, and so presumably is discriminating. But Azzouni 
rejects 5 as false—the indispensability of mathematics requires us to countenance the truth 
only of 4.44 
                                                 
44What turns out to be indispensable about mathematics, then, is not any mathematical ontology, but just 
mathematical truth. 
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In fact, 4 and 5 are actually poor test cases for our interests, since they may well not 
be contingencies, and hence are non-discriminating simply by way of being necessary. So 
consider instead the following pair, which are also perfectly separable on Azzouni’s view: 
(6) <There are penguins> 
 
(7) <There are penguins that EXIST> 
 
Let me go out on a limb and say that both 6 and 7 are true: penguins belong inside our 
ontologies. Nevertheless, 6 and 7 are distinct claims, the latter being logically stronger. What 
I am interested in are those possible worlds where 7 is false. These are worlds where 
penguins never evolved in the first place. But 7’s being false is compatible with either the 
truth or falsity of 6. If 7 falls, 6 doesn’t have to go down with it, for the two are logically 
distinct. Here is the puzzle: among those worlds where 7 is false, what is the difference 
between those worlds where 6 is true, and those worlds where 6 is false? In worlds like ours 
where 7 is true, there is no puzzle about the truth of 6. 7 entails 6, and 7 is properly 
discriminating. Penguins tell the difference between 7’s T worlds and its F worlds. The truth 
of 6 is entailed by the truth of 7. But the question, really, is what makes 6 true in those 
worlds where 7 is false, but 6 is nevertheless true. There won’t be any penguins around to do 
the job. One option is to say that 6 is actually a necessary truth, and so we need not account 
for its truth by any special means in worlds where 7 is false. I find it deeply implausible that 
all existential propositions like 6 are necessary truths, so I find this an unstable resting spot 
for Azzouni. The other option, which is in the spirit of Azzouni’s view, is to take 6 to be a 
contingent, but non-discriminating proposition. In those worlds where 7 is false, the truth-
value of 6 is just a brute fact. Since all other contingent existential propositions will follow 
suit, Azzouni seems committed to the view that all existential propositions that are not 
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explicitly ontological (for they involve no use of the existence predicate) are non-
discriminating. As such, they violate the maxim that truth supervenes on being, and stand as 
potential counterexamples to truthmaker theorists.45 
Picking up on that last point, we can see quite easily that if there are true, contingent, 
non-discriminating propositions, then those truths are truthmaker gaps. For suppose that 
<Mickey Mouse exists> is contingently true, but is non-discriminating. As a result, there is a 
possible world W qualitatively identical to the actual world—that is, a world that bears no 
metaphysical difference to ours in the sense described above—where the proposition is false. 
Now suppose that the proposition has a truthmaker, T. T also exists in W, and so the 
proposition is true in W after all, contradicting our initial assumption. So any contingently 
true non-discriminating proposition is a truthmaker gap, a truth without a truthmaker. 
In an ecumenical spirit, I have been presenting Azzouni’s view rather than arguing 
against it. Indeed, we are not assuming maximalism, so the existence of more truthmaker 
gaps is no objection in and of itself. But I could very well have launched a dilemma: either 
existential propositions like <There are penguins> are necessary, or they are ungrounded. 
Either way, the view seems to be implausible. Azzouni may well simply charge me with 
begging the question: the reason why I find his view implausible is simply that I am 
assuming the very assumption—what he calls the truthmaker assumption—which he has 
already explicitly rejected. So I do not take myself to be arguing definitively against the view 
that there are non-discriminating contingent propositions (even when those propositions are 
existentials). Moreover, I want to put such truths (be there any) to theoretical use later as a 
                                                 
45Another option for Azzouni might be to take the truth of 6 to be “up to us”, as detailed in Azzouni and Bueno 
2008. But then such truths would be discriminating after all—their truth would depend upon the existence of 
certain choices made by cognitive creatures like us—and thus would not actually violate the truthmaker 
assumption. 
 217
way of understanding some forms of anti-realism. So let us assume in what follows that there 
might well be contingent non-discriminating propositions, and see what comes of it. 
We are now in a position to appreciate that not all truthmaker gaps are created equal. 
Consider yet again the famous case of negative existentials. ‘There are no unicorns’ is true, 
but not, perhaps, because of the existence of something. Rather, ‘There are no unicorns’ is 
true because nothing of a certain kind exists.46 Nonetheless, ‘There are no unicorns’ is 
discriminating in our sense. Take any world where ‘There are no unicorns’ is true, and any 
world where it is false, and we can locate a metaphysical difference between them: one has 
unicorns, the other does not. Hence, even if ‘There are no unicorns’ does not have a 
truthmaker, it is no counterexample to the supervenience principle advocated by Bigelow and 
Lewis, for it accompanies metaphysical commitments in our sense (though it has no Quinean 
ontological commitments). Because our world belongs among the no-unicorn worlds, ‘There 
are no unicorns’ is true. Just as is the case with truths that have truthmakers, we can account 
for the truths by way of metaphysical analysis and description. Negative existentials admit of 
the same metaphysical accountability that non-truthmaker gaps do. We cite things that do or 
do not exist, and the features that those things do or don’t have. Hence, when we grant the 
truth of certain truthmaker gaps like negative existentials, we still take on certain 
metaphysical commitments. In Schaffer’s language, we find something in the “fundament” 
out of which to construct their truth. Positing truthmakers is not the only way to hold a 
theorist’s feet to the ontological fire. For example, since I believe ‘There are no unicorns’ to 
be true, I have ruled out an infinity of possible worlds as being actual. In taking on this 
“atheism” about unicorns, I take on a decisive metaphysical stand about one aspect of how 
                                                 
46To put the point bluntly, to be an atheist about something is not to be a theist about something else, as the 
maximalist has it. 
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the world is.47 Consequently, I am in no way taking the truth to be metaphysically brute. 
Truthmaker gaps are not necessarily devoid of metaphysical substance, here understood as 
bearing certain metaphysical commitments, even if there is no particular entity whose 
existence guarantees their truth. 
But now consider other truthmaker gaps that philosophers have posited. There are 
Lange’s counterfactuals (2009). The laws of nature are true in virtue of those counterfactuals’ 
being true, and not the other way round. But no truthmakers for the counterfactuals are then 
offered. Azzouni advocates the truth of mathematical claims—including existential sentences 
like ‘There are numbers’—without thinking that anything must exist to make them true 
(2004). Sorensen employs ungrounded truthmaker gaps to solve the sorites paradox, the no-
no paradox, and issues involving vagueness (2001, chapter 11). In all these various cases, 
philosophers have posited the existence of truthmaker gaps that do not owe their truth to 
anything about the world, lack any metaphysical substance whatsoever, and hence falsify the 
supposed supervenience of truth on being. Such truthmaker gaps are non-discriminating—
their truth makes no difference to the world. 
To take another example (one of Sorensen’s), consider the liar sentence’s less 
disruptive cousin, the truth-teller: 
(TT) This sentence is true. 
 
The interesting thing about the truth-teller is not that it is inconsistent like the liar, but rather 
that it can consistently bear either truth-value. If TT is true, then TT is true. No trouble there. 
If TT is not true, then it’s not the case that TT is true. No trouble there, either. Sorensen 
                                                 
47One thing that strikes me as missing from the Quinean approach to ontology is its inevitable inattention to 
negative metaphysical commitments. Neither the agnostic nor the atheist quantifies over any deity, so neither is 
ontologically committed to any god. But if metaphysicians merely attend to what we will or won’t quantify over, 
they will miss the fundamental metaphysical distinction between atheistic and agnostic metaphysical views. I 
elaborate on this theme in my 2010. 
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suggests that we treat TT as a truthmaker gap, but as a non-discriminating truthmaker gap. 
On such a view, TT may well be true. It may be false. It has a truth-value, but no truthmaker 
or falsemaker. As a result, Sorensen thinks we have an explanation of why we cannot know 
its truth-value—it is an “epistemic island” whose truth-value cannot be known by us. 
Suppose that TT is in fact true. If so, and there is nothing about the world that accounts for 
its truth, then there is a possible world metaphysically indiscernible from ours—all the same 
stuff exists, and that stuff has all the same properties and stands in the same relations they 
stand in here—but where TT is false. After all, TT’s truth (or falsity) in no way depends 
upon the world. Sorensen’s point is that we have no idea whether the actual world belongs 
among TT’s T worlds or its F worlds. For each world in one of the sets, we can find a 
qualitatively identical one in the other—their only disagreement will be about the truth-value 
of TT. My point here is not to refute the existence of such truths, but rather to call attention 
to what they would be like, if in fact there are any.48 
The first step in articulating an adequate metaphysics of truthmaker gaps is to 
recognize the distinction between truthmaker gaps like negative existentials on the one hand, 
whose truth is still grounded in the world, and the other kinds of posited gaps on the other, 
where the truths do not appear to be grounded in reality at all. A hard-nosed truthmaker 
maximalist might reject that there is any real distinction here, because he finds the 
metaphysical accounting attached to the first kind just as empty as the refusal to offer any 
such metaphysical accounting in the second kind. Unless there is some particular thing that 
makes some truth true, we have no adequate ontological accounting of the truth’s truth.49 The 
                                                 
48See Williamson 2007: 725-726 for criticism of Sorensen’s view here. 
49This is the view of Cameron 2008d: 107-108. Cameron, in effect, simply equates “being grounded” with 
“having a truthmaker”. 
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non-maximalist demurs: no, we have a perfectly good ontological account of the truth’s truth, 
even though there is no particular thing that guarantees its truth. But supposing we may take 
non-maximalism seriously, and thus believe that some truths are properly metaphysically 
grounded in spite of having no truthmaker, we open the door to exploring the contrast 
between truthmaker gaps that are grounded in reality, and those that are not. Herein, I think, 
lies some insight into what is at stake in the various divides between realism and anti-realism 
that occur across the philosophical landscape. Perhaps one form of anti-realism about the 
truths in some domain is not just to accept that those truths are truthmaker gaps, but that 
those truths make no difference as to how the world is. After all, if the truths in some domain 
are not grounded in reality, then we seem free to reject realism about that domain. Other 
truthmaker gaps—negative existentials being the paradigm example—do admit of some kind 
of metaphysical accountability, and hence do not seem in any way indicative of anti-realism. 
Equipped with these insights, we can now turn to a truthmaker based approach to the topic of 
realism and anti-realism. 
 
4.3. A truthmaker account of realism 
Where others have found the nature of truth to be crucial to understanding the nature 
of realism, I find the nature of truthmakers to be the crucial element. Truthmaker theory is an 
explicitly metaphysical enterprise—it seeks after the ontological grounds for truths—and as 
such is a more suitable candidate for being able to articulate the gulf that lies between realists 
and their opponents. What I would now like to do is offer an approach to the question of 
realism that is framed in terms of truthmaker theory, not the theory of truth. 
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The connection between truthmaking and realism is obvious enough to have been 
noticed already. John Bigelow, in an oft-quoted passage, writes that  
I have sometimes tried to stop believing in the Truthmaker axiom. Yet I have never 
really succeeded. Without some such axiom, I find I have no adequate anchor to hold 
me from drifting onto the shoals of some sort of pragmatism or idealism. And that is 
altogether uncongenial to me; I am a congenital realist about almost everything. 
(1988: 123) 
 
John Heil, following Charlie Martin, writes that the core truthmaking idea that “when a 
statement concerning the world is true, there must be something about the world that makes it 
true” is “a central tenet of realism” (2003: 61). Armstrong and Cameron, as we shall see next, 
also draw close connections between realism and truthmaker theory. Indeed, no one is 
shocked that truthmaker theory has thrived in Australia, not unknown for its hospitality 
toward realism. Still, I do not think that anyone has correctly articulated what the relationship 
between realism and truthmaking is, and it is that deficit that I would like to remedy. 
Furthermore, the above quotes all suggest that truthmaker theory is exclusive territory for 
realists. While I think realism is best understood in terms of truthmakers, this is not because 
only realists are entitled to take a stand on truthmakers. Michael Pendlebury, critical of the 
thought that truthmaker theory is essentially realist, writes that the “realism of the Truth-
maker Program is an uncritical article of faith that is simply taken for granted” (2010: 145). 
This chapter challenges that article of faith, and shows how truthmaker theory is safe 
territory for anti-realists. The best way of understanding the divide between realists and anti-
realists involves understanding their dividing views about truthmakers and truthmaking. 
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4.3.1. Truthmaking and realism: Armstrong 
Almost in passing, Armstrong writes that “To demand truthmakers for particular 
truths is to accept a realist theory for these truths” (2004: 5). Elsewhere he defines “realism 
about the truth of a particular true proposition as the contention that its truth is determined by 
something that lies outside that proposition”, the plausibility of which he then takes to be the 
“charter” of truthmaker theory (2003: 12). Here we have an elegantly simple account of the 
relationship between truthmaking and realism: 
(R1) To be a realist with respect to a set of true propositions is to hold that those 
propositions all have truthmakers. 
 
According to this account, wherever truthmakers are found, so too is realism. Presumably, 
whatever makes a proposition true also makes that proposition’s negation false, and so we 
can adopt this slightly broader statement of Armstrong’s view: 
(R2) To be a realist with respect to a set of propositions is to hold that all the true 
propositions in the set have truthmakers, and that all the false propositions in 
the set have falsemakers.50 
 
R2 provides a more satisfying formulation, for it allows us to speak about realism for an 
entire domain of propositions (e.g., science or ethics) rather than just for a set of truths. 
Moral realists, for instance, are just as realist about the falsity of their falsehoods as they are 
about the truth of their truths. 
Armstrong’s identification of realism and the doctrine that truths have truthmakers is, 
unfortunately, too quick. First, consider the fact that Armstrong himself accepts truthmaker 
maximalism, the thesis that every truth has a truthmaker (and, thus, that every falsehood has a 
falsemaker) (2004: 5). Hence, Armstrong is by his own lights a global realist—he is a realist 
about every domain of discourse (or, at least, every domain of discourse where he finds any 
                                                 
50The notion of a falsemaker hasn’t come up, but can be defined in exact parallel fashion to how we have 
defined what a truthmaker is using TM. 
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truth or falsity at all). Now, Armstrong may be a global realist, but the real issue is whether 
commitment to truthmaker maximalism alone ought to commit one to global realism. 
According to R2, one cannot be a maximalist and yet be an anti-realist about some domain of 
claims, so long as those claims are truth-valued. The only non-globalist alternative for the 
maximalist is to take a non-cognitive stance toward some domain of claims; by ‘non-
cognitive’ here I mean views like Ayer’s emotivism that deny that ethical and religious 
judgments bear a truth-value (1952). R2 rightly categorizes such non-cognitivist views as a 
form of anti-realism, but the problem is that it makes it the only form of anti-realism that the 
maximalist has available. We should hope for a more flexible understanding of the nature of 
realism, given the great abundance of other anti-realist options.51 
A second problem is that error theorists turn out to be realists, according to 
maximalists who adopt R2. For error theory (e.g., Mackie 1977 and Field 1980) is typically 
understood as an anti-realist view that holds that the propositions of a domain are 
systematically false. According to maximalists, those falsehoods have falsemakers, just as 
their negations have truthmakers. So the error theorist turns out to be a realist after all. So R2 
suffers from a categorization defect. 
A third problem with R2 involves its commitment to all truthmakers being realism-
relevant. In other words, R2 supposes that truthmakers automatically carry realism in tow. If 
we are realists with respect to some proposition p, we think it has some truthmaker T. That 
we believe in the existence of T and take it to be a truthmaker for p is enough for being 
                                                 
51Blackburn offers a nice catalog of the various competitors to realism that have surfaced over the years: 
“Realists are contrasted with a variety of alleged opponents: reductionists, idealists, instrumentalists, 
pragmatists, verificationists, internalists, neo-Wittgensteinian neutralists, and no doubt others” (1984b: 145). 
We could add to the list quietists, expressivists, fictionalists, nominalists, semantic anti-realists, conventionalists, 
non-cognitivists, constructivists, relativists, intuitionists, subjectivists, quasi-realists, non-factualists, error 
theorists, and probably still others. 
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realist about p, according to R2. We don’t need to know anything else about T. The 
possibility that R2 is closing off here is that anti-realists, too, may avail themselves of 
truthmakers, albeit anti-realism-relevant ones. According to R2, truthmaker theory is strictly 
realist territory; anti-realists are not invited to play along. 
However, we can make perfect sense of anti-realist truthmaking accounts. Suppose I 
hold a particularly abhorrent metaethical view, according to which something is good just in 
case I desire it, and that everything I do not desire is bad. Now, this is not a kind of 
relativism—what’s good for me is what I desire, and what’s good for you is what you desire. 
No, this view is that what it is to be good is to be desired by me. According to this view, the 
proposition that echidnas are good is true, and made true by my desire for echidnas. The 
proposition that tapirs are bad is also true, this time made true by my absence of a desire for 
tapirs. To put it lightly, I would hesitate to call this view a form of moral realism, despite its 
providing truthmakers for moral judgments. 
Other far more tenable forms of anti-realism also are able to offer truthmakers to 
ground their theories. Constructivist metaethical theories, for example, might hold that moral 
judgments are true in virtue of the decisions of a set of ideal observers (e.g., Milo 1995). Just 
what the ontological status of those decisions is is a good question, of course, but we can see 
how they don’t have the obvious realist flavor that accompanies traditional realist accounts of 
moral truthmakers (such as moral facts, divine commands, or natural facts about flourishing, 
etc.). Or consider the case of fashion. Some things are fashionable; other things are not. We 
do not need to be fashion realists to find truthmakers for claims about what is or isn’t 
fashionable.52 It might be true that some dress is fashionable simply in virtue of the event of 
its being worn to the Oscars. Working out in detail an account of truthmakers for fashion 
                                                 
52Cf. López de Sa 2010, which offers an account of relativist truth in terms of response-dependent truthmakers. 
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discourse may be fairly complicated, but it should be clear that giving an account of what 
makes fashion judgments true or false is not automatically to concede a realist account of 
fashion. Fashion discourse does not bear the traditional marks of objectivity with which we 
characterize realist domains, even though we may be able to say exactly what it is that makes 
fashion judgments true or false.53 
My third objection boils down to the thought that realism does not consist in whether 
or not the truths of some domain have truthmakers, but rather what the nature or character is 
of those truthmakers. Having truthmakers is not alone sufficient for realism. If we want to 
leave open the possibility that there are anti-realist accounts of truthmaking for certain 
domains, then we need to reject R2. 
My final objection to R2 is that just as having truthmakers is not sufficient for realism, 
it is not necessary either. One can be a realist about a particular domain even if one thinks 
that not all the truths of that domain have truthmakers. This objection relies on the tenability 
of there being truthmaker gaps—truths without truthmakers. Consider yet again those wily 
negative existentials. It is true that there are no Arctic penguins. Here we have a proposition 
that seems to be true in virtue of nothing of a certain kind existing, not in virtue of something 
of a certain kind existing. Now, I continue to maintain that it is an open question whether 
negative existentials are genuine counterexamples to maximalism. For our purposes, we need 
only make two observations. First, one can still in engage in truthmaker theory even without 
                                                 
53See also Cameron’s discussion of Berkeley, whom he takes to be an anti-realist in spite of having truthmakers 
available to him (2008d: 118-122). Berkeley’s idealism consists in the (mind-dependent) nature of the objects 
that he has available as truthmakers. 
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being a maximalist.54 Second, to take some truths to be truthmaker gaps is not automatically 
to concede a form of anti-realism with respect to them. 
To illustrate both claims, we can simply look again to Bigelow, who, recall, admits to 
being a “a congenital realist about almost everything” (1988: 123). Bigelow is not a 
maximalist. He thinks that truthmaker theory is best captured by a weaker thesis, that truth 
supervenes on being. If some true proposition had been false, then either something that does 
exist wouldn’t have existed, or something that doesn’t exist would have. For example, had it 
turned out that the proposition that there are no Arctic penguins had been false, then 
something that doesn’t exist (namely, an Arctic penguin) would have to have existed. Now, 
Bigelow is no anti-realist when it comes to penguin discourse, in spite of his taking the 
discourse to include truthmaker gaps. Bigelow is not moved by idealism or pragmatism when 
it comes to truths involving Arctic wildlife. What explains the distinction between truths with 
truthmakers and truths without is not necessarily one having anything to do with realism and 
anti-realism. We shall meet below some anti-realist theories that do rely crucially on positing 
truths without truthmakers. But not all truthmaker gaps are created equal, as the case of 
negative existentials makes manifest. Just as some but not all truthmakers are indicative of 
realism, some but not all truthmaker gaps are indicative of anti-realism. 
 
4.3.2. Truthmaking and realism: Cameron 
Armstrong’s identification of realism with the mere having of truthmakers is too 
simple to be true. A set of truths having truthmakers is neither necessary nor sufficient for 
counting as realist. We need a more subtle account that takes to heart the idea that it is the 
                                                 
54Armstrong even observes that most truthmaker theorists reject maximalism (2006: 245). 
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nature of the truthmakers that matters, not merely their existence. Cameron (2008d: 122) 
offers an account of realism in the spirit of truthmaker theory that satisfies this requirement: 
(R3) To be a realist with respect to a set of propositions is (i) to think that the 
propositions of the domain are, when literally construed, literally true or false, 
(ii) to think that some propositions of the domain are non-vacuously literally 
true, and (iii) to think that the grounds of those true propositions exist/obtain 
mind-independently (and that this fact is itself a mind-independent matter). 
 
Cameron borrows the first two conditions from Geoffrey Sayre-McCord’s account of realism 
(1986: 5), and adds the third to fix what he (correctly) identifies as an insufficiency in Sayre-
McCord’s account. Plenty of anti-realists nowadays uphold the existence of (literal, non-
vacuous) truths to be found inside the domains they take to be anti-realist. Consider 
constructivists (social or not), relativists, subjectivists, and idealists. Crispin Wright (1992) 
goes to great lengths to show how to uphold truth inside anti-realist domains. Quasi-realists 
like Blackburn (1998) are notorious for finding truth and anti-realism compatible. 
Contemporary expressivists also accept the existence of truth in their expressivist domains 
(Field 1994b, Gibbard 2003). On Cameron’s account, what sets these views off as anti-realist 
must involve their taking the grounds for anti-realist truths to be a mind-dependent matter. 
I have said that our account of realism needs to countenance the fact that it is the 
nature of one’s stock of truthmakers that matters for whether a domain counts as realist or 
not. Cameron accounts for that fact by maintaining that realists require mind-independent 
entities as grounds for truths, while anti-realists may help themselves to mind-dependent 
entities as grounds for truth.55 Mind-independence is the feature that makes an entity relevant 
                                                 
55Cameron speaks of grounds rather than truthmakers here because he is being sensitive to the idea that grounds 
need not be truthmakers (i.e., entities that necessitate the truth of propositions). One might think that, in line 
with my final objection in the previous section, he is not trying to rule out as anti-realists non-maximalists like 
Bigelow who might take negative existentials to be grounded in some sense while not having truthmakers. But 
that is not at all obvious, for Cameron claims quite boldly that truths without truthmakers are ungrounded 
(2008a: 412 and 2008d: 107). 
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to realism or anti-realism. To make good on this account, we of course would need to offer a 
theory of just what it is in which mind-independence consists, which is no easy matter. 
Neither Cameron nor I have such an account, but I for one am confident that the notion is a 
genuine one that, while perhaps vague, admits of clear positive and negative cases.56 
Equipped with condition (iii), we can properly categorize a number of anti-realist 
positions as such. For the moral relativist, moral claims are true in virtue of the existence of 
certain social norms, which in turn only exist due to the conventions of the society in 
question. The Berkeleyan idealist thinks that truths are true in virtue of mind-dependent 
entities like minds and ideas. The constructivist philosopher—in ethics, mathematics, or 
wherever—holds that constructed truths are true in virtue of their being constructed, where 
what’s doing the constructing is mental agents like us. For Wright, one form of anti-realism 
involves the claims in a domain being true in virtue of their being superassertible—in virtue 
of their being warranted, and continuing to be warranted under arbitrary improvements of 
information (1992). Here, truths are true in virtue of their possessing certain epistemic 
features about us; they are true in virtue of our being warranted in believing them in a certain 
way. The notion of mind-dependence does a good job of capturing what seems to unite  anti-
realist views. Each of these views hold that we are responsible in a crucial way for the truth 
of various sets of propositions. In understanding what makes certain propositions true, we 
need to understand what role we play in making them true. Such is one of the key ideas 
behind anti-realism. 
Cameron’s view is a significant improvement over Armstrong’s. But it still does not 
capture everything there is to the debate between realists and anti-realists. Just how much it 
                                                 
56See Devitt 1984 and 1991 and Jenkins 2005 for treatments of mind-independence. Rosen 1994 raises worries 
about the legitimacy of the notion, as well as its cousin objectivity. See Fine 1986 for an example of how not to 
understand mind-independence, and Musgrave 1989 for an explanation of where Fine goes wrong. 
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fails to capture depends in part on how we are to understand the parenthetical clause of 
condition (iii). Cameron writes that the realist about some domain thinks that the grounds for 
the truths of the domain exist mind-independently, and that this fact is itself a mind-
independent matter (2008d: 122). To what is ‘this fact’ supposed to be referring? The most 
natural reading is that it refers to the fact expressed in the first half of the sentence. Consider 
realism about penguins, for example. The proposition that there are penguins is true, and 
grounded by the penguins that exist in the world. The realist thinks that penguins exist mind-
independently, which is plausible enough. Is the fact that penguins exist mind-independently 
itself a mind-independent fact? Presumably. In general, it seems that if the proposition <Xs 
exist mind-independently> is a fact, then that fact is itself a mind-independent matter. In 
other words, if the existence of something is a mind-independent matter, then it is also a 
mind-independent matter that the proposition that that thing exists is true. On this reading, 
the parenthetical addition adds no content to the account. 
What Cameron seems to intend is that ‘this fact’ refers to something else. Suppose G 
provides the grounds for some proposition <p>. Condition (iii) holds that realism about <p> 
requires G to exist mind-independently. What Cameron also intends to require via the 
parenthetical is that a separate fact, the fact that G grounds <p>, is itself mind-independent. 
He writes: “You don’t count as a realist about <p> if you think that some feature of the world 
grounds <p> but are an anti-realist about the fact that it grounds <p>” (2008d: 122). In other 
words, not only must the grounds themselves exist mind-independently, so too must the 
grounding relation that obtains between the grounds and the truth. The possibility being 
brought up here is that while the existence of a particular kind of object may be a mind-
independent matter, the issue of which things it makes true (or false) is not. Cameron does 
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not elaborate on the possibility of grounding relations being a mind-dependent matter, but it 
is worth dwelling upon because no one in the truthmaking literature has considered such a 
possibility, and it opens the door to understanding a powerful form of anti-realism from 
within a truthmaking context. 
When some object T is a truthmaker for some proposition p, what accounts for the 
fact that T and p stand in the truthmaking relationship? Armstrong’s view of the matter, as 
we have seen, is that the truthmaking relation is an internal relation, by which he means that 
the existence of the relata guarantee that the relation obtains (2004: 9). Socrates is a 
truthmaker for <Socrates exists>. The man and the proposition suffice for accounting why 
they stand in the truthmaking relation. What is not needed, according to Armstrong, is a 
further relational universal to fuse the two together. If Socrates and the proposition do not 
need any outside help for them to stand together inside the truthmaking relation, then it must 
be their very natures that accounts for why they do. Indeed, E. J. Lowe accounts for the 
truthmaking relation by holding that <Socrates exists> is made true by Socrates because it is 
a part of the former’s essence to be true, provided that Socrates exists (2007: 250). 
Truthmaker theory in general relies upon the de re modal features of objects in accounting 
for which things stand in the truthmaking relation to which propositions (see Fox 1987: 189 
and Merricks 2007: 11-14). Socrates is a truthmaker not just for <Socrates exists>, but for 
<There is a human> as well. Socrates makes true the latter proposition because Socrates is 
essentially human. 
If we account for the truthmaking relation by relying on the de re modal features of 
objects and propositions, and hold that the modal profile of objects and propositions is a 
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mind-independent matter,57 then we have the kind of truthmaking that is conducive for 
realism, and which Cameron appears to be attempting to capture in the parenthetical clause in 
3. But most truthmaker theorists would be startled by the thought that there could be any 
other sort of truthmaking. Just what would a mind-dependent account of the truthmaking 
relation look like? 
 
4.3.3. Projectivist truthmaking 
To get a sense for this new possibility for truthmaking, I suggest we look to the 
projectivist philosophy of Simon Blackburn (1984b, 1998).58 When it comes to ethics, 
Blackburn is a projectivist. He doesn’t think that the moral features of the world are “out 
there” waiting to be detected. Rather, we “gild and stain” the natural world with ethical 
features. But Blackburn is no mere subjectivist. In fact, his program of quasi-realism is 
intended to capture the objectivist trappings of realism without admitting its metaphysics. 
Quasi-realism, predictably, is a headache for any theorist trying to make sense of realism. 
The quasi-realist seeks to be able to say everything the realist says, and yet distinguish 
himself from the realist. Finding an account of realism and anti-realism that correctly 
categorizes quasi-realism as an anti-realist view is tricky business. 
What is revealing about Blackburn’s projectivism is how he repeatedly employs the 
language familiar to those interested in truthmaker theory. For instance, he writes: 
It is because of our responses that we say that cruelty is wrong, but it is not because 
of them that it is so. […O]ur actual responses are inappropriate for the wrongness of 
cruelty to depend upon. What makes cruelty abhorrent is not that it offends us, but all 
those hideous things that make it do so. (1988: 367) 
 
                                                 
57But see Sidelle 1989 for criticism of this view. 
58We’ll tackle quasi-realism again in detail in section 5.2.7. 
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Interestingly, in a reprint of this article, Blackburn’s talk of dependence here is swapped for 
talk of anchoring: “[O]ur actual responses are inappropriate anchors for the wrongness of 
cruelty” (1993b: 172). Elsewhere, Blackburn writes that “what makes it wrong to kick dogs 
is that it causes them pain” (1981: 179). Of course, what makes it wrong to kick dogs is 
exactly the same thing as what makes <It is wrong to kick dogs> true. Finally, Blackburn 
even employs the language of being in virtue of and of grounds: 
Ethical avowals, like decisions and verdicts, require grounds. If I grade one paper 
higher than another, I must be prepared to indicate some relevant difference between 
them. We acknowledge the need to point to something that grounds our judgement, in 
virtue of which one is better than the other. But […] no complete theory of ethics can 
simply point to the grounding properties, and suppose that evaluations are given their 
meaning by their relationship to them. We need first to understand the evaluative 
stance. (1998: 69) 
 
That Blackburn is drawn to the same language exploited by truthmaker theorists is no 
coincidence. He, too, thinks that ethical truths (which he believes in, given his quasi-realism) 
are not brute facts: they are true in virtue of something that provides grounds for them. The 
grounds Blackburn cites are all naturalistic in nature: facts about pain, the detrimental 
consequences of cruelty, students’ markings on exams. Because such naturalistic facts exist, 
certain moral judgments are true. 
Now, Blackburn would loathe the suggestion that we can understand the truth of 
moral judgments by attending to the de re modal properties of the natural features and 
properties of the world. Indeed, he goes on to say that “no complete theory of ethics can 
simply point to the grounding properties, and suppose that evaluations are given their 
meaning by their relationship to them. We need first to understand the evaluative stance” 
(1998: 69). Blackburn is here critiquing “Cornell realism”, the school of moral realist thought 
that treats moral facts as being identical with or reducible down to natural facts (e.g., Railton 
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1986 and Boyd 1988). In fact, he writes that “Cornell realism thinks we can identify the 
‘truth-makers’ for our ethical thoughts, identifying what properties of things make them true, 
rather as the scientist identifies the property of stuff that identifies water or gold” (1998: 87-
88). Blackburn’s criticism is that Cornell realism cannot simply engage in its naturalistic 
analysis of moral judgments, and claim to have offered a full account of the nature of moral 
thought. Such a metaethical view would miss the role of projection that Blackburn takes to be 
central to ethical thinking. 
Regardless of whether this critique is sound, we can now notice a very interesting 
possibility. Blackburn and the naturalistic realist need not in principle have any dispute about 
which natural facts and properties provide the right kind of grounds for ethical judgments. 
When it comes to the wrongness of kicking dogs, they may well both point to the set of 
natural facts about what causes animals to feel pain. Both can say that what makes it true that 
kicking dogs is wrong is whatever makes it true that kicking dogs causes them pain. Both can, 
in principle, agree on what the truthmakers are for moral judgments. Yet we need not infer 
that they fall on the same side of the realism/anti-realism divide, even if they agree on what 
the truthmakers are for moral judgments. There is still room for disagreement: they can 
disagree as to how things get to be truthmakers. 
Recall from above that most truthmaker theorists think that what determine the 
truthmaking relation—what it is that accounts for which objects make which propositions 
true—are the de re modal properties of those objects and propositions. Because Socrates is 
essentially human, he is a truthmaker for <There are humans>. When it comes to the 
relationship between moral truths and their naturalistic truthmakers, the naturalistic moral 
realists see a similar relationship. Given that moral facts and properties just are (or are 
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reducible to) natural facts and properties, it makes perfect sense why moral truths should, by 
necessity, accompany the existence of the relevant natural facts and properties. But here 
Blackburn would get off the boat. It is not a part of the nature or essence of the natural world 
that certain moral propositions be true. Such thinking misses the projected nature of moral 
properties. The natural world grounds the truths of morality, for Blackburn as well as for the 
naturalistic realist. What they disagree about is how to account for the grounding relationship 
that obtains between moral truths and the natural world. For the naturalistic realist, the 
relationship is understood in the way already familiar to truthmaker theory. It is part of the 
essence of certain natural facts that certain moral judgments will be true if those natural facts 
exist, just as it is part of the essence of collections of H2O molecules that certain judgments 
about water will be true if those collections of molecules exist. For Blackburn’s projectivist, 
the relationship between moral truths and the natural facts that ground them must be 
understood another way. 
My suggestion is that Blackburn is best understood as employing a kind of 
projectivist account of truthmaking. We as moral agents stumble our way through the natural 
world, and eventually begin evaluating it; as part of that evaluative stance, we project ethical 
features onto the world, for they are not “antecedently there”. But we engage in this practice 
systematically—it is no part of ethical thinking to be arbitrary. We are not allowed to assign 
different grades, for example, to identical exams. Our gilding and staining must respect the 
restraint of non-arbitrariness; anyone who does otherwise “is convicted of misidentifying a 
caprice as a moral opinion” (Blackburn 1971: 115). It is this process of projection, the 
gilding and staining of the world in moral terms, that we need to turn to if we are to 
understand how the natural world ends up making true the claims of ethics. Suppose that 
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whenever we encounter some set of natural facts N we make a moral judgment p. We hold 
that p is true in virtue of N. The relationship is not to be understood in terms of any sort of 
metaphysical necessity holding between N and the truth of p. Still, N is playing a kind of 
truthmaking role toward p. N is a truthmaker for p because of our practices of projection, not 
because of their de re modal features. 
What is the nature of projectivist truthmaking? That’s a difficult question, and I do 
not have a fully developed answer. It’s easier to say something negative rather than positive. 
Projectivist truthmaking, if it exists, does not rely on the de re modal features of objects. 
Accordingly, it probably does not involve the sort of ontological dependence that I take to be 
crucial to truthmaking as I defended it in the form of TM. One avenue worth exploring is 
whether the projectivist relationship here is at all related to another relation I have already 
invoked: the relation between the truth of analyticities and their constituent concepts. In 
section 1.2.5 I suggested that analyticities may be true in virtue of their constituent concepts 
while failing to be made true by them, for I was understanding making true as involving a 
kind of ontological dependence irrelevant to the truth of analytic statements. There may be 
instructive parallels between the two cases. I offer up the thought as one to be pursued in 
future work. 
Regardless of the tenability of this sort of projectivist truthmaking, and its particular 
application in the moral domain, it seems clear that Blackburn is thinking in terms similar to 
what I have been describing. He thinks that ethical judgments require grounds for their truth, 
and those grounds, in virtue of which ethical judgments are true, are to be found in the 
natural world. Notice that the natural facts and properties to which Blackburn may appeal are 
themselves mind-independent entities. So far, then, the quasi-realist satisfies the first two and 
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a half requirements of Cameron’s account of realism. Quasi-realists believe, unlike their 
emotivist predecessors, that ethical judgments are truth-apt, and, moreover, that many of 
them are literally and non-vacuously true. Quasi-realists can even hold that moral truths are 
grounded in the mind-independent natural world. Quasi-realists fail to collapse into realism, 
however, if we interpret the last requirement of Cameron’s account in the second way I have 
offered. Even if p is made true by some mind-independent entity N, realism also requires that 
the truthmaking relation that obtains between p and N is itself a mind-independent matter. 
For the projectivist, the truthmaking relation that holds between moral truths and the natural 
world is a matter of projection, which involves a kind of mental labor on our part. Projectivist 
truthmaking, unlike the more familiar kind of truthmaking involving de re modal properties, 
is a mind-dependent kind of truthmaking. Accordingly, Cameron’s R3 can distinguish 
between realism and quasi-realism—at least provided that it is clarified and interpreted in the 
way that I have suggested. They can both agree that there are mind-independent entities 
responsible for the literal, non-vacuous truth of moral propositions. Where they disagree is in 
the account of how those entities end up being moral truthmakers. 
 
4.3.4. Truthmaking and realism: a new account 
Given my interpretation of how we should understand Blackburn’s quasi-realism, 
Cameron’s account of realism manifests the impressive virtue of not only classifying quasi-
realism as a form of anti-realism, but also pinpointing exactly where the anti-realism is to be 
found in the view. Quasi-realism is by design a deceptive view; it mimics realism in any way 
possible, such that it inevitably tends to obfuscate its distinctness from realism. My account 
of quasi-realism allows it all sorts of realist claims—including even the idea that moral truths 
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are true in virtue of a mind-independent reality—and yet avoids having to collapse it back 
into realism by means of its truly distinctive feature that it manifestly does not share with 
realism, namely, its projectivism. 
I take the ability of Cameron’s account to handle quasi-realism appropriately to be a 
very strong argument in favor of it. As it stands, R3 correctly categorizes a number of anti-
realist positions. Classical emotivism fails (i); subjectivism, relativism, constructivism, and 
idealism all fail the first half of (iii), while quasi-realism fails its second half. Still, there are 
other forms of anti-realism that 3 cannot obviously countenance, at least not without some 
crucial reformulation, and it is those that will lead us to our final statement of realism. 
Consider first error theories (e.g., Mackie 1977 and Field 1980). Formulating error 
theory is a tricky matter. It can’t simply be the view that all the claims of a domain are false. 
If some proposition is a member of some domain, then so too is its negation, and they can’t 
both be false. Further, error theorists are committed to many of the same truths as realists. 
For example, <All prime numbers greater than 2 are odd> is true, even for error theorists. 
According to the anti-realist, the proposition is a universal generalization with an empty 
antecedent, and so the proposition is true. Cameron would say that the proposition, for the 
error theorist, is vacuously true, and so fails condition (ii). But claims of vacuous truth have 
to be treated with great care when we approach them via truthmaker theory. The 
mathematical error theorist denies that there are any numbers; as a result, any mathematical 
claim existentially committed to numbers is false. But plenty of mathematical claims—all the 
negative existentials and universal generalizations—are not existentially committing, and so 
wind up true for error theorists. It doesn’t immediately follow that their truth is vacuous. For 
suppose that our error theorist is, for independent reasons, a maximalist. There is no internal 
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tension between error theory and maximalism. Error theories are driven by suspicion about 
certain kind of entities (numbers or values, say), not by suspicion about whether all truths 
need truthmakers. 
Assuming maximalism, both the realist and error theorist must provide a truthmaker 
for <All prime numbers greater than 2 are odd>. For the realist, the answer might go 
something like this:59 The proposition is true in virtue of an infinitely large conjunctive state 
of affairs, including the state of affairs of 5’s being a prime number greater than 2 and being 
odd, and 7’s being a prime number greater than 2 and being odd, and so on, all taken together 
with the second-order state of affairs of all those numbers being all the prime numbers 
greater than 2. Because we are dealing with a universal generalization, its truthmaker has to 
involve something like a totality state of affairs that captures the “allness” that accompanies 
universal generalizations. The error theorist, too, needs to appeal to the totality fact; he needs 
a kind of object that rules out there being any numbers. Of course, the error theorist and 
realist will disagree as to what that totality fact is. They’ll disagree as to which first-order 
states of affairs are a part of it, as the error theorist will think it doesn’t include any states of 
affairs involving numbers. In essence, the realist needs to appeal to a totality fact that 
includes first-order states of affairs involving numbers, and the error theorists needs a totality 
fact that does not include any such states of affairs. 
The upshot is that, once truthmaking is on the table, the very idea of vacuous truth is 
not so easy to understand. For the maximalist, all truths, existentially committing or not, 
                                                 
59In what follows, I shall be employing, for ease of exposition, the machinery on which Armstrong relies. There 
are other options for handling truthmakers for negative and universal truths. See Cameron 2008a, for instance. 
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require truthmakers, and thereby require some metaphysical substance for them to be true.60 
The maximalist error theorist believes in a large host of negative claims, and needs 
something like a totality fact to make them true. But totality facts are not good candidates for 
being mind-dependent objects. The matter of which states of affairs there are is not up to us. 
So it is not at all clear that R3 has the resources for explaining why our maximalist error 
theorist is an anti-realist: he believes there to be truths in his anti-realist domain, and believes 
to it be a mind-independent matter that those truths are grounded by a mind-independent 
reality (i.e., a totality fact not involving numbers). 
Another anti-realist view that R3 doesn’t obviously capture is Bas van Fraassen’s 
constructive empiricism (1980). Van Fraassen is an anti-realist about unobservable entities 
because he is entirely agnostic regarding them. He thinks it is no responsibility of scientific 
theories to track the truth of the unobservable features of the world. That said, van Fraassen 
is happy to concede that there are facts of the matter about what the unobservable features of 
the world are. He just thinks that science does not provide us with evidence about what those 
facts are, and thus that agnosticism is the right cognitive attitude to hold toward them. Here, 
van Fraassen is happy to accept (i), and even to accept (iii). It is because the unobservable 
world is mind-independent—so independent, in fact, that our minds have no access to it—
that he calls for agnosticism. 
As for (ii), it too looks to be something that van Fraassen may accept as stated, 
though there may be an ambiguity here that needs sorting out. True, for any given 
proposition involving the unobservable, van Fraassen does not believe of it that it is true. But 
                                                 
60We should not say—hearkening back to our discussion in section 4.2, that maximalists think that all truths are, 
it turns out, existentially or ontologically committing. <There is no god> is not existentially committing, even if 
it has a truthmaker, for it entails no existential truth. Our commitments come only after we take on a theory of 
truthmakers. 
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I see no reason for him to reject what (ii) actually says, which is that some propositions 
involving unobservables are true. Some of them are true; he just doesn’t know which. For 
example, van Fraassen can happily concede that he knows that one of <There are electrons> 
and <There are no electrons> is true. Most fundamentally, constructive empiricism’s anti-
realism consists in its not taking on any sort of commitment to unobservable entities, just as 
the mathematical error theorists’ anti-realism consists in their not taking on any sort of 
commitment to mathematical entities. What we are seeing is that R3 is not the most 
perspicuous way of capturing these features. 
The last anti-realist contender I want to consider is Jody Azzouni’s nominalism in the 
philosophy of mathematics (2004, 2006). Like the error theorist, Azzouni accepts no 
mathematical ontology. However, Azzouni does not draw the inference that the existentially 
committing claims of mathematics are false. Propositions like <There are numbers> are true 
despite there not being any numbers. The view may appear contradictory at first, but it is in 
fact consistent because Azzouni, as we saw earlier, does not take quantificational expressions 
like ‘there are’ to be ontologically committing. Such commitments are best associated with 
something along the lines of an existence predicate. Hence, there is a difference between the 
propositions <There are numbers> and <There are numbers that EXIST>. According to 
Azzouni, the latter, which is a tenet of mathematical realism, is false. The former, however, 
can be true even if numbers do not really exist. In general, Azzouni holds that it is possible 
that “truth vehicles can be true without there being a metaphysical trace in the world that 
their truth reflects” (Azzouni 2006: 5). 
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As before, Azzouni appears to treat mathematical truths as non-discriminating 
propositions.61 Recall also Sorensen’s treatment of the truth-teller. He thinks that it has a 
definitive truth value, though we cannot know which one. Because Sorensen treats the truth-
teller as a non-discriminating truthmaker gap, he must think that it in no way owes its truth to 
the way of the world. Hence, it could have had the opposite truth value, even if nothing else 
had been different about the world. Because nothing about reality can serve to account for the 
truth of the truth-teller, its truth value must be taken as an inexplicable, brute fact. Those who 
employ non-supervening truthmaker gaps look to be opening up the door to a new kind of 
anti-realism, for such truths are not in any way tied to reality. Had they been false, the world 
would not have noticed. 
If we have another form of anti-realism on our hands here, it’s not exactly clear how 
R3 might find room for it. The posited truthmaker gaps are not obviously cases of “vacuous” 
truths. The paradigm case of a vacuous truth is a universal generalization with an empty 
antecedent, but that’s not what we have here. A brute truth is not necessarily a vacuous one. 
Condition (iii) provides no guidance, as it just takes for granted that true sentences always 
have grounds. Since that presupposition is precisely what is being challenged, I cannot say 
how R3 should come down on Azzouni and Sorensen. No mind-dependence is obviously 
involved, which is how R3 in general approaches non-skeptical forms of anti-realism.62 
Let me make one final complaint about R3. It holds that mind-independence is a 
necessary mark of realism. But it seems unlikely that mind-independence is always required 
                                                 
61His account of mathematics is, of course, far more complicated than this. See his 1994, 2004, and 2006. 
62A similar idea, which Azzouni floats elsewhere (Azzouni and Bueno 2008), is that some truths can be made 
true by fiat. Where there is no fact of the matter with respect to p, we are free to assign to it a truth-value of our 
choice. But here we have a perfectly adequate mind-dependent kind of truthmaking. It’s not that p is made true 
by nothing; rather, it’s made true by our decision that it be true. The idea we are presently considering is a non-
supervening truthmaker gap, a truth tied in no way to the world. It’s not that anyone decided that they’re true. 
They just are true, and that’s that. We can expect no more from a genuinely brute truth. 
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for realism. Mind-independence does not seem relevant to realism about mental states like 
beliefs, for instance. Its absence does seem indicative of anti-realism in metaethics, which is 
why many do not take subjectivism, relativism, and constructivism to be species of moral 
realism.63 But if mind-independent truthmakers are not always called for, what kinds of 
truthmakers are? Well, the kinds of truthmakers that are indicative of realism may well 
depend on the domain. It is not my aim here to give a general account of what realism-
relevant truthmakers are; I am somewhat skeptical that there is such an account. Paraphrasing 
Aristotle, we should not look for any more a precise account of realism and anti-realism than 
our subject permits (2000: 5; 1094b). My claim is merely that when we are inclined to judge 
a metaphysical view to be realist or anti-realist, that judgment is best understood and 
explained by attending to the kinds of truthmakers that the view provides. So what is the kind 
of ontology relevant for realism about some domain? To find out, we need only immerse 
ourselves in that domain of thought, and seek to uncover what it is that seems to be of such 
metaphysical significance as to generate the realism debate in the first place. 
We can now appreciate what we need our truthmaking-based statement of realism to 
involve. We need to capture the successes of R3, but also take to heart some of the morals we 
have been drawing from our discussion of the various kinds of anti-realism. We need to show 
how one’s realism involves what one is committed to, metaphysically speaking, and also 
make sense of truths that have no grounds. We also need to be sensitive to the distinction 
between the discriminating truthmaker gaps that are not indicative of anti-realism, and the 
                                                 
63Another example: one might take response-dependence to be a mark of anti-realism in some domains, but not 
others. If ethical properties turn out to be response-dependent, some might draw the conclusion that moral 
realism is false. They might do this even if they take color properties to be response-dependent and yet not 
indicative of anti-realism about color. Like mind-dependence, whether response-dependence is a mark of anti-
realism or not depends on the domain. 
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non-discriminating truthmaker gaps that are. Finally, we need to not rely simply on mind-
independence when specifying the nature of realistic truthmakers and truthmaking. 
First, we may note that condition (i) from R3 is redundant, given (ii). If there are 
truths to be found in some domain, that must be because truth-aptness is also to be found in 
the domain. There is no truth without truth-aptness. So we may dispense with (i), for it does 
no work for us. It is intended to rule out classical non-cognitivists, but (ii) does that just as 
well. Something like condition (ii) is still important, for if there is any reality to a domain, 
then there must be truths about it. Realists must in turn commit to those truths. Condition (iii) 
remains necessary, though it needs to be broadened, and must be understood as above as 
relying on a mind-independent conception of truthmaking. All told, we end up with the 
following account of realism: 
(R4) To be a realist with respect to a set of propositions is (i) to be committed to 
the truth of some particular propositions of the set, (ii) to be committed to a 
realism-relevant ontology of the relevant kind in virtue of which those truths 
are true, and (iii) to maintain that those truths are true in virtue of that 
ontology in a mind-independent fashion. 
 
In effect, R4 holds that realists are committed to the truths of the relevant domain, and take 
those truths to be made true by the right kind of ontology in a mind-independent way. R4 is 
composed so as to avoid the various problems with R3 that we have encountered. 
Constructive empiricists fail the first condition, for they are not committed to the truth of any 
particular proposition about unobservables, though they are happy to say that many of them 
(they don’t know which) are in fact true. Azzouni, or anyone else who relies on non-
discriminating truthmaker gaps, fails to satisfy condition (ii), for they are not committed to 
any ontology at all grounding their anti-realist truths. Note that I speak of ‘ontology’ in 
general rather than truthmakers in particular in (ii) and (iii) so as to accommodate the 
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discriminating truthmaker gaps we have been countenancing. The earlier successes of R3 
carry over: non-cognitivists fail to satisfy (i), quasi-realists fail (iii), and the various brands of 
subjectivism constructivism, relativism, and idealism fail (ii). 
In order to solve the aforementioned problem due to error theory, I have included ‘of 
the relevant kind’ in condition (ii). The problem, again, is that error theorists are committed 
to some truths in the domain where they detect massive error, and may, for independent 
reasons, be truthmaker maximalists. If so, error theorists will have realism-relevant grounds 
(such as totality facts) to serve as truthmakers for the relevant truths. Now, the ultimate 
thought we need to capture is easy enough to articulate. In the mathematics case, even where 
error theorists and realists agree on some proposition’s truth (in all likelihood a negative 
existential), they give different truthmakers for it. Realists need a totality state of affairs that 
includes numbers, whereas error theorists need a totality state of affairs without numbers. 
Speaking loosely, realists think such claims are true (in part) in virtue of the numbers that 
exist, while error theorists think they’re true (in part) in virtue of the absence of those 
numbers. It is tempting to fix the problem by amending condition (i) to require realists to 
believe in some existentially committing truths. In the mathematical domain, all the 
problematic cases are with negative existentials. But this fix won’t work in the ethical case, 
for ethical error theorists ought to believe in the truth of some existentially committing 
propositions, such as <It is not the case that Pol Pot was morally good>. Again, we know the 
insight we’re trying to capture: error theorists don’t believe in any truths made true in part by 
the kinds of entities or properties to which moral realists are committed. Mackie rejects the 
truth of any moral judgment that ascribes a moral property to an object because he thinks that 
the truth of such a judgment requires there to be an objective value, akin to a Platonic form of 
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goodness, in the world. What is common to both kinds of error theory is the idea that even if 
certain judgments in the defective domain turn out to be true, they are not true in the way that 
realists think they are. The details work themselves out differently in the two cases, and 
doubtless might work out yet another way in a different domain. Hence, I have stuck with my 
current formulation because it is open-ended enough to respect the diversity in the various 
domains of our thought, but not so vague that it fails to track the issue at hand. What is the 
kind of ontology relevant for realism about some domain? To find out, we need to jump 
headfirst into that domain and find out. Doing precisely that is the goal of the next chapters. 
 
4.4. Conclusion 
As we continue our inquiry into realism and truthmaking, we shall proceed by turning 
to some specific realism debates directly, and showing how either the notion of truthmaking 
is already implicitly at work there, or how truthmaking can be put to work in sorting out the 
issues that divide realists from their opponents. Truthmaking has not yet been put to work 
explicitly in the realism debates we shall canvass. 
Our goal, then, is to regiment as much of the extant realism literature as we can into a 
debate involving truthmakers. Doing so will enable us to uncover the distinctly metaphysical 
underpinnings to the various questions of realism. Where the question of realism has strayed 
from its metaphysical core (in the work of, say, Dummett), we will encounter more difficulty 
in applying the notion of truthmaking. That is to be expected. Inquiry into truthmaking is a 
metaphysical endeavor; semantic considerations are far from primary. Viewing realism 
through the lens of truthmaking enables us to keep a metaphysical focus on the topic of 
realism. Again, I stress that realism, whatever else it may be, is a distinctly metaphysical 
 246
doctrine, and we should understand it as such (cf. Arthur Fine 2001: 120). The 
epistemological, semantic, and pragmatic implications of realism can and ought to be 
explored. But in understanding what realism is, we should not lose sight of its metaphysical 
core. Realism is about reality, and reality falls under the purview of metaphysics. 
Our investigation into the relationship between realism and truthmaking should not be 
misunderstood as simply a search for an adequate means for categorization. ‘Realism’ is a 
mere label, and labels are of no philosophical importance. Realism, by contrast, is of deep 
philosophical importance. The reason that the topic of realism is of such lasting interest to 
philosophers and those who think philosophically is that it seeks to reveal the ultimate nature 
of reality. To ask what we should be realists about is simply to ask what we should take to be 
real. Questions about reality are foundational to philosophy and metaphysics, and so long as 
people think philosophically they will engage with the topic of realism. But let us not forget 
that ‘realism’ has come to denote a plethora of views over the years. That diversity leads me 
to conclude that there is no single, privileged conception that states once and for all what 
realism really is. (Hence the built-in vagueness of R4.) I think that ‘realism’ is a label for a 
rich, broad family of views, attitudes, perspectives, and methodologies. 
It is of little importance, at the end of the day, what classification we end up offering 
of which views we should count as realist, and which we should count as anti-realist. Such a 
classification will be of some utility, but will not solve any metaphysical puzzles. What is 
more important is bringing to the fore the metaphysical commitments and metaphysical 
differences that divide the various views that have been defended and critiqued in the realism 
literature. What we want to know, really, is why we draw a distinction between realism and 
anti-realism, and why we are compelled to place certain views on one side of the divide 
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rather than the other. Those differences and divides have become obscure as philosophers 
(some with intentions of dissolving rather than resolving realism disputes) have brought non-
metaphysical considerations to bear on the question of realism. What we want at the end of a 
philosophical inquiry is a well-argued reason to prefer one conclusion over another; how we 
should classify that conclusion is of secondary interest. 
Still, I do not mean to deny that ‘realism’ is a meaningful term, or that there is no 
utility in speaking of some views as being realist, and others as being anti-realist. Quite to the 
contrary. Rather, I simply want to stress that we should not forget that ‘realism’ is a slippery 
and fairly amorphous term. We should not fall into the trap of asking whether some view is 
realist or not, while at the same time presupposing that there is a determinate fact of the 
matter as to how to answer that question. The term is of our own making, and may not be all 
that sharp and precise in its meaning. What motivates realism in one domain may not 
motivate it in another. I simply am not convinced that ‘realism’ denotes a natural (or even 
philosophical) “kind”. Instead of asking whether some account is realist, we should uncover 
the metaphysical commitments that accompany that account and its competitors, and evaluate 
them on that basis. We can then understand why that view has traditionally been considered 
realist or not. Only after we have a good sense for the metaphysical terrain in a particular 
realism debate can we understand the metaphysical import of the divide. 
It is needless to say, then, that I believe that there are substantive philosophical 
divides between realists and their opponents. But for as long as there is metaphysical debate, 
there will be those who judge such debate to rest on a mistake. It is no challenge to find so-
called quietists, those who think that there are no genuine philosophical issues between 
realists and their opponents. Quietism, in various forms and to varying degrees, can be found 
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in the work of Wittgenstein (1953), Blackburn (1980, 2002b), Fine (1984a and 1984b), Rorty 
(1986), John McDowell (1994), Gideon Rosen (1994), Horwich (2006), and many others. 
Given that we aim to appeal to truthmaking in order to reveal genuine metaphysical questions 
and disputes that divide realists from their opponents, we shall have a rebuttal against those 
who seek to undermine the very topic of realism. The issue of realism and anti-realism is a 
genuine one, one foundational to all of philosophy and metaphysics. Those who follow us in 
endorsing the notion of truthmaking in order to help elucidate the nature of realism need not 
undergo any costly (and ultimately futile) philosophical therapy. Quietism, like 
psychoanalysis, has no place in a scientifically informed and philosophically respectable 
worldview. 
 
4.5. Appendix: realism about truth 
Given our extended discussion of both truth and realism, it is natural to engage the 
topic of realism about truth. What is it to be a realist about truth? Ultimately, my view is that 
the question is not very important. We can introduce the realism/anti-realism distinction to 
the particular topic of truth, but doing so results in no more than a multiplication of labels, 
and not any philosophical illumination. My sense is that the idea of a realist conception of 
truth is an unfortunate remnant of the days of non-neutrality between truth and realism. For 
folks like Dummett, Putnam,64 and Rorty, there is no distinguishing between “metaphysical 
realism” and “realism about truth”.65 Once we realize that the two topics can be distinguished, 
and that one’s broader metaphysical views are not settled by one’s attitudes toward truth (and 
vice versa), then the interest in formulating a realist sense of truth evaporates. Still, let us 
                                                 
64Or at least the “middle” Putnam of the late seventies and eighties. 
65See Horwich 1982 for discussion. 
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briefly examine what now flies under the banner of realist truth. In so doing, we will also be 
able to clear up some misconceptions that exist in the literature, particularly toward 
deflationary theories of truth. 
A first suggestion as to what realism about truth is, and a non-starter at that, is simply 
that there are truths. But since it is impossible to deny coherently that there are truths, such 
realism about truth is trivially satisfied. A second suggestion would be that realism about 
truth is simply another name for what we have called metaphysical substantivism about truth, 
the thesis that there is a property (in some metaphysically loaded sense) of truth, be it a 
universal, trope, or natural class. Metaphysical deflationists, then, would be anti-realists 
about truth.66 Lynch would be happy with that conclusion. He defines realism about truth as 
the combination of metaphysical substantivism and the rejection of epistemic accounts of 
truth: 
In short, realism about truth minimally implies two commitments: (a) truth is an 
authentic property that some propositions have and others lack, and (b) the concept of 
truth is, in Putnam’s words, “radically non-epistemic”; that is, whether a proposition 
is true (in most cases) does not depend on what I or anyone else believes or knows. 
(1998: 101) 
 
I am not sure what makes a property authentic (perhaps he means what we mean by a 
property being metaphysically robust or sparse), but I am sure that Lynch intends 
commitment (a) to disqualify deflationists from being realists about truth. So for Lynch, 
realism is a club to which neither (metaphysical) deflationists nor epistemicists are invited to 
join. Of course, we have already seen why no one should want to be a realist about truth in 
Lynch’s sense. Metaphysical substantivism about truth is not a view anyone should wish to 
hold. We have rejected (a) outright, and so, I suppose, we are anti-realists about truth in 
                                                 
66Devitt (2002a) adopts this understanding of realism about truth. (Or at least something close: realist views of 
truth hold that truth has a nature; anti-realist views hold, with deflationism, that truth has no nature.) 
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Lynch’s eyes. For all that, we may still adopt a non-deflationary conception of truth (i.e., 
conceptual substantivism), a particular criterion of ontological commitment, and a 
thoroughgoing truthmaker theory to boot. We may wish to be realists about universals, states 
of affairs, or whatever else we require in order to make sense of our world. What, then, is 
lacking? Is there anything lost in abandoning Lynch’s realism about truth? Take some 
particular truth: that electrons are charged. I might believe that ‘Electrons are charged’ has a 
truthmaker, and that this truthmaker is a state of affairs. I may believe that this truth is as 
objective as it gets—it would be true regardless of whether anyone had ever thought of it. All 
the foregoing is consistent with a thoroughgoing anti-realism about truth, in Lynch’s sense, 
for I have not yet adopted the view that there is some metaphysically robust property of truth. 
If we accept Lynch’s account of realism about truth, then the conclusion is clear. Realism 
about truth is false, and not anything that we should be sad to abandon (even if we are, like 
Bigelow, congenital realists about just about everything). 
Fumerton has also advanced an account of realism about truth, but it is also lacking. 
At first he seems to endorse Lynch’s position—realism about truth consists in there being a 
property of truth “in the most neutral sense possible”, and that truth is mind-independent, a 
condition which Fumerton then “more carefully” presents as the idea that truthmakers are 
mind-independent (2002: 4).67 First, I certainly acknowledge that there is an entirely neutral 
sense in which truth is a property—that’s the sense in which we can all agree that we can 
predicate truth of truth-bearers. ‘True’ is an adjective of our language (a satisfied one, even), 
and in that neutral sense there is a property of truth. Why Fumerton thinks that that sense of a 
property is philosophically relevant to realism about truth escapes me. As for the mind-
                                                 
67Later, Fumerton defines the realist about truth as one who “thinks that the predicate expression “is true” picks 
out a genuine property” (2010: 91). 
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independence criterion, Fumerton presumably is trying to capture something like Lynch’s 
non-epistemic criterion. Things are true independently of anything we may have to say about 
them. His jump to truthmakers, however, simply betrays an unwarranted conflation of truth 
and truthmaking. After some refinement, Fumerton presents his view as follows: 
we can characterize the realist as holding that every truth is made true by some fact 
(some feature of the world) that is conceptually independent of any representation of 
it (conceptually independent of any intentional state with that fact as its object). (2002: 
9) 
 
Realism about truth now seems to be committed both to truthmaker maximalism and to a 
controversial view as to what truthmakers there are. Since we have seen reasons to reject 
maximalism, we yet again have reason to be anti-realists about truth, in Fumerton’s sense. 
And again, this is no great loss. Besides, Fumerton’s account of realism about truth reveals 
that he seems to be interested more in developing an account of truthmakers than truth. We 
have gone to great lengths to keep those two tasks separate; the theory of truth and the theory 
of truthmakers are very distinct enterprises. 
Perhaps the most important contemporary figure when it comes to realist truth is 
William Alston (see his aptly titled 1996 and 2001). Interestingly, Alston finds there to be 
nothing more to realism about truth than acceptance of the T-sentences: “Anyone who 
realizes the necessary, conceptual, analytic truth of any substitution instance of the T-schema 
has grasped the realist conception of truth” (2001: 47). On the realist picture, truths tell it like 
it is: “A statement, for example, is true if and only if (iff) what the statement is about is as the 
statement says it to be” (Alston 2001: 41). For Alston, then, realism about truth amounts to 
no more than the generalized propositional truth schema: 
(T2) The proposition that p is true if and only if p. 
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Alston has no worries about substitutional quantification, and so endorses T2 as a universally 
substitutionally quantified sentence, and thinks that it expresses realism about truth (Newman 
2002 seems to agree). Merricks defines realism about truth similarly, though he foregoes the 
general formulation T2 and simply endorses the series of biconditionals it produces (2007: 
175).68 It is clear that Alston’s realism about truth takes as its main target epistemic and 
verificationist theories of truth.69 Those theories are the notorious ones most responsible for 
running together the theories of truth and realism in the latter half of the twentieth century. 
Alston is not himself guilty of any such non-neutrality, but his framing of the issue clearly 
reveals how steeped it is in the non-neutralist tradition.  
Defining realism about truth in a way that relies solely on the truth schema risks 
trivializing the notion. Merricks is happy about the consequence; he does not think that 
realism about truth is controversial. Given that Tarski (1956) thought it a condition of 
adequacy on any theory of truth that it must entail the T-sentences (let us set aside the 
subtleties as to whether theories must entail the sentential versions, propositional versions, 
both, or whatever), it would follow that any adequate theory of truth must be realist. 
Furthermore, it might be thought that every theory of truth worth its salt upholds the T-
sentences, and so would count as realist. If so, then realism about truth is all well and good, 
but does not serve to divide the philosophical landscape in any way. “Realism” about truth 
now seems to amount to no more than a theory of truth that is minimally adequate. Again, I 
suggest we not multiply labels beyond necessity. 
                                                 
68It’s worth reminding ourselves here of how many theorists see the correspondence theory of truth right inside 
the set of T-sentences: the right-hand side is taken to refer to a fact corresponding to the truth-bearer mentioned 
on the left-hand side. See again the discussion in section 3.4. 
69Cf. the way Davidson handles realism about truth (1990: 304-305). He regrets having applied the language of 
realism to the language about truth, noting that he merely sought to distinguish his own view from epistemic 
accounts of truth. 
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However, it is often thought that some theories of truth have difficulty accounting for 
the T-sentences. Ramsey, at times, suggests that only correspondence theorists can maintain 
T-sentences (1991: 18). Merricks thinks that deflationists (!) stumble on the T-sentences 
(2007: 191), while Horwich thinks that non-deflationary theories of truth face difficulties 
accounting for the T-sentences (1996: 193). Alston (1996, chapter 7) argues against 
epistemic theories by showing how they cannot embrace the T-schema.70 If some theories of 
truth are in fact incompatible with the T-sentences, then so much the worse for those theories. 
But that is just to say that Tarski’s adequacy condition is a genuine adequacy condition. The 
detour through whether a theory is realist or not is beside the point. The problem with a 
theory of truth that denies certain T-sentences is not that those theories aren’t realist, and 
realism is true. It’s that those theories deny certain T-sentences, even though those T-
sentences are true.71 
If realism about truth is just due respect for the truth schemas, then discussion over 
realism about truth is no more than the needless proliferation of labels. If one chooses to call 
some thesis “realism about truth”, so be it. I shall not dispute about a word. My point is only 
that talking about realism about truth is potentially misleading, hearkens back to a past age 
that falsely presupposed non-neutrality, and doesn’t lead to any philosophical illumination. 
We have seen that on some readings, realism about truth is simply false, and that our 
rejection of it is of nothing valuable. On other readings, realism is true, and possibly upheld 
by everyone who is a party to the debate over truth. But there is an interesting question 
whether certain theories of truth fail to respect properly the T-sentences. As I have suggested, 
                                                 
70Similarly, Young thinks coherence theorists can happily reject certain interpretations of T-sentences (2009: 
573). 
71Or, perhaps, the problem with some theories is that they assign the T-sentences the incorrect modal status. 
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it is misleading to frame that question as one about whether those theories are realist or anti-
realist about truth. The question is important primarily because it is relevant to whether the 
theories of truth in question are true. 
There are reasons to think that coherence, pragmatist, verificationist, and epistemic 
accounts of truth (i.e., those accounts most often associated with anti-realism) do not respect 
the T-sentences. A simple recipe shows how to bring out the tension. Take the proposition 
that there are penguins. The proposition that there are penguins is true just in case there are 
penguins. Hence we have: 
(8) <There are penguins> is true if and only if there are penguins. 
 
I contend that 8 is not only true, but necessarily so. It is impossible for the proposition to be 
true, and yet there be no penguins, or for there to be penguins, and yet the proposition not be 
true. But now consider how the theories of truth cited above handle <There are penguins>: 
(9) <There are penguins> is true if and only if <There are penguins> coheres in 
the best system of beliefs. 
 
(10) <There are penguins> is true if and only if <There are penguins> is useful to 
believe. 
 
(11) <There are penguins> is true if and only if <There are penguins> is verifiable. 
 
(12) <There are penguins> is true if and only if <There are penguins> would be 
justified in ideal epistemic conditions. 
 
Now we just engage in some modal speculation. Is it possible to imagine, for instance, that 
although the proposition that there are penguins is true, that there are no penguins? No. 
Hence, 8 is necessarily true. But suppose we are coherentists, and believe 9. Is it possible to 
imagine a case where the proposition that there are penguins coheres in a best system of 
beliefs, and yet there are no penguins? Yes. But this is a case where the proposition is true, 
and yet there are no penguins. So 9 implies the possible falsity of 8, and so 9 is false. We can 
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proceed similarly for the others. Might it be useful to believe that there are penguins, even 
though there are none? Yes. So much for 10. We can refute the others working backwards. 
Suppose (for whatever reason) that the proposition that there are penguins is not verifiable. 
According to 11, then, the proposition is not true. Might there still be penguins? Of course. 
(Perhaps they reside outside humanity’s past and future light cones.) So 11, too, implies the 
possible falsity of 8. Similarly, suppose that ideal epistemic conditions reveal <There are 
penguins> not to be justified. Might there still be penguins? Of course.72 So much for 12.73 
Call these lines of argument “fast-track” refutations of the various theories of truth. 
They have been around for a long time, and proponents of the respective views are well 
aware of them.74 I do not mean to suggest that there are no responses available to them (or 
that they cannot disagree with the answers I have given to my own questions above). At the 
end of the day, though, I suspect that the arguments are sound. It has long been my suspicion 
that the initial and most natural objections that arise to philosophical theories are also the 
most devastating. Theories evolve and take on epicycle after epicycle in order to avoid such 
objections, but ultimately never escape from them. 
                                                 
72If one disagrees, that is most likely due to one’s holding an understanding of “ideal epistemic conditions” that 
already presupposes a non-epistemic conception of truth. Indeed, there is no understanding what an “ideal” 
theory is such that it could come apart from being a true theory. Truth just is a necessary condition for a theory 
to be ideal, and philosophers are fooling themselves if they think they have some other notion in mind. So much 
the worse for Putnam’s argument against realism (1978). 
73Similarly, one can take the argument of section 3.3.2 to be that if one takes the proposition’s “corresponding 
with the facts” to be something separate from the existence of penguins, then we end up with the same 
inconsistency. The correspondence theorist must hold that the correspondence can obtain only when penguins 
exist, and that is to posit unprincipled necessary connections between distinct existences. Or, if the 
correspondence amounts to no more than the existence of penguins, we fall back into anodyne truthmaker 
theory. So much for correspondence. That there is a parallel between my new argument against correspondence 
theories and these familiar refutations of the other substantive views is rather interesting and surprising, for it 
shows that defenders of correspondence theories fall prey to their own arguments. 
74See, for instance, Stout 1907 and Russell 1908, both of which take on pragmatic theories of truth in a similar 
vein, and Russell 1906-1907 and Van Cleve 1996, which take on coherence theories. 
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The basic problem with these theories of truth is that the truth of a proposition is 
identified with something beyond the original content of the proposition. What is it for 
<There are penguins> to be true? For there to be penguins. Not for belief in them to be useful, 
cohere in some story, or be justified at the end of scientific inquiry, whatever that is. No, 
what it is for <There are penguins> to be true is for there to be penguins. Here, I adopt the 
Butlerian maxim that everything is what it is, and not another thing (2006: 44). The truth of 
<Snow is white> just is snow’s being white, and nothing else. The truth of <Grass is green> 
is grass’s being green, and nothing else. Deflationists have long acknowledged the insight 
here; truthmaker theorists should as well. 
Let us return to our original topic: realism about truth. If it can be shown that certain 
theories of truth must reject the truth or even just the necessity of certain T-sentences (in 
particular, the propositional ones), then I conclude that those theories are false. Others might 
say that they are anti-realist (and then perhaps reject the theories as false because realism 
about truth is true).75 Again, I do not see any value in describing the issue as yet another 
realism debate. There are plenty of realism debates to get immersed in. I suggest that we do 
not add the theory of truth as yet another one. 
That said, I think it is fairly clear why some talk about realism about truth, and why 
many go out of their way to defend it. In an earlier section, I defended the so-called 
“worldliness” of truth, the idea that truths have ontological and metaphysical commitments. 
Correspondence theories of truth grant the worldliness of truth, as does truthmaker theory. In 
fact, I suggested that we reject correspondence theories in part because truthmaker theory 
                                                 
75Arriving at more or less the same point from a different direction, Colin McGinn argues that coherence and 
pragmatist theories of truth can maintain the T-sentences, but only at the cost of immediately embracing some 
sort of idealism (2000: 88-90; see also his 2002: 195). The reason why is that they would agree, as Young puts 
it in a separate but related discussion: “A T-sentence is supposed to say what makes a given sentence true” 
(2009: 573). 
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itself gives us all the worldliness we need. Furthermore, what seems fundamentally wrong 
with coherence, pragmatic, and epistemic theories is that they leave out the world in their 
accounts of truth. The truth of the matter may very well be that what others have called 
“realism” about truth, I have called its “worldliness”. So truthmaker theory is out to uphold 
exactly what defenders of realist truth have been out to uphold. My suggestion all along is 
that such matters are better handled by the metaphysical theory of truthmaking, and not the 
theory of truth itself.
 
5. Truthmaking, Metaethics, and Creeping Minimalism 
In the previous chapter, we saw reasons to think that the debates between realists and 
their opponents are better thought of as debates about truthmakers, not debates about truth. 
The issue over how we should understand the reality of a domain of thought is better 
understood when viewed through the lens of the theory of truthmaking, which is perfectly 
suited to give an account of what the reality is that underlies some domain of our thought. 
That said, truthmaker theory offers no easy recipe for understanding what the topic of realism 
is all about in a given domain. But we do have two thoughts that can guide our explorations. 
First, what is at stake between realists and anti-realists is not whether the truths of some 
domain have truthmakers, but rather the nature of the truthmakers that operate in that domain, 
and the nature of how they got to be truthmakers. Second, even within the class of truthmaker 
gaps, we have seen an important distinction between gaps that are metaphysically 
discriminatory and those that are not. Non-discriminating truthmaker gaps are true 
independently of how the world is—of reality—and thus seem perfectly suited to give insight 
into the nature of perhaps some varieties of anti-realism. 
The best way to argue for a truthmaking approach to realism is to jump headfirst into 
the various realism debates and try to understand them in terms of how they approach the 
topic of truthmakers. In this chapter, we shall explore one of the best mapped out realism 
debates in all of philosophy, the one in metaethics. 
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5.1. A new approach to metaethics 
To adopt, as I suggest, the truthmaker approach to realism is to engage in something 
akin to a shift in paradigm. Painting with a very wide brush, we can say that the old 
metaethical paradigm focused on moral truth. Our approach centers on moral truthmakers. 
The old paradigm is perhaps best encapsulated by a formulation of realism by Geoffrey 
Sayre-McCord: “Wherever it is found, I’ll argue, realism involves embracing just two theses: 
(1) the claims in question, when literally construed, are literally true or false (cognitivism), 
and (2) some are literally true” (1986: 3). Sayre-McCord’s account gives moral anti-realists 
two options. They can, like the classical emotivists, resist the view that moral statements 
have truth-values (e.g., Stevenson 1944 and 1963, Ayer 1952, and Hare 1952). Or they can 
deny that moral statements are literally true, either because they are literally false (e.g., 
Mackie 1977), or because their truth is not literal (e.g., Harman 1975 and Wong 1984 and 
2006). Regardless of the method, the moral anti-realist is one who must avoid moral truth. 
Moral truths are the mark of moral realism.1 
According to the new paradigm of metaethics, moral truth is no longer the enemy of 
moral anti-realism. Nowadays, it is pervasively claimed that moral truth and moral anti-
realism can go hand in hand.2 Consider, to name a first example, the quasi-realist camp (e.g., 
Blackburn 1984b and 1998 and Gibbard 1990 and 2003). The quasi-realist seeks to claim the 
truth of nearly everything that the moral realist believes. For all that, the quasi-realist claims 
not to be committed to realism.3 Or consider Wright’s approach to moral realism (1992, 
1995). For Wright, the hallmark of moral realism is not moral truth (for that, he thinks, is 
                                                 
1James Dreier calls the old paradigm the “Good Old Days” of metaethics (2004: 23). 
2In Kit Fine’s terminology, such views are “non-skeptical” forms of anti-realism (2001). Cf. his 1982: 72. 
3See also the “cognitivist expressivism” of Timmons 1999 and Horgan and Timmons 2000 and 2006a. 
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attained quite cheaply), but something else, such as the depth of explanatory power assigned 
to moral facts (to name just one of his “cruces”).4 
Now, it is sometimes claimed that what entitles the moral anti-realist to embrace 
moral truth is his rejection of the correspondence theory of truth and subsequent acceptance 
of some kind of deflationary theory.5 If there is any take-home point in what I have written so 
far, it is that such a move is fraught with misunderstanding. To stake out a deflationary view 
of truth is not in any way to take on a realism-relevant metaphysical stand. Deflationism is 
consistent with the most robust realism imaginable. The trick to fusing moral anti-realism 
and moral truth is not the deflationary theory of truth (though the latter may help in enabling 
the union), but rather adopting a certain view of metaphysical commitment, a view about 
what it is to which those truths are committed. 
When it comes to articulating what it is about moral realism that makes it a form of 
realism, the truthmaker theorist has a ready answer. Realists have a particular view as to what 
moral reality is. They may agree with the moral anti-realist as to much of what is true in the 
ethical domain. But they have distinctive views about what makes those truths true. They 
think that the anti-realists’ suggested truthmakers are too meager and weak to respect and 
account for the proper level of objectivity relevant to moral discourse. The moral anti-realist 
gives a different account as to what makes true the moral statements he believes to be true. 
                                                 
4Consider this passage from Wright: “To grant that notions of truth and falsity, and thereby belief and disbelief, 
can engage with moral contents is no concession to moral realism at all; the question is what the notion of truth 
comes to in the moral case—and whether, in particular, it can carry the significance which moral realism 
requires” (1988: 8). See also his 1995: “what we want, of course, is a way of casting the anti-realist intuition 
which is consistent with the integrity of moral discourse and argument, and which allows us to take a moral 
point of view with a clean intellectual conscience” (213). Cf. Blackburn 1984b: 196. 
5This claim seems to be implicit in much of the work of Blackburn and Wright. Russ Shafer-Landau seems to 
attribute the view to contemporary expressivists (2003: 31). Michael Smith (1994c) may well endorse it. Dreier 
(2004), Andy Egan (2007), and Matthew Chrisman (2008 and 2009) present deflationism as a key ingredient in 
the anti-realist claim to moral truth. See Dreier 1996 for discussion. 
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He thinks the moral realist either overestimates the objectivity belonging to moral thought, or 
does not appreciate how the anti-realist’s favored account of moral truthmakers is sufficient 
to ground the truth of moral claims. In any case, the truthmaker approach to realism 
emphasizes that the realism debate is one with fundamentally metaphysical implications. It is 
a realism debate after all. While the topic of truthmaking has not consciously been brought to 
bear on the metaethical dispute between realists and anti-realists, I suspect that issues 
involving truthmaking have long been operating just under the surface.6 My hope is that by 
attending to the debate and, in effect, regimenting it into a debate about truthmakers, we can 
find some metaethical clarity, and pave a road to progress. 
My claim is that the topic of what makes moral truths true has been simmering just 
under the surface of metaethical debate. To make good on that claim, I suggest we take a tour 
through the various prominent metaethical views in order to see just how easily they could 
incorporate the notion of moral truthmaking. Having surveyed how the various positions 
understand what it is that makes moral truths true, we can appreciate what is at stake in the 
metaethical debate, at least in its metaphysical aspects. Moral realism and moral anti-realism 
are views best formulated with an eye toward truthmaker theory. 
The truthmaker approach to moral realism has more to offer than just a way of 
categorizing metaethical views. For one, we can use considerations about truthmaking to put 
pressure on various metaethical views, and argue for and against particular theories. Also, we 
can put it to work in offering a solution to the problem that James Dreier has dubbed 
“creeping minimalism” (2004). Dreier’s contention is that once we adopt deflationism about 
truth (which seems necessary if anti-realists are to embrace moral truth alongside realists), 
                                                 
6The language of truthmaking does surface here and there, though in a way that is clearly disengaged from the 
“truthmaking industry” alive and well in contemporary metaphysics. See Blackburn 1986, Milo 1995, 
Bloomfield 2003: 513, Shafer-Landau 2003: 15 and 48, and Horgan and Timmons 2006b for some instances. 
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we are led down a path that threatens to cloud what seemed originally to be at stake between 
moral realists and anti-realists. By attending to how the different metaethical views address 
our truthmaking queries, we will see those differences reemerge. The problem of creeping 
minimalism is no problem at all for the truthmaker theorist’s approach to metaethical debate. 
 
5.2. Truthmakers for moral truths 
5.2.1. Moral realism 
I propose that we enter the metaethical terrain with the realists. Traditionally, moral 
realists are divided into two categories: naturalists and non-naturalists.7 Naturalists take 
morality to be a perfectly real, perfectly natural phenomenon. Naturalistic moral realism 
often goes by the name ‘Cornell realism’, and is defended by Nicholas Sturgeon (1984), 
Peter Railton (1986), Richard Boyd (1988), David Brink (1989), Frank Jackson (1998)8, and 
Devitt (2002b) among others. Naturalistic realists take moral properties and facts and reduce 
them to or identity them with natural properties and facts. 
Non-naturalistic realism finds its locus classicus in Moore 1903, and is defended 
today by Russ Shafer-Landau (2003). For non-naturalistic realists, moral properties cannot in 
any way be reduced to or identified with the non-moral. Moore famously launched the open 
question argument, which purports to show that any analysis of goodness in terms of some 
other property will “leave open” an important question: but is that really good? In particular, 
no natural property can be identified with any moral property. (To do so would be to commit 
the naturalistic fallacy.) Hence, Moore takes goodness to be a non-natural, indefinable 
                                                 
7But see also the “Oxford realists” who, following out some insights of Wittgenstein, understand moral 
properties to be secondary properties (e.g., Wiggins 1976 and McDowell 1981 and 1985). Jonathan Dancy 
(1986) questions whether such views should count as being realist; I share the worry. 
8But note that Jackson, while considering himself a naturalistic realist, distances himself from the Cornell 
school. See his 1998: 144-146. 
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property. Moore takes on a metaphysical commitment to an independent realm of moral 
reality, and it is that commitment that places him squarely in the realist camp. 
Shafer-Landau defines moral realism in terms of independent moral truth: 
The way I would prefer to characterize the realist position is by reference to its 
endorsement of the stance-independence of moral reality. Realists believe that there 
are moral truths that obtain independently of any preferred perspective, in the sense 
that the moral standards that fix the moral facts are not made true by virtue of their 
ratification from within any given actual or hypothetical perspective. That a person 
takes a particular attitude toward a putative moral standard is not what makes that 
standard correct. (2003: 15) 
 
Similarly, Brink defines moral realism as the view that there are moral facts or truths whose 
truth is independent of the evidence for them (1989: 17).9 Boyd endorses these 
characterizations, and adds the epistemological claim (which we shall set aside) that 
“ordinary canons of moral reasoning” can produce moral knowledge (1988: 182).10 As we 
shall see, these characterizations of realism are not entirely satisfactory, for quasi-realists 
seem to be entitled to them.11 
However the details unfold, realists will be able to answer our truthmaking queries by 
appealing to moral facts and properties (naturalistically construed or not). We shall see the 
best way for them to do this below. Somewhat surprisingly, though, Shafer-Landau at one 
point characterizes his realist view (and realism of other stripes as well) as one that eschews 
moral truthmakers. He writes: 
                                                 
9Though Brink qualifies this thesis as necessary but probably insufficient for realism. 
10Smith defines moral realism as “the view that, amongst the various facts there are in the world, there aren’t 
just facts about (say) the consequences of our actions of the well-being of our families and friends, there are 
also distinctively moral facts: facts about the rightness and wrongness of our actions having these 
consequences” (1994b: 9). I’m not sure what he means by ‘distinctively moral’. Is a kind of non-naturalism 
intended? Are the facts to be understood linguistically or metaphysically? Gibbard (1990) also associates 
realism with the existence of a distinctive kind of fact, though I raise the same questions for him. Terence 
Horgan and Mark Timmons also define moral realism in terms of facts (1992b). Blackburn associates realism 
with the “irreducible or essential appeal to the existence of moral ‘properties’ or ‘facts’” and the demand for an 
ontology of morals (1988: 370). This more ontological account is closest to what I shall be offering. 
11See also Railton 1986: 164-165 for a helpful slew of realism-relevant questions and theses. 
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moral and other realists about irreducible domains are on a par when it comes to the 
extremely limited kind of explanation they can give of the status of their favoured 
standards. If some standard is true, irreducible, and to be construed realistically, then 
nothing makes it true; its truth is not a creation, but instead a brute fact about the way 
the world works. (2003: 48) 
 
The straightforward reading of this passage is that Shafer-Landau thinks moral truths are 
what we have called non-discriminating truthmaker gaps. Their truth makes no difference to 
the world. Their truth is a mere brute fact, and is in no ways ontologically accountable. On 
this reading, Shafer-Landau would be best understood as an arch anti-realist: there are moral 
truths, but their truth is in no way tied to reality. I think the best way to interpret this striking 
passage, then, is that it betrays an understanding of truthmaking that is out of sync with the 
approach we have undertaken, and a conflation between the linguistic and metaphysical 
reading of facts.12 Shafer-Landau is taking moral truths as being irreducible to other (say, 
naturalistic) truths. If they were reducible, then, he would say, it would be those naturalistic 
truths that made moral truths true. We can predict that Shafer-Landau would agree that 
though there are moral facts, they aren’t made true by any natural facts (as Cornell realists 
would have it). So what Shafer-Landau should say is that there is a realm of moral facts (in 
the metaphysical sense), distinct from the naturalistic facts, and that moral judgments are true 
or false in virtue of the existence of those moral facts. 
How, then, should the moral realist answer our question of what makes moral truths 
true? Here I think answers can and should diverge, since moral realists need not subscribe to 
any single metaphysic any more than any truthmaker theorist need be committed to a 
particular metaphysic. There are two traditional answers that realists have given that we may 
                                                 
12Evidence for this reading is the fact that Shafer-Landau does not deny the supervenience of the moral on the 
non-moral. If the truth of some contingent moral proposition p is brute, then there is a metaphysically 
indiscernible world where p is false. Taking moral truths as brute thus violates the supervenience of truth on 
being, and a fortiori the supervenience of moral truth on non-moral being. We shall take up the topic of moral 
supervenience below. 
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now flesh out. One option is to say that what makes moral judgments true are moral facts. As 
before, we must be extremely careful about how we wield ‘fact’. One sense of the term—
famously captured by Strawson 1950—is what I have been calling the linguistic conception. 
The linguistic conception of facts is governed by another one of the familiar and undeniable 
T-schemas, the fact schema: 
(T4) It is a fact that p if and only if p. 
 
If there are truths, then there are facts. No one need disagree about that.13 But facts in this 
sense—nominalizations of true truth-bearers, in effect—are terrible truthmakers.14 They exist 
in possible worlds where they are false, if they be contingent. If the (linguistic) fact that snow 
is white just is the true proposition <Snow is white>, then it exists in worlds where it is false 
(though we wouldn’t call it a fact in such worlds). In any event, speaking of facts in the 
liberal, linguistic sense in the same breath as speaking of facts as truthmakers will only breed 
confusion. The other sense—the metaphysical sense—is the idea of facts as compound or 
structured entities. Here we have a sense that will be suitable for truthmaking. Armstrong 
(1997) calls such things “states of affairs”, while Mellor (1995) calls such things “facta”. 
Russell (1985) just called them “facts”. Facts in the metaphysical sense are concrete, existing 
objects. For Armstrong, if some particular a instantiates the universal F, then ‘a is F’ is true, 
and made true by the state of affairs that is composed non-mereologically of a and F. In 
worlds where a does not instantiate F, the state of affairs of a’s being F does not exist. 
One way to be a moral realist is to advocate a realm of moral facts, in the 
metaphysical sense. (Anyone who believes in moral truth will be committed to moral facts in 
                                                 
13Do not be tempted into saying that deflationists can accept that there are moral facts because of T4. That is 
true, but violates the Gricean maxim on informativeness. Anyone can accept the existence of moral facts simply 
by accepting that there are moral truths because T4 is available to all (who are competent speakers of English). 
14Cf. Fine 1982: 72, and why facts in this sense cut no metaphysical ice between realists and anti-realists. 
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the linguistic sense.) Such moral facts will be composed of particulars and moral properties, 
here understood as universals. What makes the moral realist position distinctive is that it 
posits the existence of such properties. The non-naturalist thinks that these moral properties 
are not in any way identifiable with or reducible to other non-moral properties. They enjoy a 
sui generis existence. Such properties, taken together with the particulars that instantiate 
them in order to compose states of affairs, make for adequate truthmakers for moral 
judgments. In every possible world in which some object a instantiates the universal 
goodness, a will be good. Hence, the state of affairs (a, goodness) is a truthmaker for ‘a is 
good’. 
Those who believe in moral facts, understood metaphysically as above, will also 
believe in moral properties in the form of universals (assuming that they understand facts 
along the general lines advocated by Armstrong). Sometimes moral realism is defined 
exclusively in terms of the existence of moral properties (e.g., Dancy 1986).15 Even if one 
does not believe in moral facts, one can still use such properties to serve as a proper 
ontological ground for moral claims (so long as those properties are understood in one of the 
“metaphysically robust” ways we saw in section 3.2.4). If moral properties are tropes, then 
they will be able to serve as truthmakers for moral predications. Or, if we relax our 
truthmaking ambitions and think that predications do not require truthmakers (following 
Lewis 2001b), then we can still say that moral truths are metaphysically committing in that 
the possible worlds where the moral judgment ‘a is M’ is true differ in some metaphysical 
                                                 
15Just as the term ‘fact’ has been abused in metaethics, so too has ‘property’. Recall from our chapter on 
deflationism that there is a completely innocuous sense to the word ‘property’. There is a property X just in case 
‘X’ is a predicate of our language. So suppose that there is some true moral predication: a is M, where M is 
something sufficient to render ‘a is M’ a member of moral discourse. Since a is M, something is M; that is, 
something has the property M. So there is a moral property M. Anyone who believes there are moral truths, then, 
earns the right to speak of there being moral properties in this very weak and uninteresting sense. If we want 
properties that can serve as truthmakers (or be definitive of realism), we need something in the neighborhood of 
universals, tropes, or natural classes. 
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respect from any world where ‘a is M’ is false. The metaphysical difference will involve 
whether the moral property M is instantiated by a. If M is a real feature of the world (the sort 
of thing the realist but not the anti-realist believes in), then it can figure into the metaphysical 
commitments that accompany moral judgments. 
Hence, moral realists typically endorse the existence of moral facts or moral 
properties (in the relevant metaphysically loaded senses). Such things provide the ontological 
grounds for moral truth. Moral truths are true in virtue of the existence of such properties and 
facts. The internal debate between naturalists and non-naturalists is over the nature of those 
facts and properties. One thinks a single class of natural facts and properties can serve a 
double-duty truthmaking role for both moral and natural truths. The other thinks that natural 
properties and facts are not the right sort of beast to make moral judgments true. What both 
kinds of realist agree upon is that their moral realism is due to their ontological commitment 
to moral facts and/or properties. Such things are what make moral judgments true. As we saw 
in the last chapter, it’s not just the fact that realists offer truthmakers for moral truths that 
makes them realists. What also matters is the nature of the truthmakers they offer. What 
seems to be common to most realist views about ethics is that they take moral truthmakers to 
be mind-independent facts—facts involving either the natural world or an independent realm 
of moral fact. The differences between the realist’s truthmakers and the anti-realist’s will 
become apparent when we turn to the latter sort of view. 
 
5.2.2. Classical non-cognitivism 
Before turning to more contemporary forms of metaethical anti-realism, let us take a 
look at those anti-realist views that flourished during Dreier’s “Good Old Days”. We may 
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commence with A. J. Ayer, whose classical emotivism about the ethical is a jumping off 
point for many contemporary anti-realists, most notably the quasi-realists. Here is a 
characteristic passage from Language, Truth and Logic: 
We can now see why it is impossible to find a criterion for determining the validity of 
ethical judgements. It is not because they have an “absolute” validity which is 
mysteriously independent of ordinary sense-experience, but because they have no 
objective validity whatsoever. If a sentence makes no statement at all, there is 
obviously no sense in asking whether what it says is true or false. And we have seen 
that sentences which simply express moral judgements do not say anything. They are 
pure expressions of feeling and as such do not come under the category of truth and 
falsehood. They are unverifiable for the same reason as a cry of pain or a word of 
command is unverifiable—because they do not express genuine propositions. (1952: 
108-109) 
 
Ayer’s anti-realism about ethics is grounded entirely in his broader verificationist views 
about meaning. Where statements do not meet his criterion for empirical verifiability, they 
are dismissed as being in some sense meaningless, that sense being that they express no 
proposition, and hence fail to be either true or false.16 Ayer, siding with Moore (1903), 
argues that ethical concepts are irreducible to empirical concepts; as such, ethical concepts 
are “pseudo-concepts” and statements that employ them do not express propositions.17 When 
reality is limited, in good positivistic fashion, to the empirical, nothing could possibly make 
ethical judgments true. To the extent that someone like Ayer would even countenance talk of 
truthmakers, we can say on his behalf that the only truthmakers there are are empirical (for 
everything is a truthmaker, and everything, for Ayer, is empirical). Ethical judgments do not 
express empirical propositions, and so express nothing meaningful at all. Ayer goes on to 
give an analysis of what ethical language is up to (its job is to express sentiment, not fact), 
                                                 
16Cf. Carnap: “a value statement is nothing else than a command in a misleading grammatical form. It may have 
effects upon the actions of men, and these effects may either be in accordance with our wishes or not; but it is 
neither true nor false” (1935: 24). See also Barnes 1934 and Russell 1935: 242-248. 
17More precisely: “in so far as statements of value are significant, they are ordinary “scientific” statements; and 
that in so far as they are not scientific, they are not in the literal sense significant, but are simply expressions of 
emotion which can be neither true nor false” (Ayer 1952: 102-103). 
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but that analysis places ethical discourse squarely outside the domain of truth and falsity. 
Since ethical judgments are not true, they do not have truthmakers. Given that there are no 
true ethical judgments, there is no need to posit any ethical ontology upon which to ground 
them. Any moral reality there could be would be unempirical and thus, by Ayer’s lights, no 
reality at all. Ayer is thus an anti-realist par excellence in our sense; there simply is no part of 
reality that is correctly described in ethical terms. If there were, there would be true 
propositions about it. If we are understanding realism primarily as a metaphysical doctrine, 
then there is no way to be more anti-realist than to deny that there is no metaphysical 
dimension to ethical discourse whatsoever. 
Usually classed alongside Ayer’s, Charles Stevenson’s work (e.g., his 1937 and 1944) 
also stresses the emotive role of ethical discourse.18 Stevenson distinguishes between 
descriptive and dynamic uses of language. The former typically communicates beliefs, 
whereas the latter vents emotions and effects action (1937: 21). What distinguishes ethical 
judgments is their “emotive meaning”, which is intended to produce affective responses in 
their audiences. Their primary purpose is not to describe the world or to communicate beliefs. 
Hence: “A man uses an ethical judgment in order to exert an influence. He can be “refuted” 
only by being led to exert a different kind of influence, or else to exert no influence at all” 
(1938: 51). By way of contrast, a physicist presumably is “refuted” by being shown facts 
which falsify his theory. Stevenson is suggesting that when it comes to ethical discourse, the 
judgments of the domain are not aiming to describe the world, and hence are not open to 
refutation by the discovery of facts about the world. 
                                                 
18Though their two views converged, they arose from different springs. Whereas Ayer drew his ideas from the 
radical empiricism espoused by the Vienna Circle, Stevenson’s work emerged from the pragmatist tradition, 
specifically the work of C. K. Ogden and I. A. Richards (1946). See also Hare’s prescriptivism (1952), which is 
usually coupled with the non-cognitivism of Ayer and Stevenson. 
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That said, Stevenson shies away from Ayer’s cavalier pronouncement that ethical 
judgments lack truth-values: “the remark, “ethical judgments are neither true nor false,” is 
absurd. Those who have insisted on the remark have spoken with an insensitivity to the ways 
of our language” (1963: 219; see also his 1944: 169-173).19 The ways of our language to 
which Stevenson is referring (and to which he admits being sometimes insensitive himself) is 
the familiar equivalence between ‘p’ and ‘It is true that p’. When I judge that liberty is good, 
you are free to reply that what I said is true. To deny applications of ‘is true’ to ethical 
judgments is to offend against ordinary linguistic practice.20 Even though Stevenson allows 
ethical judgments a truth-value, he does not thereby think he has dispensed with non-
cognitivism, broadly understood as the class of views that assign ethical judgments an 
emotive meaning. But he does think that we have to ask “in what sense” ethical judgments 
are true or false (1963: 217). Positing different senses of truth is at odds with a standard 
deflationary approach to truth, to which Stevenson seems to be appealing when he invokes 
Ramsey in defense of the equivalence between ‘p’ and ‘It is true that p’.21 Still, what 
Stevenson has in mind is something along the following lines: The primary function of 
ethical judgments is to effect certain kinds of affects, not to describe some ethical portion of 
reality. As such, the “truths” of ethical discourse are not grounded in reality in the way that 
                                                 
19Many have noted an apparent irony in Ayer’s subscribing both to a deflationary theory of truth and the thesis 
that ethical judgments lack truth-values. See Boghossian 1990, Stoljar 1993, Dreier 2004, and Chrisman 2008. 
In fact, all the major non-cognitivists sided with Ramsey on the topic of truth. See Ayer 1952: 87-90, Stevenson 
1963: 219, and Hare 1981: 213. 
20Here we encounter the beginnings of the infamous “Frege-Geach” problem for non-cognitivism. See Geach 
1960 and 1965, and Searle 1969: 136-141. The Frege-Geach problem is but a species of the more general 
problem involving what Bar-On (2004) calls “semantic continuity”. Ethical discourse seems to share all the 
same semantic trappings of other non-ethical domains. 
21Why should deflationists eschew different senses of truth? Because deflationism is motivated by the idea that 
there is nothing, really, to the notion of truth, let alone there being several different notions of truth. Cf. Wright: 
“Truth cannot admit of variable realisation if, as for the deflationist, there is nothing substantial in which it ever 
consists. For deflationism, pluralism will seem merely to compound the errors of its more traditional 
antagonists” (1996: 925). 
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other descriptive judgments (such as ‘Snow is white’) are. Thus, ethical judgments are not 
tied up with ontology. They have no ontological implications. To think otherwise is to 
conflate their emotive and descriptive (if any) meanings. Accordingly, Stevenson’s view is 
also thoroughly anti-realistic. It posits no ethical reality, and holds that true ethical judgments 
require none. Alongside Ayer, Stevenson would claim that a search after “moral 
truthmakers” is misguided. Perhaps, then, Stevenson is better understood as advocating moral 
truths as being non-discriminating. Their truth makes no metaphysical difference to the world. 
If so, then their truth is nowise grounded in reality, thereby securing Stevenson’s moral anti-
realism. We shall evaluate the tenability of this position below; for now we need only 
appreciate that such a line maintains the existence of moral truth by taking it to be a brute 
feature about the world. 
 
5.2.3. Error theory 
Next up we may consider error theory, most ably defended by J. L. Mackie (1946 and 
1977; see also Joyce 2001). According to Mackie, it is at least part of the meaning of 
ordinary ethical judgments that they have some claim to objectivity. When I judge that 
something is good, I do not simply emote, or express my own preferences. Rather, I claim 
that that something is objectively good, in some sense that transcends my own subjective 
preferences, desires, and emotions. On ontological grounds, Mackie denies that there are any 
objective values. But since the existence of those things is presupposed by ordinary moral 
judgments, those judgments are false: 
the denial of objective values will have to be put forward not as the result of an 
analytic approach, but as an ‘error theory’, a theory that although most people in 
making moral judgements implicitly claim, among other things, to be pointing to 
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something objectively prescriptive, these claims are all false. It is this that makes the 
name ‘moral scepticism’ appropriate. (1977: 35) 
 
Mackie therefore breaks with his positivistic predecessors canvassed above in thinking that 
moral judgments are not meaningless, but just false.22 Discussion of Mackie’s work usually 
presents his view as a semantic one: the meaning of moral judgments presupposes the 
existence of objective moral judgments. On that reading, moral judgments have truth-
conditions that go unfulfilled. But we can also approach the view metaphysically, setting 
aside any (potentially quite controversial) claims about the meaning of moral judgments. On 
the alternative metaphysical reading, Mackie is offering an account of what kinds of 
truthmakers there would have to be if ordinary moral judgments were to be true. In Mackie’s 
famous “argument from queerness”, he gives an account of what objective values would have 
to be, if they existed. An objective value would be 
such that knowledge of it provides the knower with both direction and an overriding 
motive; something’s being good both tells the person who knows this to pursue it and 
makes him pursue it. An objective good would be sought by anyone who was 
acquainted with it, not because of any contingent fact that this person, or every person, 
is so constituted that he desires this end, but just because the end has to-be-
pursuedness somehow build into it. (1977: 40) 
 
If there were such objective values, they could serve as truthmakers for ethical judgments. 
Suppose, for instance, that objective values were understood as universals. (Mackie himself 
leans on an understanding of Platonic forms, or, in modern parlance, transcendent universals.) 
Suppose, then, that the universal goodness exists. Then certain objects or events can 
instantiate it. If such a view were happy with states of affairs, then those states of affairs that 
                                                 
22It is tempting to characterize views like Mackie’s as entailing that all moral judgments are false. But we 
should be careful in our formulation, as we saw above in section 4.3.4. For example, if ‘a is F’ is some false 
moral predication, then its negation is true. But, presumably, both sentences belong to the moral domain if one 
of them does. Cf. Dreier: “To be precise, the moral judgments with existential commitment to moral properties 
are all false. Strictly speaking, the moral judgment that no activity is ever wrong unless it causes harm to others 
is true, according to Mackie, since no activity is ever wrong at all” (2004: 43, endnote 1). It seems, then, that 
Sayre-McCord’s account of realism (1986: 3) commits him to the view that Mackie is a realist. Cf. Cameron 
2008d: 117. 
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combine goodness with the things it instantiates would be perfectly adequate truthmakers for 
moral judgments. For instance, suppose it is true that the rescue of some drowning child was 
good. There is a state of affairs—the non-mereological union of the event with goodness—
that guarantees the truth of the truth. (Similarly, one might instead take there to be goodness 
tropes, which would then serve as truthmakers for moral judgments.) But the existence of 
such entities, Mackie argues, is metaphysically queer, and out of step with our best 
ontological understanding of the world (namely, naturalism, or something near enough). 
Without such entities, there is nothing to make true our ordinary moral judgments. Hence, 
they are false. 
According to the two canonical paradigms of ethical anti-realism, there are no moral 
truths. As such, there are no moral truthmakers. Our realists, by way of contrast, embrace 
moral truths and have moral truthmakers on offer. Recall Sayre-McCord’s claim (1986: 3) 
that realism about the moral domain involves just thinking that there are literal moral truths. 
So far we have canvassed two kinds of moral realist who embrace moral truth, and two kinds 
of moral anti-realists who eschew moral truth. But the Good Old Days have passed, and now 
many anti-realists in the ethical domain admit that there are ethical truths (e.g., Blackburn, 
Gibbard, Mark Timmons, and Wright). Furthermore, there are constructivist views (relativist 
and absolutist) that maintain the existence of moral truth, and yet fail to own up to the 
commitments of moral realism. The existence of moral truth, then, is not sufficient to draw 
the distinction between realism and its opposition. Hence, we should adopt the shift to 
thinking about moral realism in terms of moral truthmakers. 
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5.2.4. Moral relativism 
Consider now the moral relativist, who may be plausibly thought of as a moral anti-
realist who upholds the existence of (relative) moral truth.23 Here is how Gilbert Harman 
presents the view: 
moral right and wrong (good and bad, justice and injustice, virtue and vice, etc.) are 
always relative to a choice of moral framework. What is morally right in relation to 
one moral framework can be morally wrong in relation to a different moral 
framework. And no moral framework is objectively privileged as the one true 
morality. (Harman and Thomson 1996: 3) 
 
Moral judgments, if they are to have any chance at being true, must be understood elliptically. 
It’s not the case that something bears (or does not bear) some moral property simpliciter. 
Rather, it bears (or does not bear) a moral property only relative to some moral framework.24 
Moral claims are thus on a par with claims about motion and mass, from a relativistic 
perspective. Suppose I judge that some action A is bad. A might be bad relative to framework 
F1, but good relative to framework F2. If so, then we have some relativistic moral truths: A is 
bad with respect to F1, and A is good with respect to F2. 
Let us get into focus one moral truth for discussion. Suppose I am a thoroughgoing 
Kantian and judge that lying is wrong. Lying is not wrong in and of itself (nothing is for the 
relativist), but it is wrong in the Kantian framework. So my judgment is true: lying is wrong 
with respect to thoroughgoing Kantian ethics. So we have at least one instance of a moral 
truth: 
(1) Lying is wrong [with respect to thoroughgoing Kantian ethics]. 
 
                                                 
23But see Sayre-McCord 1986 for an account of what sorts of conditions should lead one to see relativism as a 
form of realism. (Basically, if relativists are correct about the semantics of moral discourse, then their view 
constitutes realism.) 
24Harman spells out the details somewhat differently in his 1975. See also Wong’s formulation (1984, 2006). 
 275
Relativism, as is familiar, struggles in making sense of moral disagreement. A sociopathic 
egoist may reject the claim that lying is wrong, and may very well be correct to do so. For he 
may be prepared to assent to: 
(2) Lying is not wrong [with respect to sociopathic egoist ethics]. 
 
When our egoist judges that lying is not wrong, he expresses something captured by 2, 
whereas the dutiful Kantian’s judgment that lying is wrong is best captured by 1. Now, fully 
exposed, 1 and 2 do not contradict one another, even though our Kantian and sociopath may 
be coming to blows over the matter. Both are even true; what they really disagree about is 
which moral framework we ought to adopt (a matter over which there is no fact of the 
matter). Still, 1 is true. Now we must ask the truthmaker question: in virtue of what is 1 true? 
The answer will depend on how we understand the nature of moral frameworks, and 
the details of that I leave to specific relativists. But here is one simple model for 
understanding what makes 1 true.25 We might understand the thoroughgoing Kantian ethical 
framework as being a network of hypotheses, some ethical and some not. Let us suppose, 
then, that frameworks are understood as sets of sentences.26 For example, it might consist of 
the following claims: 
(3) Actions are wrong if and only if they are not universalizable. 
 
(4) Lying is not universalizable. 
 
Note that 3 involves the moral term ‘wrong’, and thus should not be thought of as being true, 
since it’s unrelativized. 4 seems to be something of a logical truth, falling out of the 
                                                 
25Cf. Boghossian 2006b. 
26Or we might construe frameworks as sets of rules, and understand morality as on a par with games like chess. 
Chess is defined by its rules; bishops move diagonally, for instance. What status does ‘Bishops move 
diagonally’ have? Does it express a proposition? Is it stipulated to be true? Regardless of how we answer these 
questions, the fact that ‘Bishops move diagonally’ features in the rules of chess (however we understand that) 
accounts for why ‘In chess, bishops move diagonally’ is straightforwardly true. The rules of chess, whatever 
their ontological status, make it true that bishops move diagonally in chess. 
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definitions of ‘lying’ and ‘universalizability’, as we demonstrate to our undergraduate ethics 
students. It follows from 3 and 4 that lying is wrong, in the sense that if both were true, then 
it would be true that lying is wrong. Because ‘Lying is wrong’ follows from sentences of the 
framework of thoroughgoing Kantian ethics, 1 is true. Put another way, given that 3 is a 
member of the framework of thoroughgoing Kantian ethics, 
(3') Actions are wrong with respect to thoroughgoing Kantian ethics if and only if 
they are not universalizable. 
 
is true. And 3' and 4 together entail 1. 
 
In many cases, we may need to bring in information outside the framework in order to 
explain the truth of some moral judgment. For example, it may be wrong for me to tell Bill 
that Cheney is a gorilla. Now, such an action is wrong because Cheney is not a gorilla, and I 
do not believe that Cheney is a gorilla. Hence, my saying so to Bill would constitute a lie, 
and thus would be wrong according to the thoroughgoing Kantian framework. But the fact 
that Cheney is not a gorilla is no part of the thoroughgoing Kantian ethical framework (so far 
as I know!). So perhaps a better answer is that some unrelativized moral judgment p is true in 
a framework just in case p follows from the axioms of the framework, taken together with a 
certain class of non-moral facts. Again, my task is not to supply the details. But we now have 
an approximation of what it is, if anything, that makes moral judgments true. True moral 
judgments are only those that are indexed to some ethical framework. Those frameworks, 
together with whatever non-moral facts are needed to entail the unrelativized moral 
judgments, are responsible for the truth of moral judgments. 
1 is true in virtue of the mini-framework given by 3 and 4. In every world in which 
that framework exists, ‘Lying is wrong’ follows from its axioms, and hence 1 is true. Here, it 
seems that the framework itself is the truthmaker or 1. As for my lying to Bill about Cheney, 
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what makes it true that doing so is wrong in the thoroughgoing Kantian framework is the 
framework taken together with whatever it is that makes it true that Cheney is not a gorilla, 
and what makes it true that I believe truly on the matter. Presumably Cheney himself makes 
it true that he is not a gorilla, and my belief that he is not a gorilla makes it true that I believe 
he is not a gorilla. So here we have the sum of the framework, Cheney, and my belief that 
serves as a truthmaker for ‘It would be wrong [with respect to thoroughgoing Kantian ethics] 
for me to tell Bill that Cheney is a gorilla’. 
What the foregoing brings out is how blandly logical moral judgments can appear on 
the relativist’s conception.27 Moral judgments look to be on a par with sentences like 
‘According to the rules of chess, bishops move diagonally’ and ‘According to the Harry 
Potter novels, the Hogwarts Express leaves from Platform 9 ¾ at King’s Cross Station’. One 
might wonder how the relativist can capture the normativity supposed to accompany moral 
judgments, and how genuine moral disagreement is possible. But setting such worries about 
the view aside (it is not my aim to defend the view), it is at least easy to see how to offer a 
truthmaking account of relativistic moral judgments. In many cases, the judgments amount to 
nothing more than (something like) mere logical claims. If so, the existence of the 
frameworks themselves suffice to ground the truth of moral claims. If non-logical facts enter 
into the picture (as with Cheney’s not being a gorilla), then we need to bring in more 
truthmakers, but none of those will be distinctly moral truthmakers. Cheney makes Cheney is 
not a gorilla true, and nothing more than the thoroughgoing Kantian framework is needed in 
addition to account for truth of It’s wrong according to thoroughgoing Kantian ethics to lie 
                                                 
27Indeed, their austere logical nature may render them analytic truths, in which case they escape our 
truthmaking discussion. But maybe the frameworks and their consequences can be understood in a synthetic 
way. Perhaps: moral frameworks are not sets of propositions, but sets of actual beliefs that are widespread in a 
given community. 
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about Cheney not being a gorilla. The frameworks themselves are ontologically innocuous, 
in the sense that opponents of the framework should be just as happy to accept their existence 
as the defenders of the framework. Hence, the moral relativist needs no additions to his non-
moral ontology to ground the truth of moral judgments. After all, the frameworks themselves 
are not true, and don’t have to be true in order for moral judgments to be true in them.28 It is 
now easy to see why many consider relativists to be anti-realists; the only metaphysical 
substance to moral views amounts to there being certain logical relations between 
propositions in particular moral systems that (while not true) people adopt. Relativists need 
not invoke any kind of moral reality in order to ground the truth of moral judgments. Indeed, 
relativism could very easily be married to an error theory about non-relative moral judgments. 
 
5.2.5. Constructivism 
Relativists are sometimes described as a kind of moral constructivist. There are moral 
truths, and they are “constructed” out of existing moral frameworks. Such relativistic 
constructions lack the absoluteness or “objectivity” belonging to the metaethical views 
usually laboring under the banner of constructivism. I shall refer to such objectivist views as 
being constructivist simpliciter, as is typically done. Just like any other “ism”, constructivism 
is in no way a single unified metaethical view. But we may point to some common themes 
and exemplars. Constructivists oppose realism by arguing that there is no mind-independent 
moral reality (natural or non-natural) to be discovered and described. They oppose classical 
non-cognitivism by taking moral judgments to be truth-apt, and oppose error theory by taking 
                                                 
28If frameworks are understood as propositions or sentences or some other kind of truth-bearer, then it might be 
thought that they are things that need to be made true, not things that make other things true. But recall that 
everything is a truthmaker. Truth-bearers play double duty as both the subject and object of the truthmaking 
relation. 
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some moral judgments to be true. Constructivists tend to uphold a more “objective” 
conception of morality than do “subjectivist” relativists. Still, they hold that moral truth and 
reality is essentially dependent upon the practices and goings-on of moral agents like us—
and here emerges the constructivist’s anti-realist credentials. But the moral truths themselves, 
constructions though they are, are taken very seriously, and emerge as having a non-relative, 
non-subjectivist standing (and here the claim to objectivity is invoked). 
As for proponents of constructivist views, there is Roderick Firth’s ideal observer 
theory, which construes 
statements of the form “x is P,” in which P is some particular ethical predicate, to be 
identical in meaning with statements of the form: “Any ideal observer would react to 
x in such and such a way under such and such conditions”. (1952: 321) 
 
Many contemporary Kantians also consider themselves to be constructivists. Christine 
Korsgaard argues that moral truths “spring from the nature of the will—the principles of 
practical reasoning” (1996: 36). Taking his cue from some tentative and highly guarded 
remarks of John Rawls (1980: 569 and 1985: 230), Ronald Milo (1995) defends a view he 
calls “contractarian constructivism”: 
Contractarian constructivism, as I shall call it, holds that moral truths are most 
plausibly construed as truths about an ideal social order, rather than the natural (or 
some curious nonnatural) order of things. It is true (or is a fact) that a certain kind of 
act is wrong, for example, just in case a social order prohibiting such acts would be 
chosen by rational contractors under suitably idealized conditions. […] The 
objectivity of the moral principles so constructed consists not in their being grounded 
in an independently existing moral order that explains why the process of 
construction leads to an agreement on these principles. Rather, the objectivity of these 
moral principles consists simply in their rational acceptability from an impartial 
social point of view. (1995: 184-185) 
 
Shafer-Landau offers a helpful summary of the overall constructivist program: 
Constructivists endorse the reality of a domain, but explain this by invoking a 
constructive function out of which the reality is created. This function has moral 
reality as its output. What distinguishes constructivist theories from one another are 
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the different views about the proper input. Subjectivists claim that individual tastes 
and opinions are the things out of which moral reality is constructed. Relativists cite 
various conventions or social agreements. Kantians cite the workings of the rational 
will. Contractarians cite the edicts of deliberators situated in special circumstances of 
choice. What is common to all constructivists is the idea that moral reality is 
constituted by the attitudes, actions, responses, or outlooks of persons, possibly under 
idealized conditions. In short, moral reality is constructed from the states or activities 
(understood very broadly) undertaken from a preferred standpoint. The absence of 
this standpoint signifies the absence of moral reality. (2003: 14) 
 
Like the projectivists we shall meet later, constructivists think that understanding our 
attitudes, values, abilities, and stances is paramount for understanding moral thought. 
Constructivists go further by arguing that moral reality is constructed out of or constituted by 
those attitudes and values. Hence, constructivists must maintain the truth of certain 
counterfactuals that turn on the dependency (or lack thereof) between moral reality and moral 
attitudes and values. Had we not had the faculty of practical reasoning that we do, or the 
same kinds of attitudes and values, then moral reality would have been different, says the 
constructivist. 
Constructivism at first appears to offer a fairly straightforward set of answers to our 
truthmaking questions. Milo, for one, is explicit about this: “Contractarian constructivism is a 
metaethical theory about the subject matter of moral judgments, about what sort of facts 
makes them true” (1995: 189).29 Later, Milo writes: “The fact that an act violates [the norms 
chosen by hypothetical ideal contractors] is not just evidence of its wrongness; it is the truth 
maker for the claim that it is wrong” (1995: 202). Though he employs the language of 
truthmaking here, Milo is not bringing to bear a systematic account of truthmaking to his 
metaethics—that task is our own. But his preferred language is some confirmation of our 
present hypothesis, that debates about moral realism are (at least in part) debates about 
                                                 
29But notice that this statement itself might be conflating semantic issues (the subject matter of ethical 
judgments) with metaphysical issues (the truthmakers of ethical judgments). 
 281
truthmakers. Constructivists are clear that they believe that moral facts are constituted or 
grounded by us, or at least some idealized version of us. 
Consider this moral judgment (a favorite of Blackburn’s), and let us agree that it is 
true: 
(5) It is wrong to kick dogs. 
 
Firth would say what 5 means the same as: 
(6) Any ideal observer would judge that kicking dogs is wrong. 
 
We can set aside the (I would say dubious) semantic claim about whether 5 and 6 share the 
same meaning. What is more relevant for us is that, according to the constructivist, if 6 is true, 
then 5 is true as well. So whatever it is that makes 6 true will be a truthmaker for 5. The 
contractarian might wish to substitute the judgments of the ideal observer with the judgments 
of a group of dispassionate contractors operating in the original position, behind a veil of 
ignorance, etc. We can call this group the ‘Committee’. According to the contractarian 
constructivist, 5 is true because 7 is true: 
(7) The Committee would decide on a system of norms that renders kicking dogs 
impermissible. 
 
So whatever makes 7 true will carry over as a truthmaker for 5. 
Constructivists appear, then, to have a good chance at answering our truthmaking 
inquiries. The truthmakers for moral judgments are the decisions that would be made by an 
ideal observer, the Committee, or something of similar stripe. But the constructivist’s answer 
to our question also brings into focus a central objection to the view. The first thing to notice 
about constructivist theories is how the truth of moral judgments is derived from the truth of 
certain counterfactuals. The Committee doesn’t exist, and neither does an ideal observer. 
Neither, then, do their decisions. Hence, the truths about what sorts of judgments and 
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decisions they would make are all counterfactual: if there were such a committee, then it 
would judge in thus-and-so a manner. Anyone with a penchant for truthmaker investigations 
knows to be suspicious of such bald appeals to counterfactuals. Phenomenalists appealed to 
counterfactuals to ground claims about unobserved objects. Behaviorists appealed to 
counterfactuals to ground claims about dispositions. The flight to counterfactuals only pushes 
the question back a step. Suppose the Committee would in fact look unfavorably upon 
kicking dogs for fun. What makes that claim true? 
One option is to take the counterfactual as brute. It has no ontological ground 
supporting it. It’s not true in virtue of anything; it’s just a fundamental feature of the world, 
completely inexplicable. On this reading, the relevant moral counterfactuals are non-
discriminating. Taking this route would secure the constructivist’s anti-realist credentials, but 
at an extreme theoretical cost. A second option, only slightly less unsavory, is to take the 
counterfactual to be made true by a counterfactual fact (understood metaphysically).30 Here 
we would have an ontological ground for our counterfactual, albeit one that is posited solely 
to be a truthmaker for the truth in question. It would be hard to see the motivation for the 
view. Why, for instance, do brute counterfactual facts fare any better than simply positing, 
alongside the non-naturalistic realist, brute ethical facts? 
The more satisfying response to our inquiry would be to offer an ontological ground 
for sentences like 6 and 7 that does not resort to any extravagant or ad hoc ontological 
additions. But in trying to do so, we run head-on into a fundamental objection to 
constructivist theories. The problem is a direct descendent of Plato’s Euthyphro problem, 
                                                 
30Russell had qualms about negative facts, though he embraced them in the end. But counterfactual facts? That 
might just be a contradiction in terms. Lange (2009) speaks of “subjunctive facts”, but has in mind only the 
linguistic conception of a fact. Surely there are subjunctive facts in that sense (since there are truths in the 
subjunctive mood). But a subjunctive fact in the metaphysical sense seems like a category mistake. Being 
subjunctive is a trait of linguistic items, not worldly items (the linguistic items of the world excepted). 
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which we met at the very beginning of our project. In the Euthyphro, Socrates and Euthyphro 
agree that all and only things that are pious are beloved by all the gods. Even granting the 
coextension of the two predicates, there remains a further question: Are things pious because 
they are beloved by the gods, or are things beloved by the gods because they are pious? The 
question is one of ontological ground, and metaphysical dependence. On the first answer, 
piety is constituted by being god-beloved. What it is to be pious is no more and no less than 
to be loved by the gods. On the second answer, piety is more fundamental, such that an act’s 
being pious explains why the gods love it, and not the other way round. In the present case, 
we are assuming that the Committee is morally infallible. In point of fact, whatever the 
Committee approves of is morally sound. Whatever the Committee forbids is morally wrong. 
The relevant question is whether things have the moral properties they do because of the 
Committee’s judgment, or whether the Committee makes the judgments that they do because 
of the moral properties that things have. Constructivists are clear in endorsing the first 
answer to the Euthyphro question. Recall Milo’s admission that the fact that some act 
violates the Committee’s norms is what makes it true that something is wrong (1995: 202). 
The Euthyphro contrast raises a problem for constructivist theories. We are 
embracing the view that morality is in fact entirely dependent upon the will of the Committee. 
Since the morality of certain actions is entirely dependent upon the Committee’s judgment, 
the following sorts of counterfactuals are true: If the Committee had endorsed slavery, then 
slavery would have been permissible. If the Committee had outlawed philanthropy, then 
philanthropy would have been wrong. Such counterfactuals are the logical fallout of the 
Committee’s opinions being constitutive of morality. To the detriment of constructivist views, 
such counterfactuals also need to be squared with the following requirement: constructed 
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truths must be metaphysically mandated. Though they are constructed, they could not have 
been otherwise. Here is Paul Boghossian: 
it is in principle possible to combine a constructivism about a given fact P with the 
view that we were somehow metaphysically constrained to construct P, once we had 
considered the question. But, as I also pointed out, the social constructivist is not 
interested in such mandated constructions. His whole point is to emphasize the 
dependence of any fact on our contingent social needs and interests, so that if our 
needs and interests had been different then so, too, would have been the relevant facts. 
(2006a: 39) 
 
What Boghossian here says is in principle possible turns out to be required. The 
constructivist’s overall view is that although there are facts of a certain domain, those facts 
are reflections and constructions of the contingent factors that bring them into existence. No 
Committee, no morality. But this view is metaphysically impossible. Suppose that the 
Committee judges that p, and so p is a constructed moral fact. Suppose also that p is 
metaphysically contingent, in that p was not metaphysically mandated (it’s a product of our 
contingent circumstances, after all). Now the following possibility emerges. The Committee 
judges that p. And so it is a fact that p. But the Committee was not metaphysically mandated 
to judge that p. So it is possible that another committee, the Others, judges that it’s not the 
case that p. And so it is a fact that it’s not the case that p. Given that the decisions of these 
two committees are not metaphysically mandated, it follows that it’s possible that 
inconsistent facts could be constructed. But that is impossible. Inconsistencies, constructed or 
not, are metaphysically impossible. If there are any “constructed facts”, they must be 
metaphysically mandatory. As Boghossian rightly observes (2006a: 40), it doesn’t matter that 
in fact no competing communities, committees, or whatever has constructed conflicting facts. 
All that matters is that it is in principle possible to do so, which violates the necessity of non-
contradiction. 
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On pain of contradiction, then, the constructivist must hold that his constructed facts 
are metaphysically necessary. That consequence is already out of the spirit of his view, but 
let us press on. The Committee is now charged with the task of making metaphysically 
mandatory judgments. If it’s possible for the Committee to produce the wrong results, then 
the Committee’s decisions are not in fact constitutive of morality. So it must be impossible 
for the Committee to do things like allow slavery. The dilemma for constructivism arises in 
trying to explain why. Either the Committee arrives at its decisions via completely non-moral 
considerations, or they import moral considerations into their decision making process. If the 
former, then there looks to be no way to guarantee that they will prohibit slavery and allow 
philanthropy. It must be impossible for them to do otherwise: 
If the responses of idealized agents justified ethnic cleansing, or a policy that entirely 
discounted the needs of the vulnerable, then there is something wrong with the 
idealization. The resulting theory is either not a moral theory at all, or a false one. 
(Shafer-Landau 2003: 41) 
 
Recall that not only must the Committee give the right verdict in paradigm cases, it must be 
impossible for them to do anything else. If the latter, then moral considerations transcend the 
Committee, and so constructivism is false after all. Thinking about the Committee is a handy 
heuristic for tracking moral status, but is not constitutive of it. 
The worry, then, is that the constructivist faces the possibly unanswerable challenge 
of giving an adequate account of just what the Committee is such that it both does not import 
any moral considerations into its deliberations (thereby giving up the game of constructivism) 
and also guarantees that the Committee will necessarily give the correct judgments in 
paradigm cases. It must be impossible for them to have done otherwise. The challenge, I 
believe, can be understood in terms of truthmaking. What is it that makes it true that the 
Committee necessarily judges thus-and-so? The realist opposition has in mind an answer to 
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the question: something moral that is conceptually and metaphysically prior to the workings 
of the Committee. The constructivist, like the behaviorist and phenomenalist before him, 
retreats to counterfactuals, about what we would judge if we were so positioned. But this is 
no escape from the truthmaker theorist’s question. In virtue of what are those counterfactuals 
true? Our demand is for a metaphysical accounting of why the Committee does what it does. 
Constructivists, I think, have not offered a solid reply to this sort of worry. Viewed through 
the lens of truthmaker theory, constructivist metaethics looks to rest on unstable 
metaphysical ground. 
 
5.2.6. Superassertibility 
Next let us turn to the work of Wright (1988a, 1992, 1995). Wright rejects non-
cognitivism on the grounds that ethical judgments satisfy certain basic platitudes about 
assertoric discourses. For instance, they may be negated, embedded in conditionals, and used 
as premises in arguments. Further, Wright thinks it is in general wrong to ascribe widespread, 
systematic error to those operating within the normal bounds of a discipline such as ethical 
thought. Wright asks rhetorically: “why insist on construing truth for moral discourse in 
terms which motivate a charge of global error, rather than explicate it in terms of the 
satisfaction of [some] putative subsidiary norm, whatever it is?” (1995: 211). If we set the 
standards for moral truth as high as Mackie does, we are compelled to find moral thinking 
engaged in systematic error. A better, more charitable alternative is to think that moral 
thought does not operate with such massive error, and instead successfully accomplishes its 
actual, more modest task. 
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So what does Wright think moral truth is, since it’s not what Mackie says it is? Here, 
Wright adopts a pluralist (or “functionalist”) account of truth. What it is to be a truth 
predicate is to satisfy certain minimal constraints or platitudes (1992: 34; 1995: 215-216; 
2001: 760). Truths have to admit of negation, conditionalization, and the like. They must 
correspond with the facts. Truth itself has to be stable, not come in degrees, and be distinct 
from justification. Any predicate that satisfies the list of platitudes counts as a truth predicate. 
The crucial move of Wright’s is that he thinks that different domains of discourse operate 
with distinct truth predicates, such that some discourses operate with truth predicates that 
have application conditions going beyond the minimal constraints.31 Wright leans most 
heavily on the correspondence platitude in articulating what he thinks about moral truth. It is 
a platitude, Wright claims, that truths correspond to the facts. However, admitting this 
harmless truism should not compel us to adopt whole hog a correspondence theory of truth. 
Wright thinks that there is a very minimal understanding of the correspondence platitude, 
such that even the most deflationary of deflationists can accept it. That minimal 
understanding must be upheld by any candidate for a truth predicate, and can be upheld 
because “the permissibility of correspondence phraseology as paraphrase of “true” is the 
merest by-product of the minimal platitudes” (1992: 143). In its weakest version, the 
correspondence platitude holds that ‘is true’ and ‘corresponds to the facts’ are just two ways 
of saying the same thing.32 However, some truth predicates may adopt a more substantive 
reading of the correspondence platitude. Specifically, some disciplines may require the 
correspondence to be robustly representational, and some disciplines may require the facts 
involved to be metaphysically robust. 
                                                 
31Cf. the pluralism found in Lynch 2009. 
32Recall our earlier discussion of the correspondence platitude in section 2.4. 
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We must be careful about what ‘robust’ means here. What is it for a discourse to 
embrace a “robust” correspondence relation? Wright understands a robust correspondence 
relation in terms of what he calls cognitive command. A discourse exhibits cognitive 
command if and only if it is a priori that any dispute (unrelated to vagueness) that may occur 
over some claim of the domain is due to some cognitive shortcoming (1992: 144). The idea is 
that when the aim of a domain of discourse is to represent, disagreements over what has been 
represented must be due to someone’s having failed to represent correctly. If a copy machine 
produces a defective image, then the machine has malfunctioned somehow. If the same 
original produces different outputs in different copy machines, then something is wrong with 
at least one of the copiers. Wright’s suggestion is that one (probably necessary but 
insufficient) mark of realist discourse is that the judgments of the discourse aim to be 
representational. Consequently, the discourse will manifest cognitive command, for 
differences in opinion that arise over some statement of the domain will be due to some 
malfunction in the representational processes underlying the competing judgments. In anti-
realist domains, the aim is not representation, and thus the domain may not exhibit cognitive 
command. If so, differences in opinion may well be intractable; no amount of added 
information will resolve the dispute. Wright can charge Mackie with illegitimately attributing 
cognitive command to moral discourse. Mackie thinks that we aim and fail to represent moral 
reality when we make moral judgments; Wright thinks we never so aim, and thus do not fail. 
Whatever the aim of moral discourse is, we succeed in doing that, and that’s why there’s 
moral truth. But we can maintain moral anti-realism because the aim of moral discourse is 
not representational, which is a hallmark of realism. 
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The second way to amplify the correspondence platitude is to adopt a more robust 
account of facts. Wright’s approach to facts does not engage the traditional metaphysical 
debate over facts. One might have thought that the distinction between robust and non-robust 
facts tracks the distinction between linguistic facts understood merely as truths and 
metaphysical facts understood along the lines of Armstrong’s states of affairs (i.e., as 
truthmakers). But that is not Wright’s concern. Instead, Wright spells out robustness in terms 
of explanatory power.33 Robust facts are facts that have explanatory capacities that extend 
beyond their home domain. Realists and anti-realists alike can grant that moral facts help to 
explain moral beliefs. Moral realists bear the burden of showing how moral facts can 
“contribute to the explanation of things other than moral beliefs” (1995: 223). If so, then 
moral facts exhibit wide cosmological role, which is another mark of realism. 
For Wright, moral discourse does not exhibit cognitive command, and moral facts 
have narrow cosmological role. He concludes that moral realism is false. Hence, while there 
are moral truths and moral facts, the truth predicate operating in ethical thought is quite 
minimal. Though moral truths correspond to the facts, the correspondence is not 
representational, and the facts themselves are explanatorily impotent at explaining beliefs 
other than those strictly falling into the moral domain. Wright is best understood as trying to 
legitimate the presence of a satisfied truth predicate in moral discourse, thereby earning the 
anti-realist’s right to moral truth back from non-cognitivists and error theorists who tried to 
banish it. In fact, Wright thinks that the truth predicate governing ethical discourse is best 
understood in terms of superassertibility (1995). A statement is superassertible 
                                                 
33Hence, Wright does not ever say what he thinks facts are. This is unfortunate, given how much 
misunderstanding trades on conflating the various senses of ‘fact’. 
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if and only if it is, or can be, warranted and some warrant for it would survive 
arbitrarily close scrutiny of its pedigree and arbitrarily extensive increments to or 
other forms of improvement of our information. (1992: 48) 
 
Superassertibility is thus an epistemically constrained notion of truth; the truth to be found in 
domains governed by superassertibility cannot outstrip our possible evidence. For Wright, 
then, what it is for a moral judgment to be true is simply that it be superassertible. Nothing 
else is required.34 
Though it is not Wright’s question, our question is: Since we are now supposing there 
to be moral truths, what is it that makes them true? For example, let us continue to suppose 
that 5 is true: 
(5) It is wrong to kick dogs. 
 
Now let us follow Wright in thinking that moral truth amounts merely to superassertibility, 
and not anything more robust. If 5 is a moral truth, then 5 is superassertible. Hence the 
following is true: 
(8) That it is wrong to kick dogs is, or can be, warranted and some warrant for it 
would survive arbitrarily close scrutiny of its pedigree and arbitrarily 
extensive increments to or other forms of improvement of our information. 
 
As a first pass to the question of what makes 5 true, Wright may offer 8. In effect, 5 is true 
because it’s superassertible, which is precisely what 8 says. Of course, accounting for the 
truth of one thing by citing a truth from which it follows is not yet to give an ontological 
accounting, to give the ontological grounds for it; we instead simply push the question back a 
step. What is it that makes 8 true? 
For it to be wrong to kick dogs, two conditions must obtain. First, it must be 
warranted that it is wrong to kick dogs. Second, such warrant would have to survive in the 
                                                 
34See Lynch 2009, chapter 8 for a defense of the idea that moral truth might amount to something like 
superassertibility and nothing more. 
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face of arbitrarily large improvements of our epistemic state. I admit that I find it baffling 
how to evaluate these conditions in the present context. Truth is being understood in terms of 
warrant and improvement of our information. Hence, in understanding what the nature of 
warrant is here, or what it is to improve our state of information, we cannot, on pain of 
circularity, be relying on some prior notion of truth. But I have no grasp of what it is for 
some statement to be warranted independently of the notion of truth. And so I have no grasp 
of what it is that could make 8 true. 
Let us delve into this argument a bit more deeply. We are supposing that 5 is true: it 
is wrong to kick dogs. Now, we of course can uphold this biconditional: 
(9) ‘It is wrong to kick dogs’ is true if and only if it is wrong to kick dogs. 
 
As 9 makes explicit, the truth of 5 amounts to no more than the wrongness of kicking dogs. 
There is no more to the truth of ‘It is wrong to kick dogs’ than there is to the wrongness of 
kicking dogs. This is the deflationist’s key insight, and the one we exploited in section 3.3. 
But Wright’s assimilation of moral truth to superassertibility shows that the truth of 5 
amounts to no more than the truth of 8. Hence, the wrongness of kicking dogs amounts to no 
more than what is given in 8. 8 offers an account of what it is for kicking dogs to be wrong. 
So what is it for kicking dogs to be wrong? There are two conditions. Kicking dogs is wrong 
only if we are warranted in believing that kicking dogs is wrong. And kicking dogs is wrong 
only if that warrant would survive an arbitrary increase in our amount of information. I 
happen to think that this is a most implausible account of what it is for it to be wrong to kick 
dogs, but let us not beg the question too early.35 What is it for the first condition to obtain? 
                                                 
35Indeed, I am inclined to call this view (and all other epistemically constrained notions of truth) a non-starter. 
Note that in this presentation of the argument I have deliberately disquoted ‘truth’ away. Doing so brings out 
much more explicitly the (what I find to be) deeply implausible nature of the view. (Musgrave refers to 
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We need an account of warrant for believing that kicking dogs is wrong that has nothing to 
do with the wrongness of kicking dogs. After all, the wrongness itself is constituted in part by 
our warrant for believing in it. 
The natural thing to say here (and I think the correct thing to say here) is that our 
warrant for believing that kicking dogs is wrong is constituted by our evidence and reason for 
thinking that kicking dogs is wrong. But that answer already takes for granted the notion of 
the wrongness of kicking dogs, which is precisely what we’re trying to understand. On the 
correct view of things, we have warrant when we are on track toward the truth: warrant is 
understood in terms of truth. On the superassertibilist view of things, truth consists in part in 
being warranted: truth is understood in terms of warrant. It strikes me that the 
superassertibilist gets the order of explanation exactly backwards. In any event, we are owed 
an account of what warrant for believing in the wrongness of kicking dogs is such that it is 
completely independent of the wrongness of kicking dogs. I fail to be able to anticipate what 
such an account may be.36 
I have no good answer, then, for what could serve as the basis for my warrant in 
believing that kicking dogs is wrong (since that warrant cannot consist in my having 
evidence that points in favor of the wrongness of kicking dogs). Turn now to the second 
condition. It is wrong to kick dogs only if our warrant in believing in such wrongness would 
survive any arbitrary increase in information. Here we run into a counterfactual yet again. 
The problem for understanding the second condition is just a compounding of the first. 
Warrant shows up again (and it remains mysterious what that consists in), but this time with 
                                                 
epistemic theories of truth as a “fandango” that are “one of the least edifying sights in philosophy” (1989: 390). 
Those are his words, not mine, but I appreciate the sentiment.) 
36Perhaps the answer has to do with what my social cohorts do. When I affirm 5 they give me high-fives, and 
when I deny it they hiss at me. I take it that anyone with an epistemic conscience does not think that these are 
good reasons for belief. 
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modal features. Here I just echo what came before. If we cannot say what warrant is, we 
cannot say what it is for warrant to remain under various counterfactual circumstances. So 
even if 8 is true, it provides no insight into what could make it true. Truthmaker theorists are 
interested in the ontological inventory that accompanies our store of truths. Their ontological 
inquiries concerning some truth are not satiated by being passed on, customer service style, 
to some other truth. The truths need to bottom out in the world, and the now pervasive retreat 
to counterfactuals serves only to obscure the questions of ontological accountability that are 
at the heart of the truthmaking literature.37 
 
5.2.7. Quasi-realism 
Let us turn now to the elusive camp of quasi-realism. We met this view in section 
4.3.3, where we exploited it in giving an account of projectivist truthmaking, and so the stage 
has already been set for most of our discussion of the view. Like Wright, quasi-realists seek 
to make out a place for moral truth that is firmly entrenched in an anti-realist understanding 
of ethical thought. The most prominent defenders of quasi-realism are Blackburn (e.g., 1984b, 
1998) and Gibbard (1990, 2003). I shall focus on Blackburn’s work, since he is the 
program’s inventor38 and standard-bearer. The quasi-realist is one who, starting from a 
generally anti-realist perspective, comes to mimic the perspective of realism while still 
maintaining anti-realism (Blackburn 1980: 353). The quasi-realist “earns the right” to views 
typically associated with realism by allowing himself only those resources available to the 
anti-realist. The prima facie challenge for the quasi-realist is to show that he has legitimately 
                                                 
37Perhaps the answer for Wright (and the constructivist as well) when it comes to the counterfactuals is to take 
them as non-discriminating truthmaker gaps (i.e., as brute truths). Such appeals to brute counterfactual facts fall 
foul of good truthmaker theory, and good ethical thought as well. We shall take up this response below. 
38The name, at least, is due to Blackburn. Blackburn would no doubt honor Hume with inventing the program. 
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earned the right to realist doctrines in a way that both does not compromise his anti-realism 
and also offers a recognizable difference from realism. The view certainly can give the 
appearance of possessing all the benefits of theft over honest toil; the trick to defending 
quasi-realism is to dispel such appearances. 
Quasi-realism has developed and morphed over the years, precisely over some of the 
points most crucial to our interest in the project. For example, Blackburn at times used to 
describe his projectivism as an “as if” philosophy: 
According to projectivism we speak and think ‘as if’ the world contained a certain 
kind of fact, whereas the true explanation of what we are doing is that we have certain 
reactions, habits or sentiments, which we voice and discuss by such talk. (1984a: 284) 
 
In later years, the ‘as if’ portion of the view disappears completely. Faced with the question 
of whether quasi-realism is an ‘as if’ philosophy, Blackburn now bluntly replies: “No, no, 
no” (1998: 319). The as-if approach squares with the general goal of quasi-realism, which is 
to earn realist doctrines (we are entitled to speak as if there are things such as objective moral 
truths) without compromising anti-realism (but really there are no such things). It easy to see, 
then, why no less than Lewis (2005) has classified quasi-realism as a kind of fictionalism. 
(Blackburn 2005 adamantly resists the parallel.) But since quasi-realism is not the as-if view, 
it must accomplish its task by other means. 
The quasi-realist takes his cue instead from Hume’s projectivism about causation: 
“The central thought is that dignifying a relationship between events as causal is spreading or 
projecting a reaction which we have to something else we are aware of about the events” 
(Blackburn 1984b: 210). The causal relation is not something that we detect and describe, 
accurately or not, in nature; rather, it is something that our minds project onto the world. It is 
tempting to describe the projectivist view as holding that, as a result of our “spreading” the 
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projected properties onto the world ourselves, they in fact aren’t really there. The task of 
quasi-realism is to justify why projectivism is after all entitled to realist-sounding claims like 
‘Causality is real’ and ‘That event would have caused that other event even if no one had 
judged it so’.39 Blackburn is thus an expressivist because he takes moral judgments to be 
expressive of certain kinds of attitudes rather than descriptive of some portion of reality, a 
projectivist because, following Hume, he takes moral properties to be projections onto the 
world by our moral practices, and finally a quasi-realist because he defends his projectivist 
expressivism’s right to typically realism-indicative claims.40 
Blackburn’s view shares much in common with the early non-cognitivists that we 
toured earlier. Moral judgments do not aim at describing reality; rather, they aim to express 
certain kinds of attitudes. Because we need not posit any independent moral reality for moral 
judgments to describe, quasi-realists can offer an account of moral practice on slim 
metaphysical grounds. Here is Blackburn: “So the expressivist thinks we can say 
interestingly what is involved for a subject S to think that X is good. It is for S to value it, and 
this can be explained in natural terms” (1998: 50).41 It is important to realize that even 
though moral judgments express our moral values, we do not describe ourselves as having 
those values when we make moral judgments. Moral judgments express our values; they 
don’t describe them. Hence, the following judgments of S’s are distinct: 
(10) X is good. 
 
(11) I value X. 
                                                 
39Blackburn nicely distinguishes projectivism from quasi-realism at his 1984b: 180. There he describes Mackie 
as a projectivist, but not a quasi-realist. 
40In general, I shall refer to the quasi-realist as the one who, like Blackburn, endorses this tripartite view. 
41What is it to value something? Here is Blackburn’s answer: “To hold a value, then, is typically to have a 
relatively stable disposition to conduct practical life and practical discussion in a particular way: it is to be 
disposed or set in that way, and notably to be set against change in this respect” (1998: 67). 
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When S utters 10 sincerely, she expresses her valuing of X, and so she cannot sincerely utter 
10 unless 11 is true. Even if X weren’t good, it may still be the case that S values it. So 10 
and 11, even in the mouth of S, are logically distinct. Further, if S is entitled to assert 10 
(which she is if 11 is true), then she is entitled to assert 
(12) It is true that X is good. 
 
Blackburn would say that what entitles the quasi-realist to the jump from 10 to 12 is his 
acceptance of the deflationary theory of truth. Embracing such a theory is certainly sufficient 
to justify the inference, but is far from necessary. What is necessary is that the quasi-realist 
speak English. As Ramsey (1927) pointed out early on about ‘is true’ (and as Frege (1956) 
and Wittgenstein (1953) both observed about ‘ist wahr’), we can move freely between the 
assertion that p and the assertion that p is true. Nothing is gained or lost when moving from 
side to side across a T-sentence. That’s just a fact about English, and recognizable by anyone 
who has mastered ‘is true’ (and ‘it is true that’, ‘it is a fact that’, etc.). The important point is 
that even the expressivist may make the inference between 10 and 12. So if S is prepared to 
assert that X is good, she should be equally prepared to assert that ‘X is good’ is true, that it is 
a matter of fact that X is good, and that God, supposing he exists and is omniscient, believes 
that X is good. Expressivists have as much right to the truth predicate and its cognates as 
anyone else. 
What I find most curious about the quasi-realist program is its near exclusive 
attention to the psychology of moral judgment, and not its metaphysics. Of course, quasi-
realists attempt to defend their metaethical views on metaphysically austere grounds; but an 
austere metaphysics is a metaphysics nonetheless. The anti-realist is a brother metaphysician. 
My worry is that by keeping silent on certain questions, quasi-realism hides some of its 
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(potentially but not necessarily problematic) metaphysical features. We have already seen 
one such passage a moment ago: the quasi-realist offers an account of “what is involved for a 
subject S to think that X is good” (Blackburn 1998: 50; emphasis added). Here is a sampling 
of more of the kinds of passages I have in mind: 
The sentence ‘a is good’ is indeed true, in English, if and only if a is good. That is, if 
and only if we are committed to the goodness of a will we allow that the English 
sentence is true. That is its rule of use. But saying this tells us nothing about the kind 
of commitment it is: it is quite irrelevant to the metaphysics. (Blackburn 1981: 180; 
emphasis added) 
 
If quasi-realism is successful, a projectivist has the right to think of moral judgments 
as true or false, as reasonable or unreasonable, and so on. (Blackburn 1981: 185; 
emphasis added) 
 
if we sympathize with the pressures I have described, we come to appreciate why it 
should be natural to treat expressions of attitude as if they were similar to ordinary 
judgements. We come to need a predicate, whose behaviour is like that of others. 
Why not regard ourselves as having constructed a notion of moral truth? If we have 
done so, then we can happily say that moral judgements are true or false, only not 
think that we have sold out to realism when we do so. (Blackburn 1984b: 196; latter 
emphasis added) 
 
To allow that a moral judgement is true is to endorse the attitude it expresses. 
(Blackburn 2002a: 134; emphasis added) 
 
If I can explain normative language in such a way that a minimal notion of truth 
applies to normative claims as I explain them, I can happily call many such claims 
true. (Gibbard 2003: 63; emphasis added) 
 
Suppose instead that minimalists are right for truth, for facts, and for belief: there is 
no more to claiming “It’s true that pain is bad” than to claim that pain is bad; the fact 
that pain is bad just consists in pain’s being bad; to believe that pain is bad is just to 
accept that it is. Then it’s true that pain is bad and it’s a fact that pain is bad—so long 
as, indeed, pain is bad. I genuinely believe that pain is bad, and my expressivistic 
theory, filled out, explains what believing this consists in. (Gibbard 2003: 182-183; 
emphasis added) 
 
What I mean to call attention to in my selective italicization is the quasi-realist focus on what 
we’re doing when we make moral judgments, and what we will allow and say about certain 
moral judgments, and what rights or entitlements we have to make such claims. I am raising 
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no objection by pointing out the quasi-realist attention to such matters. My point is merely to 
highlight the kinds of questions for which quasi-realism provides an answer, so as to bring 
into focus another question about which it seems at times to be absolutely (and needlessly 
willfully) silent. 
The kind of contrast I have in mind can be seen by once again turning to Hume on 
causation.42 Hume’s exploration into causality provides us with an account of what it is that 
we’re up to when we make judgments of causality. When I judge that C caused E, what 
exactly is the idea I have in my mind when I make such a judgment? Hume adroitly shows 
how, within the framework of his theory of ideas, he can offer a satisfying naturalistic 
account of what it is to judge that C causes E. When I make some such judgment, I do not 
have before my mind an idea of some mysterious power or necessary connection which is 
traceable to no impression. Instead, I have before my mind a constant conjunction of events 
paired with a certain extra push from my mind that moves me from thoughts of C to thoughts 
of E. If you, to the contrary, do not judge that C caused E, Hume can explain why: your mind 
has not supplied the extra kick that would move you to infer E from C. 
Let us accept all of this so far. We have an adequate account of what it is to make a 
judgment of causality. We have an answer to the question: What am I up to when I judge that 
C causes E? But here is another question: What is it for C to cause E? Furthermore, did C in 
fact cause E? The distinction can be put quite bluntly. Hume may well tell me what I’m 
thinking when I judge that C causes E. But I also want to know whether I’m right, whether 
                                                 
42See section 7 of Hume’s Enquiry concerning Human Understanding or section 1.3.14 of his A Treatise of 
Human Nature. 
 299
my judgment is true.43 C does not cause E simply because I judge that it does. The canons of 
good causal reasoning say just as much. If we think we have a legitimate separation of 
inquiries here (and perhaps Hume himself would deny this), we are forced to conclude that 
while Hume offers an account of the former, the latter questions remain unanswered.44 
My worry about quasi-realism is that while it may well give us the right to treat moral 
discourse in cognitivist fashion, and happily explain what we’re doing when we engage in 
moral discourse, it does nothing to address the issue of whether what we’re doing is correct. 
We have not yet, in other words, separated projectivism from error theory. Of course, once 
we recognize the equivalence between ‘X is wrong’ and ‘It is true that X is wrong’, we can 
apply the projectivist analysis offered for the former equally well to the latter. In the above 
passages, Gibbard is stressing just this point, and it is something about which I have 
absolutely no reservations. Anyone prepared to make one of the claims had better be 
prepared, on pain of inconsistency, to make the other. We should expect as much from any 
cognitivist metaethical theory (where I take ‘cognitivism’ just to indicate truth-aptness, and 
the kind of view that avoids the Frege-Geach problem). 
But notice that all the quasi-realist has earned so far is cognitivism. Moral judgments, 
just like any other kind of judgment, are either true or false. The quasi-realist has a perfectly 
                                                 
43This sentence is a perfect example of a stylistic reason to keep ‘is true’ around. My question of whether it’s 
true that C caused E is exactly the same question as whether C caused E. But even though the two ways of 
formulating the question are equivalent, asking it in the way I did makes the import and intent of the question 
more perspicuous. Yet my experience has been that when I ask such questions utilizing the abbreviatory and 
anaphoric functions of ‘is true’, people often take me to be asking a more “philosophical” question (that perhaps 
brings in the baggage of objectivity and all that) than if I had not made the semantic ascent, as if by doing so I 
had (impossibly) climbed higher up Ramsey’s ladder. But asking after the truth of the matter at hand here is no 
more or less metaphysically loaded than is asking whether C caused E. So my question in no way presupposes a 
metaphysically robust conception of truth, such that the question would dissolve were we to take on 
deflationism. 
44I note in passing the familiar observation that the British empiricists, stuck as they are behind the veil of ideas, 
in general have a difficult time accounting for how a belief can be true. I admit that this is a theoretical demand 
of my own that they might not necessarily recognize. 
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good story of how, on projectivist grounds, we can speak of the truth or falsity of moral 
judgments (and, in turn, moral facts, moral reality, etc.).45 What is in danger of being left out 
is how it can be possible for ethical judgments to be true. Granted, we have the “right” to 
attribute truth to them, just as we have the “right” to say that it’s true that C caused E 
whenever I say that C caused E. The quasi-realist gives us a satisfying account, let us say, of 
what it is to judge that X is bad, or that X is good (and furthermore, of what it is to judge that 
it is true that X is bad, or that it is true that X is good). But what is it for X to be bad, or for X 
to be good? When are my moral judgments true, and when are they false? True, my judgment 
that X is bad is true just in case X is bad. No one is out to deny that. But what is it for X to be 
bad, on the projectivist story? That question seems to be of less interest to quasi-realists, but 
it is an important one that must be addressed for those interested in the metaphysical 
implications of ethical discourse.46 The worry is that the subject has been changed on us. We 
want an account of why a certain moral judgment is true, not an account of why we are 
entitled to append ‘is true’ to the back of our moral commitments. We want to know what 
makes those commitments the correct ones.47 
                                                 
45Note that quasi-realists may not ignore the fact that there is a genuine metaphysical issue regarding the 
metaphysics of facts. Everyone who speaks English can admit that there is a sense of the word ‘fact’ that is 
synonymous with ‘truth’, such that ‘It’s a truth that snow is white’ and ‘It’s a fact that snow is white’ are 
synonymous. (I deliberately used that sense in the first occurrence of ‘fact’ in the first sentence of this footnote, 
but not in the second.) Granting that there is this sense, however, in no way erases the debate over whether there 
are such things as (the other kind of) facts (or Mellor’s facta, or Armstrong’s states of affairs). The quasi-realist, 
if successful, has earned the right to there being moral facts in the first, linguistic sense, just as anyone else has 
who has earned the right to speak of moral truth. But the quasi-realist has in no way earned any moral facts in 
the sense of Russell, Mellor, or Armstrong (nor should he want to). It is misleading to say, without 
disambiguation, that quasi-realists can agree with moral realists that there are moral facts. There is no more 
agreement here (if the realist adopts moral facts as entities) than there is when you and I “agree” that there are 
banks (while you’re thinking of the Danube and I’m thinking of Wall Street). 
46Indeed, I think it is the worry held (consciously or not) by those who suspect that quasi-realism collapses into 
subjectivism. See Jackson and Pettit 1998, Bloomfield 2003, Shafer-Landau 2003, Suikkanen 2009, and 
Blackburn’s various responses (e.g., his 1999 and 2006). 
47Blackburn seems intent at times to demean the value of my question: whether something is good strikes the 
expressivist as something that “is not the subject of this theoretical concern—that is, not the subject of concern 
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The worry here is perhaps most explicit in the first block quotation from Blackburn 
above. He first focuses our attention on this biconditional: 
(13) ‘a is good’ is true if and only if a is good. 
 
So far so good. But the ‘that is’ that immediately follows suggests that 13 is intended to be 
nothing more than a rephrasing of this (very different) biconditional: 
(14) We allow that ‘a is good’ is true if and only if we are committed to the 
goodness of a. 
 
14, I take it, is true, at least by the projectivist’s lights. Yet in no way is it equivalent to 13. 
Blackburn’s point is that, for each of the biconditionals, what goes on the left is no different 
from what goes on the right. But if 13 and 14 are equivalent, then given the equivalence of 
each of the biconditionals’ two conditions, we can derive the following absurd (by the quasi-
realist’s lights) biconditionals: 
(15) ‘a is good’ is true if and only if we allow that ‘a is good’ is true. 
 
(16) a is good if and only if we are committed to the goodness of a. 
 
Fully exposed, 15 and 16 are biconditionals that only a subjectivist could accept.48 13 and 14 
are both true, but in no way is 14 a restatement or elucidation of 13. 13 is just a banal T-
sentence. 14 follows from the projectivist’s account of what we’re up to when we make 
moral judgments. Our commitment to a’s goodness makes sincere our assertion that ‘a is 
good’ is true; hence 14’s two conditions go together. But our commitment to a’s goodness 
does not make true the assertion that ‘a is good’ is true, and so 16 is (indicatively) false. My 
worry about quasi-realism is that it attends to sentences like 14, which speak to the 
                                                 
for those of us who, while naturalists, want a theory of ethics” (1998: 50). It’s unclear, though, that Blackburn 
believes this. As we shall see, he goes on to tell us what makes certain things good or bad. 
48At least, on their most natural (indicative) reading they are false. Of course, they could very well be true read 
materially. In any event, what is important is that 15 and 16 are not necessarily true as 13 and 14 are (holding 
their conditions’ meanings fixed across possible worlds, of course). 
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psychology of moral judgment and what it is to make a moral judgment, and then assimilates 
that account to 13, which is just about the truth of moral judgments. Think of it this way: 
That I gladly assent to both conditions of 14 in no way helps me determine whether the 
conditions of 13 are true. The truth of the conditions of 14 can come apart from the truth of 
the conditions of 13, as any quasi-realist should be quick to point out.49 
The impending challenge for quasi-realism here can be brought into better focus by 
viewing the case through the lens of truthmaker theory. The quasi-realist agrees with the 
error theorist that moral judgments are truth-apt. They diverge in that the quasi-realist thinks 
that there are moral truths. ‘Kicking dogs is wrong’ is true if and only if kicking dogs is 
wrong. Blackburn and Mackie both agree.50 Blackburn assents to both the left-hand and 
right-hand conditions; Mackie denies both. The truthmaker theorist gives Mackie a pass—no 
truth, no need for a truthmaker. But we do need to pose the question to Blackburn: Given that 
it’s true, what, if anything, is the truthmaker for ‘Kicking dogs is wrong’? 
                                                 
49Blackburn might respond by saying that he does take 13 and 14 to be equivalent, but only because he 
understands 14 differently than I do. I am taking the conditions of 14 on what I take to be their natural reading. 
‘We are committed to the goodness of a’ is a statement about us and what our commitments are. Someone could 
assent to that sentence even if he disagreed with us about a’s supposed goodness (because he knows that we 
happen to value a). Blackburn might be taking ‘We are committed to the goodness of a’ not to be a statement 
about us at all, but instead as no more than a statement about the goodness of a, exactly equivalent to ‘a is good’ 
after all. I am taking my cue here from Blackburn 1998: 305, where he assimilates ‘Slavery is a bad system’ to 
‘Our opinion is this: slavery is a bad system’. If this alternate reading is right, then Blackburn’s first-person 
plural sentences are highly misleading, and are helping to breed the confusion behind quasi-realism’s objectors 
charging the program with subjectivist consequences. 
50Note that they agree even if they disagree on what the best theory of truth is. This entire section is a testament 
to how irrelevant the debate between correspondence and deflationism is to the topic of moral realism. 
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I suspect that Blackburn may want to reject the question.51, 52 But what is it to reject a 
question? Is it to find it unintelligible? Is it to think it unimportant or irrelevant? Our question 
is perfectly intelligible; I have said what it is for a truth to have a truthmaker. Whether the 
question is important or irrelevant will be seen clearly after (but only after) we start to answer 
it. So I take it that rejection is not an option. What is an option is to deny that ‘Kicking dogs 
is wrong’ has a truthmaker. Truthmaker gaps are perfectly tolerable on our view. In that case, 
we can then ask whether it has metaphysical grounds at all, and then what relevance that 
ground (or lack thereof) has for moral realism and anti-realism. We can explore, in other 
words, whether the truth is metaphysically discriminating or not. If ‘Kicking dogs is wrong’ 
does have a truthmaker, then again we can ask what it is, and what implication that has for 
the realism debate. 
                                                 
51My suspicion here is due to the opening pages of Blackburn 1986, where he contrasts his favored metaethical 
approach (the “quasi-realist alternative”) with the “truth-conditions” approach that he rejects. The language of 
truth-conditions here suggests some linguistic infiltration into a metaphysical issue. Indeed, part of the truth-
conditions approach involves asking the question “of what it is that makes [moral judgments] true” (119). Once 
again, I urge that we resist any temptation to conflate truth-conditions with truthmakers. See also Blackburn 
2009: 207, the tone of which suggests that Blackburn would be unsympathetic to our investigations here. But 
note that Blackburn suggests that we may still “ruminate over what it is in virtue of which happiness is good, 
and deploy our standards and values to pursue this ethical question” (ibid.). But asking in virtue of what it is 
that happiness is good just is asking what it is in virtue of which ‘Happiness is good’ is true, which just is 
asking what the truthmaker is for ‘Happiness is good’. That Blackburn can sweep away metaphysical questions 
with one hand, only to draw them back with the other suggests that he is reading too much inflationary 
metaphysics into our present investigation. 
52Cf. Horgan and Timmons: “On our view and on expressivist views generally, moral judgments are not in the 
business of describing or representing the world—they are not to be understood as way-the-world-might-be 
judgments. So, metaphysically speaking, there is nothing to say about what makes a moral judgment true or 
false, where the expectation is to specify some substantive truth (and falsity)-makers for moral judgments” 
(2006b: 88, footnote 17). First, note the assumption that only judgments that represent the world require 
truthmakers. Note also the assumption that there is a distinction between judgments that represent and those that 
don’t. Finally, note the suggestion that moral judgments require no truthmakers. All of these claims I am happy 
to reject. The first assumption is not argued for, and disappears altogether once we reject the second assumption 
(on grounds of semantic deflationism—see the discussion of creeping minimalism below in section 5.3). The 
third, as we shall see, is actually out of spirit with expressivism, given that it essentially rejects the lesson of the 
supervenience argument Blackburn offers in favor of expressivism (1971, 1985b). We also tackle this argument 
below, in section 5.4. It is clear from their essay that Horgan and Timmons are running together the idea of a 
substantive theory of truth with the idea of a substantive theory of truthmakers. We shall see below what 
consequences befall those who argue that moral truths do not have truthmakers. 
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It has long been asked of quasi-realism whether it is a genuinely anti-realist view, or 
whether it is merely a “queasy” form of realism.53 The truthmaker theorist predicts that, since 
realism debates are at bottom debates over truthmakers, if quasi-realism is the anti-realist 
view it proclaims itself to be, then its anti-realism will be made apparent by a careful 
investigation into how it responds to our series of truthmaking questions. As should be 
obvious from the previous chapter, I think we can use truthmaker theory to articulate 
precisely where quasi-realism diverges from moral realism. 
What is very clear on the quasi-realist view is what moral truthmakers are not. First, 
they are not sui generis non-naturalistic moral facts (in the metaphysical sense), for they 
believe that there are no such things (Blackburn 1986: 124). Nor does the quasi-realist accept 
naturalistic facts as truthmakers in the way that naturalistic realists do. When addressing 
“Cornell realism”—the naturalistic approach to moral realism that identifies moral properties 
with natural ones—Blackburn writes: “Cornell realism thinks we can identify the ‘truth-
makers’ for our ethical thoughts, identifying what properties of things make them true, rather 
as the scientist identifies the property of stuff that identifies water or gold” (1998: 87-88). As 
before, I take the punch line of this story to be that Blackburn does not think that there is any 
sort of ontological dependence that holds between natural facts and moral truths (even 
though he can think that the natural facts make moral judgments true in a different, 
projectivist, sense). 
It is of paramount importance to the defenders of quasi-realism that they make it clear 
that the moral truthmakers cannot be the attitudes themselves that are expressed by moral 
                                                 
53E.g., Dworkin 1996 and Rosen 1998. For further discussion see McDowell 1985, Wright 1988b, Blackburn 
1993d, Kit Fine 2001, Devitt 2002b, Gibbard 2003: 184-188, and Dreier 2004. 
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judgments, crucial though they are to understanding the projectivist view. Suppose I deeply 
value philanthropy. Then when I utter 
(17) Philanthropy is good 
 
I do so sincerely. But it does not follow that I thereby judge truly. It does follow that if I were 
to utter 
(18) It is true that philanthropy is good 
 
I would thereby do so sincerely. But it would not follow that my utterance of 18 would be 
true. The truth of 17 and 18 stand and fall together, for sure, as does their sincerity. But my 
valuing of philanthropy guarantees only that my utterances are sincere, not that they are true. 
To think that the attitudes and values are themselves the moral truthmakers would be to 
endorse a kind of subjectivism: what makes it true that philanthropy is good is just that I 
value it.54 For suppose that I also dearly value kicking dogs. Then my utterance of 
(19) Kicking dogs is good 
 
is sincere, but hardly true (even though I would sincerely (and incorrectly) judge that it’s true 
that kicking dogs is good). Blackburn is explicit in his acknowledgement of this point: “Like 
anyone else [the projectivist] thinks that what makes it wrong to kick dogs is that it causes 
them pain” (1981: 179).55 It is not the attitudes themselves that make things right or wrong, 
                                                 
54See Blackburn 2006. Blackburn is fond of complaining that commentators often interpret his view, against his 
repeated protestations, as being committed to such subjectivism—see again footnote 46. I think such 
commentators are best interpreted as not understanding what else it could be that grounds the truth of moral 
judgments, given that they are in fact true on the quasi-realist’s view (see Bloomfield 2003). Does nothing 
ground the truth of moral judgments? If so, then both their truth and falsity are equally grounded (i.e., not at all). 
55Cf. Blackburn 1985a: “if everyone comes to think of it as permissible to maltreat animals, this does nothing at 
all to make it permissible: it just means that everybody has deteriorated” (14). See also Blackburn 1988: “It is 
because of our responses that we say that cruelty is wrong, but it is not because of them that it is so. […O]ur 
actual responses are inappropriate for the wrongness of cruelty to depend upon. What makes cruelty abhorrent 
is not that it offends us, but all those hideous things that make it do so” (367). Interestingly, in a later reprint the 
middle sentence here gets changed to “[O]ur actual responses are inappropriate anchors for the wrongness of 
cruelty” (1993b: 172). The talk of “anchoring” here (and the original talk of dependence, as well as the repeated 
reference to “making”) strongly suggests that Blackburn (despite his own efforts, perhaps) is thinking in terms 
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even though it is the attitudes that are expressed when we judge of things that they are right 
or wrong. The projectivist stresses that when we make a moral judgment, we commit 
ourselves rather than describe ourselves. Were I to utter 
(20) I value philanthropy 
 
I would do so truly and sincerely (supposing my self-reflective beliefs are correctly attuned). 
But 20 does not express what 17 expresses, even though 17 is sincere if and only if 20 is true. 
The biconditional we are lacking is the one between 17 and 20. In other words, the 
biconditional 
(21) I value philanthropy if and only if philanthropy is good 
is not necessarily true (and indicatively false). Philanthropy would still be good even if I did 
not value it.56 As a result, the projectivist avoids a distasteful subjectivism (where 
philanthropy’s being good is solely dependent upon my valuing it), but at the cost of making 
our truthmaker question all the more difficult to answer. If 17 and 20 were equivalent, then 
we could transfer the (easily enough attained) truthmaker for 20 over to 17. But the truth of 
17 is independent from the truth of 20. The sincerity of 17, again, is dependent upon the truth 
of 20. The truth of 17, alas, is another matter. 
We know how the quasi-realist should not answer our truthmaker query. How should 
he answer it? Here I make the case that quasi-realists can look to the natural world, so long as 
they rely on a projectivist account of the truthmaking relation. Recall that Blackburn writes 
that “what makes it wrong to kick dogs is that it causes them pain” (1981: 179). Here we can 
attend to the following fact: 
                                                 
of truthmaking and ontological grounding, and that our attitudes are not playing that role when it comes to the 
truth of moral judgments. 
56Hence quasi-realists disagree with constructivists about how to answer the Euthyphro question regarding the 
moral and the judgments of the ideal observer, and hence disagree about such counterfactuals. For concern over 
whether quasi-realists are actually entitled to this answer, see Rasmussen 1985. 
 307
(22) Kicking dogs causes them pain. 
Suppose we offer an adequate truthmaker for 22. The details will be difficult, of course; the 
presence of causality here forces us to inquire into what it is that makes causal judgments 
true. (And recall my suspicion that even if projectivists are right about what it is to make a 
causal judgment, they haven’t yet said what it is that makes a causal judgment true.) 
Whatever the best truthmaker account is that is available for 22, we can at least notice that 
there is nothing distinctly ethical about 22. 22 is of interest to philosophers of science and 
philosophers of mind; they are the ones to whom we should turn if we want a metaphysical 
account of the nature of causality and pain.57 So let us suppose that they do have a truthmaker 
to offer us for 22; let us call it ‘K’. The existence of K guarantees the truth of 22. Blackburn 
thinks that because 22 is true, so too is 23: 
(23) It is wrong to kick dogs. 
 
The reason why it’s wrong to kick dogs is that doing so causes them pain. If 23 follows58 
from 22, then whatever makes true 22 (namely, K) is also a truthmaker for 23. Presumably, K 
is a perfectly acceptable natural creature. It is no offense to naturalists, since 22 itself is no 
offense. It seems, then, that the quasi-realist does have the resources to give an account of 
what makes moral truths true. The quasi-realist may point in the same direction as the 
naturalistic realist. The quasi-realist’s distinctive metaethical theses involve attitudes, values, 
and sentiments. Those are what get expressed by moral judgments. But it is clear that they do 
not make moral judgments true—though they play an important role in understanding how 
                                                 
57Of course, we may also consult the relevant psychologists and scientists. I’m not advocating an entirely a 
priori approach to truthmaking. Those who accuse contemporary analytic metaphysicians of being confined to 
the armchair do so to their own ironic peril; a quick glance at the empirical facts of what metaphysicians are up 
to will reveal that they do not take metaphysical questions to be decided purely a priori. 
58The nature of the consequence relation here is of course a matter of some controversy. We shall tackle the 
question when we get to the topic of moral supervenience. 
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truths and their truthmakers match up. Notice that for quasi-realists, to see what makes moral 
judgments true, we have to inquire individually into what makes things right or wrong. There 
is no single property like goodness that can be an across-the-board truthmaker for moral 
judgments. So, kicking dogs is wrong because it causes them pain. Cruelty is abhorrent 
because it causes suffering. On the quasi-realist view, moral truths are true because of certain 
naturalistic facts (they allow for no others).59 
The quasi-realist I have presented can agree with the naturalist on what the moral 
truthmakers are. Again, this does not mean that the two views collapse into a single 
metaethical view. The reason why is that there is more to moral realism, and more to 
metaethics, than just what truthmakers there are. There is also the question of how things get 
to be truthmakers. Does K make it true that kicking dogs is wrong in virtue of its de re modal 
properties, or are we intimately involved via our sentiments and emotions? The quasi-realist 
distinguishes himself from the naturalist not in terms of what truthmakers there are, but in 
terms of the nature of the truthmaking relation, which must be understood in projectivist 
fashion when it comes to ethics. 
In Blackburn’s own critique of naturalistic moral realism, he contends that “no 
complete theory of ethics can simply point to the grounding properties, and suppose that 
evaluations are given their meaning by their relationship to them. We need first to understand 
                                                 
59But see Blackburn 1984b, where attempts are made at giving a distinctive account of moral truth. Blackburn 
suggests there that we can “construct a notion of truth” such that a moral judgment is true just in case the 
attitude it expresses belongs to a “best possible set of attitudes” (198). If so, then what would make a moral 
judgment true is whatever it is that makes the attitude it expresses belong to the best possible set of attitudes; 
understanding this latter notion would then be paramount in understanding the metaphysics of quasi-realism. 
This particular strategy, however, has been abandoned. First, it seems to make quasi-realism just another 
version of constructivism, in which case it would inherit that view’s truthmaking fumbles. Second, it is very 
much out of step with more deflationary accounts of truth, which Blackburn seems to endorse happily 
nowadays. Just as deflationists should make no use of distinct “senses” of truth, we should not think that there 
are multiple varieties of truth. There’s nothing distinctive about moral truth, in contrast to scientific truth, say, 
such that theorists of truth have a multiplicity of distinct projects in which to engage. There are just moral truths, 
scientific truths, etc. Lynch, by contrast, has taken up the Spreading the Word approach in formulating a 
distinctively moral kind of truth (2009). 
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the evaluative stance” (1998: 69). Blackburn’s point against the Cornell realist is well taken. 
Suppose that the Cornell realist gets the truthmaker story about moral judgments correct. 
Does it follow that every metaethical question has been answered? Surely not. Now, we have 
so far suggested that 22 and 23 share the same truthmaker(s). But in no way should we claim 
that 22 and 23 share the same meaning.60 The threat of Moore’s open question argument 
looms large when naturalistic reductions or identifications are afoot. The Cornell realist goes 
so far as to identify moral properties with certain naturalistic ones. Blackburn’s view seems 
to be that this identification of properties is mostly beside the point when it comes to 
understanding ethical thought. “I find this approach puzzling, because it is unclear what 
problems it solves,” Blackburn writes about the Cornell school (1993a: 180). One does not 
understand ethics any better, one can imagine Blackburn saying, by discovering the de re 
features of the natural world. 
If the foregoing is correct, then quasi-realists should not say that ethical truths come 
with no metaphysical commitments whatsoever. Eschewing realist metaphysics is not 
tantamount to eschewing metaphysics altogether. Ethical truths are still true in virtue of 
something or other. We now have the materials to address one of the most contentious 
questions surrounding quasi-realism. Is it really a version of anti-realism, or is it just moral 
realism again in different dress? We now know the answer. Quasi-realism is a form of anti-
realism, because though it takes there to be moral truths grounded in a realism-relevant 
                                                 
60Note, however, that a fair question for the quasi-realist is this: If 22 and 23 do not mean the same thing, then 
why are they made true by the same thing(s)? Of course, metaphysical issues are not semantic ones; truthmaker 
theorists are the first to point that out. One may still wonder, however, why there should be metaphysical 
coincidence when not semantic coincidence. Another difficult question for the quasi-realist is how he answers 
the competing claims of those who say that a different set of naturalistic facts and properties are the truthmakers 
for moral truths. The Cornell realists can tie their truthmakers to their moral truths by means of their 
sophisticated semantic machinery. But on what grounds may Blackburn claim that 22 is the natural fact relevant 
to the truth of 23? My thanks to Ben Herscovitch and Matthew Hammerton for helping me to appreciate these 
standing challenges for quasi-realism. (But note that I shall later be spinning this “challenge” for quasi-realism 
as a potential advantage.) 
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ontology (i.e., the natural world), it takes the relationship between moral truth and their 
truthmakers to be a mind-dependent, projectivist matter. 
 
5.3. Creeping minimalism 
5.3.1. The problem 
We have now completed a long (and still not fully comprehensive) tour of the 
metaethical terrain.61 We have discussed a number of the prominent views, and seen how 
those views interact with the kinds of questions that are pertinent to truthmaker theory. My 
overall hypothesis is that questions about moral realism are at bottom question about 
truthmakers. What is at stake between moral realists and moral anti-realists is not over 
whether moral judgments are true, but what it is (if anything) that makes them true, and how 
those things get to be truthmakers. The truthmaker theory approach to realism thus has an 
account of moral realism to offer to metaethicists. If so, then we should be able to solve the 
problem of creeping minimalism, which purports to undermine the very debate by collapsing 
the distinctions between the various metaethical positions. 
The problem of creeping minimalism comes to the fore when we recognize the 
potential strength of the quasi-realist program, and just how peculiar its standard is for 
success. The quasi-realist seeks to mimic the intellectual practices and views of his realist 
opponent. The more successful the quasi-realist program is, the more quasi-realism 
resembles realism. So the stronger the case is for quasi-realism, the more difficult the case is 
for distinguishing it from realism. The problem of creeping minimalism appears when views 
                                                 
61For example, we have not discussed the secondary property view of McDowell (1981, 1985) and David 
Wiggins (1976). Nor have we discussed the ethical contextualism of Timmons (1999), or moral fictionalism 
(e.g., Joyce 2001 and Kalderon 2005). Richard Joyce has the same account of moral truthmakers as does 
Mackie—there are none—though Mark Eli Kalderon’s view is somewhat different. 
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like the deflationary theory of truth enter the scene. Once we acknowledge the merits of 
deflationary or minimal views on truth, we are led to acknowledge the merits of minimal 
approaches to other related notions such as propositions, reference, belief, and facts. In so 
doing, we begin to embrace everything that the realist originally embraced, and lose any 
grasp on just what was supposed to be at issue.62 
Dreier describes the phenomenon of creeping minimalism as follows: 
Minimalism sucks the substance out of heavy-duty metaphysical concepts. If 
successful, it can help Expressivism recapture the ordinary realist language of ethics. 
But in so doing it also threatens to make irrealism indistinguishable from realism. 
That is the problem of Creeping Minimalism. (2004: 26)63 
 
If truth is not a substantive property of propositions, then all it is for the proposition, say, that 
torture is wrong to be true is just for torture to be wrong. So much for the supposedly 
difficult question of whether truth consists in conformity with reality, useful belief, or 
systematic coherence. But what is a proposition? The minimalist about propositions says that 
just as ‘is true’ is a handy appendage we can add to sentences, so too may I tack ‘the 
proposition that’ onto some sentence, thereby creating a singular term useful for other 
purposes. Since I can meaningfully discuss whether torture is wrong, I can just as easily 
meaningfully discuss whether the proposition that torture is wrong is true. But (it is claimed), 
                                                 
62The historical precursor to the discussion of creeping minimalism was the question over whether metaethical 
expressivists could or should embrace some sort of deflationary theory of truth (and so possibly avoid the 
problems introduced by the Frege-Geach problem). That little literature is hard going. Dreier (1996) thinks that 
deflationism is no help here in solving the problem. If ‘expressivism’ picks out a view committed to moral 
judgments not being apt for truth, then Smith (1994a and 1994c) thinks expressivists ought to adopt 
deflationism (ditto for Jackson, Oppy, and Smith 1994), whereas Wright (1992), Horwich (1993 and 1994), and 
John Divers and Alexander Miller (1994 and 1995) think deflationism undermines the view that moral 
judgments are not truth-apt. Here I side with the latter camp. Deflationism about truth motivates deflationism 
about truth-aptness, and thus does away with expressivism in Smith’s sense. Boghossian (1990) argues for a 
tension between deflationism and any kind of non-factualism. Finally, O’Leary-Hawthorne and Huw Price 
(1996) argue that expressivism (at least when understood more perspicuously) can be maintained in spite of 
granting truth-aptness to ethical discourse, a conclusion with which I (along with Horwich 1990 and all 
contemporary quasi-realists) agree. See Bar-On and Chrisman 2009 for an explicit defense of such a view. 
63See also Zangwill 1992, which anticipates the same problem. 
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I do not here engage in any extra ontological commitment to strange and mysterious entities 
called “propositions”.64 A minimalist about facts just says that it’s a fact that torture is wrong 
just in case torture is wrong. Torture is wrong, and so there are ethical facts. Facts, minimally 
understood, are just true propositions, which in turn are just true sentences. Next, do I 
sincerely assert that torture is wrong? Yes, and so I believe that torture is wrong (so says the 
minimalist about belief).65 We can even do the same for properties. Properties, minimally 
understood, are little more than predicates. If torture is wrong, then there is a moral property: 
wrongness. Very quickly, we see that ethical propositions, truths, facts, properties, and 
beliefs are very easily earned by the minimalist. But such things, in Dreier’s “Good Old 
Days”, were the cruces that kept realists and anti-realists separate. Emotivists denied that 
there were ethical propositions (and hence none of the rest, either). Error theorists admitted 
ethical propositions, but denied that there were ethical properties, truths, or facts. 
Contemporary ethical expressivists (or certain time slices of them) allow ethical truths, but 
deny that our assertions of them express our beliefs. Once we open the minimalist floodgate, 
we appear to lose sight of what distinguishes realists from anti-realists. For the minimalist is 
entitled to say that there are moral truths, moral facts, moral propositions, and moral beliefs. 
Given that deflationism is now a solid plank in the quasi-realist platform (as in Blackburn 
1998), one wonders if quasi-realism has become too successful: in attempting to mimic 
realism, it has just become realism.66 
                                                 
64But see Hofweber 2005b for more thoroughgoing discussion of some of the issues in the neighborhood here. 
65Gibbard explicitly endorses such a view of beliefs at his 2003: 182-183, as do Horgan and Timmons (2006b: 
93). 
66This seems to be Rosen’s conclusion (1998: 400). Dunaway 2010 argues that, contrary to Dreier, there is no 
minimalist theory that expressivists may accept that allows them to accept all of the realist’s claims. 
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In deference both to ordinary ethical practice—which the parties to the debate seem 
to agree manifests the surface trappings of realism—and to objections in the wake of the 
writings of P. T. Geach (1960, 1965), contemporary ethical anti-realists have sought to 
maintain that they too may earn the appearances of realist-sounding ethical discourse. The 
trick to doing so seems to be embracing minimalism about the key notions. To save the 
ethical phenomena, then, anti-realists turn to minimalism. But in so doing, they appear to turn 
into realists. (For why shouldn’t realists be equally entitled to semantic minimalism?) The 
more the quasi-realism program is successful (such that it better and better can reclaim the 
claims of realism), the less it remains a distinctive view. The problem of creeping 
minimalism threatens to undermine a distinction at the very center of metaethical thought. As 
Dreier puts it: “those of us who feel confident that there is some difference between the two 
meta-ethical camps should be concerned that we don’t know how to say what that difference 
is” (2004: 31). 
There is one option, albeit it a highly unattractive one, that a theorist might take for 
drawing the difference. That option is to bifurcate each of the various notions. Truth is one 
thing; TRUTH is another. Some sentences express propositions; others express 
PROPOSITIONS. I have lots of beliefs; only some of these are BELIEFS. The lowercase 
notions are the minimalist versions, whereas the uppercase notions are the non-minimalist 
versions. The distinction between the quasi-realist and the realist can now be drawn. The 
quasi-realist thinks that we can have moral beliefs that, when true, express true moral 
propositions. By contrast, the realist thinks that we can have moral BELIEFS that, when 
TRUE, express TRUE moral PROPOSITIONS. Now, I am not terribly sympathetic toward 
classical non-cognitivism in general, but I heartily endorse a robust non-cognitivism about 
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capitalization. The sentence ‘It is true that snow is white’ conveys the exact same content as 
does ‘It is True that snow is white’ and ‘It is TRUE that snow is white’. If there is any 
difference to be found, it is in the former’s sole conformity to proper English grammar. Just 
how the distinction between “Capital ‘T’ Truth” and truth is supposed to be drawn has 
always escaped me.67 That anyone should take a distinction in capitalization to bear some 
heavy philosophical load baffles me even more. Yet many have apparently taken refuge in it. 
Arthur Fine (1986) makes use of the notion of the “World” (utilizing both italics and 
capitalization!) to stigmatize certain (supposedly) opposing views.68 Kit Fine (2001) 
distinguishes reality from Reality.69 Now, of course these philosophers do not think that 
merely capitalizing a word adds cognitive content to it. They are using the syntactical 
distinction to mark a difference between what they take to be substantively different 
metaphysical positions. It’s easy to see why one might be attracted to drawing such a fine 
distinction,70 and there seems to be a corresponding distinction in the popular vernacular (as 
in the distinction between truth and “capital T” truth). However, I think this bifurcated 
strategy is a dead end, or at least serves to trivialize a substantive metaethical issue. (I take it 
that Dreier takes his paper to reduce such views to absurdity, even if not to contradiction!) 
                                                 
67Though I suppose it may have its root, as do many philosophical confusions, in a conflation of metaphysics 
and epistemology. Perhaps the capital ‘T’ truths are thought to be those with a privileged epistemic status. Or 
perhaps the capitalization is thought to convey modal status: truths are contingent, whereas Truths or TRUTHS 
are necessary. In any event, if there is a distinction to be drawn, doing so with capitalization (or italicization, or 
foot stomps, or other non-cognitive devices) is never illuminating. See James 1981:104 and 110 for a sample of 
what not to do. 
68See Musgrave 1989 for a clever and insightful response to such moves of Fine’s. Cf. Putnam 1978 and its use 
of ‘THE WORLD’. We take up these views in full detail in the next chapter. 
69See also Timmons 1999, which is particularly guilty in unapologetically employing a similar strategy. See 
Horwich 2007 for a critique of Fine’s program, and Fine 2007 for response. Putnam (in, e.g., his 1988) also 
makes use of a distinction between ‘realism’ and ‘Realism’. 
70Here the pun was intended. 
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So what is the difference? Dreier considers three answers (drawing from O’Leary-
Hawthorne and Price 1996, Kit Fine 2001, and Gibbard 2003) and adopts a hybridization of 
the proffered accounts that he calls “the “explanation” explanation” (2004: 39). The idea is 
that what distinguishes realists from anti-realists is how they go about explaining the 
existence of our moral beliefs. Suppose that Obama believes that torture is wrong. Then the 
following is true: 
(24) Obama believes that torture is wrong. 
 
Realists and anti-realists can agree that ‘Torture is wrong’ expresses a true moral proposition 
(i.e., a moral fact), and that Obama really does believe it. The difference comes in how they 
explain the truth of 24. The realist must somehow explain 24 by demonstrating there to be 
some relationship between Obama, torture, and wrongness. The anti-realist does so without 
resorting to wrongness. Gibbard, for example, would say that the truth of 24 is explained by 
the planning state that Obama is in that has resulted in Obama’s thinking that the thing to do 
is not to torture. Wrongness gets left out of the anti-realist’s explanation, even though his 
minimalism about properties leads him to agree with the realist that there is a property of 
wrongness. (After all, torture is one thing that has the property.) 
Here is how Dreier summarizes his response to the problem: 
Crucial to maintaining the distinction, in meta-ethics, in the twenty-first century, 
between realism and irrealism is the possibility that concepts (and meanings) can 
differ in ways other than by their content. Or, if the difference between normative (or 
evaluative, or “planning”) concepts and descriptive (naturalistic) ones can also be 
stated as a difference in content, then at least it must be a comprehensible, substantive 
question whether the difference in concept is explained by (or if you prefer amounts 
to no more than) a difference in content, on the one hand, or rather it is explained by 
(amounts to) something else entirely, which in turn explains the difference in content. 
The divide between realism and irrealism, at least in meta-ethics, rests on the 
substance of questions about metaphysical explanation. (2004: 42) 
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The waters here are somewhat murky, but let us try to understand what is at stake in Dreier’s 
response. The realist and anti-realist need not disagree as to the content of 24. When they 
both maintain its truth, they are agreeing on the exact same claim. If they do disagree as to 
the content of such claims, then that difference must admit of some realism-relevant 
metaphysical explanation. I agree wholeheartedly, in some sense or other, with Dreier’s 
claim that the divide between realism and anti-realism is a question about metaphysical 
explanation (though, as above, I have my reservations about wielding ‘explanation’ too 
incautiously). After all, we are understanding truthmaker theory as being in the business of 
offering metaphysical accountability. Still, I worry that the explanation explanation might not 
cut it. We have already seen what should long ago have been accepted as a Moorean fact in 
philosophy, namely, that requests for explanations are deeply sensitive to context and 
pragmatic interests. For any given datum—such as the truth of 24—there are several 
explanatory demands that may be asked of it. It is hopelessly simple to think that there is 
some privileged explanation of something like 24. Because of the plurality of explanatory 
requests that may be raised by 24, it is hard to say that wrongness could not figure into any of 
them. Given that our contemporary expressivist is happy to say that there is a property of 
wrongness, it will be perfectly acceptable to use it in explaining things that involve it. There 
are other explanations on hand, for sure. But that is true in any explanatory project. Hence I 
doubt that relying on a simple model of explanation is the key to saving the differences 
between moral realism and anti-realism. One might think that explanatory resources 
involving moral properties are just one more thing that will become available to both sides of 
the chasm.71 
                                                 
71See Chrisman 2008 for more criticism of Dreier’s proposal. He thinks Dreier’s suggestion ultimately falls prey 
to creeping minimalism after all. Chrisman goes on to offer an inferentialist option for drawing the debate 
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5.3.2. The solution 
Creeping minimalism is a problem for metaethics. It comes to light most explicitly by 
way of the success of quasi-realism, and its embrace of semantic deflationism. Our task is to 
employ truthmaker theory somehow in order to appreciate what is at stake in the metaethical 
debate. To do that, I suggest that we consider some very preliminary and I hope 
uncontroversial thoughts about metaethics in general. 
Metaethics is the philosophical topic that asks philosophical questions about the 
domain of ethical thought and practice. There are a variety of kinds of philosophical 
questions, and so there are a variety of kinds of metaethical questions. We might ask about 
the metaphysics underlying ethical thought, or the epistemology behind it. We might ask 
questions about how ethical language works, or about what it is to have ethical beliefs. We 
might ask about the psychology of moral judgment, or even about the neurobiology behind it. 
There is, in other words, a multiplicity of metaethical projects. Some of these projects have 
already been adequately isolated and distinguished—take moral epistemology, for instance. 
But although there is a plurality of various metaethical projects, this plurality disappears from 
sight when the traditional metaethical views are adumbrated. We speak of the error theorist, 
the realist, the expressivist. But which projects are these theories engaged in? All of them? 
Certainly not. Just some of them? If so, then which ones? My suspicion is that the traditional 
metaethical views—including all the ones we have been exploring—have simultaneously 
been giving accounts of the metaphysics and the philosophy of language behind ethical 
thought, but without attending too carefully to the distinction. There is a perfectly natural 
                                                 
between realism and anti-realism. I fear that his proposal, which relies on a distinction between theoretical and 
practical commitments, will likewise fall prey to the creeping minimalist. Why can’t ethical commitments be 
theoretical? Can we not have a theory of ethics, in the relevant sense? Given my commitment to moral realism 
being a metaphysical thesis, my view predicts that any psychological or semantic basis for the distinction, 
including Chrisman’s, will fail to be sufficient for properly grounding the moral realism debate. 
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sociological explanation for the (con)fusion. Expressivism was born from logical positivism 
and verificationism, views that sought to eradicate metaphysical inquiry and replace it with 
the analysis of language. Dummett’s verificationism was an attempt to redefine debates about 
realism in semantic terms. Nowadays, we know better and keep our metaphysical and 
semantic ducks in their respective, separate rows. Now, if creeping minimalism poses a 
problem for understanding the debate in metaethics, we need first to ask: which debate? The 
one over the metaphysics of ethical thought, or the one about the nature of ethical language? 
If we hope to solve the problem of creeping minimalism, we need to keep those two 
metaethical projects separate. 
I, of course, advocate understanding moral realism as a distinctively metaphysical 
thesis. Moral realism is about moral reality, and reality is the exclusive domain of 
metaphysics. Disagreements between moral realists and moral anti-realists are to be 
understood in terms metaphysical and ontological. Whatever divides realists from anti-
realists should have something or other to do with reality, something that can cut 
metaphysical ice. What the problem of creeping minimalism shows is that semantic notions 
like propositions, reference, and truth cannot do the job. On our approach, the way to study 
metaphysics and ontology is to be engaged in the search for truthmakers (or other suitable 
ontological grounds). Hence, the way to understand what is at stake between various 
metaethical views (in the metaphysical subdomain of metaethics) is to understand how they 
give differing accounts of what makes moral judgments true, and how they do so. Realists 
offer moral facts and/or properties (of either naturalistic or non-naturalistic origin). 
Relativists offer moral frameworks. Constructivists and superassertibilists founder on the 
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truthmaking question, and end up with no good account on offer (so far as I can tell). Quasi-
realists offer natural facts, but take on an anti-realist account of the truthmaking relation. 
I consider, then, the problem of creeping minimalism solved. The first stage to the 
solution is simply to distinguish quite explicitly what in retrospect seems so obvious, namely, 
the plurality of metaethical projects and questions. Once we see that metaethical views may 
take a stand on one set of questions while setting another set aside, we can urge the extant 
metaethical positions to keep clear on the distinction between questions of moral metaphysics 
and questions of moral language. Questions of moral metaphysics are to be understood in 
terms of truthmaking, and regimenting the debate in this fashion shows that there still is real 
debate. Within the realist camp, we see naturalists and non-naturalists divide over the 
question what makes moral judgments true. They offer competing sets of truthmakers to do 
the job. We see certain metaethical anti-realists get out of the game of offering truthmakers 
altogether (by way of getting out of the game of moral truth). Truthmaking considerations 
also put enormous pressure on other anti-realist accounts. Superassertibilists and 
constructivists are shown to offer inadequate (or at least incomplete) accounts, and relativists 
emerge as simply dodging the original question. The quasi-realist, too, can be seen as 
engaging in moral metaphysics, but perhaps in a way consistent with the naturalistic realist. 
None of this metaphysical debate turns on whether we should adopt a deflationary account of 
truth, reference, or belief. As we saw in the previous chapter, truth and realism are neutral 
regarding each other. 
As for questions of moral language and moral practice, there still seem to be 
important differences between the competing views. As Dreier shows, the way to understand 
those differences is not to be understood in terms of truth, belief, reference, or other semantic 
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notions. The legacy of the Frege-Geach problem (together with the important insights behind 
deflationism) is that ethical language is semantically on a par with other domains of 
discourse.72 Thankfully, that semantic continuity is consistent with metaphysical 
discontinuity. What makes ethical judgments true may be very different in character from 
what makes judgments about the natural world true. (Or, as in the case of quasi-realism, the 
truthmaking relation in which the truths of scientific theories, say, stand is very different in 
character from the one in which ethical truths stand.) One might be tempted to say that while 
expressivists think that moral judgments project our attitudes on the world, realists think that 
our moral judgments represent the way the world is (e.g., Blackburn 1998: 77 and 2002a). 
But I am inclined to think that ‘representation’ here is just another notion that will get sucked 
up by the creeping minimalist vacuum. ‘The judgment that murder is wrong represents how 
things are with respect to murder’ seems a perfectly fine thing to say, regardless of one’s 
metaethical preferences. The lesson of creeping minimalism is that we cannot put all the 
metaethical weight on some particular semantic notion, and expect it to save the differences 
all by itself. The strength of the quasi-realist program, equipped with the right kind of 
deflationism, shows how that maneuver cannot work. To see what is at stake between 
projectivists and non-projectivists, we have to take in a broader view of what it is to engage 
in ethical thought, practice, and behavior. Here the projectivist has a detailed account, and a 
distinctive view. When we engage in ethical practice, we project our values, interests, and 
sentiments onto the world. The function of ethical discourse is to do just that. Non-
                                                 
72Recall from before that to accept certain canonical deflationary theses is not to accept them all. I happen to 
think that quasi-realists can get by in solving the Frege-Geach problem merely by recognizing the truth of 
linguistic and metaphysical deflationism. Conceptual deflationism is not at issue here. Hence, I think creeping 
minimalism is a potential problem for just about everyone, since just about everyone had better accept linguistic 
and metaphysical deflationism. 
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projectivists think that the function of ethical discourse is not to project anything on the 
world, but to describe what is there antecedently. 
The main point of the foregoing is that we have questions about what makes moral 
judgments true on the one hand, and questions about the function of moral judgments in our 
thought and practice on the other. Separating out the two questions, we can give sophisticated 
views that try to make best sense out of both. This sort of separation is the real answer to the 
problem of creeping minimalism. We want to understand what is at stake in metaethical 
debate; to understand that, we have to recognize that there are different projects and different 
questions afoot. 
 
5.4. Progress in metaethics 
In section 5.2, I argued that we can use the truthmaker approach to realism developed 
in chapter 4 in order to offer an understanding of what is at stake in the debate over moral 
realism. The truthmaker approach both properly categorizes the various views on the correct 
side of the realist/anti-realist divide while at the same time explaining why those theories 
deserve to be there. One additional benefit of this approach was explored in section 5.3, 
where I showed how we can use truthmaker theory to dissolve the problem of creeping 
minimalism. In this section, I want to sketch how truthmaker theory can also put pressure on 
various metaethical views. Hence, rather than merely pouring old wine into new bottles, we 
can use truthmaker theory to make some progress in the debate. Specifically, I think 
considerations involving truthmaker theory can be used to argue that, on the realist side, 
naturalism is the strongest metaethical contender, and that, on the anti-realist side, quasi-
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realism is the most defensible view. As for the choice between naturalism and quasi-realism, 
truthmaking considerations do offer a modest argument in favor of the latter. 
Consider first the various anti-realist views. The older contenders—classical non-
cognitivism and error theory—must give up something that most parties to the metaethical 
debate seek to uphold: the existence of ordinary moral truth. Minimalism about truth (and, in 
its wake, truth-aptness) together with worries about the Frege-Geach problem are sufficient 
to dispose of traditional non-cognitivism, especially since there are newer forms of 
expressivism available that avoid those problems while preserving some of the emotivists’ 
initial motivations. Error theories are saddled with finding a discourse systematically 
defective. Relativistic views face difficulties when trying to account for the normativity of 
moral judgments, given their logical austerity once their true relativistic form is revealed. 
These problems are familiar, and so views like constructivism, superassertibilism, and 
quasi-realism are attractive precisely because they all uphold the existence of absolute moral 
truth while not succumbing to realism. But the first two of those views founder when it 
comes to our truthmaking inquiries. Constructivists and superassertibilists like Wright point 
to certain counterfactual conditionals to elucidate the truth of moral judgments, but then fall 
silent as to the metaphysical status of those counterfactuals. Unless an account of what makes 
those counterfactuals true is forthcoming, the truthmaker theorist has a valid complaint 
against such theories. They refuse to engage the topic of moral realism by refusing to engage 
in what it is about the world that makes moral judgments true. Whatever the merits of the 
projects, they fail to take seriously a key metaethical question: what makes moral judgments 
true? 
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Suppose, however, that these accounts think that their counterfactuals hit rock bottom. 
They are themselves true, and serve to account for the truth of moral judgments even though 
nothing accounts for their truth. They are metaphysically brute, in other words: makers of 
truth that are not themselves made true. We have been countenancing the existence of such 
views, but have hardly been bestowing any praise upon them. Here is how the view would 
work: Suppose again that 6 is true: 
(6) Any ideal observer would judge that kicking dogs is wrong. 
 
If so, then it is true that kicking dogs is wrong. But perhaps the truth of 6 is just a brute fact, 
an unexplained explainer as it were. If so, 6 is non-discriminating; its truth is nowise 
reflected in the world. As such, there is a possible world metaphysically indiscernible from 
the actual world—all the same stuff exists, and the distribution of all the properties and 
relations is the same—but where 6 is false.73 It’s just a brute fact that our world is the one 
where 6 is true, even though our world’s identical twin holds it to be false. 
It now becomes apparent that taking moral judgments to be non-discriminating 
truthmaker gaps is not the way to go (even if, following Azzouni, it is the way to go with 
numbers). Part of the practice of engaging in ethical discourse consists in giving reasons for 
our moral beliefs, and providing for them suitable grounds. Recall this passage from 
Blackburn above: 
Ethical avowals, like decisions and verdicts, require grounds. If I grade one paper 
higher than another, I must be prepared to indicate some relevant difference between 
them. We acknowledge the need to point to something that grounds our judgement, in 
virtue of which one is better than the other. (1998: 69) 
 
When trying to account for why kicking dogs is wrong, we are obligated to offer grounds that 
justify the ethical judgment. Hence we appeal to the fact that kicking dogs causes them pain, 
                                                 
73Unless 6 is necessarily true, which seems false. Imagine a world where kicking dogs bestowed upon them 
eternal happiness. Any ideal observer that forbade kicking dogs in such a world would be a moral monster. 
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or leads to greater unhappiness, or something similar. These appeals are not merely 
epistemological; if the wrongness of kicking dogs is metaphysically isolated from the fact 
that it causes them pain, then it would be completely arbitrary as to why that natural fact was 
relevant to the wrongness of the act, and not some other natural fact (such as that kicking 
dogs releases energy). For the stated natural facts to be grounds for the ethical claims, they 
have to stand in the proper relationship to them. When ethical judgments bottom out too 
quickly—as with taking 6 to be a non-discriminating truthmaker gap—we give up on that 
obligation. It just becomes a brute fact that the world is one way ethically, and not some 
other way. But this is out of sync with what it is to be an ethical thinker. Ethical thinkers 
offer an account of what makes things have the moral properties that they do. The lesson is 
that ethical judgments (or the counterfactuals supporting them) are not good candidates for 
being non-discriminating truthmaker gaps. Positing them as such would relieve us of the duty 
of offering grounds for our ethical claims. If such counterfactuals were brute facts, then we 
could justify all ethical claims (quite correctly) merely by referencing the workings of the 
Committee: “Why is torturing babies wrong? Well, the Committee wouldn’t approve, and 
that’s just a brute feature of reality.” 
If ethical judgments were non-discriminating truthmaker gaps, then we could easily 
understand why any such view that posited them as such qualifies as being anti-realist, for 
moral truths would then enjoy their truth entirely independently of reality. But since one can 
be an anti-realist without resorting to non-discriminating truthmaker gaps, I suggest that no 
moral anti-realist take refuge here. Hence all metaphysical metaethicists, realist and anti-
realist alike, should never claim that the truth of moral judgments does not accompany any 
metaphysical commitments. Even if one is an anti-realist, or an epistemicist about moral truth, 
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one should not deny that moral truths make a difference to the way the world is. To think 
otherwise is to take moral truths as brute, which is anathema to ethical thought and practice. 
If Wright or the constructivists are indeed committed to brute moral truths, I conclude that 
their views are false. If they are not so committed, then they owe us an account of what 
makes their preferred counterfactuals true. 
The foregoing presents an argument to the effect that taking moral truths (or truths 
like 6 that are one step removed from first-order moral truths) as metaphysically brute—i.e., 
non-discriminating—is out of sync with proper moralizing. It will be useful to compare this 
argument with a similar predecessor, Blackburn’s original supervenience argument against 
moral realism (1971, 1985b).74 The literature on supervenience seems to take its jumping off 
point from examples like this: 
If I said ‘Smith acted rightly in giving her the money, but he might have given her the 
money, and in all other respects acted similarly, except that his act was not right’, I 
should invite the comment ‘But how could the rightness of the act disappear like this? 
If the act, motives, circumstances, &c., were all the same, then you would be bound, 
logically, to judge it right in the hypothetical case as you did in the actual case. The 
actual action couldn’t have been right and the hypothetical action not right, unless 
there had been some other difference between the actions, or their circumstances, or 
their motives, or something else’. (Hare 1952: 153). 
 
Such examples are supposed to bring out the idea that the moral supervenes upon the 
natural.75 If two circumstances somehow differ in their moral features, then the naturalistic 
features of those circumstances must also differ somehow. To maintain that two 
circumstances could be completely indiscernible naturalistically, and yet differ in their moral 
                                                 
74For further discussion of the argument see Blackburn 1984b, Hare 1984, Klagge 1984, 1987, and 1988, 
McFetridge 1985, Elliot 1987, Noonan 1987, Price 1988: 77-82, Dreier 1992, Horgan and Timmons 1992b, and 
Shafer-Landau 2003: 84-98. 
75See also Moore 1903 and 1922: 260-261. 
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status, is to manifest incompetence in ethical thinking. It is taken to be a matter of ethical 
competence that one recognize the supervenience of the moral upon the natural. 
The difficulty for the moral realist is as follows (though it can only pose a problem 
for non-naturalistic realists). The moral is said to supervene on the natural. But there is no 
entailment (in all cases) from the natural to the moral (recalling Hume’s maxim that one 
cannot derive an ought from an is). Hence, we are loathe to think that two things 
naturalistically indiscernible may differ in their moral features, even though the lack of 
entailment between the two domains gives rise to some sense in which it’s possible for the 
two to come apart. Why, then, do we uphold the supervenience requirement? Blackburn 
thinks that the anti-realist has the correct reply: we project moral features onto the natural 
world, and do so in an orderly, disciplined manner. It is no part of moral thinking to be 
arbitrary. If moral thinking is the game of gilding and staining the natural world with ethical 
colors, and this game is to be properly disciplined, then our gilding and staining should be 
consistently and systematically applied. Since the natural world is all the world there is, we 
must consistently and non-arbitrarily gild and stain it with our moral projections. To reject 
the supervenience constraint—to start arbitrarily attributing moral features to things, 
irrespective of their natural features—is to give up the game of morality. Supervenience is a 
constraint on moralizing that is fundamental to the practice. 
But the issue cannot be handled so adroitly by the non-naturalistic realist. There is no 
entailment from the natural truths to the moral truths. Furthermore, the realist thinks that the 
moral features of the world are neither reducible to nor identical with the natural features of 
the world. The moral represents an independent, sui generis domain of reality. But if so, it 
becomes quite mysterious why moral supervenience should hold: if the moral and natural are 
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independent domains of reality, then why should the naturalistic facts constrain the moral 
facts? As Blackburn concludes, “Supervenience becomes, for the realist, an opaque, isolated, 
logical fact, for which no explanation can be proffered” (1971: 111). 
I actually think Blackburn underplays his hand here (though the literature tends to go 
in the opposite direction—see the references in footnote 74). To see why, let’s think through 
one possible realist metaphysics. Suppose there are two moral properties, good and bad, here 
understood as immanent universals. Let’s suppose that there are events, and that they 
instantiate the moral properties. The bombing of Dresden, let’s say, instantiates bad, whereas 
Lincoln’s freeing of the American slaves instantiates good. Both events instantiate plenty of 
other non-moral universals as well, but let us simplify and just assume that the bombing 
instantiates the natural universal European (and nothing else) whereas the freeing instantiates 
the natural universal American (and nothing else). In this toy universe, we have the bombing 
of Dresden being bad and European, whereas the freeing of the slaves was good and 
American. We are taking the two events as basic particulars, and the four properties as 
universals. As such, all six things are independent existences,76 and thus can be recombined 
according to the canons of good combinatorial reasoning.77 But immediately we see that the 
realist cannot respect supervenience. For a particular’s instantiating some universal is a 
matter between that particular and that universal; that is what recombination between distinct 
existences is all about. Whether the two events instantiate good or bad is a matter completely 
independent of whether they instantiate any natural universal, including American and 
European. Some universal N cannot constrain the instantiation of some other universal M if 
indeed N and M be distinct existences. If the moral and the natural represent distinct, 
                                                 
76Suppose for the purposes of the example that the locations of these events are not essential to them. 
77See Armstrong 1989a. 
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independent ontological dimensions, then by combinatorial reasoning we can construct all 
sorts of possible worlds that do not respect the supervenience of the moral on the natural. In 
our toy universe, for example, both events could be American, and yet one be good whereas 
the other is bad.  Hence, I conclude that non-naturalistic realists are committed to rejecting 
moral supervenience, and thus their view is false. Blackburn’s more modest conclusion is 
that realists do maintain moral supervenience, but they, in effect, have to give up 
combinatorial reasoning. We cannot recombine to form “mixed worlds” where two things 
instantiate the same natural universals, but only one of them instantiates some moral 
universal. Here we have necessary connections between distinct existences—that is, 
violations of the principle of unrestricted recombination—which, I think, is just another way 
of restating Blackburn’s “opaque, isolated, logical fact” objection. Realists must maintain 
that we cannot so recombine, but seem to have no principled reason for the stipulation. 
Because I embrace combinatorial reasoning, non-naturalistic moral realism is here shown to 
be false. Surely realists will find fault instead with the combinatorial reasoning, but I caution 
against such drastic (and seemingly unprincipled) metaphysical and logical destruction. 
The older supervenience argument shows that moral reality (understood either in 
terms of non-natural facts or properties) cannot be an independent existence. If it were, then 
reality could have been such that distinct things naturally indiscernible were nonetheless 
morally discernible. Understanding what it is to be a proper, non-arbitrary moralizer shows 
such possibilities to be fraudulent. The world could not have been that way, and so the moral 
cannot be its own independent metaphysical domain. Non-naturalistic moral realism posits 
the autonomy of the moral, and so is committed to a false conclusion for moral modal 
metaphysics. 
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The newer truthmaking argument shows that moral truths cannot be metaphysically 
brute—they cannot be non-discriminating truthmaker gaps, in our phrase. Here we have an 
argument against possible types of anti-realism like Wright’s view and constructivism. 
Positing such brute truths again bestows a level of metaphysical autonomy to the moral that it 
does not possess. If some contingently true moral judgment p is a non-discriminating 
truthmaker gap, then there is a possible world metaphysically indiscernible from our own 
where p is false. Nothing in our world accounts for p’s truth, just as nothing in our twin 
world accounts for its falsity. Here the lesson is that moral truths cannot be grounded by 
nothing.78 Interestingly, the old supervenience argument shows that moral truths cannot be 
grounded by a sui generis moral reality. The new supervenience argument (for recall that 
non-discriminating truthmaker gaps just are violations of the supervenience of truth upon 
being) shows that moral truths cannot be grounded by nothing at all. Moral practice requires 
that moral truths be grounded in something, and the startling fact of the supervenience of the 
moral upon the natural gives us an obvious clue: moral truths are grounded by the natural 
features of the world, and nothing else. Hence we have uncovered an important similarity 
between the most robust realism we have encountered (such that moral truths are grounded 
by an independent, sui generis realm of being) and one quite robust version of anti-realism 
(where there are moral truths, but they are nowise reflected by reality). Both extremes 
founder by isolating the ethical. Non-naturalistic realists isolate the ethical from the rest of 
the world; (certain possible) anti-realists isolate it from everything whatsoever. 
                                                 
78Cf. Horgan and Timmons 2006b on the “groundless objection” for expressivists. They find the idea of moral 
truths as non-discriminating truthmaker gaps perfectly legitimate. Their central error concerns a conflation 
between truth and truthmaking, such that things that are only “disquotationally true” (whatever that means) 
require no ontological grounds. 
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Of all the various metaethical anti-realisms, quasi-realism has the best means for 
answering the truthmaker theorist’s questions. They have truthmakers to offer, and a 
projectivist account of truthmaking that ensures the view’s anti-realist credentials. As for the 
realist side of things, the previous discussion of Blackburn’s supervenience argument should 
make evident where my sympathies lie. Having moral judgments made true by a realm of 
independent moral facts upsets the supervenience that obtains between the ethical and the 
natural. When it comes to moral realism, naturalists and quasi-realists are the best games in 
town. But which is better? 
First, recall the plurality of metaethical projects. Not all metaethical questions are 
settled by settling the metaphysical ones. In particular, settling on the metaphysics does not 
settle how to think about ethical language or practice, which is where naturalists and quasi-
realists diverge the most. Even more important to notice, neither does settling on how moral 
language works settle the metaphysics underlying it.79 Recall Blackburn’s contention that “no 
complete theory of ethics can simply point to the grounding properties, and suppose that 
evaluations are given their meaning by their relationship to them. We need first to understand 
the evaluative stance” (1998: 69). I take this passage to be a recognition of the fact that even 
if the naturalist’s grounding properties are present, and the right ones for us to be attending to, 
we do not yet understand what it is to be an ethical thinker, or what role ethical judgments 
play in our language, thought, and life.80 I wholeheartedly agree. For example, we do not 
need to accept the naturalistic realist’s account of how moral language works. We need not 
think that they have told us the correct story of what moral judgments mean, even though 
                                                 
79Consider also Schaffer’s distinction between ontological grounding and conceptual analyzability (2008a: 309). 
That moral truths are not a fundamental feature of reality—that they require ontological grounds—does not 
entail they may be conceptually analyzable into non-moral terms. 
80See also Blackburn 1998: 121. 
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they may have got it right with respect to what makes them true. For truthmaker theory 
allows us to see quite clearly that the project of saying what statements mean and what makes 
them true come apart. Truthmakers are not meanings. (Though meanings, if they exist, are 
truthmakers.) 
What separates quasi-realism from naturalism is the former’s projectivism and 
expressivism. Moral properties are projected onto the natural world, and our moral judgments 
are expressive of our attitudes and sentiments in a way that other judgments are not. As a 
result, the reason why certain natural facts stand in the truthmaking relation to moral facts is 
due to our projections, and not the modal features of the natural world. Such distinctive 
projectivist views may get lost in the attempt to take moral properties and facts and reduce 
them to or identify them with natural properties and facts. To the extent that such projects 
strike the quasi-realist as being beside the point, the quasi-realist betrays his real interest in 
ethical practice and ethical language. And those are perfectly fine interests to have. All I am 
stressing here is that there are other interests, distinctly metaphysical interests that also 
deserve a proper hearing. Accounting for how ethical language works does not yet account 
for how ethical reality is.81, 82 
                                                 
81Cf. the neo-expressivist view defended by Bar-On and Chrisman. They hold their expressivism to be a 
distinctly psychological thesis that is neutral with respect to questions of moral reality (2009: 142). I am, in 
effect, advocating that Blackburn take a similar stance regarding his own view, and not think (as is implicit in 
his writings) that his views about the nature of ethical language silence issues about the nature of moral reality. 
82It might be useful to compare my treatment of moral realism here with van Fraassen’s treatment of scientific 
realism (1980), which we take up in full in the next chapter. Van Fraassen defines scientific realism and anti-
realism in terms of the aim of scientific practice, in terms of what counts as success in the scientific endeavor. 
As such, van Fraassen is willing to grant much of the metaphysics and semantics of his realist opponents. The 
realist and anti-realist can agree on the content of a scientific theory, and need not think that the distinction 
between the observable and the unobservable is of any metaphysical relevance. It is of epistemological 
significance, however, and so van Fraassen’s anti-realist constructive empiricism has sometimes been described 
as (merely) “epistemological” (Musgrave 1985, Arthur Fine 2001). On days where I feel like enforcing strict 
semantic distinctions, I am inclined to say that epistemological distinctions have nothing to do with a realism 
debate. Cf. Arthur Fine: “Any student in a freshman philosophy course knows that realism is a metaphysical 
doctrine” (2001: 120). Still, notice the lesson we may draw from van Fraassen. Realists and empiricists can 
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This project is not the place to evaluate naturalism and quasi-realism with respect to 
their competing views on the semantics and psychology of ethical practice. But truthmaker 
theory does, I think, offer a modest argument in favor of quasi-realism when it comes to the 
metaphysics of morals. An important advantage over naturalism of the quasi-realist’s 
projectivist account of moral truthmakers is that it preserves a metaphysical version of 
Moore’s open question argument (1903).83 Moore argues that any identification of the 
property good with some natural property n would leave open the question: But is n good? It 
is always an open question whether any naturalistic identification of goodness means the 
same thing as goodness. Naturalists have circumvented Moore’s argument recently by 
pointing to the existence of a posteriori necessities such as water’s being composed of H2O. 
It’s not analytic that water is H2O, and so no amount of conceptual analysis will reveal its 
essence. Moore’s argument, according to naturalists, only shows that there is no conceptual 
connection between goodness and any natural property. For all that, there may still be 
relations of metaphysical necessity to be found.84 
But the argument can be revived in metaphysical terms. On the metaphysical side of 
things, we can put the point this way, as Blackburn in fact has: “it is always an open question, 
something that can be discussed and denied, whether some given feature of things is the thing 
that determines whether they are good” (1998: 15). If we read this passage in the spirit of 
                                                 
agree on the metaphysics of scientific theories. They agree on what the world would be like (and what would 
belong in our ontology) if some scientific theory were true. Compare: quasi-realists and naturalists can agree on 
what the world would be like if some ethical theory were true—they agree on what metaphysical commitments 
accompany our ethical commitments. Nevertheless, there are important distinctions to be drawn between 
realists and empiricists in just what it is to practice science, and what it is to commit to scientific theories. 
Compare: there are important distinctions to be drawn between quasi-realists and naturalists in just what it is to 
engage in moral thought and practice. 
83This shouldn’t come as too great a surprise, since the original open question argument takes any sort of 
naturalism about morality as its target. 
84See Horgan and Timmons 1992a and 1992b for critical discussion of the issue. 
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truthmaker theory, we can see that the punch line of the open question argument for 
truthmaker theory is that it’s always an open question what it is in the natural world that 
makes ethical judgments true. To offer competing accounts just is to engage in ethical 
thought and practice; the issue can’t be resolved, once and for all, by semantics alone. Quasi-
realism scores points over naturalism by being able to respect the phenomenon of openness 
that lies at the heart of the open question argument. If we take the open question phenomenon 
seriously, then the quasi-realist has the resources to accommodate it. 
 
5.5. Conclusion 
I opened the present chapter by suggesting that we could insightfully regiment the 
debate over moral realism into a debate about truthmakers. And indeed, many of the 
traditional theses, arguments, and objections that constitute the metaethical terrain can be 
understood perspicuously through the lens of truthmaker theory. But I hope also to have 
shown that we can go further than merely pouring old wine into new bottles. We saw 
distinctive truthmaking-based reasons to be dissatisfied with Wright’s superassertibilist view, 
as well as the view of the moral constructivists. We have also seen how thinking about 
truthmaking helps us understand better and ultimately avoid the problem of creeping 
minimalism. Further, I am inclined to say that in thinking about metaethics in the right way, 
we may well be in a strong position to support the quasi-realist program (provided it eschews 
its traditional anti-metaphysical rhetoric; not to engage in thoroughly realist metaphysics is 
not to abandon engaging metaphysics wholesale). 
To see why I think quasi-realism emerges as the best metaethical contender, recall 
again the “new paradigm” in metaethics. I take it that the issues surrounding the Frege-Geach 
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problem had the effect of causing a metaethical crisis that ended up bringing about a 
metaethical revolution.85 Realists and anti-realists alike now take it for granted that there are 
moral truths. Eradicating moral truth from our worldview is no longer the most salient means 
of securing one’s anti-realist inclinations.86 But when we turn to the contemporary anti-realist 
accounts that try to save moral truth, we see that they all, save for quasi-realism, founder on 
the truthmaking question. The view that moral judgments are metaphysically brute is 
inconsistent with how ethical practice and thought works, so they need some sort of 
metaphysical accounting. But Wright and the constructivists are at pains to adequately 
address that concern (and thus engage in the “flight to counterfactuals”, a move that has been 
the rallying cry of truthmaker theory since the beginning). 
Quasi-realists, at least when they are not employing their anti-metaphysical rhetoric, 
have recognized such need. What makes it wrong to kick dogs (i.e., what makes it true that 
kicking dogs is wrong) is that it causes them pain. In defending our ethical views, we need to 
be able to offer such accounting. Moral truths need to be anchored, even if those anchors can 
be found only in the natural world. The moral truths simply cannot float free of the way the 
natural world is. Views that take moral truths to be metaphysically brute (as in 
constructivism or superassertibilism), or that take moral entities (like moral facts or 
properties) to be sui generis creatures will fail to satisfy the need for proper (i.e., 
supervenience respecting) anchoring. 
Quasi-realists, then, have a decent account of what makes moral judgments true: it’s 
the natural world, understood in terms of natural facts, natural properties, or whatsoever 
                                                 
85Here, of course, I am borrowing the familiar language of Kuhn 1962. 
86Though contemporary fictionalists like Joyce (2001) are working hard to develop sophisticated versions of 
error theory. Of course, fictionalism is itself an attempt to soften the appearance-denying nature of error theory. 
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please your overall metaphysical prejudices. Here they triumph over their fellow anti-realists. 
But their account is also superior to the non-naturalistic realist, for the quasi-realist can better 
account for the sorts of anchoring that ethical judgments require. What the original 
supervenience argument shows is just what the new truthmaker argument (against non-
discriminating moral truths) shows: the moral cannot be primary. Just as the truthmaker 
theorist is motivated by the idea that truths are not fundamental, that they are grounded in 
something else, quasi-realists recognize the fact that ethical reality is not fundamental. 
Ethical truths need to be anchored, and that anchoring must consist in something other than a 
sui generis moral reality. To think otherwise is to miss a crucial feature of moralizing. 
It is also worth noting that the quasi-realist, if he accepts my gift of naturalistic moral 
truthmakers, can meet the objection that his view cannot maintain the objectivity of moral 
discourse. Blackburn (1999) thinks the quasi-realist can maintain the objectivity of moral 
discourse, but his own defense is likely to be seen as just missing the point, from the point of 
view of his objectors.87 The relativistic worry about quasi-realism is that if you and I disagree 
about the truth of some moral judgment, then the quasi-realist has no grounds on which to 
establish that there is a fact of the matter as to who is correct. There are no moral facts 
making it true, so the worry is that the grounds for its truth must lie in our attitudes (in which 
case we have given in to relativism or subjectivism), or nothing at all (since the quasi-realist 
rejects both the realist’s and the relativist’s accounting of moral truthmaking).88 The relativist 
here has the right truthmaking worry: the quasi-realist has to posit ontological grounds for 
moral truth, but eschews all the obvious means for doing so. If there are no grounds for moral 
                                                 
87See, for instance, Rasmussen 1985. 
88Cf. A. W. Moore (2002) on the relativistic notion of “metaphysical even-handedness” to which he thinks 
Blackburn is committed. I admit that I do not know what Blackburn means when he replies that “metaphysics” 
is “silent” but not even-handed regarding ethical verdicts (2002c: 174). 
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truth, then it looks like there is no fact of the matter as to who is right in our moral 
disagreement. Even by the quasi-realist’s lights, moral truth is not a brute metaphysical 
feature of the world. Blackburn’s objectors are worried that the quasi-realist is cheating—he 
claims moral truth for himself, but rejects the duty of offering grounds for it. The worry is a 
distinctly metaphysical one—not the epistemological worry that Blackburn considers about 
how we can convince others that they are wrong in their moral beliefs (1999: 221). 
Blackburn might respond that we are just here presupposing a substantive theory of 
truth, but that is to misunderstand the issue. That truths require ontological grounds is no 
offense to the claim that truth itself is a metaphysically transparent property. Truthmaker 
theory holds that truth is not a primitive, fundamental feature of the world. It is no axiom of 
deflationism that it is. So Blackburn’s acceptance of deflationism is no excuse for ignoring 
the question of what makes moral judgments true. Does deflationism render truthmaking 
inquiries needless? To borrow Blackburn’s phrase: “No, no, no”. My offering to the quasi-
realist is to accept the naturalistic realist’s account of moral truthmakers, and in so doing 
answer the worries of those who suspect that quasi-realists cheat by claiming the existence of 
grounded moral truths without positing any grounds. 
Quasi-realism, then, succeeds over its non-naturalistic realist opponent, and its fellow 
anti-realist opponents. Furthermore, it succeeds over naturalism by accommodating the 
phenomenon of the open question argument. Hence, careful attention to the metaphysics of 
truthmaking shows that quasi-realism may well be the strongest metaethical view when it 
comes to the question of anti-realism.
 
6. Three Paradigms of Scientific Realism 
 
In the previous chapter, we saw how to apply our thinking about truthmaking to the 
realism debate in metaethics. Now we may turn to the question of what relevance 
truthmaking can have for the realism debate in the philosophy of science. The debate over 
scientific realism, like other realism debates, is complicated by the fact that there are a 
diversity of ways of understanding what is at stake in the topic. As Kitcher observes, “There 
are almost as many versions of realism as there are antirealists, each ready to supply a 
preferred characterization before undertaking demolition” (2001: 151). As before, we shall 
be guided by the thought that realism debates are at heart debates about reality, and hence are 
metaphysical to the core. But like much else in philosophy, the topic of scientific realism has 
often strayed from metaphysics into the realms of language and epistemology. The goal of 
this chapter is to employ truthmaker theory in order to better appreciate what is at stake in the 
dispute between scientific realists and their opponents. Our eye will be directed specifically 
at the metaphysical implications that accompany the topic, for those will be the ones into 
which truthmaker theory can provide the most insight. 
In order to get clear about our topic, this chapter explores what I call the three 
paradigms of realism.1 There is the truth-mongering paradigm, which seeks to reduce the 
realism debate down to a theory about the nature of truth. There is the methodological 
paradigm, which sets up the debate with an eye toward the aim of scientific inquiry. And, 
finally, there is the metaphysical paradigm, which construes the debate as one over how to 
                                                 
1For whatever reason, three is the magic number when it comes to scientific realism. See Horwich 1982 and 
Putnam 1982a. 
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interpret the metaphysical foundations of scientific theories. It will come as no surprise that I 
advocate the third paradigm. Our goal in this chapter is to appreciate where the other 
approaches to scientific realism stray from the domain of metaphysics, in order to be able to 
reconstruct a robustly metaphysical understanding of the debate. But, as before, our intent is 
not merely to pour old wine into new bottles. For we shall see just how our paradigms 
succeed and fail in their various attempts to articulate and answer the fundamental 
philosophical queries that drive our interest in scientific realism. Ultimately, the truthmaker 
theorist rejects the truth-mongering paradigm, and better captures its suggestions about the 
role that truth plays in scientific realism by showing how truthmakers play that role in the 
debate instead. As for the methodological paradigm, the truthmaker theorist respects its 
central questions, and merely stresses that since its focus is primarily epistemological, its 
fundamental concerns are orthogonal to truthmaking concerns. After developing the 
truthmaker-based metaphysical approach to scientific realism, I show how it nicely 
accommodates the topic of structural realism, and the various positions therein, which is the 
topic de jour in recent discussions of scientific realism. 
 
6.1. The truth-mongering paradigm 
The truth-mongering paradigm of scientific realism is the one that attempts to reduce 
the debate over scientific realism down to a debate regarding the nature of truth. The truth-
mongering paradigm, then, is a blatant example of non-neutrality between truth and realism, 
which we met and rejected in chapter 4. The truth-mongering theorist is a particularly strong 
kind of non-neutralist, for not only does he think that certain views about realism require 
taking on a particular stance regarding truth, he thinks the question of realism just is a 
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question of which theory of truth is correct. Nothing separates the realist, the anti-realist, and 
the quietist besides their respective views on truth. 
The most adamant defender of the truth-mongering approach to realism is Arthur Fine 
(1984a, 1984b, 1986). To his credit, Fine’s construal of the realism debate bears an appealing 
theoretical simplicity and elegance. Common to all parties to the debate, Fine holds, is a 
rather “homely” attitude about science. This attitude—the natural ontological attitude, or 
‘NOA’ (pronounced as in ‘Noah’)—holds that “it is possible to accept the evidence of one’s 
senses and to accept, in the same way, the confirmed results of science” (1984b: 95). When I 
see a table in front of me, I begin to believe that there exists a table in front of me. Similarly, 
if science tells me that the table is made of atoms, then I begin to believe that the table is 
made of atoms. In other words, I take the same attitude toward scientific findings as I do 
toward the ordinary observations I make with my own senses. NOA thus takes the findings of 
science at “face value”. 
Realists, anti-realists, and quietists alike can all agree that the results of our best 
sciences are (at least approximately) true. What distinguishes the various positions is what 
they add to the core doctrine of NOA. The realist adds a correspondence theory of truth to 
NOA: 
The realist adopts a standard, model-theoretic, correspondence theory of truth; where 
the model is just the definite world structure posited by realism and where 
correspondence is understood as a relation that reaches right out to touch the world. 
(1984a: 52). 
 
The anti-realist, by contrast, adds some sort of pragmatic or epistemic theory of truth: “The 
antirealist may add onto the core position a particular analysis of the concept of truth, as in 
the pragmatic and instrumentalist and conventionalist conceptions of truth” (1984b: 97; see 
also Fine 1986: 157). The right attitude to take toward science, Fine argues, is simply NOA 
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itself, and nothing more. The basic idea is that if we want to understand the practice of 
science, we should take it simply on its own terms, and not try to add to it various 
philosophical theses—in particular, we should not attach any particular philosophical theory 
about the nature of truth to the claims of scientific theories. Hence, Fine writes: 
NOA is inclined to reject all interpretations, theories, construals, pictures, etc. of truth, 
just as it rejects the special correspondence theory of realism and the acceptance 
pictures of the truth-mongering anti-realisms. (1984a: 62)2 
 
NOA all by itself, unadorned by any philosophical theses, is the right attitude to take toward 
science.3 Fine admonishes us to continue accepting NOA—it’s the natural attitude to hold, 
after all—but not to conjoin it with any particular conception of truth. The result is an 
understanding of scientific inquiry that is neither realist nor anti-realist. By taking on a sort of 
quietism about truth, Fine advances a non-realist and non-anti-realist attitude toward science. 
Also among the truth-mongers are philosophers such as Putnam (or at least certain 
temporal stages of Putnam). Though Putnam admits that there may be a variety of views that 
go by the name ‘scientific realism’ (see his 1982a), one of his familiar opponents is 
“metaphysical realism”, a view he finds far less palatable than his own “internal” or 
“pragmatic” realism. When faced with a pair of mathematically and empirically equivalent 
theories that nonetheless have competing interpretations, the metaphysical realist thinks that 
there is a fact of the matter as to which is true (assuming one is), whereas the internal realist 
thinks that both are true. The difference is due to the metaphysical realist’s adoption of a 
                                                 
2Note here where I borrow the language of truth-mongering. Ironically, I think it is Fine himself who is the 
truth-monger, for he thinks it is the notion that bears all the weight in the debate (even though he himself does 
not advocate a theory of truth, and so does not consider himself a truth-monger—the truth-mongers, for me, are 
those who take truth to be the notion that holds the theoretical weight). As I observed in section 3.2.1, it is 
ironic that someone like Fine, who has a deflationary attitude about truth, puts so much theoretical weight on it 
nonetheless. 
3Interestingly, Fine’s fellow truth-monger Putnam refers to just this kind of attitude as a species of realism. See 
Putnam 1975-1976: 193. 
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correspondence or “recognition-transcendent” conception of truth, whereas the internal 
realist adopts a pragmatic conception of truth where truth is just “correct assertibility” (1982a: 
197).4 
In addition to Fine and Putnam, other philosophers have argued (or even just assumed) 
that particular theories of truth are essential to particular views about realism.5 I have already 
argued, in general, that such non-neutrality is false. In this section, I want to diagnose, with 
an eye explicitly directed toward truthmaker theory, why the truth-mongering approach to 
scientific realism is a non-starter. 
There is plenty to be said in criticism of the truth-mongering approach, independently 
of truthmaker theory.6 First, we should in general be skeptical of philosophical strategies that 
argue against a view by saddling it with another view that the philosopher antecedently 
rejects. (Herein lie the dialectical dangers of non-neutrality.) Fine and Putnam, both 
suspicious of correspondence theories of truth, can quickly reject scientific realism by merely 
identifying it with some form of correspondence theory of truth (or by treating 
correspondence as a necessary condition on scientific realism). Employing correspondence 
theories in such a strategy is already dubious, given just how amorphous the notion of 
correspondence is in the theory of truth. Many have complained that we don’t have a clear 
idea of what such theories are supposed to be, Fine and Putnam included; it’s inappropriate 
for those making such complaints to turn around and then build the theory into other 
                                                 
4For similar views see also Ellis 1985 and Jardine 1986. Newton-Smith 1989 and Niiniluoto 1999 offer 
excellent discussion and criticism of the approach. 
5See the references to non-neutralists in section 4.1, particularly those mentioned in footnote 8. The work of 
Dummett and Wright is of special importance here, historically speaking. 
6Musgrave 1989 is an excellent critique of Fine’s program; see also Jennings 1989: 237 and Psillos 1999, 
chapter 10. For discussion and criticism of Putnam’s internal realism, see Field 1982, Newton-Smith 1989, 
Davidson 1990: 307-309, Sosa 1993b, van Fraassen 1997, and Niiniluoto 1999. 
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positions they are seeking to reject. In other words, it is disingenuous to, on the one hand, 
claim not to know what correspondence theories are, and, on the other hand, claim that 
certain other philosophical theories are nevertheless committed to them. Correspondence 
theories of truth are familiar whipping boys in philosophy, and that they are being used to 
such purposes here is no great surprise.7 
A second problem with the truth-mongering approach is that it turns the question of 
realism into something else. As a result, the question of scientific realism turns out to have 
nothing in particular to do with the philosophy of science. For Fine, realism is NOA plus a 
correspondence theory of truth. NOA is not up for debate; everyone who’s epistemically 
sensible embraces NOA, realist, anti-realist, and quietist alike. As a result, the truth-monger 
argues against realism and anti-realism simply by arguing against correspondence and 
epistemic theories of truth. There is no need to engage the arguments from 
underdetermination, the pessimistic induction, the irrationality of scientific revolutions, or 
the no-miracles argument.8 All we need to do to solve the realism debate in the philosophy of 
science is come to sensible conclusions about the nature of truth, an inquiry far removed 
from the philosophy of science. 
                                                 
7For an example of one particularly egregious howler, note Putnam’s casual insertion of the noumenal into his 
opponent’s view. Putnam does not believe in “the metaphysical realist’s notion of a description which 
“corresponds” to the noumenal facts” (1990: 40; cf. the notion of a “ready-made world” in Goodman 1978 and 
Putnam 1982b). So not only is the scientific realist one who believes that truth is correspondence with the facts, 
he believes that truth is correspondence with the noumenal facts. (Note: I have never seen a correspondence 
theory of truth that invokes the noumena. Have you?) Now we’ve saddled the realist with both a particular 
theory of truth and a misunderstanding of Kantian metaphysics! As I read Kant, the noumenal is what is 
antecedent to conceptualization. Talk of noumenal anything is nonsense (that’s why Kant wouldn’t talk about 
it—at least not in the first Critique), since to talk about such things would be to import concepts into the 
noumena, which is just categorical confusion. My overarching hunch about Putnam’s dialectic between the 
internal and metaphysical realist is that it turns on saddling the metaphysical realist with an antecedently 
confused view. I conclude not that Putnam wins the debate, but rather that he has not set it up correctly. 
8See, respectively, Psillos 1999, chapter 8, Laudan 1981, Kuhn 1962, and Putnam 1975. 
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Next, by turning scientific realism into something else, the truth-monger encounters 
what we may call the problem of inadvertent realism. One of Fine’s main contentions is that 
science does not need to be supplemented by any philosophical theorizing. It does its task 
just fine without any help from philosophy. Let us admit the point. But we are interested in 
the nature of truth for its own sake, not because we are interested in the nature of scientific 
inquiry. Theories of truth can be motivated independently of any interest in any realism 
debate. And once such views are formulated and defended, they will apply in any domain of 
thought possessed of any truth. Science is one such domain, at least in the eyes of any 
NOAer (pronounced as in ‘knower’). Hence, we accept science as providing us with some 
truth about the world (even if not the whole truth). Completely independently, we come to 
have views about the nature of truth, which then apply to the truths we find in science as 
much as anywhere else. Here we just have two distinct things—the findings of science, and 
the findings of the philosophy of truth—overlapping in the appropriate places. Does science 
forbid us from asking about the nature of truth? Of course not. We may grant Fine’s point 
that science doesn’t force us to ask such questions. But if science involves making true 
claims (as NOA says it does), then the best theory of truth applies to those claims. 
Consequently, NOAers who for independent reasons accept certain views about the nature of 
truth will find themselves saddled with an inadvertent commitment to realism or anti-realism. 
Another preliminary reason to be dissatisfied with the truth-mongering paradigm is 
that it makes it quite difficult to engage in local or “retail” applications of realism. If realism 
or anti-realism about some domain requires adopting a particular theory of truth, then being a 
non-globalist about realism debates requires being a non-globalist (i.e., pluralist) about truth. 
For example, suppose I am a scientific realist but a moral anti-realist. As a scientific realist, I 
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accept the natural ontological attitude for science and embrace a correspondence theory of 
truth. But when it comes to ethics, I am an anti-realist. Presumably, moral realism for the 
truth-monger is just a combination of the “natural ethical attitude” with a correspondence 
theory of truth. To maintain my ethical anti-realism, I must reject either the correspondence 
theory of truth for ethics (in which case I am forced to adopt a pluralist position about truth), 
or the natural ethical attitude, which presumably would involve something like an error-
theoretic attitude toward the domain.9 Now, these consequences do not refute the truth-
mongering approach. Some philosophers defend pluralist conceptions of truth (e.g., Wright 
1992 and Lynch 2009), and some are happy to embrace error theories (e.g., Mackie 1977 and 
Joyce 2001). Indeed, the truth pluralism of Wright and Lynch is motivated by their pluralism 
about realism debates. My point is merely that we should not constrain our choices so heavily 
from the outset. We need a more subtle understanding of the relationship between truth and 
realism. The crude identifications of the truth-mongering approach cannot handle such 
subtlety.10 
A final reason to reject the truth-mongering paradigm—and here we may segue into 
our discussion of truthmaking—is that it leaves no conceptual room for those who reject both 
correspondence and epistemic theories of truth, but yet do not give up altogether on the 
theory of truth. Specifically, it ignores deflationary theories of truth (e.g., Horwich 1990). 
Deflationists about truth generally agree that truth is not a metaphysically substantive 
property. Truth is an important logical device—useful for disquotation, generalization, 
                                                 
9In fact, a helpful way of thinking about contemporary metaethics is that it seeks to uphold the natural ethical 
attitude, and not resort to the apparently revisionist tactics of classical non-cognitivism and error theory. Here 
we have again what Kit Fine calls “non-skeptical” anti-realism (2001). 
10Moreover, we may want to admit localized realism even within a domain. We might want to be realists about 
particles, say, but not fields. Such localized views are even harder to maintain for the truth-monger. (Thanks to 
Marc Lange on this point.) 
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forming anaphora, etc.—but nothing more. As such, truth is not to be identified with any 
complex property such as “correspondence with the facts” or “practical utility”. As stated, 
the truth-mongering paradigm does not address deflationary views.11  But perhaps Fine could 
happily say that the deflationist about truth, like his own “no-theory” attitude about truth, 
belongs alongside him in the non-realism camp. So perhaps Fine’s apparatus for approaching 
scientific realism can easily accommodate the deflationist.12 
The present suggestion is that NOA plus deflationism about truth, just like Fine’s own 
view, constitutes a kind of non-realism (and non-anti-realism). However, such a view is not 
sufficient for constituting a genuinely “beyond the debate” attitude toward realism, as Fine 
desires. For whether or not one is a realist has nothing whatsoever to do with whether or not 
one is a deflationist about truth. To see why, we first need to appreciate the distinction 
between theories of truth and theories of truthmaking. Theories of truth aim to reveal the 
essence or nature of truth. They give an account of what property, if any, is held in common 
between all and only truths. Theories of truthmaking are up to a different task. They are 
ontological theories that offer accounts of what there has to be in the world to ground what is 
true. Given some true claim, truthmaker theorists aim to say what it is in the world upon 
which that truth depends. 
As we explored in chapters 3 and 4, to be a deflationist about truth is not yet to take 
any stance on what truthmakers there are. Consequently, one can be a deflationist and take on 
                                                 
11To be fair, when Putnam and Fine were putting forth their views in the seventies and eighties, deflationist 
views of truth did not have the same grasp on the philosophical mindset that they enjoy today. Nonetheless, the 
views of Ayer, Quine, and Ramsey were hardly unknown at the time (quite to the contrary), and it is surprising 
to see how their deflationary views seem not to earn a place in our truth-mongers’ setting up of the issue. 
Perhaps they subscribed to the false presupposition that if one is a deflationist about truth, then one cannot 
engage the question of realism. One ongoing goal of this project has been to offer as definitive a refutation as is 
possible of that persistent and pernicious presupposition. 
12Indeed, at times Fine seems to express sympathy with deflationary views. See his 1986: 175. 
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all sorts of substantive ontological commitments, including those that are constitutive of 
realism. Imagine a NOAer who accepts deflationism about truth, but thinks that our best 
scientific theories are made true by unobservable entities like electrons, fields, forces, genes, 
and the like, and so commits to the reality of such entities. This is not a quietist 
understanding of science; it’s a kind of realism. To be above the debate, as Fine wishes, one 
must avoid taking on any such metaphysical commitments. Fine’s NOAers, in other words, 
must eschew the theory of truthmaking just as they eschew the theory of truth. Now, Fine’s 
setup of the realism debate predates the contemporary resurgence in truthmaking. Still, it is 
implicit in his view that the ontological questions of interest to truthmaker theory belong to 
the theorizing and interpretation of science that the NOAer rejects. It is not enough, then, 
simply to be a deflationist if one is to be a genuinely quietistic NOAer. One must also reject 
any theory of truthmaking; one must be fully agnostic regarding not only the nature of truth, 
but about what, if anything, makes truths true. 
So suppose I uphold with NOA that ‘There are electrons’ is true, and reject all 
substantive theories of truth. It remains an open question as to what it is that makes ‘There 
are electrons’ true. Realists might say electrons. Positivists might say tracks in cloud 
chambers. Phenomenalists might say certain sequences of observations. Social constructivists 
might say our discovery of electrons. Notice how the views characteristic of the various 
parties to the traditional scientific realism debate reemerge when we ask the truthmaking 
question. They do this even if we are deflationists about truth, or take no stance on the nature 
of truth. The real questions behind the debate persist, even when we set aside the theory of 
truth. 
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It would be a great offense to the spirit of Fine’s attitude toward science if the NOAer 
held that while science needs no help from philosophy in understanding the nature of 
scientific truth, it could benefit quite greatly by being supplemented by a theory of scientific 
truthmaking. Hence, the genuine NOAer who is truly beyond the realism debate must also 
reject any theory of truthmaking. Science needs no interpretation, including no ontological 
interpretation of the sort offered by truthmaker theory. Consequently, we need to understand 
Fine as suggesting that his non-realist must make no claims at all about the ontology 
underlying the truths of science. Hence, he is forbidden from making even the most modest 
of claims, such as that ‘There are electrons’ is true in virtue of the existence of electrons. To 
do so would be to supplement NOA with a distinctly ontological theory, and science, says 
Fine, needs no such supplementation. 
Is Fine really forbidden from making such modest claims, such as that electrons are 
the truthmakers for ‘There are electrons’? Can’t Fine agree with me that ‘There are electrons’ 
is true in virtue of the existence of electrons? After all, it seems that doing so is in accordance 
with good scientific thinking , and so is not to be rejected by the NOAer.13 My response takes 
the form of a dilemma. If Fine accepts my truthmaking claim (and others like it), then I 
maintain that he counts as a realist by my accounting (which is developed below in section 
6.3), for he takes the claims of science to be made true by a mind-independent reality. Here 
we have all the realism anyone could ever want. So if Fine goes this way, he leaves behind 
his “above the debate” angle. The natural ontological attitude turns out to be sufficient for 
realism. 
If Fine rejects this truthmaking claim (and all other truthmaking claims), then we may 
take him at his word that he truly is above the realism debate. As such, we should interpret 
                                                 
13My thanks go to Marc Lange, Huw Price, and Keith Simmons for all pressing me very hard on this objection. 
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him as thinking that the NOAer takes on no ontological commitments when taking on the 
truth of a theory. One earns truth without ontology only by severing all bridges between the 
two, regardless of whether they are built by the theory of truth, truthmaking, or ontological 
commitment. Consequently, Fine must refuse to embrace any such theory, a consequence 
which he recognizes: “NOA, as such, has no specific ontological commitments” (1986: 176). 
Indeed, it cannot have any ontological commitments. 
Still, it might be thought that it is simply inconceivable that one could accept the truth 
of ‘There are electrons’ without also taking on an ontological commitment to electrons. But 
here we must be careful not to import any assumptions about how truth depends upon reality, 
for those are precisely the assumptions that a true metaphysical agnostic must reject. If we 
assume that Quine (1948, 1960) is right about ontological commitment, then of course we 
will assume that anyone who accepts the truth of ‘There are electrons’ will take on an 
ontological commitment to electrons. But Quine’s is not the only game in town. Azzouni 
(2004) and Hofweber (2005) both argue, on separate grounds, that we can embrace the truth 
of mathematics (including its existential claims) without thereby taking on any mathematical 
ontology. Such theories might seem to be impossible, but they appear so only if we start with 
certain presuppositions about how truths connect with the world. The lesson for Fine is clear: 
he can stay above the debate while maintaining the truth of scientific theories only by 
remaining fully agnostic about the ontology that grounds the truth of those theories.14 
We can now appreciate why the truth-mongering approach to scientific realism should be 
rejected. By not sufficiently distinguishing issues concerning truth with issues involving 
truthmaking, the truth-mongers come to see the former as essential to the debate, whereas the 
                                                 
14Alan Musgrave comes quite close to my interpretation of Fine, which he notes was not originally obvious to 
him. He describes NOA as  “a complete philosophical know-nothing-ism. The NOA[er] is not committed to 
electrons, the moon, tables and chairs, physical objects, other people, his self, anything at all” (1989: 391). 
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latter is really the crucial notion. Once we relocate the debate to one about what makes 
scientific claims true, the possibility of debate between realists and anti-realists reemerges. 
For example, do we need unobservable entities as truthmakers for scientific claims, or can we 
make do with merely the realm of the observable? The truth-mongering approach never gets 
to the heart of the real metaphysical debate.15 
In closing, we may acknowledge something importantly right about the truth-
mongering paradigm. Fine’s instinct is to think that the realist needs to add something that 
goes above and beyond NOA.16 Infamously, Fine describes that something more as “a desk-
thumping, foot-stamping shout of “Really!”” (1984b: 97). But there is no distinction between 
being true and being really true, and loud noises add no cognitive content to our utterances. 
What really needs to be added is a realism-relevant theory of truthmaking that will supply a 
realist ontology that grounds the true claims of science. 
That the distinction between truth and truthmaking is so easy to collapse is evident in 
the following observation of William Newton-Smith: the “realist wanted to say that our 
theories are true or false in virtue of an external reality and she or he used the vocabulary of 
correspondence in an effort to convey this” (1988: 188). Correspondence is not the way to 
convey this important idea; truthmaker theory offers the right way to understand what it is in 
virtue of which our theories are true or false.17 
                                                 
15My promissory note about Fine interpretation from footnote 10 of section 4.1 is now discharged. 
16Indeed, Fine is absolutely correct when he points out that “realism requires two distinct elements. It requires 
belief and it also requires a particular interpretation of that belief” (1986: 176). The idea here is that 
instrumentalists and realists may both agree that ‘There are electrons’ is true, and so their realism-relevant 
disagreement must lie elsewhere. As we shall see, the “interpretation” needed here gets construed by van 
Fraassen as a matter of “literal” versus “non-literal” truth. My suggestion will be that the interpretation needed 
here is the ontological one about what makes truths true. 
17Related to the truth-mongers are the reference-mongers. Often, scientific realism has been defined with 
explicit connection to the theory of reference. The theory of reference has played a central role in both defenses 
(e.g., Boyd 1984) and critiques (e.g., Laudan 1981) of realism. Whether such reference to reference is essential 
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6.2. The epistemological paradigm 
The epistemological paradigm of scientific realism treats the debate as one about the 
proper epistemic attitude to take toward scientific inquiry. This approach is advocated most 
prominently by van Fraassen, who writes that scientific realism “concerns our epistemic 
attitude toward theories rather than their internal structure” (1976: 632). According to van 
Fraassen, scientific realism is the view that the aim of science is to produce literally true 
theories—theories that are true not only with respect to the observable facts, but to the 
unobservable facts as well—and that acceptance of a scientific theory involves the belief that 
the theory is true (1980: 8).18 Van Fraassen’s favored anti-realist—the constructive 
empiricist—holds that the aim of science is to produce empirically adequate theories, where 
empirical adequacy is a matter of truth with respect solely to observable phenomena. All that 
constructive empiricism requires by way of belief is that when one accepts a theory one 
believes it to be empirically adequate.19 
In order to appreciate van Fraassen’s position, it is important to understand the 
historical context in which it was developed. In the heyday of logical positivism (or so the 
story goes), scientific anti-realism in the form of some sort of instrumentalism was king (e.g., 
Carnap 1956). Realism made an astonishing comeback thanks to the insightful critiques and 
arguments of, among others, Grover Maxwell (1962), Sellars (1963), J. J. C. Smart (1963), 
and Putnam (1975). Realism, it was claimed, is the only philosophy of science that doesn’t 
                                                 
to the adherents’ arguments, or just a byproduct of more linguistic times, is an open question; certainly it is 
essential in the case of Kitcher’s defenses of realism (1993, 2001, 2002), and in Hardin and Rosenberg 1982. In 
any event, I am even less moved by the thought of framing realism debates in terms of reference than I am by 
the thought of framing them in terms of truth. For excellent critical discussions of the “flight to reference” in the 
philosophy of science, see Bishop and Stich 1998 and Bishop 2003. 
18The presence of ‘literal’ in the account will be explained and elaborated upon below. 
19There is also an important pragmatic dimension to the constructive empiricist’s notion of acceptance. To 
accept a theory is to take it into one’s life, using it as a foundation for offering explanations, pursuing research 
opportunities, etc. See van Fraassen 1980: 12-13. 
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make the success of science a miracle (Putnam 1975: 73; see also Smart 1963: 39). Van 
Fraassen’s empiricism emerges as an anti-realist response to such realist arguments, but it 
sheds many of the untenable views that had led to the downfall of the logical empiricist 
views of science. Van Fraassen rejects their adoption of a strict dichotomy between 
observational and theoretical language, and rejects their instrumentalist readings of scientific 
theories. In effect, van Fraassen agrees with his realist opponents on the meaning and 
interpretation of scientific theories. There is not necessarily any semantic or metaphysical 
dispute between the two camps. Hence, some have identified van Fraassen’s anti-realism as 
being merely epistemological (Musgrave 1985, Arthur Fine 2001). As a result, van Fraassen 
argues for the rationality of his empiricism on epistemological grounds.  
It is important to recognize that van Fraassen’s construal of the realism debate does 
not collapse back into the truth-mongering paradigm. To be sure, van Fraassen employs truth 
in defining scientific realism and anti-realism. But he does not reduce the question of realism 
to the theory of truth. Realists think that science aims to produce theories that are true with 
respect to both the observable and the unobservable. Constructive empiricists think that 
science aims to produce theories that are true with respect to the observable alone. But here, 
truth need not be understood as playing anything more than its usual abbreviatory and 
anaphoric role.20 If snow is white, then scientific theories ought to entail that snow is white. 
If there are electrons, then realists think that theories ought to entail that there are electrons, 
though empiricists are more open minded. It is not one’s theory of truth that makes one a 
realist or an anti-realist. What makes someone a realist or an anti-realist is the class of truths 
                                                 
20Van Fraassen seems to be assuming a correspondence theory of truth in his 1980 (see pages 90 and 197), 
though he later disavows such theories (2006a: 153). But he needn’t have committed to a correspondence theory. 
Deflationism would have suited his purposes just as well—save for the caveat I discuss in the following 
footnote. 
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that one thinks is relevant to the aim of science. Those steeped in the epistemological 
paradigm may remain neutral on the topic of the nature of truth in a way that truth-mongers 
may not.21 
Van Fraassen’s philosophy of science has been tremendously influential, and so has 
inspired an enormous literature that critiques and defends the view. Much of the criticism 
centers on the distinction between the observable and unobservable, which van Fraassen 
needs in order to distinguish truth from empirical adequacy,22 and on the distinction between 
belief and acceptance, which van Fraassen needs in order to articulate the distinctive 
cognitive attitude of the constructive empiricist.23 For our purposes, we may set aside the 
question of whether van Fraassen’s account of the aim of science is a good one, and whether 
his empiricism is properly motivated.24 What we are interested in is what truthmaker theory 
has to do with van Fraassen’s setup of the question of realism. 
The short answer is: not very much. As already noted, van Fraassen’s approach to the 
question of realism is primarily epistemological. He deflects the realists’ arguments that 
                                                 
21Actually, the issue is more complex. In my 2009, I argue that constructive empiricists must rely on a notion of 
truth that requires more than the standard logical resources associated with deflationism. The problem is due to 
van Fraassen’s adoption of the semantic (model-theoretic) account of theories. On the semantic account, we 
need some way of cashing out the isomorphism between the structure of the theory’s models and the things in 
the world, and it is here that a pure deflationary theory of truth becomes untenable. That said, if scientific 
theories were merely sets of sentences or propositions or some other sort of truth-bearer (as in the syntactic 
view of theories), then van Fraassen’s statement of realism and empiricism would be relying on truth in a 
deflationarily acceptable manner. But notice that this is a problem for anyone embracing the semantic account, 
realist or empiricist. 
22See, for instance, Hacking 1981, Churchland 1985, Musgrave 1985: 207-209, Ladyman 2000, Dicken and 
Lipton 2006, and Dicken 2009 for criticism, and van Fraassen 1985 and Muller 2005 for defense. Note that the 
distinction between the observable and the unobservable is not the distinction between the observational and the 
theoretical, as van Fraassen expertly demonstrates (1980: 14). Terms and concepts are theoretical or not, 
depending upon whether they find their way inside theory. Entities are observable or not, depending upon their 
physical properties. 
23See, for instance, Blackburn 1984b: 223 and 2002b, Horwich 1991, and Teller 2001: 139-142 for criticism, 
and van Fraassen 2001: 164-168 for defense. 
24I happen to think it is. James Ladyman thinks it isn’t, due to its apparent need for a robust modal metaphysics. 
See his 2000, and Monton and van Fraassen 2003, Hanna 2004, Ladyman 2004, Muller 2005, and Dicken 2009 
for further discussion. 
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science requires belief in the truth of its theories, and sets aside the instrumentalists’ 
reinterpretation of scientific theories. The only thing that seems to separate van Fraassen’s 
realist from his empiricist is a view regarding the aim of science, and the epistemological 
attitudes it licenses. Truthmaker theorists need not have any particular views about 
epistemology, so truthmaker theory does not necessarily have any distinct contribution to 
make toward van Fraassen’s epistemological arguments for constructive empiricism. 
Fine detects some trickery behind van Fraassen’s epistemological turn: 
In redefining realism as a doctrine about truth and belief in the truth, van Fraassen set 
up the debate over realism as a debate over the reach of evidence. Does the evidence 
support belief in the truth of our theories or does it only reach as far as belief in their 
empirical adequacy? Notice that this is a purely epistemological question and this is 
the question on which almost all the recent literature in the realism debate has 
centered. Still, it really is a set up. Like a skilled magician doing slight [sic] of hand, 
van Fraassen's focus on the epistemological question has distracted us from what 
realism actually involves. Any student in a freshman philosophy course knows that 
realism is a metaphysical doctrine. It asserts the existence of a real, external world. In 
The Scientific Image van Fraassen made that world disappear from the debate. (2001: 
120)25 
 
I sympathize with Fine’s sentiment here. Along with my first-year students, I too wish to 
stress the metaphysical core of scientific realism. But van Fraassen does not make the world 
disappear from the realism debate; rather, he simply assumes from the outset that it’s there. If 
van Fraassen seems to be ignoring the older non-epistemological forms of anti-realism that 
actively denied the existence of a real, unobservable world, it’s because the philosophical 
community is already happy to abandon them.26 
                                                 
25We know, of course, what Fine thinks about the world that he claims to be the real issue behind realism. (Note, 
though, the welcome disappearance of excessive capitals and italics!) 
26Here is Stathis Psillos: “Semantic realism is no longer contested. Theoretical discourse is taken to be 
irreducible and assertoric (contentful) by all sides of the debate” (2000: 707). Interestingly, then, the question of 
scientific realism has moved in an opposite path than has the question of moral realism. In the old paradigm of 
metaethics, anti-realists rejected moral truth. In the new paradigm, they have searched for ways to maintain it on 
metaphysically austere grounds. In the days of positivism, anti-realists attempted to salvage the truth of theories 
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I have no objection to the importance of the central questions of the epistemological 
paradigm.27 The question of what sort of epistemic attitude science warrants us to take is an 
important one,28 and not one that can be solved from within truthmaker theory. My objection 
for van Fraassen is slightly different, and involves his analysis of what realism is. What van 
Fraassen needs to be able to explain is why believing in the literal truth of a scientific theory 
is a sufficient characterization of realism. Absent that explanation, it’s not clear why van 
Fraassen’s realist is deserving of the name. 
To get clear on this objection, we can turn to a small puzzle that emerges from 
thinking about Fine’s view and van Fraassen’s in tandem. According to van Fraassen, to take 
a realist attitude toward science is to think that scientific theories aim at a literally true story 
of what the world is like, and that in accepting a scientific theory one believes it to be true. 
According to Arthur Fine, to take a non-realist attitude toward science is to take scientific 
theories “into one’s life as true, with all that implies concerning adjusting one’s behavior, 
practical and theoretical, to accommodate these truths” (1984b: 95-96). Constitutive of both 
positions is the belief that scientific theories are true. Where Fine sees quietism—an 
abandonment of both scientific realism and anti-realism—van Fraassen sees realism. How is 
this possible? 
The explanation for the puzzle deals with how the two understand the bridge between 
truth and ontology. Fine thinks that by eschewing any theory of truth, we sever any possible 
                                                 
by showing how they required no ontological grounding in the unobservable. Nowadays, the consensus seems 
to be that theories, in order to be true, do need the kind of grounding offered by realists. 
27What I would object to is a view that held that all the important questions involving scientific realism were 
epistemic. This is not van Fraassen’s view, though perhaps he might believe that all the important questions not 
yet settled in the debate are epistemic. 
28Fine disagrees: “As for ‘the aim of science’, NOA thinks this is a chimera, conjured up in response to 
misplaced hermeneuticism and fear of the irrational” (1986: 177). 
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link between truth and ontology. By not accepting a substantive theory of truth, we can 
accept the truths of science without accepting any ontological or metaphysical commitments. 
But, as we have seen, what bridges truth and ontology is not the theory of truth, but the 
theory of truthmaking. Fine falsely sees quietism in taking theories to be true but not 
adorning them with a substantive theory of truth because he supposes that ontological and 
metaphysical commitments cannot be undertaken in the absence of a substantive theory of 
truth. 
By contrast, van Fraassen sees realism in taking theories to be literally true because 
he is most likely assuming a fairly straightforward, realism-relevant conception of 
truthmaking. 29, 30 If theories are true, that is because there exists a mind-independent reality 
that makes them true. But notice that it is the commitment to that sort of reality, and not 
merely the commitment to the truth of the theory, that serves to explain why the realist is a 
realist. We can imagine competing theorists who brought anti-realist truthmaking accounts to 
the table; they would also believe that theories are literally true, but made true by something 
other than a world of mind-independent electrons, fields, forces, and genes. Realists must do 
more than believe that their theory is literally true, which, again, is the kernel of truth behind 
the truth-mongering paradigm. 
My suggestion, then, is that van Fraassen sees realism in his statement of scientific 
realism only because he is assuming an ordinary, realist account of truthmaking. (Just what 
this is we shall explore in detail in the next section.) He might, however, think that the 
                                                 
29In discussing his own account of scientific realism, Wright contrasts literal truth with disquotational truth 
(1986: 253). I admit that I do not quite understand the contrast here: disquotational truth is as literal as it gets! I 
think the idea may be that Wright suspects (alongside van Fraassen) that literal truth is needed for realism, and 
thus that literal truth must be something robustly metaphysical in a way that disquotationalism does not allow. 
We have seen this mistake before, and need not belabor it again. 
30In fact, van Fraassen’s talk of truth in The Scientific Image strongly suggests correspondence theory (1980: 90, 
197). 
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presence of “literal” truth is what plays that role: a literally true theory just is a theory made 
true by a mind-independent reality. To motivate his view that realists believe in the literal 
truth of theories, van Fraassen gives the example of two empirically equivalent theories that 
nonetheless appear to disagree regarding the unobservable (1980: 10-11). One theory holds 
that all matter consists of atoms; the other replaces atoms with the existence of a universal 
continuous medium. A positivist who thought that statements like ‘Atoms exist’ and ‘The 
universal continuous medium exists’ bear meaning only through their connection with the 
observable consequences of their respective theories might hold that both theories are true, 
since they are empirically equivalent and hence “mean the same thing”, appearances to the 
contrary. Here we have a non-literal reading of the theories, for “two theories which 
contradict each other in such a way can ‘really’ be saying the same thing only if they are not 
literally construed” (van Fraassen 1980: 11). 
There is something right about van Fraassen’s characterization of the literal construal 
of theories. By granting that realists and anti-realists alike can admit a literal reading of 
scientific theories, he helps to move the question of realism away from a question about 
language: “I do not conceive the dispute as being about language at all,” he says in distancing 
himself from Dummett’s semantic take on the debate (1980: 38). We can push the issue even 
further, for we can reconstruct the point about theories being true under literal or non-literal 
interpretations into a purely metaphysical point, and thereby distance ourselves even further 
from any linguistic approach to realism. 
Imagine a more traditional anti-realist, constructive empiricist, and realist discussing 
‘There are electrons’.31 Suppose they all accept some scientific theory of which it is a 
                                                 
31The traditional anti-realists I have in mind are those that van Fraassen seeks to exclude from realism by his 
literality requirement. He mentions conventionalism, logical positivism, and instrumentalism, saying of them 
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consequence. The anti-realist and realist agree that it is true, whereas the constructive 
empiricist announces agnosticism. Van Fraassen would say that the anti-realist thinks it is 
non-literally true, and that the realist thinks it’s literally true. But might it be possible for the 
two to come to agree upon its meaning after all? Suppose that the realist and the anti-realist 
come to the table with rather thin semantic theories, or with perhaps none at all. Perhaps they 
are both use-theorists, or agree on some sort of inferential role semantics.32 If so, we can still 
find room for non-semantic disagreement between them, and so we do not have to hold that 
they are simply talking past one another. The disagreement will be an ontological one. The 
realist thinks that ‘There are electrons’ is made true by electrons. But electrons, were they to 
exist, would be unobservable. So the anti-realist does not believe in such things. But the anti-
realist does think that ‘There are electrons’ is true, and so must offer a competing story about 
what makes it true, since electrons aren’t around to do the trick. Just how the story goes 
might be quite complicated, perhaps involving cloud chambers, readings on galvanometers, 
and the like. In any event, the resources for making the sentence true will be limited to the 
observable. The observable world itself suffices to ground the truth of ‘There are electrons’; 
the realist disagrees, and takes on an additional ontological commitment involving 
unobservable entities. Such ontological disagreements may persist even if there are no 
semantic disagreements involved. 
As should now be clear, agreeing on the meaning and truth of claims need not 
coincide with agreeing on what the truthmakers are for those claims. The constructive 
empiricist may agree with the realist about what it is that would make ‘There are electrons’ 
                                                 
that they are consistent with the claim that “science is true if ‘properly understood’” (1980: 9). What I shall be 
doing, in effect, is giving a metaphysical, not semantic, account of what it is to “properly understand” a theory. 
32See, for instance, Brandom 1994. 
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true, if indeed it were true. Since our anti-realist and constructive empiricist may agree on 
what exists in the observable world, yet disagree over whether to believe ‘There are 
electrons’, they must disagree about what it takes to make it true (supposing, as we are, that 
they agree on its meaning). When it comes to other scientific truths, the truthmaking story 
may be more controversial. Whether ‘Electrons are negatively charged’ is made true by a 
state of affairs, relation between universals, collection of tropes, electrons themselves, or 
nothing at all is an open question. Here, a scientific realist who is also a realist about 
universals (e.g., Armstrong) may disagree with a constructive empiricist who is also a 
nominalist (e.g., van Fraassen). But here the dispute is due to their differing stances on the 
realism/nominalism question, and not to their differing stances regarding scientific realism. 
Van Fraassen, surely, would have no truck with many of the debates that are internal to 
truthmaker theory. Nevertheless, even a nominalist of his radical stripe can agree that truths 
are grounded in the world (Quine thought so, as did David Lewis); he just disagrees with 
others about what exactly those grounds are. 
We may now appreciate how we can more fully shed the trappings of linguisticism 
from the question of scientific realism.33 The dispute need not be over how to interpret 
theories, or whether we should construe them literally or non-literally. The instinct behind 
van Fraassen’s appeal to literal truth is better satisfied by appeal to truthmaking. In the next 
section, we shall spell out this distinctly metaphysical approach to the topic of scientific 
realism. 
                                                 
33In his 1984, Jarrett Leplin offers ten theses common to various species of scientific realism (1-2). Of those, 
three make use of the notion of reference, and two others involve literal truth. Seven involve truth, but this is no 
evidence of semantic infiltration, at least given a deflationary reading of ‘true’. One involves the claim that 
scientific theories make “genuine, existential claims”, which presumably also relates to the literal truth of 
theories. As I hope to have made clear, the debate does not turn on issues about reference, literal truth, or which 
theory of truth is true. 
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6.3. The metaphysical paradigm 
To get from truth to realism, we need the right sort of connection. Fine recognizes the 
point, and charges van Fraassen with leaving something important out of the debate. The 
question of realism is at heart a metaphysical question, and so van Fraassen’s construal of 
things, according to Fine, leaves out something crucial. Actually, I think van Fraassen simply 
takes something for granted, which by the time of his writing was in fact a safe assumption: 
positivist attempts to write the unobservable out of scientific theories (semantically and 
metaphysically) have conclusively failed. As such, there is no avoiding the consequence that 
belief in the truth of a scientific theory will somehow involve a commitment to unobservable 
entities and/or properties. We shall not take the matter for granted. So let us now take a look 
at the field of views in the scientific realism debate with an eye toward truthmaking, and the 
metaphysical commitments that separate the various parties to the debate. In so doing, we 
may offer a proper articulation of the metaphysical paradigm to scientific realism, which will 
show just what is at stake, metaphysically speaking, in the debate between realism and its 
opposition. 
According to the metaphysical paradigm, our commitments with respect to scientific 
realism are determined by the metaphysical and ontological commitments that we take to 
accompany our scientific commitments. In accepting a scientific theory, to what 
metaphysical or ontological account of the world are we committed? We can draw on R4 
from section 4.3.4 to give an account of scientific realism: 
(R4) To be a realist with respect to a set of propositions is (i) to be committed to 
the truth of some particular propositions of the set, (ii) to be committed to a 
realism-relevant ontology of the relevant kind in virtue of which those truths 
are true, and (iii) to maintain that those truths are true in virtue of that 
ontology in a mind-independent fashion. 
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Scientific realism is a commitment to the (at least approximate) truth of our best scientific 
theories, and a commitment to a realism-relevant set of truthmakers in virtue of which those 
theories are true—where the relation of truthmaking itself is a mind-independent matter. 
Scientific anti-realism either abandons the first commitment (thereby nullifying the second), 
or keeps the first, but supplements it with an anti-realism-relevant set of truthmakers, or 
acknowledges something in the neighborhood of projectivism when it comes to 
understanding the truth of scientific theories.34. Truthmakers, then, are not exclusively for 
realists. Anti-realists, too, can admit that the truths they accept are made true. Their anti-
realism will be due to the nature of the truthmakers they provide. Quietists, regardless of 
what they think about the truth of the theories they accept, must remain fully agnostic about 
what makes them true. According to the metaphysical paradigm, then, one’s stance regarding 
scientific realism depends upon what one takes to be the reality underpinning scientific 
theories. The metaphysical paradigm rightly restores metaphysics to the center of the debate. 
So what makes for a realism-relevant or anti-realism-relevant theory of truthmaking? 
There may be no simple answer, and I do not intend to give a full analysis. Nor should we 
hope for one. Realism debates come in various forms, and are motivated by different 
considerations in different areas. Still, mind-independence of some sort seems to be of 
paramount importance in much of the realism literature.35 The kinds of truthmakers relevant 
to realism are the kinds of things that would still exist even if we didn’t. Truthmakers that are 
indicative of anti-realism, by contrast, are likely to be entities that somehow depend upon us 
for their existence. Rather than attempting to offer precise analyses of realist and anti-realist 
                                                 
34As far as I know, Jennings 1989 is the only paper to have taken up something like this last option. 
35See Devitt 1984 and Jenkins 2005 for treatments of mind-independence. For a challenge to the notion of 
mind-independence, see Rosen 1994. 
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accounts of truthmaking, it will be more instructive to attend to specific views inside the 
realism debate, and see how their status vis-à-vis realism is best understood by attending to 
how they approach our truthmaking queries. 
Fine, recall, claims that the scientific realist “asserts the existence of a real, external 
world” (2001: 120).36 Putnam also considers the idea, which he attributes to Dummett, that 
scientific realism involves the claim “that what makes [the sentences of scientific theories] 
true or false is something external—that is to say, it is not (in general) our sense data, actual 
or potential, or the structure of our minds, or our language, etc.” (1975: 70).37 Both of these 
remarks are close to the truth, and we may now elaborate upon them. 
First consider the observable domain of scientific theories. Realists about the 
observable portions of scientific theories take those portions to be true, and to be made true 
by a mind-independent reality. Here we have little more than what Devitt calls “common 
sense realism” (1984). There is still plenty of room within the realist camp for truthmaking 
disagreement. When it comes to the truthmaker for ‘There is copper’, any hunk of copper 
suffices.38 When it comes to the truthmaker for ‘This sample of copper is conductive’, the 
matter is more controversial. Perhaps we need a state of affairs here, a trope, or an object 
                                                 
36Cf. Melnyk 2003: 229, which holds that realism is committed to the view that current scientific hypotheses are 
“true or false in virtue of the way the mind-independent world is”. 
37Cf. Wright: “What, I suggest, scientific realism essentially maintains is, rather, just that (successful) scientific 
theories deal in aspects of reality: that there are aspects of the natural world for whose correct description the 
techniques of concept-formation used by theoretical scientists are indispensable” (1986: 253; cf. his 1992: 158-
159). 
38The tactics of Putnam and Fine would seem to suggest otherwise; their talk of “THE WORLD” (Putnam 1978) 
and “the World” (Fine 1986) is misleading, as if the truthmaker for realism about ‘There is copper’ required 
more than copper. Putnam, recalling footnote 7 of this chapter, seems to think that a noumenal fact is required 
as a truthmaker, whatever that might be. We should not be deterred by the bogies of capitalization and 
italicization, which suggest a hidden meaning not captured by ‘the world’. The world is all that you and I 
believe in, and our belief in it alone is sufficient for realism. 
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under a counterpart relation.39 These familiar truthmaking accounts all rely on mind-
independent entities to serve as truthmakers, and hence they all count as realist. Importantly, 
notice that nominalists and their opponents can disagree with each other about what makes 
such claims about the observable true without sacrificing their overarching realism about the 
observable. Anti-realists about the observable have to take a very different tack. What makes 
it true that there is copper is not the existence of that mind-independent element copper, but 
something else (see Putnam’s suggestions in his quote above). 
Where scientific realism becomes controversial is in the realm of the unobservable. 
Realists maintain the reality of the unobservable world, and commit to it in order to find 
truthmakers for the truths they believe about the unobservable. The truthmakers realists offer 
are of the standard realism-relevant variety: the truthmakers for claims about the 
unobservable are just as mind-independent as are the truthmakers they posit for claims about 
the observable. The realist maintains, in other words, a kind of metaphysical continuity 
between the observable and unobservable. Constructive empiricists accept that same 
metaphysical continuity alongside the realists, and therefore can agree with realists as to what 
it would take to make truths about the unobservable true, if indeed they are. However, on 
epistemological grounds constructive empiricists remain agnostic about the reality of such 
truthmakers, and thus remain agnostic about the truth of the unobservable portions of 
scientific theories.40 They earn their anti-realism by not taking on the metaphysical 
                                                 
39Again, see, respectively, Armstrong 2004, Mulligan, Simons, and Smith 1984, and Lewis 2003. 
40To be more precise, constructive empiricists hold that all that science requires of us when we accept its 
theories is that we believe them to be empirically adequate. But there could be extrascientific reasons for 
believing in the unobservable portions of theories. Constructive empiricists qua scientific thinkers must remain 
agnostic about electrons, but they might renounce such agnosticism for other reasons external to the scientific 
enterprise. 
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commitments that realists take on, even though they are in agreement as to what 
commitments they should take on, if they were epistemologically so inclined. 
Other views about what makes statements about unobservables true, including anti-
realist ones, are possible. What makes other views anti-realist is that they attempt to ground 
the truth of claims about the unobservable in something other than a mind-independent 
unobservable reality. Imagine a kind of phenomenalist who employed what we might call the 
“flight to counterfactuals”: What makes ‘There are electrons’ true is that it’s true that if we 
were to look at a cloud chamber in such-and-such experimental setup, then we would see 
certain kinds of tracks. That counterfactual could in turn be taken as a brute truth, made true 
by nothing at all, or the phenomenalist could attempt a (difficult, to say the least) 
truthmaking story that in turn relied on nothing unobservable.41 The phenomenalist is here 
engaged in a distinctly anti-realist endeavor: trying to maintain truths about the supposed 
unobservable realm without adopting any unobservable ontology. A logical positivist, 
convinced that the very idea of an unobservable object is meaningless, might offer an 
account of what makes the unobservable portions of theories true simply by reference to 
observable objects and properties. Others are more cavalier. The French sociologist Bruno 
Latour argues that because the Egyptian pharaoh Ramses II died long before the 1882 
discovery of the tuberculosis bacillus, he could not have been killed by it, for the bacillus did 
not exist prior to its discovery (1998). Hence, Latour thinks that what makes true 
‘Mycobacterium tuberculosis exist’ is not just the bacterial species, but an event, namely, 
Robert Koch’s discovery of it. As regards its truth, Latour’s view has nothing to recommend 
                                                 
41Perhaps Mill (1865) would offer his “permanent possibilities of sensation” as truthmakers for claims about the 
unobservable. One wonders, though, whether such things are very friendly to empiricism. 
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it. But it is instructive as it offers a very clear competing anti-realist interpretation of what 
makes scientific truths true.42 
As should now be clear, the metaphysical paradigm accurately locates the various 
views concerning scientific realism on the appropriate side of the realism/anti-realism divide. 
Realists are those who take on a commitment to a mind-independent unobservable reality 
that grounds the truth of scientific theories. Constructive empiricists maintain agnosticism 
with respect to such things. Because they do not embrace that reality, constructive empiricists 
are not realists. Other anti-realists may agree with the realists and empiricists about what 
would make true our scientific theories, but exchange the empiricists’ agnosticism for 
atheism: such things do not exist, and so the theories that require them turn out to false (even 
if perhaps useful for other reasons). Here we make room for scientific error theorists and 
fictionalists (e.g., Duhem 1954). 
The other anti-realist option is to offer a competing anti-realist truthmaking account 
for the unobservable portions of scientific theories. Philosophical consensus leans against 
such views nowadays, but they remain theoretical possibilities. One might defend an account 
where the observable realm alone makes true the parts of scientific theories that deal with the 
(supposedly) unobservable. Here we still have an anti-realism about the unobservable for the 
view holds that there are no unobservable entities or properties. Or one might, with the 
phenomenalist, resort to counterfactuals involving possible observable experiences, and take 
those counterfactuals to be brute (true in virtue of nothing at all). Here we again have anti-
realism about the unobservable, because the counterfactuals are grounded in no reality at all, 
and hence no unobservable reality. Or one might offer a deeply mind-dependent account of 
                                                 
42I borrow the example from Boghossian 2006a: 26, which in turn borrows it from Sokal and Bricmont 1998. 
See also Moore’s characterization of William James on “making true” (1907-1908: 70-75). 
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what makes scientific theories true. We saw a gesture in that direction with Latour above. 
Here, we have truths—existential truths, even—made true by anti-realist (i.e., mind-
dependent) things. 
Given some of our earlier discussion in previous chapters, we may also consider a 
final anti-realist contender. So far we have been considering only those views that take the 
truths about the unobservable, if true, to be properly grounded. But we have been at least 
countenancing the possibility of ungrounded truthmaker gaps—truths that express non-
discriminating propositions. On this view, the truths about the unobservable are brute and 
fundamental. Note that this is not the view that the fundamental constituents of reality (sub-
atomic particles, say) are unobservable. Perhaps they are.43 The view is that the truths 
themselves are brute or fundamental. The truth of ‘There are sub-atomic particles’ is not 
fundamental if it’s made true by sub-atomic particles, even if sub-atomic particles are 
themselves fundamental. To treat the truth of ‘There are sub-atomic particles’ as brute is to 
take it not to be made true by anything at all, including, of course, sub-atomic particles. How 
to even express such a view is quite difficult—it seems to hold that ‘There are sub-atomic 
particles’ is true, but that there aren’t any sub-atomic particles. So it looks to be true that 
there are sub-atomic particles, and true that there aren’t any sub-atomic particles. Azzouni 
appreciates the difficulty here with taking existential sentences to be non-discriminating 
truthmaker gaps, and thus employs new semantic resources to distinguish what there is from 
what there really is (2004, 2007).44 Some such view would seem to be required by the 
                                                 
43But see Ladyman, Ross, Spurrett, and Collier 2007. 
44Cameron, by contrast, does not seem to appreciate the difficulty here, and blatantly (though perhaps 
inadvertently) rejects T-sentences at will (2008c). 
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proponent of the brute view of truths about the unobservable, lest they fall straight into 
contradiction. Fully exposed, I doubt the view will attract any adherents.45 
In summary, the basic picture I am painting is that what is at stake between realists 
and anti-realists in the philosophy of science is the kind of metaphysical commitments they 
take on. As before, the notion of a mind-independent reality is important here, as so many in 
the literature are happy to observe. Where the literature goes wrong is in too quickly 
identifying the notion of a mind-independent reality with a correspondence theory of truth, or 
with some sort of pie-in-sky noumenal realm. Realists often make the first mistake, and thus 
find correspondence theories more plausible than they really are.46 Anti-realists often make 
the second mistake, and end up creating straw men for their opponents.47 Recall how Putnam 
(e.g., 1982a) uses ‘metaphysical realism’ to pick out a theory of truth, indeed a 
correspondence account. This semantic slippage has led to an unfortunate state of affairs, 
namely, a philosophical climate that engages realism debates in an explicitly non-neutralist 
way.48 I hereby take back ‘metaphysical realism’ from Putnam, and return to it its most 
natural meaning. Metaphysical realism is—it should have gone without saying—a 
                                                 
45Cf. Kierland and Monton 2007, which takes truths about the past to be brute. For those who employ the 
“cheater catching” lingo, this sort of brutalist view would be a prime target. We have a gigantic body of truths 
to be accounted for, and are shirking it all by taking them all to be primitive. 
46Horwich, admirably, is a very clear thinker on this score, and recognizes how the theory of truth need not be at 
issue here (1996). Few others seem to appreciate the point, and it is here that I hope to make an important 
contribution to the debate. 
47Such are the familiar tactics of Rorty (1972), Putnam (1978, 1981), and Fine (1986). This mistake has been 
well diagnosed, documented, and dismissed. See, for instance, Musgrave 1989 and 1996, Newton-Smith 1989, 
Niiniluoto 1999, and Psillos 1999 and 2000. 
48It has also led to some of the strangest and most misleading philosophical nomenclature I have ever 
encountered. Given how Putnam wields ‘metaphysical realism’, Horwich is forced to describe “the 
commonplace claim concerning some specified class of postulated entities that they really do exist” as 
“epistemological realism” (1982: 181). How a thesis about what really exists that makes no use at all of any 
epistemological concepts came to be labeled ‘epistemological’ is mind-boggling, and certainly offers no help at 
dispelling the confusions made in philosophy and elsewhere between metaphysics and epistemology. See also 
Larry Laudan’s use of ‘convergent epistemological realism’, which as far as I can tell involves no 
epistemological notion at all (1981: 21). 
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metaphysical thesis about reality. It is a thesis about the mind-independence of that reality, 
standing in stark contrast to idealism, pragmatism, verificationism, and the others. In my 
hands, metaphysical realism becomes a thesis about a mind-independent reality that serves to 
make true the truths of a domain. A domain of thought is realist when its constitutive truths 
depend for their truth on a mind-independent reality.49, 50 
 
 
 
                                                 
49I have not yet considered views that take a more piecemeal or “retail” approach to the question of realism even 
inside the philosophy of science (see Psillos 1995: 44, Cartwright 1999, and Kitcher 2001: 152). The proper 
attitude to take about scientific theories might be realist about some corners, and anti-realist or agnostic about 
others. Of course I have no objection to a more subtle approach. The metaphysical paradigm for the question of 
realism on offer here may be writ as large or as small as needs require. I wholly advocate a nuanced approach to 
the topic of realism, and there is no need—except as a presentational convenience—to limit the subtlety of 
one’s cognitive attitudes in the domain of scientific thought. I’ll just note that defining realism in terms of 
truthmakers rather than truth is a more sensible way of taking on such a subtle view, for being a “pluralist” 
about truthmakers is far more plausible than being a pluralist about truth (for everything is a truthmaker, and so 
the domain of truthmakers is as diverse as is your ontology). 
50Perhaps, before moving on, it would be wise to consider one last theoretical position that does not fit neatly 
inside the three paradigms I have canvassed: Wright’s verificationist realist (1986). Wright’s realist accepts an 
epistemically constrained notion of truth, but holds on to the thesis that scientific truths represent the underlying 
structure of the world. Fine would take Wright’s verificationism as definitive of anti-realism, and van Fraassen 
might question whether his verificationist truths count as “literal”. I think a fair reading of Wright’s program 
holds that there are three potential kinds of truth: non-epistemically constrained notions, epistemically 
constrained notions, and deflationary notions. The first, he thinks, leads to skepticism (for all the familiar and—
I would say—tired reasons). The third, he thinks, cannot hold the weight of a realism debate (or may be 
independently untenable, as argued in his 1992). So the second is the only game in town for realism (and here 
Wright goes against the grain by pairing realism and verificationism). We may get off the boat at several 
junctures. Truth is not at issue, so there is no blocking the debate by adopting (the right sort of) deflationism. 
Epistemic notions of truth are independently untenable. And, furthermore, if scientific truths are evidentially 
constrained, then Wright may end up with a distinctly anti-realist account of what makes scientific truths true 
(hence the familiar thought that verificationism and realism don’t mix). Recall that for Wright, epistemically 
constrained truth is superassertible truth (see section 5.2.6). Hence, ‘There are electrons’ is true if and only if 
‘There are electrons’ is, or can be, warranted and some warrant for it would survive arbitrarily close scrutiny of 
its pedigree and arbitrarily extensive increments to or other forms of improvement of our information. What 
grounds such counterfactuals is a question never answered or even noticed. How ‘There are electrons’ gets to be 
warranted in some way conceptually independent of the reality of electrons or the truth of ‘There are electrons’ 
continues to escape me. It also escapes me how such an account can be suitably mind-independent and hence 
realist, given that its truth is now said to depend on our epistemic practices (which again cannot be understood 
in terms of some prior notion of truth). Of course, Wright is well aware of these traditional difficulties, and it is 
a virtue of his work that he tries to meet them. Here I have space only to register my less than optimistic attitude 
about the tenability of his epistemically constrained approach to truth, and to fall back on my earlier work that 
has sought to separate issues about metaphysics from issues about truth. 
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6.4. Truthmaking and structural realism 
Van Fraassen’s new brand of empiricism was instrumental in reviving anti-realist 
interest in the philosophy of science. In the decades since constructive empiricism appeared 
on the scene, structural realism has arisen as a possible, moderate realist alternative.51 Since 
much of the discussion over scientific realism these days centers around structural realism, it 
will be instructive to see how it fits into our truthmaker-based approach to the question of 
realism. 
Structural realism, most prominently defended nowadays by John Worrall and James 
Ladyman, promises to offer the “best of both worlds”: it claims to be able to countenance the 
appeal of the “no miracles” argument in favor of realism while at the same time blocking the 
devastating conclusions of the “pessimistic (meta)induction” argument against realism and 
the anti-realist arguments from radical theory change in scientific revolutions.52 Structural 
realism maintains that despite the radical change to our scientific worldview that occurs 
during scientific revolutions or theory change, something at the level of structure remains 
constant. The structural continuity accounts for the empirical successes for which realists 
demand an explanation; but at the non-structural level, there can be dramatic changes as we 
progress through different theories, which is exactly the historical point long emphasized by 
anti-realists. 
Worrall’s favored example is that of the structural continuity in the competing 
theories of light of Augustine Fresnel and James Clerk Maxwell. Fresnel held a wave theory 
                                                 
51But see van Fraassen 2006b and 2008 for an explicitly anti-realist structuralism about science. 
52See Putnam 1975 for the no miracles argument, Laudan 1981 for the pessimistic induction, and Kuhn 1962 for 
his theory of scientific revolutions. The renewed interest in structural in realism is due to Worrall 1989. Its 
intellectual heritage traces back through Russell (1927) and Herman Weyl (1950) to H. Poincaré (1952). The 
name seems to be due to Maxwell 1970. For defense, see Ladyman 1998 and Ladyman, Ross, Spurrett, and 
Collier 2007. For critical discussion, see Psillos 1995 and 2001 for a realist angle, and van Fraassen 2006b for 
an anti-realist angle. 
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of light, such that light was the result of vibrations of the ether, whereas Maxwell held an 
electromagnetic theory of light that employs fields rather than the ether. Here is Worrall on 
the example: 
There was an important element of continuity in the shift from Fresnel to Maxwell—
and this was much more than a simple question of carrying over the successful 
empirical content into the new theory. At the same time it was rather less than a 
carrying over of the full theoretical content or full theoretical mechanisms (even in 
“approximate” form). And what was carried over can be captured without making the 
very far-fetched assumption of Hardin and Rosenberg [1982] that Fresnel’s theory 
was “really” about the electromagnetic field all along. There was continuity or 
accumulation in the shift, but the continuity is one of form or structure, not of content. 
In fact this claim was already made and defended by Poincaré. And Poincaré used the 
example of the switch from Fresnel to Maxwell to argue for a general sort of syntactic 
or structural realism quite different from the anti-realist instrumentalism which is 
often attributed to him. This largely forgotten thesis of Poincaré’s seems to me to 
offer the only hopeful way of both underwriting the ‘no miracles’ argument and 
accepting an accurate account of the extent of theory change in science. Roughly 
speaking, it seems right to say that Fresnel completely misidentified the nature of 
light, but nonetheless it is no miracle that his theory enjoyed the empirical predictive 
success that it did; it is no miracle because Fresnel’s theory, as science later saw it, 
attributed to light the right structure. (1989: 117) 
 
Here we see clearly that the structural realist relies on a distinction between content and form, 
here presented as a distinction between nature and structure.53 Structure is preserved through 
theory change; what changes with theories is our conception of the nature of that which fits 
into that preserved structure. 
A variety of views exist within the structuralist camp. Ladyman (1998) distinguishes 
between metaphysical and epistemological structuralism. Epistemological structuralists argue 
that all that can be known about the unobservable world is its structure. Here Ladyman 
locates Russell (1927) and Grover Maxwell (1962, 1970). On this view: 
the objective world is composed of unobservable objects between which certain 
properties and relations obtain; but we can only know the properties and relations of 
                                                 
53Psillos 1995 argues that this distinction is problematical for the structural realist who seeks to use it to offer an 
alternative to traditional scientific realism. 
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these properties and relations, that is the structure of the objective world. (Ladyman 
1998: 412). 
 
The modest structuralist, given his epistemological scruples, claims to have evidence for the 
nature of that structure alone, and not for the nature of that which instantiates the structure. 
Here we have the position that Stathis Psillos calls “restrictive structural realism” (2001: 
S18).54 Our interest, of course, is in the metaphysics behind structuralism, which would seem 
to be the dualistic metaphysics of structure and content already presupposed by 
epistemological structuralism. When it comes to the metaphysics about the unobservable, 
structuralists distinguish between its structure, and that which instantiates that structure. 
Ladyman presents the distinction as one between second-order properties and relations and 
first-order properties and relations, but perhaps there are other ways (see Psillos 1995). Now, 
the epistemological structuralists deny knowledge about what it is that instantiates the 
structure of the unobservable on epistemological grounds. A less modest structuralist denies 
knowledge on metaphysical grounds: if there is nothing else to the unobservable besides 
structure, then there is nothing else to be known. Here we have the “ontic structural realism” 
defended by Ladyman and Ross (Ladyman, Ross, Spurrett, and Collier 2007: 130).55 
“Structure is all there is,” as van Fraassen puts it (2006b: 280). 
Given the structuralist’s distinction between structure and what fills in the structure, 
we can now locate the various structuralist views on our map of the realism terrain. If indeed 
the unobservable may be divided into its structure and its non-structure, then there will be 
                                                 
54The view is known as “moderate structuralism” in van Fraassen 2006b: 280 and as “epistemic structural 
realism” in Ladyman, Ross, Spurrett, and Collier 2007. Psillos (1995) attributes it to Worrall, but Ladyman 
(1998) seems to find more metaphysics in Worrall’s view. 
55Psillos calls the view “eliminative structural realism” (2001: S19), whereas van Fraassen calls it “radical 
structuralism” (2006b: 280). Both authors doubt the coherence of the view. What is it for there to be structural 
relations when there is nothing else to be related? See Ladyman, Ross, Spurrett, and Collier 2007 for an 
extensive defense of the view. 
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truths about both. Van Fraassen’s empiricist structuralist does not draw the distinction in any 
ontologically distinguished way; any “knowledge of structure” that he concedes is no 
knowledge at all about the nature (or structure) of the unobservable. Thus, van Fraassen’s 
structuralist, just like his constructive empiricist, takes on no commitments to the truths about 
the unobservable, and hence no commitments to its reality either.56 The epistemic 
structuralist, by contrast, thinks we can add to the knowledge admitted by the empiricist. 
There are truths about the structure of the unobservable that science offers us. Here, in order 
for the view to have some content, it would be nice to have some examples of what those 
truths are. Then, in turn, we can explore what it is that might make those truths true.57 The 
answer will most likely be an account of a mind-independent structure to nature, which is 
why the view is a species of structural realism.58 There is a real structure to nature which is 
discovered by the sciences, and this structure supports the truths about it that we discover. 
Finally, the ontic structuralist is a full bore realist, in the sense that science captures 
all there is to reality; science leaves nothing out. What distinguishes the more traditional 
scientific realist from the ontic structuralist is that the former believes in more: unobservable 
                                                 
56My understanding of van Fraassen’s structuralism is that the role of structure in scientific theorizing is limited 
to the role that models play in our formation of scientific theories. Hence, if I understand him correctly, van 
Fraassen’s “structuralism” doesn’t really go beyond his acceptance of the semantic (model-theoretic) 
conception of scientific theories (1980: 64-69). The empirical phenomena that science seeks to save are 
embedded into models (i.e., structures), and our “knowledge of structure” is just knowledge about these models. 
So I don’t see van Fraassen’s “new” embrace of structuralism as going beyond his original empiricism. 
57A good example may be Fresnel’s equations, which are front and center in Worrall’s discussion (1989: 119; 
see also Psillos 1995: 35-39). The equations, it is claimed, are preserved across theory change, though their 
interpretation changes. What makes these equations true? Here we reach the deep and murky waters of what the 
truthmakers are for laws of nature. Any realist, structuralist or not, who accepts the truth of Fresnel’s laws must 
eventually own up to what it is (if anything) that grounds the truth of the laws. Perhaps it is in accordance with 
structuralist thinking that the truthmakers for truths about structure will actually belong to the realm of the 
unobservable that is non-structural, and hence would be unknowable. If so, then structural realists would not be 
able to believe their own truthmaking accounts for the truths about structure that they accept. As theories 
progress, we abandon our old ideas of what grounds the truth of the theories we accept. 
58Psillos observes that structural realism “admits that scientific theories are either true or false in virtue of a 
reality that exists independently of our theories and is not logically determined by them” (1995: 23). 
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structure and unobservable content. By contrast, the ontic structuralist argues that once 
science captures the structure of the unobservable, it has captured everything. So the ontic 
structuralist is an anti-realist about whatever else it is that realists believe in, and from which 
epistemic structuralists withhold judgment. In sum, ontic and epistemic structuralists are both 
theists about the structure of the unobservable; but whereas the former is an atheist about 
there being any “content” to the unobservable, the latter seems to think there is such content, 
but falls silent on its nature.59 
Just exactly how the metaphysical paradigm fits into the literature on structural 
realism of course depends on how individual views are articulated. But with the paradigm in 
place, we can better understand a particular view (and whether and why it counts as form of 
realism or anti-realism) by asking what it holds true, and what it is, metaphysically speaking, 
that those truths depend on. Consider, for example, this bold claim, due to Ladyman and 
Ross: “There are no things. Structure is all there is” (Ladyman, Ross, Spurrett, and Collier 
2007: 130). This monist metaphysical view obviously must deny the truth of any statement 
requiring the existence of objects (i.e., things), and must fight the uphill battle of relying on 
structure alone to ground the truth of the truths about the world. But so long as that structure 
is mind-independent, we will have a kind of realism, at least about structure. (Presumably the 
view is thoroughly anti-realist and error-theoretic about things.) Other views that subscribe to 
there being more than just structure can use those things as truthmakers; presumably, the 
epistemic structuralist’s revulsion to ontic structuralism can be understood in part as 
bafflement about how structure alone could provide sufficient ontological grounds for all that 
which we take to be true of the world. Even if we cannot know about unobservable things, 
                                                 
59Here we seem to have a view parallel to Demea’s and Philo’s in Hume’s Dialogues concerning Natural 
Religion. God is said to exist, but we are unable to say anything about his nature. Here we have a kind of theism 
about God’s existence mixed with agnosticism about his nature. 
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the instinct of the epistemic structural realist is that there must at least be such things. 
Otherwise, too many of the truths we learn from science will go ungrounded. 
All told, the topic of structural realism fits well within our metaphysical paradigm for 
exploring the question of scientific realism, for its metaphysical interests are readily visible. 
The distinction between structure (form) and nature (content) is ontological in nature, and the 
various views diverge with respect to whether everything there is to the unobservable falls to 
one side, or with whether both sides are (possibly) populated. The ontic structuralist takes the 
former path, arguing that structure is all there is, and that science gives us knowledge about it. 
The epistemic structuralist is more cautious, and presumably believes in an unobservable 
nature to things, though that nature is forever beyond our epistemic reach. Both sides grant 
the truth to claims about the structure of the unobservable realm, and in so doing oblige 
themselves to offer a distinctly metaphysical account of what it is that underpins those truths. 
The ontic structuralist here may resort to structure and structure alone, whereas the epistemic 
structuralist may have to plead ignorance, if, for example, the truthmakers for claims about 
the unobservable structure turn out to be part of the nature of the unobservable. Of course, if 
one is unwilling to acknowledge the reality of a realm of truthmakers, one should be hesitant 
to commit to the truth of truths that one suspects are made true by them (and them alone).60 I 
am not sure how actual structuralists might approach these truthmaking questions, but I hope 
that at least I have presented them clearly, and shown why it is important for theorists to 
consider and, ultimately, answer them. 
 
 
                                                 
60To illustrate, imagine someone who, like Mackie, thought that moral judgments could only be made true by 
something like Platonic forms. It would be highly cognitively tenuous to continue upholding the truth of moral 
claims while remaining agnostic about the forms. 
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6.5. Conclusion 
This chapter has suggested that we can reach a better understanding of what is at 
stake in the debate over scientific realism by viewing it through the lens of truthmaker theory. 
The positive results were as follows. First, we saw how Fine’s characterization of the realism 
debate puts all the theoretical weight on the theory of truth, which is a weight it cannot and 
should not have to bear. Fine’s interest in truth is misplaced; what his non-realist really needs 
to do is not abandon the theory of truth, but the theory of truthmaking. Once this correction is 
in place, though, Fine’s favored position becomes far less attractive. Second, while seeing 
how van Fraassen’s epistemological interests in the debate ultimately run orthogonal to our 
more metaphysical concerns, we have seen how his account of realism and anti-realism can 
benefit from shedding the linguistic notion of “literal truth” and adopting instead the position 
that the realist believes in realism-indicative truthmakers. This characterization is thoroughly 
metaphysical, and abandons the last vestige of semantics in van Fraassen’s account. Finally, 
we articulated a thoroughly metaphysical understanding of what is at stake in scientific 
realism, and applied that understanding to the now thriving debate over structural realism. 
Perhaps my account can go some way at convincing those who are skeptical (e.g., Blackburn 
2002b) that the realism debate in the philosophy of science is live and well.61 
                                                 
61I imagine that some of the figures I have here engaged—in particular van Fraassen and Ladyman—will be 
unmoved by the thought that their philosophy of science will be helpfully supplemented by my discussion of 
truthmaking. Both philosophers are highly skeptical of the significance of such “metaphysical” inquiry (where 
‘metaphysical’ is taken to be a derogatory term). I maintain that my concern for truthmaking is the result of 
trying to come to terms with the notion of ontological grounding, which I believe to be a basic and familiar 
notion, so much so that it finds its way into the discussion without anyone noticing. (For instance, Fine seems to 
be thinking about truthmaking all the time, though he articulates these thoughts in terms of correspondence 
theory. Van Fraassen must also have some realist sense of truthmaking in mind; if not, it would be baffling why 
he sees realism inside his characterization of realism.) In a sense, I don’t think we need to add truthmaking to 
the discussion of scientific realism—it’s already there, implicit in the practice. That van Fraassen is suspicious 
of any metaphysics incompatible with nominalism is fine as far as my project is concerned. The nominalist has 
a place in the truthmaking framework; he is a brother metaphysician. On the nominalist’s view, all truths are 
grounded in particular, non-abstract (in the “Harvard” sense) objects. Ladyman would be suspicious of any 
metaphysical labor being performed by metaphysicians that goes beyond what is performed by physicists and 
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Though we cannot explore such topics now, there remain plenty of fruitful avenues 
for truthmaking research in the philosophy of science. Philosophers of science are engaged in 
a number of important metaphysical investigations, many of which could be aided by some 
clear-headed thinking about the nature of truthmaking. Here I have in mind topics such as the 
laws of nature, causation, dispositions, counterfactuals, and chance. What, for example, is it 
in the world that makes the laws of nature true? Perhaps it is second-order relations between 
universals (Dretske 1977, Tooley 1977, Armstrong 1983). Perhaps the laws are 
discriminating truthmaker gaps that supervene on the Humean mosaic of facts (Lewis 1973). 
Perhaps the laws are made true by the truth of certain brute counterfactuals (Lange 2009). 
Tim Maudlin takes the laws themselves (or, perhaps better, the “lawmakers”) to be brute 
(2007; cf. Carroll 1994).62 Again, these views are all familiar, and can be argued for and 
against independently of any explicit attention to truthmaker theory. However, one of my 
overall proposals is that thinking about truthmakers is a useful way of understanding and 
regimenting metaphysical debates. Truthmaker theory can help us understand a little better 
just what the debate is about when it comes to, say, the laws of nature, and where it is their 
truth (or, moreover, their lawhood) comes from.63 Similar remarks can be made for causation 
(What makes it true that C causes E?), counterfactuals (What makes it true that if I were to 
release this pen, it would fall to the floor?), dispositions (What makes it true that glass is 
brittle?), and chance (What makes it true that the half-life of this atom is what it is?). Ideas 
                                                 
philosophers of physics. So be it. On his view, we can understand the proper ontological grounds for truth by 
attending to physics and physics alone. His is a view about how we should go about accounting for what makes 
our theories true, not a rejection of the enterprise. 
62Maudlin thinks of laws as entities (to be contrasted with statements of law), and that they are metaphysically 
primitive (brute, fundamental): “I suggest we accept laws as fundamental entities in our ontology” (2007: 18). 
The distinction between laws thought of as things that are true versus as things that make true is just one 
example of an idea that can be more adroitly handled with an eye toward truthmaker theory. 
63Note that Tooley 1977 and Carroll 1987 employ the language of truthmaking. See also the suggestive title of 
Lange 2009. 
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about truthmaking are alive and well when it comes to these topics, even when they are not 
fully explicit. (They certainly are explicit in Armstrong’s discussion of them, particularly in 
his 1997 and 2004.) It is my contention, shared by Armstrong, that we can approach these 
topics in the philosophy of science more thoughtfully and precisely when we are equipped 
with a sophisticated theory of truthmaking.
 
Conclusion 
In this dissertation, I have tried to accomplish three distinct tasks. I have put forward 
a novel approach to truthmaker theory, and then put that approach to work by helping further 
the debates regarding the nature of truth and realism. My approach to truthmaking is 
distinguished from the others in the literature on two counts. First, I advocate a notion of 
truthmaking that applies only to synthetic truths; I think the notion of an analytic truth is such 
that its truth is nowise grounded in the nature of the world. The truth of analyticities does not 
depend on the things that exist, and the properties they have. Second, rather than starting with 
a particular doctrine about which truths have truthmakers, I have adopted a more 
methodological approach to truthmaking. Instead of assuming that all truths (even all 
synthetic truths) have truthmakers, I suggest that we proceed on the assumption that truths 
have truthmakers, and pull back from that assumption if the individual case warrants it. As 
such, my account of truthmaking has a degree of flexibility unavailable to other approaches; 
it also enables the possibility of offering ontological grounds for truths that may not have 
truthmakers. As I hope to have shown, embracing the existence of truthmaker gaps is not yet 
any compromise to the most important insights underlying truthmaker theory. 
Having developed my approach to truthmaker theory, I then attempted to identify, 
diagnose, and put to rest one of the most pervasive and pernicious assumptions held by many 
in the literature on truthmaking (and by many outside it). That is the assumption that 
truthmaker theory is a theory about the nature of truth, or even a kind of correspondence 
theory of truth. This conflation is understandable, for one way of understanding 
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correspondence theories is as trying to combine an account of the nature of truth with a 
(rather flat-footed) account of truthmakers. But these tasks may be separated, and 
contemporary accounts of truthmaking cannot be understood as theories of truth. As a result, 
truthmaker theory is fully consistent with deflationary theories of truth, and serves to 
undermine correspondence theories of truth by doing their job even better. The fundamental 
insight that has led many to think that correspondence is the natural, correct view of truth—
that truths depend upon the world—is far better served by a sophisticated theory of 
truthmaking. 
Getting clear on the relationship between truth and truthmaking was crucial for the 
subsequent discussion of the nature of realism, for realism has often been understood in 
terms of truth. But realism debates are better understood in terms of truthmaking rather than 
truth. Realism involves taking truths to be grounded in realism-relevant reality, where what 
counts as being relevant to realism may vary from domain to domain; one abandons realism 
by abandoning the relevant truths, or taking those truths to be grounded in something less—
something mind-dependent, say, or perhaps nothing at all. 
With the truthmaking paradigm to realism in place, we saw that, when it comes to the 
metaethical question of realism, quasi-realists have the best story in town. When it comes to 
the question of scientific realism, we saw how framing the issue in terms of truthmaking 
brings out how other approaches to scientific realism are fundamentally flawed. Much of the 
action in the realism debate in the philosophy of science turns on epistemic arguments on 
which we have remained neutral; that we haven’t advanced the argument supports our 
framing of the issue, however, for it simply reflects the near universal consensus about what 
ontological story we should believe to ground our best theories, if indeed we should choose 
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to believe those theories. The remaining live debate between scientific realists and structural 
realists easily fits into our mold. 
Those familiar with the truthmaking industry will have noticed a sizable lacuna with 
respect to some of those topics that are the bread and butter of truthmaker theory. Do 
negative truths require truthmakers? Are states of affairs or tropes required for truthmaker 
theory, or can we make do with less? These topics are well covered, and I admit that I do not 
have any particularly novel contribution to add to the discussion of such questions at this 
time. I have expressed my sympathy with Lewis’s (2001b) approach to truthmaking that frees 
us from finding truthmakers for predications and negatives (or, alternatively, using objects 
under counterpart relations as truthmakers for such truths), but I have not argued for the 
superiority of his view over those of other theorists such as Armstrong, Lowe, and Schaffer. 
(Or for its superiority over the view of the Lewis of Lewis 2003 for that matter!) 
Further work is, of course, needed, and I here register my hope that our extensive 
methodological explorations can at least contribute to the project of answering the more basic 
truthmaking questions that I have set aside for present purposes. For one thing, we were led, 
in conjunction with the potentially paradoxical Milne sentences to reconsidering whether 
truthmaker theory had anything to say regarding analytic truth. This topic—crucial to 
understanding how wide the scope of truthmaking is—deserves much more investigation that 
the preliminary pages I have contributed. 
In attempting to extend truthmaker theory to new philosophical territory, I have of 
course had to limit the scope of the topics I discuss. I chose to tackle the realism debates in 
metaethics and the philosophy of science, but the general approach could be carried over to 
the philosophy of math, logic, modality, and aesthetics. Some of these topics are more 
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heavily covered by truthmaker theorists than others—math and modality have received 
substantial coverage from Armstrong (1989a, 1997, 2000, 2003, 2004, 2007), but the truths 
of logic and aesthetics have received scant attention. Such topics—as well as the topics 
relevant to the philosophy of science that I adumbrated in the conclusion to the last chapter—
deserve further truthmaking treatment. 
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